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Abstract
FRENCH POLICY TOWARDS TUNISIA AND MOROCCO:
THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF DECOLONISATION, 1950-1956
This thesis deals with French decolonisation policy towards Tunisia and Morocco 
and international impacts on the decolonisation process. It is very important to deal 
with the two countries at the same time, because nationalist movements in each 
country and French policy responses were closely related.
So far, research on French decolonisation has examined the reason why France was 
forced to retreat from their overseas territories and indicated that nationalist and 
international pressures largely contributed to this process. This thesis rather aims to 
clarify how the French tried to maintain their influence in Tunisia and Morocco. In 
terms of international impact, the existing research has stressed the role of American 
pressure towards decolonisation but has not referred to British policy. The thesis also 
focuses on Britain’s role in determining French attitudes especially in the UN. 
Furthermore, this work aims to locate the decolonisation process of both countries in a 
broader context of post-war French policy towards their overseas territories.
The thesis argues that the French accepted Tunisia’s internal autonomy because they 
realised that the Tunisian people’s consent was essential to retain influence. Hitherto, 
the French had been controlling Tunisia through puppet governments, which had been 
legitimised by the Tunisian sovereign’s traditional authority. Now the French 
understood that they had to secure collaborators who could rally popular support.
The thesis also argues that the French decision on Morocco’s independence was 
aimed at preserving the unity of Morocco, whose opinion had been seriously divided. 
Indeed, France was aiming to produce pro-French moderate nationalism, thereby 
maintaining France’s interest and influence. However, Morocco, and then Tunisia 
achieved independence without the framework of the French Union, the organisation 
grouping French overseas territories. Soon after Morocco’s independence, France 
decided to give internal autonomy to the African territories, a move which paved the 
way to those territories’ independence.
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Introduction
The Aim of the Thesis and Historiography
This thesis examines the decolonisation process of Tunisia and Morocco. They were 
French protectorate states in North Africa and obtained French recognition of their 
independence in March 1956. France dealt with them as sister countries, and in fact, 
nationalist movements in each country developed hand in hand. There are not many 
works that pay primary attention to Tunisia and Morocco, arguably because of the 
predominance of works on the Algerian war. However, the fact that the two countries 
did not experience wars during their decolonisation process suggests that they are more 
appropriate cases in which to examine France’s diplomatic activities. Indeed, 
epitomised by the Algerian and Indochinese wars, French decolonisation policy is 
sometimes notorious for its oppressive character, especially in comparison with British 
decolonisation policy. However, what is interesting to note is that the two countries 
achieved independence before Ghana gained independence from Britain in March 1957 
as the first of Britain’s colonies in Africa. It can be argued that France had adopted a 
more liberal decolonisation policy by March 1956 and that the independence of Tunisia 
and Morocco marked a major turning-point in the history of decolonisation in Africa.
The existing research on these countries’ decolonisation process can be categorised 
into two groups: the first puts the principal focus on bilateral relations, either between 
France and Tunisia, or France and Morocco. The second category, which can be found 
among more recent works, puts emphasis on international influences and US pressure in 
particular. Among the first category, Charles-Andre Julien’s work is a classic and 
comprehensive explanation of the decolonisation of North African countries including 
Algeria.1 Stdphane Bernard’s book traces the detail of Franco-Moroccan relations 
towards independence.2 On the whole, the studies that had been done before primary 
sources were declassified tend to describe the decolonisation process of the two 
countries in bilateral terms, and therefore to focus on the role of nationalist pressure. 
The works of the second category assert that the US pressurised France to give self- 
government to the Tunisians and Moroccans, either in the United Nations (hereafter 
UN) or through bilateral diplomatic channels, and sometimes refer to French suspicions
1 Julien, Charles-Andrd, L ’Afrique du Nord en Marche: Nationalismes Musulmans et Souverainete 
Franqais, (Paris: Rend Julliard, 1972).
2 Stdphane Bernard, Le Conjlit Franco-Marocain 1943-1956, (Bruxelles: l’Universitd Libre de Bruxelles, 
1963). Translated by Marianna Oliver et al., The Franco-Moroccan Conflict 1943-7956, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1968).
that the US might have wanted France to be driven out from North Africa in order to 
make the local economy open to US products. Annie Lacroix-Riz’s book, Samya El 
Mechat’s works and Martin Thomas’s study fall into the second group.3 Thomas’s other 
study focuses on UN pressure on French decolonisation policy towards North Africa.4
Thus the existing research has mainly examined the reasons why French influence 
retreated from North Africa. There is no doubt that both nationalist activities and 
international opinion played significant roles in the French retreat. Two decisions of the 
French government marked a significant diminution in French influence, i.e. the 
decision to allow Tunisia internal autonomy in July 1954 and that on Morocco’s 
independence in November 1955. However, despite these retreats, it must be 
emphasised that Tunisia and Morocco remain pro-French countries even today. This 
thesis therefore poses a different question from that of the existing research: namely, in 
what way did the French try to maintain their influence in both countries, when they 
were resisting nationalist and international pressures? In fact, it was this concern to try 
to minimise the loss of influence that determined the timing of the above decisions.
In answering this question, this study firstly examines why the French kept ignoring 
nationalist demands and international opinion until July 1954. Indeed, this was related 
to the French Union, an organisation which post-war French decolonisation policy was 
initially based on, and which previous research does not mention. Secondly, the thesis 
analyses the reason why the French decided to allow Tunisia internal autonomy, at a 
time when the authority of the Bey, Tunisia’s sovereign, was being attacked by Tunisian 
nationalists. Why did this campaign lead the French to take the decision to accept 
Tunisia’s internal autonomy? In addition, the thesis examines why this decision was 
accepted by the nationalists and international opinion. Thirdly, this study investigates to 
what extent and in which sense international opinion affected the decolonisation process 
of Tunisia and Morocco. Indeed, as shown below, international opinion was not 
unanimous in calling for the two countries’ independence before 1956. What the US 
was calling for was the introduction of self-government in the two countries and, above
3 Annie Lacroix-Riz, Les Protect orats d'AJrique du Nord entre la France et Washington, Marocet 
Tunisie 1942-1956, (Editions L’Harmattan, Paris, 1988); Samya El Mechat, Tunisie, Les Chemins vers 
I ’Independance (1945-1956), (Paris, L’Harmattan, 1992); Samya El Machat, Les Etats-Unis et la 
Tunisie : de Vambigulte a Ventente, 1945-1959, (Paris; L'Harmattan, 1997); Samya El Machat, Les Etats- 
Unis et le Maroc : le Choix Strategique, 1945-1959, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1997); Martin Thomas, 
“Defending a Lost Cause? France and the United States Vision of Imperial Rule in French North Africa, 
1945-1956”, Diplomatic History, Vol.26, No.2 (Spring 2002). El Mechat’s Tunisie, Les Chemins mainly 
focuses on relations between the Tunisian nationalists and the Arab League.
4 Martin Thomas, ‘France Accused: French North Africa before the United Nations, 1952-1962’,
Contemporary European History, vol. 10 part 1, 2001. Connelly emphasises the role of international
opinion in Algerian independence process. Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria's Fight
fo r  Independence and the Origins o f  the Post-Cold War Era, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
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all, Britain on the whole supported the French position in the UN, a point which most 
previous research on North African affairs failed to underline.5 Britain did not agree to 
oppressive French decolonisation policy, but nevertheless supported their position. 
Fourthly, why did France decide to grant Morocco independence, which was not 
necessarily what the majority of international opinion had requested France to do? 
Furthermore, shortly before this French decision, Moroccan opinion was seriously 
divided, and the nationalist forces who demanded the country’s independence were not 
dominant. There is a related puzzle to be solved: why was Morocco’s independence 
decided upon before that of Tunisia, who had gained internal autonomy first? Lastly, the 
thesis examines how both countries’ independence affected French decolonisation 
policy as a whole.
As two countries are dealt with, the thesis is not organised in a chronological fashion. 
However, political developments in each country will be explained chronologically and 
the order of the chapters is so arranged as to clarify the interaction between the two 
countries’ affairs. The distinction between the terms ‘internal autonomy’, or ‘autonomie 
interne’ in French, and ‘self-government’ is important. The French used ‘autonomie 
interne’ in two ways, and both of them were crucially different from the Anglo-Saxon 
term ‘self-government’. Firstly, until July 1954, the French repeatedly stated that they 
intended to lead Tunisia and Morocco to ‘autonomie interne’ but actually they had no 
intention of giving them any kind of autonomy. Secondly, the internal autonomy to 
which the French started to commit themselves in Tunisia after July 1954 had much 
substance, but it still had no logical connection with future independence. In contrast, 
‘self-government’ in British colonies always had the likelihood of leading to 
independence. In relation to this, French plans before July 1954 will sometimes be 
referred to as ‘reform plans’ in accordance with French insistence, although they were 
in fact not aimed at introducing greater autonomy to local people and therefore it is very 
difficult to call those plans ‘reform’. However, for the sake of convenience, the French 
plans prior to July 1954 will be referred to as such from time to time, because other 
Western governments including the US government also called them reform plans.
5 Although Martin Thomas’s The French North African Crisis; Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French
Relations, 1945-62 (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 2000), focuses mainly on Algerian independence, this
is the only work which sheds light on Anglo-French relations over North African affairs.
Background History
Tunisia became a French protectorate when the Treaty of Bardo was concluded on 12 
May 1888. This treaty allowed France to control certain geographical areas under the 
guise of re-establishing order and protecting the Bey from internal opposition, and also 
allowed French diplomatic agents to protect Tunisian interests in foreign countries. 
Then the Convention of Marsa of 8 June 1883 gave France a right to intervene in 
Tunisia’s domestic affairs. Morocco became a protectorate as a result of the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Fez on 30 March 1912. This Treaty gave France the right to occupy 
certain parts of Morocco under the guise of re-establishing order and protecting the 
Sultan, the sovereign, from internal opposition, and also to intervene in domestic affairs. 
The Treaty of Fez also provided that only the French Resident-General was capable of 
representing Morocco in foreign countries.6 Thus the two countries lost almost all 
autonomy not only in external but also internal affairs and were to be governed by 
Resident-Generals, the French representatives. The Resident-Generals had strong 
powers to formulate specific plans, the outline of which was decided by Paris, and to 
make decisions on the methods by which to negotiate with local representatives. Tunisia 
and Morocco would henceforward absorb a great number of settlers from European 
countries and mainly from France, but for the most part Tunisia remained an Arabic 
country and Morocco Arabic and Berber.
The fact that France made Tunisia and Morocco protectorate states led to several 
important consequences. Firstly, France started to commit itself to modernising the two 
countries. Under the French protectorate regime, both countries were to be equipped 
with certain modem political institutions like the Grand Council in Tunisia and the 
Government Council in Morocco. However, the real French aim was to institutionalise 
the rights and interests of French settlers. Secondly, unlike Algeria, both countries did 
not become France’s departments and preserved indigenous state machinery. The 
sovereigns of the two countries retained the right to sign the decrees, called dahirs, 
which were submitted by the Resident-Generals. This was an important right, because 
in the post-World War II era, it enabled both sovereigns to resist French attempts to 
impose their projects on their countries. Thirdly, as a certain indigenous hierarchy 
remained, the French had fewer difficulties in finding a group or an individual to whom 
they would be able to transfer power in the future decolonisation process than in the 
Algerian case. This partly explains why the two countries’ decolonisation process was 
not to be as violent as Algeria’s.
6 For the text of these agreements’, see the Appendix.
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After 1881, France moved into key positions at all levels of government in Tunisia 
while carefully maintaining a semblance of Tunisian rule but forcing the Tunisian prime 
minister to have a French adviser. The process of French infiltration continued as the 
commander of the French occupation forces became minister of war in the Tunisian 
government. In the provinces, caids, who were the head of each tribe, held a semi­
independent status, but a system of French civil controllers was established in 1884 who 
introduced central government supervision over the caids.1 Overall, the French 
protectorate met no serious opposition from the Tunisians.8
Undoubtedly encouraged by US President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points of 
1918 which referred to national self-determination, the Destour party, or le Parti 
Liberal Constitutionnel, was established in Tunisia in February 1920. The party 
demanded the termination of the protectorate but did not exclude negotiations with 
France.9 In April 1922, Nanceur Bey demanded a constitutional guarantee for the 
Tunisian people, but was forced to withdraw this request by the French Resident- 
General.10 This event prompted the French authorities to react in two ways: firstly, the 
French government started to encourage the emigration of French people to Tunisia. 
Secondly, in July 1922, the French decided to establish the Grand Council at the 
national level and the Conseil des Caidat at local levels.11 This represented French 
concessions in the sense that now the Tunisians were allowed to voice their opinion in 
making decrees, but both types of assemblies were consultative in character. In March 
1934, the Destour party broke up into the Neo-Destour and the Vieux-Destour. The 
former recruited its members mostly from moderate intellectuals, while the latter did so 
from the religious bourgeoisie. Led by Habib Bourguiba, the Neo-Destour tended to be 
moderate but the Vieux tended to be radical, putting more emphasis on pan-Arab 
solidarity.12 Especially after World War II, the Neo-Destour was inclined to seek 
independence through negotiations with the French whereas the Vieux-Destour came to 
denounce the Neo-Destour for close collaboration with the French.13
7 Dwight L. Ling, Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic, (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 
1966), pp.50-55.
8 Ibid., p.67.
9 Roger Stlphane, La Tunisie de Bourguiba, (Paris: Plon, 1958), p.72. ‘Destour’ means constitution.
10 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, Mon Oeuvre, 1952-1956,(Paris: Plon, 1987), p.327.
11 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.385, Note relative aux Conseils de Caidat, undated. Caidat meant 
prefectures. The Grand Council held an ordinary session each year to examine the budget, and one or 
several sessions to express its opinion on the legislative decrees in the financial, economic and social 
fields, which the Tunisian government submitted. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Note sur les 
rdformes en Tunisie depuis la Guerre, 1.2.1952; Ibid., Note pour le Ministre, 8.5.1950.
12 Julien, L ’Afrique du Nord, pp.74-76.
13 Ling, Tunisia, pp. 139-144.
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Unlike in Tunisia, the Sultan’s agreement to establish the protectorate in Northern 
Morocco did not mean a French conquest of the whole territory. France wasted no time 
in penetrating into Southern Morocco, populated mostly by the Berbers, and started the 
suppression of the opposition through military operations called pacification. In this 
process, the French authorities distributed the captured lands to warlords who 
collaborated with them. The French appointed them as pashas and caids, with almost a 
free hand in each area,14 and armed these tribal overlords with modem weapons.15 There 
were four phases of pacification: the first was 1912-1914, intended to subjugate an area 
called bled Maghzen, which had traditionally been under the Sultan’s control. The 
second was to subjugate the Middle Atlas from 1914 to 1920, and the third was to 
suppress the Rif rebels, an armed revolt led by Abd al-Krim which lasted from 1921 to 
1925.16 The final stage lasted from 1930 to 1934, which conquered the High Atlas, the 
Anti-Atlas and the edge of the Sahara. The conquest of Southern Morocco did not 
destroy its feudal social structure which was based on tribes. Si T’hami el-Glaoui, Pasha 
of Marrakech and the head of these Berber tribes, was at the top of this structure with 
enormously concentrated power.17 Importantly, French troops in Morocco were 
recruited among the Berber people. This was indeed a classic example of French ‘divide 
and rule’ policy,18 because the French greatly helped el-Glaoui to establish his own 
position with the purpose of making him a counterforce to the Sultan. As a part of this 
policy, the Berber dahir had been issued in May 1930, in which the Berber populations 
were administratively divided from the Arab ones, and were allowed to be governed by 
their own customary tribunals and courts of appeal instead of the Islamic shari’a 
courts.19 In other words, this dahir was meant to drive a wedge between the Arabs and 
the Berbers, thereby facilitating French control. This aroused harsh opposition from the 
Arab population, and marked an awakening of Arab nationalism in Morocco.20
After the outbreak of World War II and France’s surrender, Vichy France and the 
Gaullist France were subject to international pressure for the liberation of their colonies, 
as the Atlantic Charter in July 1941 stated the Anglo-American wish ‘to see sovereignty
14 Gavin Maxwell, Lords o f the Atlas; the Rise and Fall o f the House o f  Glaoua, 1896-1956, (London: 
Centuiy Publishing Co. Ltd., 1983), p. 136.
15 Ibid., p. 155.
16 Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, (London: Longman, 1996), p.7.
17 Two or three villages formed a sub-faction, and several sub-factions a canton. Then two or three 
cantons composed a tribe. Maxwell, Lords, pp. 139-143.
18 Foreign Relations o f the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1952-1954, XI, pp.131-142. Memorandum for 
the NSC Senior Staff, 12.9.1952.
19 http://www.c3.hu/scripta/scripta0/replika/honlap/english/02/02silver.htm. accessed on 20 September 
2005.
20 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 10-11.
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and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.’21 On 
30 May 1942, the Soviet Union approved the principle of putting all the European 
colonies under international supervision. Faced with violent protests from the British, 
however, the US suggested at the conferences of Cairo and Teheran that an international 
trusteeship be applied only to the French colonies.22 These developments made the 
French suspicious that the Anglo-Americans might intend to eject France from its 
overseas territories. This suspicion was to be strengthened by the events of the summer 
of 1945 when French troops would be forced to withdraw from Syria and Lebanon by 
the British.23
After Anglo-American forces landed in North Africa in November 1942, US 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt gave a dinner party in January 1943 in honour of Sidi 
Mohammed Ben Youssef (Mohammed V), the Moroccan Sultan, in Anfa, in the suburbs 
of Casablanca.24 There was a rumour that Roosevelt promised the Sultan independence, 
but irrespective of whether the US promise of independence was true or not, this event 
was bound to encourage nationalist sentiment. The awakening of Arab nationalism 
culminated in the establishment of the Istiqlal, the largest nationalist party in Morocco, 
on 10 December 1943 with Allal el-Fassi as President and Ahmed Balafrej as Secretary- 
General. It issued a manifesto reclaiming Morocco’s independence, to the Sultan, the 
French, the British and the Americans on 11 January 1944.25 This act angered the 
French authorities in Morocco, who arrested the Istiqlal leaders. Significantly, soon 
after its foundation, the party already aimed to attract international support to the 
nationalist cause.
The Comite frangaise de Liberation nationale opened the Brazzaville Conference on 
30 January 1944, under the chair of Charles de Gaulle to ‘determiner sur quelles bases 
pratiques pourrait etre progressivement fondle une communautd fran9aise englobant les 
territoires d’Afrique noire.’26 However, its result turned out to be very disappointing for 
the nationalists. The Brazzaville recommendations stated: ‘the objectives of the work of 
civilisation accomplished by France in the colonies exclude any idea of autonomy, any 
possibility of evolution outside the French imperial bloc; the constitution of ‘self-
21 http://usinfo.state.gov/usa/infousa/facts/democrac/53.htm. accessed on 11 October 2005.
22 Charles-Robert Ageron, France coloniale ou parti colonial?, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1978), p.276.
23 Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making o f Postwar France, 1945-1954, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.32-33.
24 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 15.
25 Ibid., pp. 19-20. The Russians also received this manifesto through their ambassador at Algiers. 
‘Istiqlal’ means independence.
26 Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs, Vol. II, Unity, 1942-1944, (Paris: Plon, 1956), quoted in Charles- 
Robert Ageron, France coloniale ou parti colonial?, p.276.
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governments’ [sic] in the colonies, even in the distant future, is to be excluded’.27 
Indeed, this position was to constitute the original framework of French policy towards 
their overseas territories, not only in Black Africa but also in North Africa in the post­
war era.
After the liberation of Paris in August 1944, the Comite frangaise de Liberation 
nationale implemented a series of reforms in Tunisia in February 1945 so that the 
population in North Africa should not be alienated. The composition of the Tunisian 
cabinet was modified, but even the most moderate Arabic journal did not accept that 
this was a reform sufficient to get the Tunisian people into the higher ranks of their own 
government. The Tunisians reacted in two ways. First, The Neo-Destour decided to 
send its own leader Habib Bourguiba to Cairo, where he clandestinely arrived by an 
American aeroplane in April 1945 28 He was to appeal to international and Arab opinion 
through the Arab League, which had been founded in March 1945 and whose original 
goal was Arab unity.29 Second, on 22 February 1945, the various Tunisian parties 
published ‘the manifesto of the Tunisian front’ which reclaimed Tunisia’s internal 
autonomy under the regime of a constitutional monarchy.
In September 1945, the Grand Council of Tunisia was reorganised into the French and 
Tunisian sections, each of them consisting of fifty-three members. The French section 
was elected indirectly by French adults through universal suffrage, and the Tunisian 
section was elected separately through a double college system.31 Dissatisfied 
nationalists including both the Neo-Destour and the Vieux-Destour clandestinely 
gathered in August 1946 in Tunis and advocated Tunisia’s independence. Salah ben 
Youssef, who was the Neo-Destour’s Secretary-General and leader during Bourguiba’s 
absence, took the initiative in this gathering. Indeed, this was the first time in which a 
meeting of nationalists from all classes in Tunisia proclaimed the country’s 
independence.32
In France, the Constituent Assembly accepted the Constitution of the French Republic
27 La Conference Africaine Franfaise, Algiers 1944, quoted in Edward Mortimer, France and the 
Africans 1944-1960; A political history, (London; Faber and Faber Limited, 1969), p.51.
2 El Mechat, Les Chemins, pp. 15-54.
29 Tawfig Y. Hasou, The Struggle fo r the Arab World; Egypt’s Nasser and the Arab League, (London: 
KPI Limited, 1985), Introduction.
30 In May 1945, the UGTT (Union G6n£rale du Travail Tunisien) was created and attracted almost all 
Tunisian workers. Under its leader, Ferhat Hached, the UGTT was to succeed in getting the Neo-Destour 
to take into consideration social problems. Louis P6rillier, La Conquete de L ’Independance Tunisienne, 
(Paris: Robert Laffont, 1979), pp.55-56.
31 Julien, L 'Ajfique du Nord, p. 160.
32 El Mechat, Les Chemins, p.80.
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on 13 October 1946. This provided the structure of the French Union under Title VIII.33 
Reflecting the spirit of the Brazzaville Conference, the French still had no intention of 
granting internal autonomy to their overseas territories.34 The Union consisted of 
Metropolitan France, overseas departments, overseas territories on the one hand and 
associated states and associated territories on the other. As central organs, the Union 
had the High Council and the Assembly but both were consultative, not legislative. 
Article 65 provided that the High Council functioned to assist the French government in 
general management of the Union. The French said that this article in practice meant 
assistance in the fields of economics, diplomacy and defence, but in reality, the Council 
represented strong control exerted by Paris. The Assembly was designed to give a voice 
to overseas territories in drawing up legislation directly affecting their areas.35 All the 
constituent territories and associate states of the French Union sent representatives to 
the Assembly, but the associate states were also allowed to send delegations to the 
Council. The French Union was thus a highly centralised organisation unlike the British 
Commonwealth. However, the two North African protectorate states did not participate 
in the Council or the Assembly, because the Bey and the Sultan refused to join the 
Union and Tunisia and Morocco were not associate states. Thus Tunisia and Morocco 
were a very big deviation from post-war French policy towards their overseas territories 
and, hence, securing the two countries’ membership became France’s primary goal. 
Although the French Union primarily consisted of Black African territories, this 
organisation would greatly affect French policy towards North Africa.
In February 1946, the liberal-minded Eirik Labonne had been appointed as Resident- 
General in Rabat, and el-Fassi and Balafrej were released soon after that. Then Labonne 
announced his own reform plan, which had political, economic, and social aspects.36 
However, the Istiqlal publicly opposed these reforms in July 1946, and started trying to 
win the Sultan over to its side. In a letter to Mohammed V, charging that the Labonne 
plan ‘consolidated the bases of a colonialist policy’, Balafrej demanded the constitution 
of an authentic Moroccan government that could enter into negotiations, under the 
Sultan’s leadership, for the conclusion of a new treaty with France. The Sultan, for his
33 As for the texts of the preamble and Title VIII o f the Constitution, see the Appendix.
34 The establishment of a territorial assembly was not allowed and it was only in January 1952 that its 
establishment was recognised by Paris. Mortimer, France and the Africans, p. 173.
35 NARA, RG59, Lot58 D48 Records of the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs, 
Subject Files of the Officer in Charge of North African Affairs, 1945-1956, Box 2 [25 French Union].
36 His plan was based on the establishment o f joint companies in which the Moroccan state would be 
associated with European and Moroccan private capital.
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part, told the Resident-General that he did not authorise his plan and left unsigned the 
six dahirs that would have put the reforms into effect.37
Early 1947 witnessed an upsurge of North African nationalist movements. The 
Congres du Maghreb Arabe was held with North African nationalist participation from 
15 to 22 February 1947 and obtained verbal support from Azzam Pasha, the Arab 
League’s Secretary-General.38 In Morocco, the Casablanca riot broke out on 7 April 
1947 in which eighty-three people were killed. Three days after, Mohammed V visited 
Tangier and made a speech calling for Morocco’s unification within the Arab World 
indicating clear support for the Istiqlal and the Arab League.39 In addition, the visit to 
Tangier by the Sultan actually encouraged Moroccan nationalist sentiment in favour of 
territorial unity because the city was controlled by an international committee.40 Having 
realised the failure of his liberal policies, Paris decided to dismiss Labonne and 
appointed General Alphonse Juin as the Resident-General in May 1947.41 Juin quickly 
made it clear that independence for the Maghreb was not on any French agenda.42 Juin 
was given instructions authorising him to threaten the Sultan with deposition if he 
continued to resist French plans.43
Nevertheless, the rise of nationalist sentiment made Paris understand the necessity of 
introducing superficial reforms in North Africa to dodge nationalist criticism. In 
Morocco in June 1947, Juin set up a new organ, the Conseil des Vizirs et Directeurs, 
within the Maghzen. This meant that through directeurs or French advisers inside the 
Maghzen, the Residency was able to exercise direct control over the viziers, whereas 
hitherto the Grand Vizier44 had controlled to a certain extent the implementation of the 
dahirs submitted by the Residency for the Sultan’s signature. Thus, the Residency was 
aiming to deprive the Maghzen of its vestiges of power. In October 1947, Juin changed 
the procedure for recruiting members of the Moroccan Section of the Government 
Council, which were now to be elected by restricted suffrage. As this reform meant 
granting the right of suffrage to the bourgeois merchants, a door to the Government
37 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.42-58.
38 El Mechat, Les Chemins, pp.37-38.
39 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.57.
40 In 1945, Britain and France, with the support of the US and the USSR, ousted Spain from Tangier and 
forced her to accept even less than her pre-war role. A new committee of control was formed to represent 
the US, the UK, France, Spain, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal, and the USSR. However, the 
USSR did not exercise its right to participate. FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, p.138, ‘The Current Situation in 
North Africa’, 12.9.1952.
41 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.59.
42 Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, p. 151.
43 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.65.
44 The Maghzen was equivalent to the Moroccan government, which was composed of the Grand Vizier 
as its head, Vizier of Justice and Vizier of Habous. L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.268. The Grand Vizier was 
the head of the Maghzen. Habous meant religious charities. Maxwell, Lords, p. 154.
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Council was now opened to Istiqlal members. However, the Residency’s real purpose 
was to pave the way for representatives of the French settlers in the contemplated 
municipal assemblies. Juin also tried to force the Sultan to accept the municipal 
assembly projects which planned to secure French settler representation, but the Sultan 
refused this proposal.45 The elections to the Government Council took place in February 
1948, and the Istiqlal obtained fifteen seats out of seventy-seven 46 
In Tunisia, Mustapha Kaak was appointed as Prime Minister in July 1947. However, 
he was only regarded as a French puppet, and a strike which took place in Sfax on 5 
August had a political character. The decree of 9 August 1947 put Tunisia’s general 
administration under the prime minister’s authority, but the prime minister’s primacy 
was only superficial: there was no significant transfer of substantive powers to 
Tunisians, although even this superficial reform was condemned by the French 
settlers.47 The death of Moncef Bey, the ex-Bey, in September 1948 resolved the 
dynastic problem,48 which had dominated Tunisian politics ever since General Juin had 
dethroned him in May 1943.49 This event helped the Tunisian nationalist movement 
establish better relations with his successor, Lamine Bey. In June 1949, the Neo- 
Destour adopted the principle that Tunisia should become a constitutional monarchy 
with representation for the people in a future national assembly. This was clearly aimed 
at obtaining Lamine Bey’s support for the nationalist cause.50
In 1948 and 1949, the North African situation was relatively calm, partly because of 
the outbreak of the Palestine War and the sharp divisions of opinion among the Arab 
League member states over this problem which had diminished the League’s strength.51 
Nevertheless, North African nationalists had created the Arab Liberation Committee in 
Cairo on 6 January 1948. The Committee decided that it would be prepared to negotiate 
with France if it recognised the independence of the three countries (Tunisia, Morocco 
and Algeria) beforehand, but permitted each nationalist party to deal with France. This 
Committee would to some extent affect the tactics adopted by North African
45 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan conflict, pp.68-71. Bernard’s book did not mention Juin’s project of 
municipal assemblies but later developments showed that Juin submitted this plan for the Sultan’s 
signature.
*  Ibid., p.75-76.
47 Julien, L ’Afrique du Nord, p. 162.
48 Ibid., pp.164-165.
49 The reason for the deposition was the Bey’s collaboration with the Axis, according to the French. Juin 
was then the acting Resident-General. The Bey’s deposition naturally angered the Tunisian people and 
stimulated nationalist sentiment.
50 El Mechat, Les Chemins, pp.88-89.
51 FRUS, 1950, V, p.1744, Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State, 9.1950; El Mechat, Les 
Chemins, Chapter 2 and 3.
52 Ibid., pp.46-47.
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nationalists, as will be shown later. However, the overall indifference of the Arab 
countries to North African nationalist movements disappointed Bourguiba,53 so he 
returned to Tunisia in September 1949 and the Neo-Destour started a vigorous 
campaign for independence.
At the end of 1949, the French goal was still to incorporate Tunisia and Morocco into 
the French Union. Both countries were supposed to participate de jure in the Union as 
associate states; namely, they would voluntarily participate while preserving their 
indigenous institutions. However, the Union de facto signified nothing but a centralised 
organisation controlled by Metropolitan France, and consequently, the sovereigns of the 
two countries refused to join it. Thus in reality, Tunisia and Morocco, if they moved 
towards self-government, would deviate significantly from French policy based on the 
French Union. The French were aware that the largest stumbling block for their goal of 
making Tunisia and Morocco associate states of the Union was the sovereigns’ right to 
sign decrees. As will be described below, the French started to persuade them to accept 
French proposals, but these proposals were in fact designed to nullify this right despite 
their insistence that they would lead the two countries to internal autonomy. In order to 
persuade the sovereigns, the French also considered it imperative to sever their links 
with the nationalists.
53 Ibid., p.75.
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Chapter 1: The French Announcement on Tunisian Internal Autonomy; 
Tunisia, January 1950 to December 1951
1.1 The French decision on Tunisian Reform and Bourguiba’s demands
On 14 January 1950, the Council of Ministers of the French government decided ‘dans 
le cadre des traitds du Barde et de la Marsa... h conduire a la gestion autonome de ses 
affaires internes la Tunisie’.1 This decision was motivated greatly by the UN resolution 
in November 1949, which promised Libyan independence in January 1952. Wary that 
possible nationalist fanaticism in Libya might make their control of Tunisian affairs 
difficult, the French were determined to accomplish their plan before 1952.2 In fact, the 
French had already started formulating reform projects at the end of 1949. However, 
this decision did not mean that the French government had engaged in comprehensive 
reforms which would ultimately lead Tunisia to internal autonomy, let alone total 
independence. On the contrary, as will be shown below, the French aim lay in avoiding 
substantive reforms in Tunisia and ultimately adhering Tunisia to the French Union. It 
was considered out of the question to alter the foundations of its protectorate regime at 
least at this stage by replacing or modifying the Treaty of Bardo and the Convention of 
Marsa.
In formulating these reform projects, the French government had three points to take 
into consideration:
1) la personnalite propre de la R6gence de Tunis n’a jamais etd constatee. Les 
rdformes des demteres anndes Font renforcde et celles de l’avenir, 
ndcessairement, l’accentueront encore.
2) pour tenir compte de 1’importance et du role essentiel de la colonie fran9ais 
dans la Rigence ainsi que pour sauvegarder ses intdrets moraux et matdriels, 
il est indispensable que les Fran9ais aient acces... aux fonctions publiques...
La Tunisie autonome doit conserver une administration franco-tunisienne.
3) le Gouvemement fran9ais tient des traites certains pouvoirs rdserv6s qui 
6chappent a la competence du Gouvemement tunisien (Affaires Etrangeres, 
Defense).3
1 Minist^re des Affaires Etrangeres [hereafter MAE]. Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.380, Note, 14.1.1950.
2 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.380, Lettre au President, 3.3.1950. The British had also observed that the 
UN resolution on Libya had made a deep impression on both French and indigenous people in Tunisia. 
Public Record Office [hereafter PRO], FO371/80619, J1018/2, Tunis to FO, 22.12.1949. For this UN 
resolution, see John Wright, Libya, (London; Ernest Benn Limited, 1969), pp.205-207. Note that the 
degree of political evolution in Libya was considered to be far behind that in Tunisia. See for instance, 
MAE, 1944-1955 vol.337, Tunis to Paris, no.2850,16.10.1951.
3 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol. 380, Note pour le Cabinet du Ministre, 10.1.1950.
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The first point suggested that France had respected, and would respect the character of 
Tunisia, but not its sovereignty as had been demanded by the nationalists. French 
hypocrisy was conspicuous particularly in the second point, for the preservation of ‘une 
administration franco-tunisienne’ was incompatible with internal autonomy. This point 
illustrated that Tunisia’s internal autonomy as envisaged by the French did not have 
substance, since the French deemed the Tunisians alone incapable of administering the 
country. French settlers’ participation in the country’s administration must be kept, also 
because their existence had contributed to Tunisia’s political and economic 
development. The third point meant that the French were not intent on allowing the 
Tunisians to exert the rights in relation to foreign affairs and defence, and therefore 
refused the idea of granting complete independence to Tunisia.
The French went on to argue that these three basic points entailed the following five 
elements. Firstly, Tunisia would have to uphold the monarchy, although the French 
envisaged that the Bey’s privileges would be modified as democracy evolved. This was 
presumably because the Treaty of Bardo and the Convention of Marsa were concluded 
with the Bey, whose consent the French considered essential to guarantee legally their 
presence. Second, with regard to governmental organisation, the Council of Ministers of 
the Tunisian government would be presided over by the Prime Minister, not by the 
Resident-General as hitherto. Parity would be established between the number of 
Tunisian ministers and French ministers within the government, although this did not 
exclude a possibility of forming a government composed only of Tunisian members in 
the future.4
Third, in return for the alleged enhancement of the Tunisian government’s powers, 
both national and local assemblies would have to be reformed, as these would guarantee 
the prevention of any single political party from having a thorough hold on the state. 
That is, by making use of those assemblies the French aimed to hinder the Neo- 
Destour’s monopoly of power in the Grand Council5 and in the government in general. 
Fourth, the Tunisian administration would have to be composed of both French and 
Tunisian people. Its legitimacy could not be doubted ‘quel que soit le degre 
d’autonomie intdrieure ou d’independance’. Finally, the Resident-General and the 
CSTT (Commandement Superieur des Troupes de Tunisie) would cease to belong to the
4 It was planned that the Ministers o f Tunisian Justice, Agriculture, Labour, Public Health, and Commerce 
and Crafts would be allocated to Tunisians while the Ministers of Finances, Public Work, Public 
Instructions and the Under-Secretaries of PTT [Poste T616graphe et Telecommunication] and 
Reconstruction would remain French.
5 Introduction, footnote 11.
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Tunisian government in their capacities as the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and of 
Defence, since their authority corresponded to the powers reserved to France. However, 
it was emphasised that the Resident-General would continue to exert French control on 
the Bey and the government. Hence, it should be concluded that the real French purpose 
was, contrary to their own insistence, avoiding real reforms for Tunisia’s internal 
autonomy. Only the second point can be regarded as a development for greater 
autonomy, but in any case there was no change to the Resident-General’s monopoly of 
power.
At the same time, the Neo-Destour had been engaged in energetic activities in order 
to realise their wish for independence, since September 1949.6 As well as appealing to 
France, their efforts lay in internationalising the problem, stimulated by the Libyan case 
in the previous year. In February 1950, Mongi Slim, a leading member of the Neo- 
Destour, asked the Arab League to examine the Tunisian question with the aim of 
bringing it to the UN, although two months later the Arab League decided not to discuss 
the problem.7 Bourguiba’s effort was, on the other hand, rather aimed at gathering 
support for the nationalist case among Tunisian people. For this reason, he travelled 
throughout Tunisia making speeches and holding meetings with local people.8 
Confident of popular support, he landed in France on 12 April 1950 with the purpose of 
publicising his demands. Tahar Ben Ammar, the president of the Tunisian section of the 
Grand Council, also visited Paris to back Bourguiba’s action and, in Tunisia, several 
meetings were held proclaiming support for Bourguiba.9
These nationalist movements pressurised the Bey to side with the nationalists. On 11 
April 1950, he sent a letter to Vincent Auriol, the President of the French Republic, to 
draw attention to the importance of reforms by indicating his fear that ‘les 
manifestations de lassitude du peuple tunisien ne d£g6n6rent en un ddsespoir susceptible 
de provoquer ce que nous desirons eviter’.10 However, it seemed that as a successor of 
the deposed Moncef Bey,11 who had been popular because of his nationalist stance, the 
Bey’s concern was more his own popularity than promoting the nationalist cause. 
Regarding his position, Jean Mons, the French Resident-General in Tunisia, noted:
6 Introduction, p. 18.
7 El Mechat, Les Chemins, p.92. On 3 April 1950, Slim also wrote to Eleanor Roosevelt, Chairman of the 
UN Commission on Human Rights, protesting that the French authorities were preventing Bourguiba 
from visiting Southern Tunisia. FRUS, 1950, V, p. 1776, footnote 2.
8 Habib Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, (Paris: Plon, 1987), p.261.
9 Ibid., p.265.
w Ibid., p.330.
11 Introduction, p. 17.
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le Bey a 6t€ saisi par le demon de la popularity... Si son changement d’attitude est 
plus grave de consequences que 1’agitation du Destour c’est parce que ce parti est 
dans Fopposition... tandis que le Bey se place a Finterieur du mecanisme 
institutionnel du Protectorat; plus pr6cis6ment, le Bey dispose du seul veritable 
pouvoir que le regime du protectorat ait laisse aux Tunisiens, c’est-a-dire le sceau 
des decrets.12
In this sense, Mons rightly commented to the Americans: ‘[the] Bey is not supporting 
Bourguiba’.13 Nevertheless, he was afraid, it was possible that the Bey would seek 
further popularity by siding with the nationalists. In that case the Bey’s retention of a 
right to veto decrees by refusing to sign could threaten French plans. Hence, both the 
French and the nationalists would, more than ever, compete in obtaining the Bey’s 
collaboration.
On 14 April 1950 in Paris, Bourguiba submitted to VAgence France-Presse the 
following seven demands:
1. ‘resurrection de l’executif tunisien depositaire de la souverainete tunisienne...
2. constitution d’un gouvemement tunisien homogene, responsable de l’ordre public, 
preside par un premier ministre tunisien designe par le souverain...
3. suppression du secretaire general...14
4. suppression des controleurs civils qui faisaient de Fadministration directe
5. suppression de la gendarmerie fran?aise qui consacrait l’occupation militaire du 
pays.
6. institution des municipalites eiues avec la representation des intdrets fran5ais dans 
toutes les agglomerations...
7. creation d’une Assemble nationale eiue au suffrage universel qui aura... 
d’eiaborer une constitution democratique qui fixera les rapports futurs franco- 
tunisiens sur la base du respect des interets legitimes de la France et egalement 
dans le respect de la souverainete tunisienne.15
Points 1-6 were, according to his declaration on 3 June 1950, aimed at restoring 
Tunisia’s sovereignty to the Tunisian people. He reasoned that the Protectorate Treaty 
had recognised it, but that ‘la souverainete tunisienne [est] etouffee par une pratique 
abusive et envahissante du controle fran9ais’. Only after French acceptance of points 1- 
6, would Tunisia, with a democratic regime, be able to negotiate with France with a
12 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.336, Mons to Schuman, no.579,25.4.1950.
13 FRUS, 1950, V, p.1775, Tunis to Acheson, no.61,21.4.1950.
14 This post was nominally to support the Prime Minister but allocated to the French, in fact having 
dominant power over the budget and personnel in the Tunisian government. The Secretary-General was 
appointed by the Bey at the Resident-General’s recommendation. At the beginning of 1950, the 
Secretary-General had the power of veto over all the decrees of the ministries.
15 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp. 301-302. The Treaty of Bardo provided for a temporary occupation 
of Tunisia by the French military authorities. This provision had not yet been lifted at this stage.
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view to concluding something like an alliance treaty.16 He also wrote to his comrade: 
‘ces 7 points doivent consacrer notre independance.’17 
Importantly, Bourguiba was willing to cooperate with France as long as the latter 
worked for Tunisia’s internal autonomy and independence, and he never intended to 
eliminate France and French people from Tunisia. In this sense his basic position was 
pro-French. Nevertheless, he later pointed out: ‘j ’ai voulu dissocier la notion d’interets 
fran9ais ou d’intfrets des Franfais de la notion de domination politique ou de 
souverainete de la France, en montrant que la deuxieme n’est pas n6cessairement une 
consequence inevitable de la premiere.’ 18 Namely, he insisted that Tunisia, as a 
sovereign country, would guarantee the interests of France and French people and that 
this guarantee be given in place of direct French control. The above demands were 
rather moderate and gradual if compared with the immediate independence that the 
Moroccan nationalists claimed in October 1950,19 but here lay Bourguiba’s strategy. He 
considered that his moderate programme ‘nous aura servi k d^masquer les intentions de 
la France, a rdaliser l’unanimite du Peuple et l’appui du Souverain, a nous gagner une 
grande partie de 1’opinion fran9aise sans parler de 1’opinion intemationale (Arabes, 
musulmans, Anglo-Saxons).’20 That is, his tactics were to obtain as much sympathy as 
possible from French opinion without having to appeal to international opinion. 
However, it is also essential to note that recourse to diplomatic means was not his only 
strategy. As he wrote to another party leader in May 1950, he had already started 
preparing for ‘la lutte arm£e’ if the French made no concessions 21 
As had been expected, Bourguiba’s demands triggered stark opposition from French 
settlers, represented by their pressure group, le Rassemblement frangais, resisting all 
suggestions of modifications to their privileges in Tunisia. Their leaders, such as senator 
Antoine Colonna,22 sent a memorandum to Foreign Minister Robert Schuman dated 25 
May 1950, arguing that the problem posed by Bourguiba was related to all territories of 
French North Africa, and rejected even minor concessions on the part of the French:
II s’agit de restaurer en Tunisie l’autoritd fran9aise... [L]es Tunisiens, qui nous 
aiment encore, ont besoin... de la manifestation tranquille, pacifique, mais tangible,
16 Ibid., pp.353-354.
17 Ibid., p.309.
18 Ibid., p.305.
19 Chapter 2, Section 1.
20 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.310.
21 Ibid., p.313.
22 He was a member of the Senate in Paris, representing Tunisia.
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de la force fran9aise... [L]a Tunisie doit strictement rester un pays de co- 
souverainete franfaise et tunisienne.23
It was this principe de co-souverainete, sometimes also called the principe de parite, 
that the French settlers and consequently the French government had advocated, and 
would continue to advocate in Tunisia and Morocco. This referred to the principle that 
the French and Tunisians should have an equal say in Tunisia’s administration but 
ultimate power was reserved for the French, a principle already embodied in the 
composition of the Grand Council where the French had the same number of 
representatives as the Tunisians. Clearly, this principle effected a tremendous 
discrimination against the Tunisians, given the different population sizes. Naturally, this 
principle thoroughly contradicted Tunisia’s sovereignty, which logically meant that 
Tunisia’s political community must be constituted by indigenous people alone.24 The 
French always regarded this principle as a very effective brake with which to prevent a 
future national assembly from passing a resolution to sever Franco-Tunisian links.
On the other hand, Resident-General Mons was advocating a more liberal approach. 
He reported to Paris at the end of April 1950 that the situation was calm and that it was 
impossible to find any troubles stirred up by Bourguiba’s visit to Paris, as against 
Colonna’s claims. Concerning French settlers, Mons observed that whereas their 
political leaders ‘gardent une attitude de combat’, the masses of settlers preferred to 
accept the idea of reforms. Finally he stressed: ‘Une chose est certaine, c’est qu’il est 
impossible de revenir en arridre’.26
The Quai d’Orsay argued that three possible courses were open to the French: (1) to 
adopt the line of the Rassemblement frangais, reversing ‘la politique liberate pratiqude 
an Tunisie depuis 3 ans’, (2) to do nothing major for the time being but to examine 
minimal reforms, (3) to adopt Mons’s line, examining ‘un nouvel amdnagement des 
institutions tunisiennes qui romprait avec la co-souverainete de fait actuelle et tendrait a 
ddgager, sous la tutelle de la France, la personnalitd de l’Etat Tunisie’.27 The Quai 
agreed with Mons that the Tunisian situation was calm, though it noted that the Bey’s
23 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.336, Memorandum au Sujet de la Tunisie par la Delegation de la 
Colonie Fran?aise, 25.5.1950.
24 Referring to Alexandria where Greek, Italian, and French minorities attended the municipal council, 
Bourguiba accepted a moderate number of minority people’s membership in municipal councils. This was 
what he meant by the 6th point of his demands in April 1950. Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, p.310. What 
he rejected was the participation of a substantial number of foreign people in municipal councils, let alone 
in a national assembly.
25 This was also the case in French policy towards Morocco. Chapter 2, Section 1.
26 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.336, Mons to Schuman, no.579,25.4.1950.
27 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.380, Notes Schdmatiques sur la Situation Politique en Tunisie, undated.
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support enhanced the Neo-Destour’s influence among the bourgeoisie. It even pointed 
out that the party was willing to cooperate with France by ceasing to demand 
independence. However, the Quai categorically rejected examining Mons’s proposal to 
abandon co-sovereignty. Thus, as a compromise between pressures from the settlers 
and from the nationalists, it decided to take the second course. Consequently, the 
French government dismissed Mons and announced on 1 June 1950 that Louis P6rillier 
would succeed him as the Resident-General.28
1.2 The Announcement of the French Plan
June of 1950 turned out to be a major turning point in French policy towards Tunisia 
since the end of World War II. For the first time, the French government publicly 
pronounced its intentions to launch a plan that would lead Tunisia to internal autonomy. 
On 10 June 1950, Schuman declared in Thionville: ‘M. Perillier aura pour mission de 
conduire la Tunisie... vers l’inddpendance qui est l’objectif final pour tous les territoires 
au sein de l’Union Fran9aise’ 29 On 13 June, he made a statement to a private session of 
the Foreign Affairs Commission of the National Assembly that the reform would be 
based on the following points.
1. In future, the Tunisian government will consist of 9 Tunisian Ministers and 3 
French Counsellors-General...
2. The Council of Ministers will be presided over by a Tunisian, instead of the 
Resident-General of the French administration as hitherto.
3. The appointment of French advisers to the Tunisian Ministers will be 
discontinued.
4. While the position of French officials will be safeguarded, Tunisians will in 
future be eligible for all posts in the administration.
5. Tunisians will be encouraged to take part in local government as a preparation 
for greater political responsibility at a later date.30
On 10 June 1950, Bourguiba had announced his support for Schuman’s declaration in 
Thionville in the name of the Neo-Destour.31 However, Bourguiba had reservations
28 Ibid.; NARA, RG59, Central Decimal Files [hereafter CDF], 772.00/1-951, the US Consulate General 
in Tunis (Jemegan) to the State Department, no.237,9.1.1951.
29 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.354-355. Schuman referred to TindSpendance’, but soon retreated. 
Two days later, he announced in Paris: ‘La France a la mission de conduire les populations (des territoires 
d’Outre-Mer) vers une gestion ind6pendante de leurs propres affaires au sein de l’Union Franfaise. C’est 
ce que j ’ai pr£cis6 h Thionville.’ Le Monde, 13.6.1950.
30 PRO, FO371/80619, J1018/18, Harvey to FO, 16.6.1950. It is not clear why Schuman mentioned that 
the number of Tunisian Ministers would be greater than French Ministers, while the Quai d’Orsay 
planned that the parity was to be established. Schuman’s stance was slightly more liberal than that of 
other leading figures to get Tunisian support and to avoid any meaningful internal autonomy.
31 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.355-356.
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about the French Union. He wrote to Salah Ben Youssef that the possibility of Tunisia’s 
adherence to the French Union could arise only after Tunisian independence although 
the French expected it inside the Union. He did not abandon a hope that the French 
would finally accept the Tunisian demands, but added that ‘de faire pencher la balance 
en faveur du clan Schuman par une attitude ferme, digne, inexpugnable ou se 
manifestera 1’unanimity du people, Bey compris.’32 
On 13 June 1950, the new Resident-General arrived in Tunisia and made a radio 
announcement explaining the broad outline of French intentions.33 The French plan was 
composed of three areas: firstly, a governmental reorganisation, secondly, the opening 
of more public service posts to Tunisians, and thirdly, municipal reforms, although 
details had not yet been examined concerning the latter two points.34 The first point was 
that the Tunisian Council of Ministers would no longer be presided over by the 
Resident-General but henceforward by the Tunisian Prime Minister, and the Foreign 
Minister and the CSTT would no longer be members of the Council of Ministers. The 
French advisers to Tunisian ministers would be removed and the Secretary-General’s 
endorsement of all the acts of the Tunisian government would be discontinued.35 Jean 
Vimont was appointed as a new Secretary-General of the Tunisian government. 
Regarding the third point, the French planned to start assembly reforms at local levels, 
not the national level. Fearing that their plan of forming a national assembly, which 
would be based on the principe de co-souverainete, would provoke fierce opposition 
from the nationalists, the French perhaps considered that starting at a municipal level 
would arouse less resentment.
In June and July 1950, Pdrillier had a series of conversations with the Bey and the 
Tunisian Prime Minister Si Mustapha Kaak, but on 8 July, the Bey and Kaak 
complained that ‘la subordination du Secretaire Gendral au Premier Ministre n’dtait pas 
assez nettement marqu6e’ in the French plan. They also demanded the immediate 
dismissal of French advisers to Tunisian Ministers. Pdrillier flatly rejected such a 
subordination, and instead emphasised that the Secretary-General ‘conserve... des 
pouvoirs propres de gestion sur les services de controle du personnel et des depenses.’36 
In the French plan, the Secretary-General’s power was to be constrained and yet remain 
dominant, and at any rate, there would be ultimately little change to French control of
32 Ibid., pp.316-318.
33 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.336, untitled, undated.
34 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, vol.101. Note pour le Ministre, 17.10.1951.
35 FRUS, 1950, X, pp.1780-1781, The Consul General at Tunis (Packer) to Acheson, no.7, 10.7.1950; 
ibid., pp.1806-1807, The Ambassador in Paris (Bruce) to Acheson, 7.12.1950.
36 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.380, Pfrillier to Schuman, no.953,11.7.1950.
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Tunisia. In view of Kaak’s opposition, Pdrillier concluded that it was impossible to start 
negotiations with the Kaak Government and decided that he should be replaced by a 
new prime minister. Perillier states in his memoirs that he had wished to form a 
government which would represent all shades of Tunisian opinion, and consequently 
would include Neo-Destour members.37 After negotiating with the Neo-Destour, 
P6rillier chose as a successor M’Hamed Chenik, a former prime minister in the era of 
MoncefBey.
Meanwhile, Schuman’s declarations in June 1950 intensified tension between French 
settlers and Tunisian nationalists. The French section of the Grand Council resigned on 
10 July 1950 to protest at the introduction of the French plan. Tahar Ben Ammar 
reacted by putting forward a motion ten days later to the French Residency to complain 
about the French unwillingness to accept internal autonomy, emphasising: ‘aucun effort 
n’a 6t6 fait pour donner satisfaction k une des plus vieilles revendications tunisiennes’.38 
However, the Residency did not accept the motion.
Nevertheless, Schuman was adamant in moving forward. He declared on 20 July 
1950 before the Council of Republic ‘la necessite de rompre l’immobilisme’. Perillier, 
on his part, after obtaining from Paris approval for the formation of the Chenik 
Government including several Neo-Destour members,39 began consultations with the 
party. The French were worried that Bourguiba might refuse to sanction his party’s 
participation unless a new government could be liberated from having its decrees 
endorsed by the Secretary-General and if the Resident-General’s control still remained 
while the Council of Ministers continued to contain French representatives.40 However, 
Salah Ben Youssef accepted his participation in the government, a decision to which 
Bourguiba agreed.41 At Bourguiba’s initiative, the Neo-Destour Enlarged National 
Council approved that decision on 4 August 1950.42 This was a significant decision, 
considering the opposition by the North African Liberation Committee and by other 
nationalist parties at home and abroad including the Istiqlal in Morocco 43
37 Perillier, La Conquete, p.78.
38 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.380, Reunion Extraordinaire du 20 Juillet 1950, Motion. Julien, 
L ’AJrique du Nord, p.175.
39 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.336, Note pour Schuman, 24.7.1950.
40 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, Circulaire no.197, Paris to Tunis, 4.9.1950.
41 Perillier reported to Paris that Bourguiba had seemingly not been consulted beforehand. MAE, Tunisie 
1944-1955, vol.336, Perillier to Schuman, no.1055, undated. However, Bourguiba implied in his memoirs 
that he had long been in favour of the idea of the Neo-Destour’s participation.
42 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.363-364. Bourguiba returned to Tunisia on 2 August 1950.
43 On 12 August 1950, a ministerial committee on North Africa was held in Paris with the participation of 
the French representatives in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia. It concluded: ‘II ne saurait... etre question 
d’opdrer, au sien de l’Empire ch6rifien ou de la R6gence, de profondes transformations de structure’ and
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It was announced on 17 August 1950 that Chenik would form a new Tunisian 
government with the membership of Salah Ben Youssef as the Minister of Justice and 
Mohammed Badra, another Neo-Destour member, as Minister of Social Affairs.44 A 
communique was issued on the same day, stating that the new government’s mission 
was ‘h negocier au nom de Son Altesse le Bey les modifications institutionnels qui... 
doivent conduire la Tunisie vers l’autonomie interne.’45 This was a distinctive event in 
the history of French policy in Tunisia in the sense that the French authorised the Neo- 
Destour, which had been banned a few years before, to participate in the government. 
The French judged it possible, with the Bey’s authority behind them, to make the 
nationalist party accept their reform plan, which contained nothing substantive so that 
French settlers could accept it. In contrast, however, the Neo-Destour’s involvement 
was aimed at impressing French opinion about its sincerity for negotiation, thereby 
strengthening the pro-Schuman group and making the French withdraw their plan for 
French participation in the countiy’s political institutions and instead present a more 
realistic one.
Perillier was optimistic that he could soon start negotiations with the Tunisians. He 
even announced on 19 August: ‘des reformes substantielles seront oper6es avant la fin 
de l’annde.’46 He issued a decree on 7 September 1950 relating to the abolition of the 
posts of the French advisers to Tunisian ministers.47 The Neo-Destour welcomed this 
decision, although it correctly regarded this as leaving intact the French veto power at a 
higher level. The Vieux-Destour’s opinion was entirely dismissive and the views of the 
French settlers were adverse.48
However, the prospect of the commencement of negotiations was rapidly 
disappearing. Prime Minister Chenik, having accepted office, was now convinced that 
the French purpose was nothing but avoiding substantive reforms to give Tunisia
that ‘Involution promise aux Tunisiens ne pourra etre conduite qu’avec une extreme prudence.’ L 'Annee 
Politique, 1950, p. 173.
44 The other Tunisian ministers were Dr Mohammed Materi as Minister o f State, Mohamed Salah Mzali 
as Minister o f Commerce, Industry and Crafts, General Saadallah as Minister of Agriculture and Dr 
Mohamed Ben Salem as Minister o f Public Health.
45 Victor Silvera, ‘Les r^formes tunisiennes de fiSvrier 1951’, p.2, cited in Julien, L ’Afrique du Nord, 
p. 176.
L ’Annee Politique, 1950, p. 174.
47 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, Tunis to Paris, no.429/432, 7.9.1950. Shortly after the formation of 
the Chenik Government, Bourguiba started a new stay in France. He had a series of conversations with 
the representatives of Arab countries in order to gather political support. El Mechat, Les Chemins, pp. 105- 
106.
48 In accordance with the Beylical decree of 1947, these advisers had hitherto exercised a considerable 
measure of control within the Ministries to which they were attached, but now they were to be transferred 
to the Secretary-General. PRO, FO371/80621, JF1018/55, Tunis to FO, 1581/551/58,20.9.1950.
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internal autonomy. As early as 12 September 1950 he wrote a letter to PErillier
•  49requesting:
1) - la suppression du visa secretariat;
2) - la devolution au Premier Ministre;
a - des attributions incombant jusqu’ici au Secretaire General tant en ce qui 
conceme la coordination et le controle de 1’activitE des Services administratifs 
que la centralisation des affaires civiles et administratives; 
b - de reiaboration et de l’execution du Plan economique; 
c - du controle du personnel et des depenses publiques des administrations 
civiles;
Simply put, Chenik demanded that all important powers be transferred from the 
Secretary-General to the Tunisian Prime Minister. These demands were natural, since 
the French had already announced their intention to give internal autonomy to Tunisia. 
However, the Resident-General’s reply was simple: ‘cette note ne saurait en aucun cas 
etre admise comme base de discussion, celle-ci demeurant ma declaration du 13 juin’. 
On 30 September the Tunisians put forward a second note repeating the same 
conditions.50 As John Jemegan, the American Consul General later put it, the Tunisian 
reluctance to accept the French plan echoed the formers’ deep-rooted distrust of the 
French, if taking into consideration the fact that the French plan’s first and second 
points were aimed at alleviating French control as a matter of formality.51
The Tunisian notes smashed PErillier’s optimism. He announced on 7 October 1950 
that it appeared to him ‘temps d’accorder une pause h la politique’ and that instead 
Tunisia should address ‘[les] problemes humaines de reconstruction Economique et 
sociale’.52 This announcement, however, did not mean that he had given up the June 
1950 plan. Realising the difficulties with the governmental reorganisation, he decided to 
open negotiations on the second and the third points of the plan: the recruitment of civic 
officials and the municipal reforms. Two days later, he proposed to Chenik the 
establishment of two mixed commissions in order to examine the two issues.53 On 30 
October, Perillier explained to Schuman the necessity of a pause in realising the
49 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, Note, Chenik to PErillier, 12.9.1950.
50 Ibid., PErillier to Schuman, no.1356,25.10.1950; Ibid., Perillier to Schuman, 12.11.1950.
51 Jemegan wrote: ‘Even this program... might have been accepted willingly and promptly if  the 
Tunisians had believed the French would implement it faithfully and in a liberal spirit.’ NARA, RG59, 
CDF, 772.00/1-951, Jemegan to the State Department, no.266,9.1.1951.
52 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, p.380.
53 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, P&illier to Schuman, no.1356,25.10.1950. The mixed commissions 
were to be composed of the same number of French delegates as Tunisian delegates who were to be 
appointed by the French authorities. This clearly reflected the French intention of making no substantive 
concessions. In fact, this was a measure which the French had often adopted and would adopt both in 
Tunisia and in Morocco.
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envisaged reforms due to fierce opposition to the plan both from French settlers and 
Tunisian nationalists.54
The Tunisian government rejected the proposed mixed commissions. In his letter 
dated 4 November 1950, Chenik explained to P6rillier the reasons for his refusal:
Des decisions de cet ordre ne pouvant etre valablement arretees que par les Parties 
en presence, k savoir le Gouvemement fran5ais et le Gouvemement tunisien, seules 
des conversations directes entre les representatives qualifies de ces Autorites 
pourraient etre engagees.55
This was an outright challenge to a fundamental principle of French control of Tunisia, 
for its protectorate status meant that France’s representative was the Resident-General 
in Tunis, and logically the Tunisian government was not entitled to negotiate directly 
with the French government. Perhaps seeing Perillier’s unwillingness to negotiate on 
substantive reform, Chenik considered that no means was left but to appeal to Paris. 
Stimulated by the Moroccan Sultan’s memoranda in October 1950, he probably also 
calculated that direct Franco-Tunisian negotiations at a governmental level would 
greatly attract French and international attention, thereby pressurising the French 
government to make concessions. However, P6rillier replied that Franco-Tunisian 
negotiation in Paris was out of the question.56
Unlike P6rillier, the French government did not want to wait.57 It ordered him to visit 
Paris at the beginning of December 1950 with the purpose of discussing the programme 
with Schuman in detail. Then on his return to Tunis, Pdrillier submitted a new plan to 
the Bey on 13 December 1950.58 The first point stated that the number of French 
ministers would be reduced in the Council of Ministers, which would be presided over 
by the Tunisian prime minister but by the Resident-General in the case of decisions on 
economic and financial affairs. This reservation indicated that French concessions 
would be restricted as compared with that of the summer of 1950. Instead, on the 
second point the French agreed to the nationalists’ request to abolish the Secretary- 
General’s endorsement: regarding the decrees of technical Ministries, the Secretary-
54 Ibid., P6rillier to Schuman, no. 1361,30.10.1950.
55 Ibid., Prime Minister Chenik to Resident-General, 4.11.1950.
56 Ibid., Tunis to Paris, no.537/538, 10.11.1950. Schuman later confirmed this point; Schuman to Tunis, 
no.592,16.11.1952.
57 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.92. He points out that the Socialists criticised the plan as insufficient. Andr6 
Julien argues that an incident in Enfidaville, a city in the northern part of Tunisia, forced the Quai 
d’Orsay to implement the plan hurriedly. On 20 November, the police opened fire against agricultural 
workers who threw stones at them protesting against bad economic conditions. Seven people were killed 
and around fifty injured. Julien, 1’AJHque du Nord., p. 177.
58 L ’Annee Politique, 1950, p.264.
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General’s endorsement would no longer be required.59 The decrees of the Prime 
Minister and the other Ministries would be submitted to the Resident-General’s 
endorsement instead of that of the Secretary-General. The reduction of the Secretary- 
General’s power was considered important to give the impression he no longer played 
an important role as represented by France in the Tunisian government. The third point 
stated that the number of Tunisian and French officials would be the same among 
higher posts in the administration.
Seeing that French control on virtually all the administration of the Tunisian 
government would remain untouched, the Tunisians were not satisfied at all. On his 
receipt of the French plan, the Bey’s first impression was ‘qu’il tenait k etudier 
attentivement les decrets, qui, a premiere vue ne lui paraissaient pas comporter des 
reformes aussi substantielles qu’il l’avait esperd.’60
In the months that followed, Chenik continued his opposition but Bourguiba, who 
returned from Paris and himself talked with Pdrillier over this issue several times, 
agreed to the French plan as part of what he called ‘un recul tactique’61 and the Tunisian 
government followed his position. The Neo-Destour, though, publicly maintained its 
opposition when the party’s National Council, held under Bourguiba’s presidency on 31 
January and 1 February 1951, concluded that the negotiations ‘n’ont pas encore permis 
de degager les bases d’un regime d’autonomie interne.’62 It was announced on 1 
February that both sides had achieved agreements which contained minor modifications 
to the December 1950 French position, and over which Secretary-General Vimont had 
offered his resignation, opposing the envisaged restriction of his post’s attributions.63 
On 7 February 1951, Pdrillier put forward the draft of the plan to the Tunisian Council 
of Ministers, which approved it on the same day. On the following day, the Bey signed 
the decrees related to the February 1951 accords. However, aware of French 
unwillingness to make substantive concessions, Bourguiba had already left Tunisia on 2 
February 1951 in order to continue his efforts to appeal to international opinion.64 
Nevertheless, Bourguiba announced in Karachi on 13 February that the agreements
59 ‘Technical Ministers’ refer to those of Labour, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, and Public Health.
60 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, Tunis to Paris, no.596/598,14.12.1950.
61 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.274-275.
62 Ibid., p.412.
63 The new agreements stated that the Resident-General would preside over a commission composed of 
all the Tunisian ministers only when it discussed serious problems relating to the Protectorate Treaties 
themselves and when the Grand Council could not make a decision over budgetary issues. MAE, Tunisie 
1944-1955, vol.382, Note, 6.2.1951; Le Monde, 1.2.1951, 2.2.1951. Raymond Pons was appointed as the 
new Secretary-General on 23 March 1951. L ’Annee Politique, 1951, p.81.
64 He was to visit Cairo, Karachi, New Delhi, Jakarta, and so on.
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‘constituent une etape bien timide, mais significative de la volonte [fran9aise] 
d’acheminer la Tunisie vers son autonomie.’65 
Thus, of the three main points listed in the June 1950 plan, the first and the second 
were accomplished. What remained was the third point, i.e. the problem of municipal 
assemblies, but the Tunisians also made concessions on this issue. They agreed that it 
should be entrusted to a mixed Franco-Tunisian commission, which would be held 
under the presidency of Dr Materi (the Tunisian Minister of Interior).66
1.3 La Note sur la Co-souverainete
Despite the accords of February 1951, the Quai d’Orsay was aware that the results 
accomplished were far from what the Tunisians were demanding, whereas French 
settlers would be highly unlikely to accept steps to transfer substantial powers to the 
Tunisians:
[Les chefs du Neo-Destour] revendiquaient... la preponderance de 1’element 
tunisien au sein du Conseil des Ministres, l’exercice par le Premier Ministre ou 
pour le Ministre d’Etat du controle des depenses et du personnel, ainsi que de la 
direction des services de security, 1’obligation de possdder la nationality tunisienne 
pour acceder aux emplois administratifs. II n’est done pas exclu que... de nouvelles 
revendications ne se manifestent dans un avenir plus ou moins proche...
[C]es concessions nouvelles ont deja suscite certaines apprehensions de la 
colonie fran9 aise de Tunisie...67
In fact, on 20 February 1951, Bourguiba instructed his party leaders to take the next 
step. After pointing out French avoidance of devolving substantive powers to the 
Tunisians, he listed the following points.
- Suppression du Secretaire General ou son remplacement par un fonctionnaire 
tunisien;
- Conseil des Ministres homogene...;
- Suppression du Comite du Budget;
- Rattachement des services de security au Ministere d’Etat ou h un Ministdre de
l’lnterieur;
- Assemble Nationale Tunisienne;
- Municipalitds eiues;
- Suppression des territoires militaire et remplacement de la gendarmerie fran9aise
par un corps de gendarmes tunisiens 68
65 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, p.414.
66 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.381, P6rillier to Schuman, no.1356. Note that this mixed commission 
was different from those proposed in October 1950.
67 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.382, Note de la Direction d’Afrique Levant. 10.2.1951.
68 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.415-418.
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Bourguiba now added new demands concerning internal security and the establishment 
of a Tunisian national assembly. The Tunisians would henceforward increase their 
demands about the latter point in particular.
The conflict between the Tunisians and the French intensified rapidly. On 10 March 
1951, the Neo-Destour and the UGTT69 launched a general strike as a protest against 
French oppression of the Moroccan people’s aspiration for autonomy.70 This decision 
reflected Tunisian nationalists’ irritation with the French unwillingness to make 
substantive reforms. Minister of Justice Salah Ben Youssef himself took part in the 
preparation of the order to strike, so the Resident-General protested to the Bey and the 
Prime Minister the following day.71 Besides, the Tunisian ministers boycotted the first 
session of the Grand Council, which was held on 31 March. P6rillier reported to Paris 
that they were following the order of Chenik, who himself was inspired by Salah Ben 
Youssef.72
The Resident-General warned Chenik on 21 April 1951 that the Tunisian Ministers’ 
absence at the Grand Council was illegal.73 The latter objected on the following day that 
their absence could be justified by the fact that the French Section of the Grand Council 
expressed hostility against the Tunisian government. He also complained that the posts 
of Ministers allocated to the Tunisians were insufficient in number and that he had 
expected that ‘des elargissements progressifs [des portefeuilles] jusqu’a la totale 
homog6neit6 [tunisienne] et meme jusqu’a la participation au Cabinet de Me Habib 
Bourguiba.’74 Chenik’s position finally made Pdrillier conclude that a new Tunisian 
government should be formed. He underlined to Schuman that the Neo-Destour’s 
involvement in the government should be terminated in order to implement the 
February 1951 agreements.75
On 24 April, the Bey protested to the French government over the French Senate’s 
vote on that day to give French people in Tunisia the right to elect two members to the 
French National Assembly.76 In the nationalists’ views, naturally, this resolution lost 
those French people the right to vote in the Grand Council, whose term was expiring in 
December 1951. The Tunisian nationalists immediately increased their calls for the
69 Introduction, footnote 30.
70 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.419-420.
71 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.337, Visit to the Bey, 11.3.1951.
72 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.382, P^rillier to Schuman, undated.
73 Ibid., Pdrillier to Schuman, undated.
74 Ibid., Chenik to P6rillier, 22.4.1951.
75 Ibid., Pdrillier to Schuman, undated.
76 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, pp.428-429.
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establishment of a national assembly elected by universal suffrage. Nationalist 
newspapers started criticising the French government and on 12 May 1951, the Neo- 
Destour established the ‘Comite d’action pour les garanties constitutionnelles et la 
representation populaire’.77 On the same day, the Vieux-Destour formed a new group 
named ‘le Front National Tunisien pour l’lndependance’, refusing negotiations with
70
France before a promise of independence.
These developments made the Bey incline more decisively to the nationalist side. On 
the occasion of the Throne Festival on 15 May 1951, he declared that Tunisia should 
have a constitution and that he had decided ‘de passer k la seconde etape des reformes... 
et confid a ses Ministres le soin de preparer les textes qui 6tablissent une representation 
elue comprenant toutes les classes du peuple.’79 The Quai d’Orsay observed that he was 
influenced by Prince Chedly, ‘dont la collusion avec le n£o-destour est bien connue’.80 
The Resident-General protested to the Bey four days later that it was no longer possible 
to have conversations with the incumbent Tunisian government.81 The Bey did not yield, 
however. On 20 May, he demanded that P6rillier transmit his letter to Auriol calling for 
intervention against Perillier’s move.82
Yet another confrontation was arising out of the budget of 1951-1952. After being 
approved in general by the two sections of the Grand Council, it was supposed to be 
considered by the Mixed Delegation to reconcile minor differences between their 
versions. However, the Tunisian ministers refused to participate in this work and, 
moreover, dissuaded the Tunisian section’s members from doing so, on the grounds that 
French control exercised through the Resident-General’s endorsement was more severe 
than before, despite the French claim to the contrary. The French members of the Mixed 
Delegation, therefore, met alone on 19 May 1951 and approved a budget based on the 
French section’s version. The nationalists publicly said that the Prime Minister would 
decline to present it for the Bey’s seal and that he would refuse his approval in any case. 
However, the crisis was averted when the Bey finally sealed the budget on 1 June 1951, 
perhaps to avoid further trouble.83
77 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman, vol. 101, Note pour le Ministre, 17.10.1951.
78 L 'Annee Politique, 1951, p. 138.
79 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.337, Note pour le Ministre, undated; Julien, L 'Afrique du Nord, p.183.
80 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.337, Circulaire no.138, Paris to Tunis, 3.6.1951.
81 Ibid., Tunis to Paris, no.226/228,19.5.1951.
82 The French government’s official reply was handed over to the Bey on 3 June. It simply demanded that 
the Bey behave in accordance with the spirit of the accords in August 1950 and in February 1951. 
P6rillier, La Conquete, p. 104.
83 The Mixed Delegation was composed of representatives of both sections. The Americans commented 
that this corresponded to the system of conference committees in the US Congress. FRUS, 1951, V,
34
In July 1951, the Moroccan Sultan’s refusal to permit French participation in local 
assemblies84 was moderating Perillier’s attitude: he became willing to negotiate with the 
Chenik government, perhaps beginning to doubt the viability of the principe de co- 
souverainete.*5 In August 1951, he proposed to Schuman that he invite the Tunisian 
ministers to Paris to discuss the basis of a new action plan, a proposal to which 
Schuman immediately agreed, probably from the fear that the Tunisian problem might 
be brought before the UN General Assembly (hereafter UNGA), into which Arab 
countries were likely to put the Moroccan problem at that time.86 Chenik accepted this 
invitation, and suggested that it be a few months later.87 Meanwhile, he continued to 
demand a nationally-elected assembly and in August 1951 announced his opposition to 
the convening of the Grand Council.88
In the autumn of 1951,89 as the proposed Tunisian ministers’ visit to Paris was 
coming closer, the Quai d’Orsay worried about the hardening of Tunisian attitudes, 
whose nationalist sentiment was given impetus by the failure to reach agreement 
between Britain and Egypt in October 1951.90 Likewise, Tunisian attitudes could have 
been encouraged by the Egyptian placement of the Moroccan problem on the UNGA 
agenda on 6 October.91 On 17 October, one day before the Tunisian Ministers’ visit, the 
Quai d’Orsay examined French responses to Chenik’s expected demands:
1. le Gouvemement franfais entend rester seul juge du rythme selon lequel des 
rdformes seront introduces dans la Rigence en vue de la conduire 
progressivement a la realisation de son “autonomie interne”.
2. le Gouvemement fran9ais desire voir aboutir, par priority la reforme 
municipale, comprise dans le programme de juin 1950... [C]’est dans le 
cadre municipal que les Tunisiens doivent faire l’apprentissage...92
The French did not intend to allow any deviation from the June 1950 programme.
pp.1402-1405, Jemegan to the State Department, no.442, 22.5.1951; MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.382, 
Note, 28.6.1951; vol.337, Note pour le Ministre, 7.1955.
84 Chapter 2, p.48.
85 However, in mid-July 1951, Dr Materi expressed his optimism to a French official: ‘en d6pit de l’6chec 
d’un texte analogue au Maroc, il gardait l’espoir de faire accepter ce projet apr&s les vacances lorsque 
l’incident marocain serait un peu oubli6.’ MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.337, Note pour le Ministre,
7.1951.
86 Chapter 2, pp.48-49.
87 P6rillier, La Conquete, p. 108.
88 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.337, Note de M Pfrillier pour le President Schuman, undated.
89 After visiting Arab-Asian countries, Bourguiba visited the UK in August 1951, where he met Foreign 
Minister Herbert Morrison, and the USA in the following month, where State Department officials 
received him. Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, p.484, p.491.
90 MAE, 1944-1955 vol.337, Tunis to Paris, no.2850, 16.10.1951. Early in October 1951, Egyptian Prime 
Minister Nahas Pasha introduced legislation to abrogate the 1936 treaty, which authorised the British 
government to station troops in the Canal Zone.
Chapter 2, p.51.
92 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.383, Note pour le Ministre, 17.10.1951.
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Namely, they would accept the establishment of an elected national assembly only after 
that of local assemblies.
Then the Department of Africa and Levant of the Quai d’Orsay drafted a note that 
discussed the future regimes of both Protectorates after the establishment of the local 
assemblies designed in the French plans.93 It clearly reflected French adherence to the 
principe de co-souverainete. It began by emphasising: ‘le moment semble venu 
d’examiner objectivement les probldmes pos6s par le fonctionnement des Protectorats 
du Maroc et de la Tunisie et de rechercher les formules qui permettraient de concilier la 
permanence de la pr6sence franfaise avec les reformes reclamdes par les Autochtones et 
par une large fraction de 1’opinion intemationale’. However, they did not try to make 
the French position in the two countries more acceptable to indigenous people and 
international opinion. It was argued that the principe de parite would be very difficult to 
obtain once abandoned and that if both countries obtained internal autonomy without 
this principle, ‘il est hors de doute que les Europ6ens... sont l’objet de mesures 
discriminatoires et se trouvent parfois meme en danger de leurs personnes, victimes 
d’un veritable racisme’, judging from the situation in other Arab countries.
The Tunisian ministers, headed by Prime Minister Chenik, left Tunis on 16 October 
1951 and had a series of conversations with the French in Paris. The memorandum, 
tabled by Chenik under the Bey’s signature on 31 October 1951, simply defined the 
‘internal autonomy’ which the Tunisians wanted, using an Anglo-Saxon term ‘self- 
government’.
L’autonomie interne veut dire une Tunisie int6rieurement souveraine, jouissant 
du ‘Self Government’ et faisant dvoluer ses institutions selon sa propre vocation...
Sur le plan gouvememental, l’homog6n6ite du Gouvemement tunisien s’est 
r^velee une n£cessite...
Sur le plan legislatif, 1’institution d’une assemble representative tunisienne, 
eiaborant les lois et controlant la gestion et la politique g£n6rale du Gouvemement, 
sera un pas appreciable dans la voie de la democratic...
Enfin, sur le plan administratif, tout en sauvegardant aux fonctionnaires fran9ais... 
il est indispensable de doter la fonction publique tunisienne d’un statut compatible 
avec le nouveau regime.94
The Tunisians called for the removal of all French control over internal affairs, not just 
for the establishment of a national assembly. Their demands were more comprehensive 
than the French had expected.
93 Ibid., Note pour le Ministre, 10.1951.
94 Ibid., Chenik to P<Srillier, 31.10.1951.
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Tunisia’s internal autonomy or ‘self-government’ was what the French simply could 
not accept, despite their insistence to the contrary. Having examined this note, the 
Department of Africa and Levant pointed out: ‘Souscrire k une Evolution aussi rapide 
des rapports franco-tunisiens aurait pour effet... de susciter les plus vives inquietudes 
dans la colonie fran5aise’.95 Of the three points listed by Chenik, the Department 
commented that the demand for a Tunisian assembly presented the gravest danger to 
French interests. It argued: ‘Comme le montre 1’experience des divers Etats arabes, une 
Assemblee purement tunisienne, elue au suffrage universel, constituerait un redoutable 
foyer d’agitation nationaliste.’ The Department highlighted the importance of i ’idee de 
parite’, which ‘constitue sans nul doute une garantie beaucoup plus efficace que le veto, 
toujours difficile k utiliser face a une assemblee elue.’96 
Meanwhile, the French government was seriously divided as to how to respond to the 
Tunisian demands. Schuman and Perillier opposed the dismissal of the Chenik 
Government at this stage.97 Perillier addressed a confidential report to Schuman on 17 
November 1951, arguing: ‘Nous devrions reconnaitre le principe de la peine 
souverainete interne tunisienne et la mettre en oeuvre progressivement sur le triple plan 
de l’executif, du representative et de la fonction publique.’ Schuman proposed an 
appeasing reply when the Council of Ministers met on 22 November, but was criticised 
by Henri Queuille and George Bidault. Harsh opposition to Chenik’s demands was also 
raised by Senator Colonna, who submitted to the Quai d’Orsay a memorandum four 
days later, requesting P6rillier’s dismissal, the constitution of a new Tunisian 
government and the maintenance of French settlers’ privileges. Perillier objected in his 
letter to Schuman on 13 December 1951 that ‘[c]e serait une erreur politique... de laisser 
repartir les Tunisiens les mains vides’, and emphasised the danger of removing the Neo- 
Destour, ‘Element le plus actif et le mieux organist, qui a depuis trente ans p6n£tr6 
profondement tous les mieux sociaux.’98
On 15 December 1951, the French government submitted to the Tunisians a note 
signed by Schuman. Reflecting the harsh opposition by the Quai and French settlers, 
this note presented an outright refusal of the Tunisian demands for internal autonomy. It 
stated:
95 Ibid., Note pour le Ministre, 15.11.1951.
96 Ibid., Note pour le Ministre, 26.11.1951. Undoubtedly, the Egyptian abrogation of the 1936 Treaty was 
regarded as a sinister precedent.
97 MAE, 1944-1955 vol.337, Tunis to Paris, no.2850,16.10.1951.
98 Perillier, La Conquete, pp.97-133. He opposed the immediate establishment of a Tunisian assembly, 
though.
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1. se fondant sur le role essentiel joue par les Fran9ais de Tunisie dans le 
developpement du pays, le Gouvemement fran9ais jugeait indispensable de 
maintenir le principe de leur participation du fonctionnement des institutions 
politiques du Protectorat.
2. le Gouvemement fran9ais se declarait disposer a donner pour instmctions a 
son repr6sentatif h Tunis de convoquer en janvier 1952 une Commission 
Mixte franco-tunisienne chargee d’etudier les modalites d’un nouveau 
systeme representatif.
3. la realisation de la Reforme municipale devait preceder la mise en 
application de toute autre reforme."
This note so clearly showed the French government’s adherence to the principe de co- 
souverainete that it was called 7a note sur la co-souverainete’. It evidently 
demonstrated a firm determination on the French part that they would not release 
complete control over internal Tunisian affairs. For Tunisian nationalists, this note 
definitely denied the Tunisian people’s right to self-determination by giving French 
nationals the right to vote.100 This note was so startling to the Tunisians, it was for this 
reason that the French could not hand it in before the closure of the GA debates on 
Morocco on 13 December 1951.101 Then Paris nominated Jean de Hauteclocque as the 
successor to Perillier on 24 December.
The consequence of this note turned out to be very profound. As Jemegan deplored, 
‘the note must be taken as a definite set-back for the moderate Tunisian nationalists.’ 
This was because the Tunisian ministers obtained virtually nothing after the long 
negotiations in Paris and therefore suffered serious damage to their prestige.102 This 
meant that the moderates such as Bourguiba would henceforward have to change their 
approach and resort to drastic action. One day after the French note, Bourguiba 
announced in Paris: ‘le Neo-Destour doit faire face k une epreuve de force qui met en 
danger son existence et l’avenir de la nation’, and publicly spoke of recourse to the 
UN.103 Consequently, Bourguiba abandoned his previous attitude with which to obtain 
internal autonomy through collaboration with France.
99 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955 vol.384, l’Evolution politique de la Tunisie depuis Juin 1950 et la Crise de 
Janvier-Avril 1952,4.1952.
100 Bourguiba later recalled: ‘depuis le 15 dScembre 1951, il s’agit de la vie ou de la mort politique d’un 
peuple, de la persistance ou de la disparition d’un Etat, du statut politique d’une nation.’ Bourguiba, Ma 
Vie, 1952-1956, p.352.
101 Chapter 2, p.53.
102 He rightly deplored the fact that ‘the Tunisians were led to expect something, only to get worse than 
nothing.’ FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1425-1426, Jemegan to the State Department, 19.12.1951.
103 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1944-1951, p.564; I'Annee Politique, 1951, p.338.
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Chapter 2: The Sultan’s memoranda and the Internationalisation of the 
Moroccan Problem; Morocco, October 1950 to December 1951
2.1 The Sultan’s memoranda
As in Tunisia, Moroccan nationalist sentiment was encouraged by the UNGA 
resolution of November 1949, which promised Libya’s independence in 1952.1 The 
French government’s announcement of its intention to lead Tunisia to internal 
autonomy gave further impetus to the rise of nationalism in Morocco. In September 
1950 Mohammed V set up the Imperial Moroccan Cabinet at the Palace. This was 
designed to secure a vital liaison between the Maghzen and the sovereign so as to offset 
the partial absorption of the Maghzen into the Conseil des Vizirs et Directeurs? The 
nationalists were soon heavily represented in the Imperial Cabinet, and the Sultan’s 
refusal to sign decrees thus appeared in its true light as the concerted policy of the 
Sultan and the Istiqlal.3 Despite French hopes, the positions of the Istiqlal and the 
sovereign were growing nearer.
In October 1950, the French government invited the Sultan to Paris. The French had 
aimed to re-create the facade of harmonious cooperation which had gradually been 
deteriorating,4 but this turned out to be a crucial moment in which the Sultan 
determinedly turned to the nationalist side calling for independence. To French surprise, 
he refused to sign a joint communique and instead, on 11 October 1950, submitted a 
memorandum stating: ‘le probldme marocain qui se pose aujourd’hui n’est plus une 
affaire de rdforme fragmentaires ou de remaniements superficiels’.5 Specifically, he 
called for: (1) greater educational facilities for Moroccans; (2) fuller Moroccan 
participation in the administration; and (3) permission for Moroccans to form their own 
trade unions.6 This memorandum was drafted by the Sultan’s entourage, but was 
actually approved by the nationalists, who had worried whether he would really present
n
the memorandum to the French. It was recognised that the nationalists were 
pressurising the Sultan to take a firm stance towards the French. In fact, the nationalists 
had opposed his visit to France, for his acceptance of the invitation could have been
1 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.67, Juin to Schuman, 33/C, 21.1.1950.
2 Introduction, p. 16.
3 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 82.
4 FRUS, 1950, V, pp.1760-1762, The Consul at Rabat (McBride) to Acheson, no.169,6.11.1950.
5 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.84, note, La Crise Marocaine, undated.
6 FRUS, 1950, V, p. 1752, The Chargd in France (Bonsai) to Acheson, no.2124, 19.10.1950.
7 Ibid., pp.1752-1753, McBride to Acheson, no.147,23.10.1950.
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taken as a sign of his reconciliatory attitude towards the French.8
The French reply of 31 October 1950 to this memorandum proved disappointing to 
the Sultan because it merely hinted at a possible lifting of censorship and recognition of 
the Moroccan people’s right to form a trade union, which would be discussed at a mixed 
commission to be established at Rabat, and side-stepped the problem of Moroccan 
sovereignty.9 On 2 November 1950, he made a clear demand that the abolition of the 
Protectorate Treaty of Fez should be negotiated. This stunned the French, who had 
thought: ‘the Sultan would be loath to abrogate the Treaty of Fez which guaranteed the 
throne to him and his heirs’.10 The French had never dreamt that the Sultan, whose 
position they considered was warranted by France, would call for independence.
There was no longer room for compromise between the position of the French 
government and the Residency on the one hand, and that of the Sultan and the 
nationalists on the other. As later developments showed, as in Tunisia, French policy 
was aimed at incorporating Morocco into the French Union, while keeping intact the 
interests of France and French settlers. Independence was ruled out, since it was 
incompatible with the Union. The French government insisted that they aspired to lead 
the Moroccan people to internal autonomy through modernisation and democratisation 
but, clearly, their purpose was to avoid any significant transfer of power to the 
indigenous people, as was the case in Tunisia. The political regime that they tried to 
introduce was to be built on the principe de co-souverainete: while keeping French 
nationality, French settlers were to have the right to vote in assemblies, at either 
national or local level. This was considered an effective brake with which to prevent a 
future national assembly from severing Franco-Moroccan legal links. This French 
stance was totally irreconcilable with Morocco’s independence as demanded by the 
Sultan and the nationalists.
In parallel with the Sultan’s initiative, the Istiqlal started anti-French broadcasting in 
Morocco under the initiative of el-Fassi. This party’s strategy lay, firstly, in showing 
that ‘la position prise par le souverain a Paris repondait au vceu unanime de la 
population’ and secondly, in internationalising the problem. The Istiqlal sent pamphlets 
to the UN and the Arab League, arguing: ‘Pceuvre de la France dans l’Empire cherifien 
tendait seulement a l’accaparement des ressources materielles et humaines de l’Empire 
cherifien au bdnefice d’une classe privildgiee de Fran5ais residant’. The same pamphlets
*Ibid., pp. 1760-1762.
9 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.78; FRUS 1950, V, p. 1761; MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, 
Schuman, vol.96, Note ‘La Crise Marocaine de F6vrier 1951’, undated.
10 FRUS 1950, V, pp.1762-1764, Bruce to Acheson, no.1244,17.11.1950.
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were distributed by two Istiqlal members during a session of the Moroccan Section of 
the Government Council in December 1950. General Juin reacted by purging them from 
the Government Council.11
The Istiqlal’s activities also alerted traditionalist pashas and caids. In particular, el- 
Glaoui felt threatened because of his belief in traditional values and his loyalty to 
France. As a Berber chieftain, he hated Arab nationalism inspired by the Istiqlal, and 
also disliked the Sultan who had previously granted an audience to trade union members, 
including communists, and who was favourable to the country’s modernisation.12 The 
antagonism between the Sultan and el-Glaoui intensified and finally on 21 December 
1950, el-Glaoui publicly condemned the Sultan for his connection with the Istiqlal.13
On the other hand, Juin was considering renewing an attack on the Sultan, taking 
advantage of the latter’s conflict with el-Glaoui. Perhaps he believed that the time was 
ripe to get the Sultan to accept his projects of October 194714 and to abandon the latter’s 
close relations with the Istiqlal. However, a divergence of views was growing between 
Paris and Juin, although this was rather related to the method to be employed than to the 
aim to be pursued. The Quai d’Orsay was afraid that his position was too favourably 
disposed towards the Pasha of Marrakech and therefore that ‘quelle que soit la maniere 
dont il cherche k exploiter la situation, il tendra k se heurter au Souverain’. It argued:
le Pacha Marrakech... prend ouvertement position d’opposant rallie autour de lui 
l’adhesion de beaucoup de notables marocains... [L]a vieille opposition entre les 
tribus et leurs chefs traditionnels d’une part, la bourgeoise arabe citadine et le 
sultan d’autre part, semble prendre quelque reality. Cet 6tat de chose transforme, k 
notre avantage, un antagonisme franco-marocain, qui commen?ait k devenir fort 
genant, en une rivalit6 entre deux clairs marocains... [Mais alors] que nous 
souhaitons prendre une position de r6formateurs en but k 1’obstruction d’un 
souverain plus desireux de r^tablir la monarchic absolue que de faire evoluer son 
peuple, nous risquons... de passer, aux yeux du monde, pour appuyer notre 
politique sur les demiers vestiges de la feodalit6 locale.15
The Quai believed that Juin’s policy could be criticised by external forces unless his 
proposal for political reforms was based on ‘principes suffisamment ddmocratiques’. 
Finally, the Quai noted that ‘en raison du temperament de [Juin], nous pourrions nous 
trouver obliges de choisir entre un recul grave pour notre prestige... ou une crise
11 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.67, Circulaire no.18,15.3.1951.
12 Conversely, the Sultan was furious as the French authorities and el-Glaoui deliberately failed to inform 
him o f the visit of American officials to Morocco, while they held a welcome party. NARA, RG59, CDF, 
771.00/1-451, Rabat to the State Department, Despatch no.243,4.1.1951.
13 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 82.
14 Introduction, pp. 16-17.
15 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol.96, Note pour le Ministre, undated.
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dynastique’, which was a fundamental dilemma in France’s rule of Morocco.
On 26 January 1951, the Resident-General met the Sultan. Juin, after stating that he 
was going to the US with French Prime Minister Rend Pleven, urged Mohammed V, 
firstly, to condemn publicly the Istiqlal’s methods such as anti-French broadcasting, if 
not its ideology, and secondly to sign the dahirs on Juin’s October 1947 projects. By 
referring to the trip, Juin implied that the Americans would agree with his plan. 
However, the Sultan refused both of his demands, on the ground that ‘Sa qualitd de 
Souverain, [le Sultan] restait au dessus des partis’ and that he had not yet fully 
examined Juin’s projects.16 His demands apart, what was remarkable was Juin’s 
menacing attitude towards the Sultan. The former reported to Paris about this meeting: 
‘Je lui ai indique que ma mission, en arrivant ici, me permettait d’envisager, soit son 
abdication, soit sa deposition, s’il persistait a faire echec aux rdformes que la France a 
mission de promouvoir dans l’Empire cherifien’.17 Thus Juin explicitly threatened the 
Sultan with deposition.
Both the nationalists and the French believed it essential to approach the Americans, 
who were considered very influential in determining other countries’ attitudes, either in 
the UN arena or outside. The Istiqlal told the US Consulate in Rabat on 29 January 1951, 
firstly, that the French government should deny its intentions on the Sultan’s abdication 
or deposition, secondly, that it was essential for the French government to appoint a 
new Resident-General in place of Juin and, thirdly, that there was no collusion between 
communism and the Istiqlal.18 Two days later, in Washington, Juin met George McGhee, 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. Juin 
insisted on the necessity of forcing the Sultan to denounce the Istiqlal’s methods. He 
also pointed to the threat from the possible expansion of communism, which would 
profit from the troubles. However, McGhee displayed a cool attitude and asked him 
instead whether the French could not collaborate with the party.19 As the French were 
soon to find out more clearly, the Americans were seeking rapprochement between the 
French and the nationalists.
The Americans were concerned with Morocco’s political stability. Firstly, support for 
the French position was considered vital not only because France was one of the most
16 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.76, Rabat to Paris, Rdsumd de l’audience du 26 janvier 1951.
17 SHAT, Fonds Juin, Tdldgramme resident gdn6ral k Diplomatic Paris, du 26 janvier 1951, cited in 
Bernard Pujo, Juin, Marechalde France, (Paris : Albin Michel, 1988), p.271. However, Juin did not state 
in his memoirs that he had contemplated deposition. Alphonse Juin, Memoires 2, (Paris, Libraire Arthdme 
Fayard, 1960), pp. 197-204.
18 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.76, Paris to Rabat, no.71/78,1.2.1951.
19 Ibid., Washington to Paris, no.946/958,1.2.1951. McGhee was the head of the US officials’ mission to 
North Africa in the autumn of 1950.
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important American allies, but also because its disappearance could cause political 
instability. Secondly, however, the French authorities’ suppression of Moroccan 
nationalism would inevitably make the Moroccans hostile to France and the Western 
countries, including the US, thereby causing further instability. The US government, 
feeling itself in a dilemma, was to pursue a ‘middle-of-the-road policy’20 towards 
Morocco. Besides, the Americans had been deeply involved in Moroccan affairs 
especially since December 1950 when Moroccan base treaties were signed between 
France and the US, which authorised the latter to construct aerial and naval bases.
A rumour was spreading that Juin had previously received US approval when he met 
McGhee. Seriously embarrassed, Dean Acheson, the US Secretary of State, sent 
warnings to the French: (1) Juin did not have US unqualified support; (2) the US would 
dissociate itself from French action to depose the Sultan and might be forced to state so 
publicly; and (3) if French action of such a kind resulted in the matter being raised in 
the UN, the US would not support France.21 In fact, as the French Embassy in 
Washington correctly noted, the US government was desperate to avoid a situation in 
which it would have to side with either party in the UN.22 The British, too, approached 
the French. On 2 February 1951, Sir Oliver Harvey, the British Ambassador in Paris, 
was instructed that after reaching agreement with the Americans, he should inform 
Robert Schuman of their concern about possible disturbances caused by a deposition. 
Harvey was also instructed to make it clear to the French that the British government 
did not wish to intervene in this matter. On that day Harvey met David Bruce, the US 
Ambassador in Paris, who replied that American reactions had been exactly the same as 
the British, but the British found the State Department’s line somewhat stiffer than that 
oftheFO .23
The Anglo-American moves made Paris aware of the necessity of avoiding the 
impression that France was seeking deposition. On 5 February 1951, after informing 
Juin of the governmental approval of his demands, Schuman warned him:
II faut done eviter tout ce qui pourrait accr6diter l’idde que la France cherche k 
ddposer le Sultan... L’intervention de l’Ambassade des Etats-Unis est 
caractdristique k cet egard... II y a lieu de marquer... tres fermement notre volonte
20 See below for the details o f this term. The US took the same attitude to Tunisian affairs.
21 FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1371-1373, Acheson to the Legation at Tangier, no.260,2.2.1951.
22 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.76, Washington to Paris, no.988/996,2.2.1951.
23 PRO, FO371/90243, JF1022/5, FO to Paris, no.96, 2.2.1951; JF1022/7, Harvey to FO, no.38, 2.2.1951; 
JF1022/12, Franks to FO, no.352, 3.2.1951. Harvey talked with Schuman over this issue on 3 February 
1951.
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de faire aboutir les rdformes immediates envisagees.24
Having returned from Washington, Juin once more met Mohammed V on 17 
February 1951 and demanded that the latter accept his points of 26 January, 
emphasising: ‘il n’dtait plus possible de diffdrer une solution indispensable au 
retablissement dans le pays d’un climat de detente’.25 In addition, the Ulama26 in 
Morocco also began to oppose the Sultan and to request the election of a new ruler. The 
Sultan turned to Paris on 21 February, writing to Auriol for arbitration. His reply arrived 
on 25 February, which only recommended the sovereign to accept the reform plans that 
Juin had tabled 27 Moreover, information began arriving at Rabat on the same day that 
the French civil controllers in the Middle-Atlas areas had instructed Berber tribes to 
despatch their troops to Rabat, in order to demonstrate against the Sultan. Perhaps these 
two factors obliged the Sultan to succumb.28 On 25 February 1951, he agreed: (1) to let 
the Grand Vizier, Hadj Mohammed el-Mokri, condemn ‘les methodes d’un certain 
parti’; (2) to remove from the Imperial Moroccan Cabinet the Istiqlal members who 
were deemed responsible for the policy of ‘obstruction’; and (3) to seal the dahirs to 
realise the reforms presented by Juin in October 1947, i.e. the establishment of the 
municipal assemblies with French settlers’ representation 29
Thus the February 1951 crisis ended. This was certainly a retreat for the Sultan, but 
not a total surrender, as it was agreed that the Grand Vizier, not the Sultan himself, 
would condemn the Istiqlal without naming it.30 Besides, this crisis was not necessarily 
indigenous, since it was to a large extent caused by the initiative of the French 
Residency including Juin, if not the French government. The threatening attitudes that 
the French authorities adopted to get this result proved radical enough to provoke 
furious reactions from the Arabs.
2.2 Arab Moves and Franco-American talks
Juin’s attitude towards the Sultan was harshly condemned by journalists in Arab 
countries, the US and Britain. Above all, Arab journalists launched an anti-French
24 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.2, Entretien avec M. Gdn6ral Juin, undated. See also Bernard, The 
Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.l 11.
25 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.77, Rabat to Paris, no.147/149,17.2.1951.
26 This was the orthodox religious council in Islamic society.
27 Le Monde, 27.2.1951; VAnnee politique, 1951, p.48.
28 FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1377-1380, McBride to the State Department, no.325, 28.2.1951.
29 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.68, Paris to Rabat, Circulaire no.18, 15.3.1951; Le Monde, 28.2.1951.
30 The Sultan signed a dahir relating to the third point on 20 March 1951. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan 
Conflict, p.90.
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campaign, and on 1 March 1951, the Arab media started broadcasting false news such 
as the French bombardment of Fez and the French incarceration of the Sultan. The 
following day, Azzam Pasha convened the Arab League Political Committee to 
examine the Moroccan problem and on 4 March the Egyptian parliament adopted a 
motion to denounce French policy.31 Moreover, Azzam Pasha asked the British and 
American Ambassadors in Cairo for their governments’ opinion in the event that the 
Arab League brought the problem to the UN Security Council (hereafter UNSC). The 
Egyptian move caused different reactions from the Anglo-Saxons. The British 
Ambassador responded that ‘il s’agissait d’une question qui ne regardait que le 
Gouvemement fran?ais et le Gouvemement marocain’, whereas the American 
counterpart did not reply.32
The Americans regarded their reaction to the Moroccan crisis as a touchstone of their 
good intentions towards the Arab-Asians.33 Therefore the US government declared in a 
press conference, on 5 March 1951, that it had already advised both parties on 
moderation. The French were quite dissatisfied with this American attitude, which, to 
their mind, ‘contribue a accrediter le bruit que le Gouvemement des Etats-Unis est 
favorable a la cause de 1’Istiqlal’.34 Moreover, it was reported to Paris two days later 
that with the help of the ‘Rhodes group’,35 the Istiqlal had been allowed by the US 
authorities to begin anti-French broadcasting activities in the US.36 However, on 9 
March, the State Department instructed the Ambassador in Cairo to dissuade the 
Egyptians from supporting the submission of the problem to the SC.37 No wonder that 
the Americans did not want to be put in a position of having to choose between the 
French and the Arabs. They considered it paramount to show, presumably to the Soviet 
Union, that there was no wedge between the Western powers and the Arabs, by 
indicating their willingness to arbitrate between France and the Moroccan nationalists.
The British had a different view: they argued that ‘the only people who would profit 
from a public discussion would be the Russians, [who] would of course back the Arabs,
31 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.79, t616gramme circulaire, Paris to Rabat, 9.3.1951.
32 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.78, Couve de Murville to Paris, no.184,4.3.1951.
33 PRO, F 0371/90244, JF1022/46, Washington to FO, no.682,7.3.1951.
34 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.78, Bonnet to Paris, no.1871/1872,5.3.1951.
35 This was a group of American businessmen in Morocco which rallied around Senator Rodes, engaging 
in activity in the US Congress to lift the restriction on exports from the US to Morocco. The French 
government had promulgated a decree for this control in December 1948, to which the US government 
agreed as a temporary measure. FRUS, 1950, V, pp.1754-1759, Acheson Memorandum to the President, 
27.10.1950.
36 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.78, New York to Paris, no.l 129,7.3.1951.
37 PRO, FO371/90244, JF1022/52, Washington to FO, no.706,9.3.1951.
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to the detriment of peace in North Africa and the position of the Western Powers.’38 For 
this reason, the British Foreign Office had persuaded the State Department not to 
publicly condemn Juin’s stem policy against the Sultan.39 Interestingly, the FO was 
motivated to show that there was no wedge between the Western powers, ‘which could 
only benefit the Soviets.’40 Therefore, the British did not tell the Arabs that they could 
induce the French to come to a settlement in Morocco. As Roger Allen, the head of the 
FO African Department, put it, they aimed to avoid giving impression to the Arabs that 
‘they can drive a wedge between [the British] and the French over Morocco.’41
On 13 March 1951, the Arab League Political Committee recommended that the 
member states bring the Moroccan problem to the UNGA, which it considered was 
preferable because of the American and British attitudes and the French veto in the 
UNSC.42 This Arabs’ decision was shocking to the British, who were now fearful of 
possible repercussions in their overseas territories caused by a UN debate. Nonetheless, 
they did not choose to persuade the French to adopt a more liberal policy, which could 
moderate the Arab countries’ attitude. On the contrary, the FO concluded that ‘whatever 
we may feel about French motives in Morocco, it seems best to leave the question 
alone’,43 seeing that the joint Anglo-Saxon approach to the French in early February 
1951 had resulted in this awkward incident.
This situation forced Paris to realise that they should immediately present a reform 
plan to Mohammed V, who had just accepted the sealing of the municipal project of 
October 1947. In order to induce him to accept their plan, the French now proposed to 
establish a new type of assembly which would be exclusively composed of the 
Moroccans. That is, the French were now planning to set up two types of consultative 
assemblies at a local level: djemaas in rural areas and municipal assemblies in town 
areas. A djemaa was a traditional assembly in local communities and the French were 
intent on transforming this into a new consultative institution consisting of 
representatives appointed by each tribe and having a certain degree of budgetary 
autonomy. A municipal assembly was to be composed of French and Moroccan
38 PRO, FO371/90244, JF1022/46, FO to Washington, no.929,9.3.1951. ‘A public discussion’ was meant 
to be US arbitration between France and the Moroccan nationalists.
39 PRO, FO371/90243, JF1022/32, Washington to FO, no.594, 26.2.1951; FO to Washington, no.798,
28.2.1951.
40 Schuman agreed with the British on this point. PRO, FO371/90244, JF1022/46, Harvey to FO, no.80,
12.3.1951.
41 PRO, FO371/90245, JF1022/71, Furlonge Minute, 11.3.1951, Allen Minute, 12.3.1951.
42 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.79, Couve de Murville to Paris, no.250,14.3.1951.
43 PRO, FO371/90246, JF1022/113, Harvey to FO, no.204, 11.4.1951. Harvey argued that giving advice 
to the French was counter-productive because of their deep-rooted suspicions about the Anglo-Saxon 
intentions in North Africa.
46
members.44
Meanwhile, the Arabs were continuing their efforts to internationalise the problem. 
On 9 April 1951, the Moroccan National Front, which had just been established in 
Tangier among major nationalist parties,45 issued a manifesto demanding Moroccan 
independence and rejecting association with the French Union. General Juin noted: 
‘Cette union £tait r6alis6e sous la pression de joumalistes £gyptiens et sous l’^gide de la 
Ligue des Etats Arabes groupe’.46 On the same day, the Egyptian ambassador in Paris, 
together with other Arab countries’ ministers, submitted a note to the Quai d’Orsay, 
calling for practical recognition of Morocco’s independence and expressed that 
otherwise they would raise the issue in the UN.47
The prospect that the Moroccan problem would be debated in the UNGA that autumn 
was becoming certain. The French wanted the US to oppose UN discussion of the 
problem, so believed that the Americans must be convinced that France was really 
intent on leading Morocco to internal autonomy. On 13 April, Henri Bonnet, the French 
Ambassador in Washington, pointed out that the US reservations about French policy 
would be likely to be aggravated in the course of a few months, due to the American 
press reports and comments on the Moroccan crisis in February 1951. Therefore, he 
continued, the French should approach not only US diplomats and consuls but also 
press correspondents and agencies,48 a proposal upon which the Quai agreed. One week 
later, Bonnet explained the French position to McGhee: France was, he said, attempting 
to prepare the Moroccans for eventual ‘self-government’ through its democratisation 
which would be launched at local levels, and that the Istiqlal was nothing but a few 
members of the privileged classes. However, McGhee replied that US information 
indicated the Moroccans were supporting the Sultan, and that ‘the progress being made 
in Morocco is negligible compared to that in India and Pakistan.’49 Thus the French did 
not achieve their goal.
In early May 1951, Bonnet reported to Paris that the Istiqlal was planning to establish 
a broadcasting bureau in New York, receiving encouragement from the Rodes group.50 
Therefore he suggested that the Quai d’Orsay ask the US not to grant such facilities to
44 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.79, Etude sur la situation au Maroc en Mars 1951.
45 Those who participated in this pact were the Istiqlal, the Democracy Independence Party (PDI), the 
Reformist Party and the Party of Moroccan Unity.
46 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.68, Juin to Paris, no.325/329,10.4.1951.
47 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.83, Note, Direction G6n6ral des Affaires Politiques, 29.6.1951; PRO, 
FO371/90246, JF1022/120, FO Minute by Stewart, 8.5.1951.
48 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.82, Washington to Paris, no.2920,13.4.1951.
49 FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1381-1384, Memcon, by the Officer in Charge of Northern African Affairs,
23.4.1951. According to this record, Bonnet used the term ‘self-government’.
50 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.68, Washington to Paris, no.3313/3318,2.5.1951.
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the Istiqlal. The Quai immediately agreed upon this proposal,51 and in the following 
month, the State Department informed Bonnet that they had postponed their decision on 
this issue.52
Perhaps the Arab countries’ moves, coupled with unsupportive US attitudes, 
persuaded Paris to present their plans to the Sultan. In May 1951 the French plan for 
local assemblies was transmitted to him,53 though its details cannot be found in French 
archives. Probably this was not made public until Mohammed V expressed disapproval 
two months later.54 In any case this was the first occasion that, as a response to the 
Sultan’s demand for independence, the French government had officially proposed 
French settlers should have the right to vote in local assemblies. On 6 July 1951 the 
Sultan announced his refusal to sign it, because this plan provided that the French and 
Moroccan representatives in the municipal assemblies would no longer be appointed by 
the authorities, but elected henceforward.55 Like Bourguiba, the sovereign considered 
the plan ‘incompatible avec la souverainete marocaine’,56 because granting this right to 
French settlers would prevent the formation of a Moroccan political community, which 
must be composed of indigenous Moroccan people alone. Instead, he signed a decree 
concerning djemaas on the following day.57
Subsequently, General Augustin Guillaume was appointed as the new Resident- 
General in Morocco on 28 August 1951. In fact, the Quai d’Orsay had already 
considered Juin’s dismissal at the end of 1950 because his attitude was too coercive and 
therefore unpopular. However, the French were keen to avoid the impression that they 
disapproved of Juin’s policy since it could cause ‘un grand trouble dans les esprits de 
ceux, tres nombreux parmi les Marocains, qui... ont mis toute leur confiance en nous’. 
For the purpose of showing their firmness to these Moroccans, they thought that a 
successor should be a military officer.58
On the other hand, el-Fassi announced on 14 August 1951 that he was going to visit 
Middle Eastern countries, the UK and the US in order to undertake a ‘grande toumde de 
propagande pour la cause marocaine’, to use an expression of a French source. Then on
51 Ibid., Note pour le Secretaire General, 5.5.1951. It was even argued that the collusion between the 
Moroccan nationalists and the Rodes Group was more dangerous than that between the Istiqlal and the 
communists.
52 Ibid., Washington to Paris, no.4388,11.6.1951.
53 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Projet de Reponse au Memorandum du Sultan du Maroc, 21.8.1952.
54 Le Monde reported no articles on this plan in May 1951. On 9 May the State Department instructed the 
Consul in Rabat to tell the French to inform them of the French plan. FRUS, 1951, V, p.1384, footnote 7.
55 Le Monde, 8-9.7.1951. In the meantime, general elections were held in France on 17 June 1951. Pleven 
was elected as a prime minister on 8 August 1951 but Robert Schuman remained as a foreign minister.
56 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Situation Politique (mars 1953).
57 L 'Annee Politique, 1951, p. 189.
58 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.83, Comitd Central de la France d’Outre-mer, 18.7.1951.
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31 August the Arab League started to discuss his proposal o f bringing the Moroccan 
question to the UNGA session in 1951.59
The French strongly felt the importance of approaching Washington once again with 
the aim o f securing firmer support. In late August 1951, Bonnet had argued that there 
were advantages in discussing Moroccan affairs with Acheson, because the State 
Department still adhered to the idea o f French collaboration with the Istiqlal, whom the 
Americans considered would otherwise turn to the communists. He also pointed out that 
State Department officials continued to meet Moroccan nationalist leaders to show US 
neutrality ‘dans le conflit qui nous oppose a ces derniers que pour sauvegarder l’avenir 
des relations suivies qui nous sont, au plus haut degre prejudiciable.’60 Bonnet, therefore, 
suggested that a paper should be prepared to indicate the extent o f possible collusion 
between the Istiqlal and the communists. However, perhaps the French themselves were 
not sure of this connection, for papers circulated in the Quai merely suggested that only 
the communists were attempting to establish collaboration with the nationalists, whereas 
the latter distanced themselves from the form er.61 The French wanted to use 
communism to persuade the Americans of the necessity o f oppressing the Istiqlal, but in 
any case the Americans did not believe in such a connection.62
At that time, the State Department drafted a paper for the forthcoming Franco- 
American discussions, entitled ‘To harmonize French and US views on Morocco’.63 It 
explained that the US objectives were:
a) To maintain stability in Morocco so that Morocco can make the maximum 
contribution to Western security and our air bases may be utilized and 
protected.
b) To assist the French in making necessary economic and social reforms and 
in guiding Moroccan political evolution toward self-government at a 
sufficiently rapid rate to forestall nationalist uprisings.
c) To cooperate with the French in the promotion o f friendly relations with the 
Moroccan people.
This paper continued that an evolutionary policy in Morocco must be accompanied by 
restraint and moderation on the part o f not only the Moroccans but also o f the French. In 
order to follow this stand the Americans felt it necessary to be informed o f the French 
plans in detail so that they could refute charges by Arab countries that French policy in
59 L ’Annee Politique, 1951, p.208. El-Fassi was in Cairo at the end o f  August 1951.
60 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.159, Washington to Paris, no.6023/6028, 23.8.1951.
61 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.67, Note, Nationalistes et communistes au Maroc, 4.7.1951.
62 For example, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, Memorandum for the NSC Senior Staff, 12.9.1952.
63 FRUS, 1951, V, pp. 1384-1386, Paper Prepared in the State Department, 29.8.1951.
Morocco was repressive.64 Thus for the Americans, the only solution lay in Moroccan 
self-government in agreement with France. To achieve this, the Americans were 
determined not to side with either side and in this sense they adopted a ‘middle-of-the- 
road policy’. This paper was of much significance, because US attitudes towards the 
Moroccan questions would continue to be based on the points listed in it.65
On 11 September 1951, Schuman-Acheson conversations were held in Washington 
and Schuman explained:
le Gouvemement fran5ais entend dtablir au Maroc un 6tat modeme, stable, 
d^mocratique, capable d’assumer lui-meme une part de plus en plus grande des 
responsabilitds... [L]e succes de ces efforts dependra dans une certaine mesure de la 
comprehension que les partenaires occidentaux de la France montreront k l’dgard de 
la politique qu’elle a entreprise... Un ddbat k  l’O.N.U. sur le probleme marocain ne 
saurait... qu’etre prejudiciable au progrds du Maroc... Si toutefois un tel debat ne 
pouvait etre evite, il conviendrait alors d’etudier en commun l’attitude.66
Once again, the French presentation was somewhat hypocritical since they never 
intended to give significant powers to Moroccan people. The Americans did not know 
details of the French plan but, as had previously been the case, the French argument did 
not persuade them to take the same stance with the French: opposition to UN debates on 
the Moroccan question. However, Acheson admitted that ‘Morocco was not ready for 
independence’. Concerning the forthcoming UN debates, when Schuman asked 
Acheson to discourage Arab countries’ action, the latter promised to discourage the 
Arab League countries’ raising the problem in the UN. He also agreed to examine the 
case together with the French if the problem was put to the UN.67
Failing to obtain American support, the French turned to a new tactic. Taking 
advantage of the NATO Council meeting at Ottawa later in September 1951, Schuman 
asked Acheson to exchange letters in which the US would mention that it supported the 
French position in Morocco and had no interest in its internal political affairs. However, 
Acheson did not make a clear reply.
“ ibid.
65 A ‘middle-of-the-road policy’ was also taken in the Tunisian case although the US did not have 
military bases in Tunisia.
66 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 164, Conversations bilat^rales Tenues entre Ministres des Affaires 
EtrangSres de France et des Etats-Unis, 11.9.1951.
67 FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1387-1389, US Minutes o f the First meeting of the Foreign Minister o f the US and 
France, 11.9.1951.
68 Ibid., p. 1390, footnote 4.
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2.3 The UN debates in 1951
The Egyptian government brought the Moroccan problem before the UNGA on 6 
October 1951.69 Importantly, this was the first occasion that the North African problem 
had been put to the UN. The French had already decided in July 1951 that their 
delegation must not accept the UN’s competence to intervene in Tunisian and Moroccan 
affairs which were exclusively French internal matters. It had also been decided that 
‘nos D616gu6s devraient sinon se retirer, du moins se refuser & participer au d6bat’ if the 
UN opened discussions on Franco-Moroccan relations.70
The Egyptian move made the French government both take action in Morocco and 
approach the Anglo-Saxons. Firstly, on 7 October 1951, four days after his arrival in 
Morocco, French Resident-General Guillaume met the Sultan and raised the question of 
the election of the Moroccan Section of the Government Council.71 Ten days later, a 
decree of the Vizier announced that elections for those Chambers would be held on 1 
November 1951, a measure aimed at depriving the nationalists of time for preparation72 
This decree expanded the Moroccan electorate from 8,000 to 220,000, but more than 
half of the increase was designed to cover rural areas, where the Istiqlal’s influence was 
weak. As the French had anticipated, on 27 October, the National Front announced its 
refusal to participate in the elections.73 The Moroccan people supported this, so the 
percentage of abstentions was extremely high: 95.9% in Casablanca at its highest, and 
60% on average. However, the Quai d’Orsay was pleased with this result, commenting: 
‘Cette proportion est trds satisfaisante si l’on tient compte de la violente campagne 
d’intimidation des nationalistes, des manoeuvres de 1’Istiqlal en vue de susciter des 
incidents et troubler l’ordre public.’74
Secondly, the French made contact with the Anglo-Saxons to ensure their support in 
the UN. On 9 October 1951, under Schuman’s instructions, Bonnet told Acheson that 
‘the French government had decided to fight the placing of this item on the agenda on 
the grounds that this was an internal matter under the UN Charter’, emphasising ‘the 
very great importance which the French government attached to obtaining [US] full 
support.’ Bonnet asserted that if the UN agreed to discuss the Moroccan question, Egypt
69 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol.97, Untitled, 6.10.1951. On 19 September 1951 Azzam Pasha 
had announced that the Egyptian government would take the initiative in presenting the problem to the 
UNGA. L 'Annee Politique, 1951, p.235.
70 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.646, Note pour le Ministre, 31.7.1951.
71 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.83, Rabat to Paris, no.810/814, 8.10.1951. This was an issue upon which 
the Sultan had agreed in February 1951.
72 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.95.
73 Ibid., p.96; MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.68, Note, undated.
74 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.84, Paris to Rabat, Circulaire no.209,3.11.1951.
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would inspire disorders in Morocco to back up the Arab case.75 However, Acheson 
insisted that the UN was competent to discuss this problem, although he admitted that it 
was not ‘competent to deal with this question in the sense of passing any condemnatory 
resolution or setting up a commission of investigation etc.’ Regarding Schuman’s 
proposal of September 1951 for an exchange of notes, Acheson mentioned that the State 
Department had not reached a conclusion. The French reaffirmed on 12 October that 
their delegation must oppose the UN’s competence, contrary to Acheson’s argument.76
On 9 October 1951, Francis Lacoste, the Alternate Permanent French Representative 
at the UN, informed Gladwyn Jebb, his British counterpart, that the French would 
contest the competence of the GA to discuss the Moroccan item, adding that ‘he 
assumed that in so doing the French government would have the full support of His 
Majesty’s government.’ Jebb replied: ‘such support would be forthcoming.’77 Moreover, 
the British government immediately tried to convince the Americans to adopt the same 
attitude. Harvey asked Acheson, who was then in Paris, whether ‘he could not support 
the French by voting against the Egyptian motion’. The latter responded that he had 
already made concessions to France by deciding to abstain on the vote for the placement. 
Harvey noted Acheson’s position:
it was a basic principle with the US government not to oppose the discussion of 
matters of this sort by the UN. He had already agreed to violate American tradition 
to the extent of abstaining, and even this was laying him open to strong attack by 
‘the liberal wing of the US delegation’, led by Mrs. Roosevelt. It would be 
impossible for him to vote against.78
In fact, the US government had never voted against the inscription of a colonial matter 
on the GA agenda.79 Acheson added, though, that he was ‘prepared to advise other 
Governments, if they should consult him, to vote against admission of the item onto the 
agenda’.
On 8 and 9 November 1951, the GA General Committee considered the Egyptian 
demand to include the Moroccan problem on the agenda. On the first day, Maurice 
Schumann, the head of the French UN Delegation, objected to that demand, ‘en ddniant 
la competence de l’Assemblee et en assurant que nous nous 6tions acquittes au Maroc 
de la mission confiee par le chapitre XI de la Charte aux membres des Nations Unis qui
75 FRUS, 1951, V, pp.1389-1395, Memcon by Acheson, 9.10.1951.
76 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.647, Paris to Washington, no.11922/26,12.10.1951.
77 PRO, F0371/90240, JF10113/10, Jebb to London, no.329, 9.10.1951.
78 PRO, FO371/90241, JF10113/35, Harvey to FO, no.645,6.11.1951.
79 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.647, Washington to Paris, No.7100/7119,11.10.1951.
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administrent des territoires non autonomes’.80 On 9 November, the Committee adopted 
a Canadian motion recommending that the consideration of the question of placing the 
item on the GA agenda should be postponed.81 In fact, by the beginning of November 
1951, the French had already agreed with the Anglo-Saxons that it would be best to 
work for an adjournment,82 an agreement on which the Canadian motion was based. 
This result also seemed to be due to lack of enthusiasm on the Egyptian part.83 The GA 
plenary session started examining the Moroccan problem on 13 November 1951 and 
concurred with the General Committee’s recommendation on 13 December 1951 by 
twenty-eight votes to twenty-three with seven abstentions.84
This result made the French optimistic about American intentions, presumably 
because the US vote was regarded as an abstention on the inscription of a colonial 
matter. On 24 November, Schuman wrote to Guillaume:
[un] changement... est apparu notamment a l’occasion de l’Assemblee des Nations 
Unis et de la discussion sur la plainte egyptienne... [Cette Evolution] represente de 
la part du Ddpartement d’Etat un effort de compr6hension que nous ne devons pas 
sous-estimer. 5
This optimism could have allowed the French to take a very stem stand against the 
Tunisians, shown in their note of 15 December 1951.
However, this French speculation was only an illusion. A State Department paper 
dated 21 November 1951 once again argued that the US government should pursue a 
‘middle-of-the-road policy’ towards Morocco. Moreover, American opinion was very 
critical of the US abstention.87 In addition, the French had found the Sultan’s attitude 
defiant during the UN session. On 18 November, Mohammed V had made a speech at 
the 24th anniversary of his accession to the throne, referring to the memoranda he had 
tabled to France in the autumn of 1950:
Les mdmoires... traduisent notre desir de voir les relations franco-marocaines 
ddfmies dans une convention garantissant au Maroc sa pleine souveraine..., tout en 
sauvegardant les interets des divers Elements residant dans notre empire. Nous ne
80 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Schuman vol.97, Note, 9.11.1951.
81 Ibid., Note, no.110, 10.11.1951. The countries that supported this were Canada, Dominican Republic, 
the US, France, Norway, and the UK. Those who opposed were Iraq, Poland, the USSR, and Yugoslavia.
82 PRO, F0371/95737, UP2021/3, Record of a meeting of the UK Delegation to the UNGA, 7.11.1951.
83 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10-2551, Bruce to Washington, no.2440,25.10.1951. According to Bruce, 
the Egyptians were offering instead moderation of their attitude on the Moroccan matter with the aim of 
receiving French support in the dispute with the British over the Suez Canal treaty of 1936. The Egyptian 
government was attempting to create a split between the two colonial powers.
Yearbook o f  the United Nations, 1951, pp.357-359. The US and the UK voted for this resolution.
85 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.159, Rome to Rabat, no.1037/1039,24.11.1951.
86 Chapter 1, Section 3.
87 Chapter 3, footnote 73.
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cessons d’esptier depuis lors Pouverture de negotiation h ce sujet.. .88
Thus the Sultan was planning to call for independence once again. However, as will be 
argued in Chapter 4, he was so cautious that his next step would only be taken in the 
spring of 1952.
88 L ’Annee Politique, 1951, p.299.
54
Chapter 3: The UN debates and Franco-Tunisian negotiations; Tunisia,
January 1952 to December 1952
3.1 Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia
It was Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia on 2 January 1952 that brought about a radical 
change to the evolution of Tunisian affairs. Since he left Tunisia just before the 
February 1951 agreements, he had been promoting the nationalist cause in a number of 
countries.1 Immediately after his arrival, he led a strong campaign in favour of the 
recourse of the problem to the UN. In addition, the Bey was reportedly keen to seek 
popularity among the Tunisian people by means of ‘sa collusion avec le N6o-Destour.’2 
Inside the Tunisian government, the moderates such as Prime Minister Chenik tried to 
prevent UN recourse, but Bourguiba’s speech on 8 January in Monastir, the town of his 
birth on the mid-eastern coast, pressed the Tunisian Ministers into a decision by stating: 
‘le peuple tunisien dtait dispose a verser son sang et k se charger de saisir lui-meme 
l’O.N.U.’ 3 Although the Bey and Chenik were still hesitant, Bourguiba finally 
succeeded in persuading almost all the Ministers of the Tunisian government on 12 
January.4 Bourguiba thus challenged overtly the very principle of French control of 
Tunisia.
The new Resident-General Jean de Hauteclocque arrived in Tunis on the following 
day. It was on 14 January 1952 that Salah Ben Youssef and Badra, Tunisian Ministers 
who had come to Paris the previous day, submitted a note to the UN Secretary-General, 
Trygve Lie, stating that Tunisia was convinced that the UNSC would be able to resolve 
the Franco-Tunisian dispute.5 This had all the Tunisian ministers’ signatures but not the 
Bey’s signature. The Tunisian request fundamentally changed the character of the 
problem, for this problem was highly likely to be brought to the UN in 1952 with the 
help of Arab countries. Furthermore, the US government was considered not unwilling 
to take up this problem because its failure to vote for the Moroccan problem’s 
inscription of the previous year had been severely criticised by American opinion.6 
France could not tolerate the Tunisian move, since this was a clear violation of the
1 Prior to his departure for Tunis, Bourguiba was reported as stating: ‘there is no precedent for a foreigner 
participating in the political institutions of a country in which he has not been integrated by accepting its 
nationality.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/1-252, no.3950, Bruce to Acheson, 2.1.1952.
2 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.358, Tunis to Paris, no.12/19,5.1.1952.
3 Ibid., Tunis to Paris, no.23/26, 8.1.1952.
4 Ibid., Tunis to Paris, no.44/52,11.1.1952; Tunis to Paris, no.53,12.1.1952.
5 L ’Armee Politique, 1952, p. 181.
6 Chapter 2, p.53.
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protectorate treaty. The UN, they maintained, must not intervene in their domestic 
matters. Likewise, they feared that violent anti-French activities were likely to increase 
in order to attract international attention and that the Bey and the nationalists would be 
encouraged to resist the French plan, once the problem was debated on the international 
scene.7
It was already rumoured that the Tunisians desired recourse to the UN through the 
good offices of Sir Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister.8 The Arab League 
was reportedly exercising strong pressure on him to bring the matter to the SC.9 On 16 
January, Maurice Schumann, the French Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, asked 
Jebb to advise the Pakistani government not to cede to the pressure imposed by the 
Arabs. Jebb promised ‘d’entrer immediatement en consultation avec sa delegation, et le 
cas dchdant, avec Londres, en vue de ‘faire ce qu’il pourrait’ pour... aider [les 
Fra^ais].’10 In fact, on 17 January, the FO instructed Jebb to contact Zafrullah and 
persuaded him not to raise the Tunisian question.11
The French countered the Tunisian move in a radical manner. The Quai d’Orsay 
instructed Hauteclocque on 18 January to arrest and expel Bourguiba and other Neo- 
Destour leaders from Tunis to provincial villages. This was done on the grounds that 
they had appealed to Tunisians to provoke trouble throughout Tunisia, such as the 
general strike on 17 January at Bizerta, a city on the northern coast, in order to attract 
international attention. In the absence of a regular French government, the decision on 
these instructions was taken by a Ministerial Committee that included Ren6 Pleven, 
Robert Schuman, Georges Bidault, Edgar Faure and Maurice Schumann among 
others.12
The Arab countries, for their part, were seeking the involvement of the Anglo-Saxons, 
as they wished to avoid an outright confrontation with France. On 18 January 1952, 
Zafrullah Khan told the British and American UN delegations: ‘il serait pret k s’abstenir 
de toute intervention s’il savait que les gouvemements britannique ou americain se 
proposaient d’agir comme mddiateurs entre Fran9ais et Tunisiens.’ The UK delegation 
refrained from answering.13 On 21 January, Mohamed Fadhil al-Jamali, the Iraqi 
Foreign Minister, also asked both countries for arbitration, but the British response was
7 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.361, Hoppenot to Paris, no.354/356,28.3.1952.
8 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.358, Karachi to Paris, no.35/37,16.1.1952.
9 Ibid., Paris to Karachi, no.30/32,16.1.1952.
10 Ibid., Paris to Tunis, 16.1.1952. ‘Sa’ refers to ‘pakistanaise’.
11 PRO, F0371/97090, J1041/16, FO minute, by Strang, 17.1.1952.
12 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, p.673, footnote 3; PRO, F0371/97090, JF1041/3, Tunis to FO, no.3, 18.1.1952. 
On that day, Faure was elected as Prime Minister.
13 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.358, London to Paris, no.260/263,19.1.1952.
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negative.14 Anthony Eden, the British Foreign Minister, met Zafrullah two days later, 
but only urged caution on the Pakistani part.15
In fact, these British attitudes reflected advice from Sir Oliver Harvey, the British 
Ambassador in Paris. He had argued on 17 January, one day before Zafrullah’s 
approach, that the British should never ‘undertake to try to influence the French to 
pursue a more moderate course’ for the following reason.
discussion in the UN might have embarrassing consequences, but the effect on 
Anglo-French relations of any attempt on our part to intervene in the conduct of 
their Tunisian affairs would be infinitely worse. They would be unlikely to listen to 
any advice we might give them and would only resent it.16
Thus he insisted that Britain, as a major ally of France, should not tender any advice to 
the French, even at the risk of the Arabs’ bringing the matter before the UN.17 He 
reasoned that damage to Anglo-French relations would make the prospect of solutions 
remote. The British were afraid that their intervention would produce deep-seated 
French suspicions that the Anglo-Saxons secretly wanted France out of its overseas
1 Xterritories including North Africa.
Roger Allen, the head of the FO African Department, minuted:
Although the French have behaved unwisely in many respects, we are bound on 
general grounds to support them. Moreover, on the particular case at issue HMG 
have themselves a substantial interest in preventing the discussion of the internal 
affairs of non-self-governing territories in the United Nations.19
Thus the FO believed that they, as a fellow colonial power, had to support the French 
position in North Africa, if not necessarily to individual French policies, by keeping the 
problem off the UN agenda. They believed so particularly because they felt there would 
be serious repercussions in Britain’s own overseas territories if they allowed 
international intervention over this problem. The prevailing British view was that they 
should refuse any advice on a solution to the problem at the risk of the problem being 
taken up unless the French wanted it, and that only after Arab-Asian countries decided 
to put the matter on the UN agenda, should the British try to disrupt their move.
14 El Mechat, Les Chemins, pp.166-167. No documents containing the American reaction to this matter 
have been found.
15 PRO, FO371/97091, JF1041/24 FO, the African Department to Paris, 6.2.1952.
16 PRO, F0371/97090, JF1041/7, Harvey to FO, no.38,19.1.1952.
17 The British had already adopted this position in March 1951. Chapter 2, pp.45-46.
18 In April 1951, Harvey had already pointed to this point. Chapter 2, footnote 43.
19 PRO, FO371/97091, JF1041/25, FO Minute, 23.1.1952.
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On the other hand, the French were attempting to force the Tunisians to accept the 
French plan of December 1951. On 15 January 1952, Maurice Schumann instructed 
Hauteclocque to protest gravely to the Bey that the French government rejected the 
Tunisian UN referral and demanded that the Bey dismiss the Chenik government.20 The 
following day, Hauteclocque requested Chenik’s departure, arguing that it was no 
longer possible to resume negotiations unless the Tunisians withdrew their demands in 
the UN 21 On 24 January, Hauteclocque again had talks with the Bey and Chenik and 
demanded that the Bey make a public appeal for the restoration of peace and order. The 
latter declined to do so, although he authorised Hauteclocque to issue such an appeal in 
the Bey’s name. The Bey, however, refused to recall the two Tunisian ministers and to 
withdraw the appeal to the UN.22 On 30 January, Hauteclocque tabled a note to the Bey, 
which repeated the demand of the December 1951 note for the establishment of mixed 
commissions, with the aim of examining the municipal and representative problems.23
The cool British attitude made the Arabs realise that they could not count on Britain’s 
arbitration and promoted their decision to turn publicly to the UN. On 30 January, 
fourteen Arab-Asian countries decided to address to the chairmen of both the UNSC 
and the UNGA with the purpose of drawing their attention to the grave Tunisian 
situation by referring to French actions which ‘constituent une menace & la paix et k la 
securite intemationale’ 24 On the same day, the French approached the GA chairman, 
insisting that the cause of the Tunisian crisis should be entirely attributed to the Bey and 
the Tunisian ministers.25 Subsequently, Zafrullah Khan spoke to a French official about 
Tdventuelle ndcessit6 d’une action positive aux Nations Unies dans le cas ou les 
relations franco-tunisiennes ne se detendraient pas dans un avenir prochain’ 26 Finally, 
on 4 February 1952, a meeting of the Arab-Asian UN delegations concluded that they 
should seize this opportunity to bring the problem before the SC.27
On 5 February, the Tunisians rejected the French note of 30 January. They replied 
that it was too vague on the issue of French nationals’ participation in public institutions, 
and that the French would have to terminate marshal law, which violated the principle
20 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.358, Paris to Tunis, no.35/39, 15.1.1952.
21 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Tunis to Paris, no.482, 5.3.1952.
22 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.673-674, Bruce to the State Department, 25.1.1952.
23 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, l’Evolution politique de la Tunisie depuis Juin 1950 et la Crise de 
Janvier-Avril 1952,4.1952; FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.674-675, Editorial Note.
24 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.359, Note pour le Ministre, undated. The participants were Afghanistan, 
Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Liberia, Pakistan, Syria and Yemen.
25 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.358, Note, 30.1.1952.
26 Ibid.
27 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.359, Note, 5.2.1952.
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of Tunisian sovereignty.28 The Tunisians had also approached the Americans. At the 
end of January 1952, one Tunisian Minister presented the nationalist case to Jemegan 
by stressing the moderate nature of Tunisian requests for greater autonomy and that the 
appeal to the UN was in the mildest possible form.29
Another problem was raised concerning the issue of visas to Salah Ben Youssef and 
Badra, who were staying in Paris. On 6 February they requested visas from the US 
Embassy in Paris, to visit New York as the SC was to be transferred from Paris to New 
York on 15 February. The French believed that the two Tunisian ministers wished to 
present their nationalist case in the UN, so they warned the Americans of ‘les graves 
inconvenients et la pdnible impression’ which the issuance of visas could produce. The 
Americans replied that they feared their refusal of visas could cause ‘une publicity 
beaucoup plus dommageables que bienfaisants.’30 Their apprehension came partly from 
the fact that the two Tunisian ministers had diplomatic passports issued by the French 
Resident-General in Tunisia, but it also came from the fact that their refusal would give 
a bad impression to the Arab-Asian countries. In view of American indecisiveness, the 
Quai d’Orsay decided on 14 February to terminate the two Tunisian ministers’ 
diplomatic passports. This measure deprived the State Department of the grounds to 
issue visas and averted potential embarrassment. On the same day, the Americans 
notified Bonnet that this measure was welcomed in Washington.31
The Americans were increasingly concerned with the development of Tunisian affairs, 
all the more because of the UN debates on Morocco in the previous year. The 
introduction of the problem in the UN gave them a similar dilemma to the visa case. 
Having been informed that Paris was considering changes to the Tunisian government 
in order to achieve a breakthrough, Jemegan proposed on 14 February that the State 
Department warn the French that they were ‘indulging in wishful thinking.’ The main 
points of his proposal lay in persuading them to recognise that the Neo-Destour was a 
dominant fact of life, and that the appeal to the UN was a natural and logical reaction of 
dissatisfied nationalists.32
The US Embassy in Paris agreed with Jemegan to approach the French. Therefore, 
eight days later, the State Department instructed the Embassy in Paris to present this 
proposal to them, arguing:
28 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.674-675, Editorial Note.
29 Ibid., pp.672-673, Jemegan to the State Department, 21.1.1952.
30 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.359, Note, 9.2.1952.
31 Ibid., Washington to Paris, no.1059/1061,14.2.1952.
32 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.676-678, Jemegan to the State Department, 14.2.1952.
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[the] best hope [of] keeping [the] Tunisian case out of SC is by resumption [of] de 
facto negotiations between the French and Tunisians. If [the] issue is posed in SC, 
[the] US Delegation would be obliged to follow [its] traditional policy of not 
opposing discussions there.
Thus the State Department warned the French that they would have to accept 
discussions if the case was brought to the SC.33 However, as will be argued below, the 
Americans had in fact not reached a decision as to their attitude when the problem was 
put to a vote for inscription on the SC agenda.
3.2 The UNSC debates 
In late February 1952, Paris received the information from New York that on 20 
February the Pakistani government had decided to bring the matter to the UN.34 On 28 
February, Ahmad Shah Bokhari, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative at the UN, called 
on Ernest Gross, the Deputy US Representative at the UN, stating that the Asian-Arab 
group would bring the matter before the SC. Moreover, he requested that the US 
government take the lead in presenting the case, or at least cooperate with the Asian- 
Arab group. However, Gross only promised to confer with him as soon as he had further 
information from Washington.
On 1 March 1952, Jebb told the French that the Pakistani representative had informed 
him of its government’s decision.36 Two days later, the FO instructed the British UN 
delegation to give maximum support to the French in keeping Tunisia off the agenda, 
emphasising that French-Tunisian relations were essentially a matter of domestic 
jurisdiction and therefore that the matter was outside the SC’s proper sphere. What was 
feared in London was that debates on the Tunisian problem would set a precedent, 
thereby allowing UN interference in Britain’s overseas territories.37
Seeing a clearer perspective of the problem being brought to the UN, on 5 March, the 
Quai d’Orsay sent the following instructions to Washington, New York, London and 
other capitals.
33 Ibid., p.679, The Charg6 in France (Bonsai) to the State Department, 15.2.1952; Ibid., pp.680-681, The 
Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, 22.2.1952.
34 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.359, Note, 20.2.1952.
35 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.682-684, The US Representative at the UN (Austin) to the State Department, 
no.554,28.2.1952.
36 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.360, New York to Paris, no.59, 1.3.1952.
37 PRO, FO371/97092, JF1041/47, FO to New York, no.78,3.3.1952; JF1041/46, FO to New York, no.74,
1.3.1952.
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Nous ne devons negliger aucun effort pour inciter la ddldgation pakistanaise, par 
l’entreprise de gouvemement ou de representations amies, a renoncer a ce projet ou 
tout au moins a l’ajoumer...
Vous pourrez a cette occasion faire valoir a vos interlocuteurs que toute initiative 
tendant k saisir les Nations Unies serait en 1* occurrence sans objet puisque nous 
demons la competence de 1’Organisation et nous nous opposerons formellement k 
P inscription de la question a l’ordre du jour du Conseil.38
This was the basic French position with regard to the UN. The French were adamant 
that they should prevent UN debate on the Tunisian problem, since it was regarded as 
being under France’s jurisdiction. If this proved impossible, the French intended to 
postpone the debate for as long as possible. In either case, they considered support from 
Washington and London essential.
On 6 March, Jebb visited Rend Massigli, the French Ambassador in London, to 
enquire about French tactics in the case of a UN debate. Jebb explained two options. 
The first was to oppose the inscription of the problem on the agenda. To prevent that, he 
continued, at least five oppositions or five abstentions were required. The FO preferred 
this option while, in Jebb’s opinion, the Americans would not oppose the inscription 
itself. The second was to accept the inscription and to contest the SC’s competence to 
discuss this problem. He personally recommended the second option because this would 
be ‘plus net et d’un effet politique plus certain’, 39 taking into consideration the 
envisaged US position. Thus Jebb believed it desirable that the French should accept the 
inscription, on the assumption that at any rate France’s veto could successfully block 
any anti-French resolutions.
In Paris, urgent efforts were being made to formulate a new reform plan in Tunisia in 
order to counter the Arabs’ move in the UN. Along with the Americans, the French 
considered that the immediate resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations was the best 
way of avoiding a UN debate. F rancis Mitterrand (UDSR), the Minister of State in 
charge of examining the Tunisian question, developed a liberal plan, inspired by the 
principle of dual-citizenship; that is, French settlers who had lived in Tunisia for five 
years would gain Tunisian citizenship and thereby participate in Tunisian political 
institutions. His plan consisted of, firstly, a government composed only of Tunisian 
ministers, secondly, a Tunisian representative assembly, thirdly, an economic and 
financial council with consultative power, and fourthly the Franco-Tunisian agreements
38 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.360, Paris to Washington, no.3753,5.3.1952.
39 Ibid., London to Paris, no.1088/1096, 6.3.1952.
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which would guarantee French interests. This was welcomed by Tunisian nationalists 
but severely opposed by French settlers.40
On the other hand, the Quai d’Orsay prepared a note in mid-February 1952 sketching 
out possible solutions of the three principal pending issues: a legislative national 
assembly, governmental reorganisation and the recruitment of public officials.41 As 
opposed to Mitterrand’s plan, this note demonstrated the Quai’s persistent determination 
to prevent the Tunisian people gaining any real power. Firstly, as for the envisaged 
legislative assembly, it argued that there were two possible solutions. The first was the 
establishment of a single assembly, but the Quai considered that the Tunisians would 
hardly accept the situation that ‘dans la future Assemble la moitfe des sieges soit 
reservee aux Fran5ais au cette qualite.’ Dual nationality was, therefore, proposed but 
this might enable the Tunisians to call for reciprocity, whereby they could enjoy double 
nationality in France. The second solution was the establishment of two assemblies. The 
first assembly would be composed of the Tunisians while in the second, an Economic 
Council, the French would play a key role. The latter’s remit would cover budgetary 
and economic affairs.
Secondly, regarding the governmental reorganisation, this note pointed to the 
Tunisian wish for a government composed exclusively of Tunisian ministers, apart from 
Defence and Foreign Affairs, but the Quai rejected the formation of such a government 
as premature. This note also indicated that it was out of the question to allow the 
Tunisians the control of internal security, as otherwise French settlers’ security could 
not be guaranteed. Lastly, regarding the recruitment of public officials, access would be 
open to more Tunisian people than the December 1951 plan. Contrary to these three 
questions, the Quai d’Orsay’s attitude became less intransigent over the issue of the 
French Union; it was abandoning the idea of Tunisia’s full participation in the future. 
Nevertheless, it noted: ‘on peut concevoir un accord bi-laferal dont l’esprit ne serait pas 
trds different et qui pourrait meme comporter une participation du gouvemement 
tunisien au Haut-Conseil de l’Union.’
Another Quai d’Orsay note of 28 February 1952 showed persisting but unfounded 
French optimism.
[les Ministres tunisiens] demandent que soit imnfediatement definie l’autonomie 
interne que nous leurs avons promise et que soient pfecisds les moyens de parvenir
40 L 'Annee Politique, 1952, p.193. This plan’s outline was also found in Le Monde of 22 March 1952.
41 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Note par la Direction d’Afrique Levant, 18.2.1952.
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sans delai au but. II est inevitable que le disaccord porte sur la durde des etapes. 
Toutefois une solution parait possible sur ce point.42
Thus the Quai failed to understand, or deliberately ignored, the structure of internal 
autonomy that the Tunisians called for, viewing that the difference of position was just 
about the duration of each step to ‘internal autonomy’. Perhaps this optimism was 
reflected in the firm French attitude towards the Chenik Government. Similarly, on 5 
March, Hauteclocque noted that it was desirable to open negotiations with a new 
Tunisian government, because
[s]i... la politique de persuasion et de conciliation... devait 6chouer, il faudrait 
immanquablement recourir a une solution de contraint; beaucoup de Tunisiens... non 
seulement s’y attendent, mais encore le souhaitent... [La] demission [de Chenik] 
forc£e ne paraTtra d’ailleurs pas une regression politique, si nous soumettons 
imm6diatement notre projet de reformes au nouveau Gouvemement43
Hauteclocque assumed that the Tunisian people would welcome Chenik’s dismissal as 
long as it allowed the French plan to proceed. Creating the appearance of setting the 
French plan in motion was considered urgent in order to prevent the SC debates of the 
Tunisian problem. Thus this optimism was dominant amongst the French, and in any 
case the fall of the Faure government on 29 February 1952 meant the end of 
Mitterrand’s more liberal plan.44
The French were continuing to make diplomatic efforts to thwart UN debates about 
Tunisia. Francis Lacoste, the Alternate Permanent French Representative at the UN, met 
Gross on 12 March 1952, asking him about the possible US attitude when this problem 
was taken up. The latter’s reply was quite evasive: he had informed Bokhari that the US 
would not actively oppose the inscription. Lacoste reported to Paris: ‘S’il refuse k 
Bokhari l’appui effectif que ce dernier sollicite, il n’en reserve pas moins a notre dgard 
sa liberte d’action...’45
42 Ibid., Note, 28.2.1952. This note also examined the way of guaranteeing the rights and interests of 
France and French settlers. Two ways were envisaged; one was ‘dispositions incluses dans la constitution 
tunisienne ou dans des textes organiques interne’, and the other was ‘garanties accordges par des 
conventions diplomatiques’. However, the disadvantages of both options were pointed out; ‘la premiere 
parce qu’elle remet aux mains des autoritls publiques tunisiennes qui seront ngcessairement entrainges k 
demander de plus en plus d’indgpendance... la seconde parce que l’histoire rgcente montre que les 
Gouvemements arabes n ’hgsitent pas k dgnoncer unilatgralement les Traitgs librement consentis.’ There 
was no decision taken at this stage, but, significantly, it was the second approach that the French 
government would take after the summer of 1954.
43 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Tunis to Paris, no.482, 5.3.1952.
44 Antoine Pinay was elected as French Prime Minister on 6 March 1952.
45 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.360, Hoppenot to Paris, no.131/144,13.3.1952.
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The French government felt the need to approach the State Department at a higher 
level. On 19 March, Franco-American talks were held in Washington in which Bonnet, 
Acheson, and other American officials participated.46 They discussed two questions; the 
first was about the inscription of the item on the agenda, and the second was the SC’s 
competence in the event of the item being inscribed. Bonnet discovered that the 
Americans did not share the French view on either question, however. Acheson 
mentioned that the Americans would not vote against inscribing the item and that the 
State Department in general viewed the SC as being competent to deal with the 
problem 47 Bonnet objected that the item should not be placed on the SC agenda and 
that the French would vote against inscription. He explained that the current Tunisian 
question was an internal one that the UN had nothing to do with. Nevertheless, Acheson 
added: ‘il espere vivement que la question sera reprise sans tarder [par le gouvemement 
ffan5ais] et que des conversations ffanco-tunisiennes vont pouvoir s’engager. Si la 
nouvelle en dtait annonc6e officiellement, l’appui... serait beaucoup plus efflcace.’ 
Bonnet, therefore, was able to report to Paris that the Americans did not want the 
problem to come to the SC, as this would by definition force the US to choose between 
France and Tunisia, and ultimately, France and the Arab world.
Acheson’s remark prompted the French Council of Ministers to adopt on 21 March 
1952 a plan based on the Quai’s proposal.48 Firstly, the French admitted that a 
‘homogenous’ government was a future goal, but this was rather a sugar-coat word to 
induce the Tunisians into accepting the plan. The French also denied the Tunisian 
people any rights to foreign affairs and internal and external security. Secondly, the 
French did finally approve the creation of a Tunisian national assembly. However, they 
were committed to the idea of co-souverainete, because they proposed to establish the 
economic council which was to represent French settlers’ interests. The Tunisian 
assembly would remain unable to discuss important issues like budgets. Thirdly, the 
plan explicitly noted: ‘Le Resident General conserve l’ensemble des attributions qu’il 
detient actuellement en tant que ddpositaire des pouvoirs de la Rdpublique.’ It was 
planned that the Resident-General would continue to endorse the Bey’s decrees of a 
judicial and religious character, while this power over other ministers’ decrees would be
46 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.690-692, Memcon, Washington, 19.3.1952; MAE, Tunisie, 1944-1955, 
vol.361, Washington to Paris, no.1782/92,19.3.1952.
47 In these conversations, one American official even argued that the US delegation should vote in favour 
of the inscription. He continued that in view of the SC’s peculiar voting procedures, where seven votes 
were required to inscribe an item on the agenda, an abstention was tantamount to a negative vote.
48 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Paris to Tunis, 21.3.1952. Mitterrand also put forward his plan to 
leading political figures on 21 March. L 'Annee Politique, 1952, p. 199.
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removed soon after the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal, which was 
designed to judge the legality of ministers’ decrees.49 Fourthly, this plan assured French 
participation in municipal assemblies in major cities while the Conseil des Caidat in 
other areas was to be reorganised so that it could exercise control over the budget.50
On the morning of 25 March, Hauteclocque warned the Bey that he would not present 
the reform programme for discussion unless the present Cabinet was dismissed from 
office. The Bey replied that it was impossible, but Hauteclocque demanded the 
dismissal by three o’clock that day.51 The Bey and the Cabinet once again refused. As in 
January 1952, France’s reaction was high-handed; the Resident-General arrested all the 
Tunisian Ministers except Salah Ben Youssef and Badra at midnight and ordered their 
temporary exile from Tunis to Kebili (in Southern Tunisia).52 In fact, Hauteclocque had, 
on this day, received instructions from Paris that gave him ‘les mains libres’ in order to 
resume dialogue. Two days later, much to the nationalists’ surprise, the Bey accepted 
the French plan.53
The US State Department was quite wary of these French moves. The Americans 
doubted whether the French plan would be acceptable to the Tunisians and expressed 
grave concern over the arrest of the Tunisian ministers, even though some State 
Department officials considered the French plan helpful in breaking the present impasse 
between both parties.54 On 26 March, Bonnet wrote optimistically to Paris: ‘Nous 
pouvons compter sur l’appui des autorit^s am6ricaines pour essayer d’empecher le 
ddpot de la plainte des Etats arabes et asiatiques.’55 However, what the Americans 
intended was to warn the French once more of the possible consequence of their firm 
policy. Secretary Acheson instructed the Embassy in France on the following day to 
approach Foreign Minister Schuman.
[The] [n]ew situation created by arbitrary French actions in detaining Chenik and 
other Tunisian leaders has inflamed [the] situation to such [an] extent that only 
[the] most prompt French action to begin negotiations would warrant [the] US in
49 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Paris to Tunis, 21.3.1952; vol.385, Declaration du Gouvemement 
Fran?ais relative au Plan de Reformes en Tunisie, 19.6.1952. The Administrative Tribunal was officially 
proposed to the Tunisians in June 1952, but, as will be noted later, this did not mean the transfer of 
significant powers to the Tunisians.
50 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Copie des Instructions envoyees to M. de Hauteclocque. 22.3.1952. 
For the Conseil des Caidat, see Introduction, p.l 1.
51 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.693-695, Jemegan to the State Department, no.124,25.3.1952.
52 Ibid., pp.696-697, Jemegan to the State Department, no.127,26.3.1952.
53 L ’Annee Politique, 1952, p.200; It was reported to Washington that Hauteclocque threatened the Bey 
with deposition. FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, p.714, Jemegan to the State Department, 3.4.1952.
54 For example, Ibid., pp.695-696, Bonsai to the State Department, no.5851,25.3.1952.
55 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.361, Bonnet to Paris, no.1964/1969,27.3.1952.
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attempting [to] forestall immediate inscription of [the] Tunisian matter on [the] S.C. 
agenda...56
The appointment of Shaheddine Baccouche as the new Prime Minister was announced 
on 28 March, which provoked a nationalist demonstration in front of the Bey’s palace.57 
It was also made public that a mixed commission would be convened on 24 April 1952 
with the aim of examining the French plan.58 This development was far from what the 
Americans had expected, but, nevertheless, affected their attitudes in the UN. Having 
obtained an excuse, they were eager to dissuade the Pakistanis from going to the UN. 
On that day, Acheson instructed Gross in New York to inform Pakistani Delegate 
Bokhari:
Now [it] appears French-Tunisian negotiations based on [the] French reform 
program will soon be underway. Since we believe French-Tunisian negotiations are 
[the] best means towards [the] solution [of the] problem, we consider SC 
consideration at this time undesirable.
Bonnet wrote to Paris that these instructions were entirely satisfactory to the French. He 
added that one American official had stated that the American delegation would be 
instructed to abstain in the case of a vote on the problem’s inscription or, maybe, even 
to vote against.59
However, the Pakistanis did not abandon the idea of taking up the Tunisian problem. 
On the contrary, Bokhari told Lacoste on 28 March: ‘il s’attendait “plus que jamais” k  
etre appele k  d’amoindrir k  ses yeux, et aux yeux de ses collogues asiatiques et 
africaines... le bien fondd d’un recours au Conseil’.60 Bokhari also approached one 
American UN delegate on the same day, describing the situation in the following way:
recent French arrests in Tunisia now raise a question as to whom [the] French 
will negotiate with and that it appears... that ‘[the] French will be sitting on both 
sides of table’.
He thus pointed out that the French interlocutors were not those who represented the 
Tunisian people. Rather than vote against the inclusion of the item on the SC agenda, 
Bokhari urged the US to abstain. The US official confined himself to replying that 
‘under present circumstances [the] US cannot support SC consideration.’61
56 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.700-701, Acheson to the Embassy in France, no.5753,27.3.1952.
57 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Paris to Tunis, no.692, 29.3.1952; L ’Annee Politique, 1952, p.203.
58 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.384, Paris to Tunis, no.694,29.3.1952.
59 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.703-704, Acheson to the US Mission at the UN, no.362, 28.3.1952; MAE, 
Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.361, Bonnet to Paris, no.2027/2030,28.3.1952.
60 Ibid., Hoppenot to Paris, no.376/378,28.3.1952.
61 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.704-705, Austin to the State Department, no.656,29.3.1952.
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At this point the French noted the British government’s retreat on its position; it was 
now more inclined to abstain if the inscription of the item was voted on. On 28 March, 
after receiving news of the appointment of a new Tunisian Prime Minister, the UK 
representative Jebb told French and US delegates that ‘under his present instructions if 
four other members were against inclusion [the] UK would abstain or vote against. If 
there were not four others against, Jebb said he might have to vote for inclusion; he 
thought probably, however, he would be instructed to abstain.’62 In fact, the FO 
instructed Jebb on the same day that he should abstain if the US voted for the inclusion 
but France voted against.63 This modification of the British position was probably due 
to Jebb’s proposition on the previous day. He had argued:
If the French insist on contesting the adoption of the agenda even without 
American support, they are almost bound to lose... [W]e should vote with the 
Americans and not incur the odium of supporting the French in a lost cause... [I]t 
is difficult to maintain that the SC should not even consider a complaint of this sort 
and these difficulties... greatly increased after the drastic action the French have 
now taken in Tunisia. In view of the present position as regards Kashmir, this 
would surely also be an unfortunate moment for us to come out openly against the 
Pakistanis over Tunisia.64
Presuming that the British vote, either for opposition or abstention, would not 
influence the result, Jebb suggested that the British follow the American lead in 
the UN.
On 29 March, Bokhari visited one US delegate at the UN and stated: Tacte de saisie 
pourrait intervenir... le 2 Avril, en vue d’une seance le 3 ou le 4 avril’.65 In fact, on 2 
April, thirteen Arab-Asian countries submitted a note to the SC chairman, asking him to 
convene the council immediately in order to examine Tunisian affairs.66
Alarmed by these moves, the French increased their efforts to persuade the British not 
to abstain. On 31 March, Massigli met Sir William Strang, the UK Permanent Under­
secretary. The French ambassador argued that his government was urging Gross to be 
instructed to vote against, and that the FO should also instruct Jebb to vote against, but 
Strang replied: ‘Jebb would probably abstain.’ He added that whether Jebb abstained or 
not would make no difference since in either event there would not be enough votes to
62 Ibid., pp.702-703, Austin to the State Department, no.652, 28.3.1952.
63 PRO, FO371/97094, JF1041/67, FO to New York, no.139,28.3.1952.
64 PRO, F 0371/97094, JF1041/67, Jebb to FO, no.147,27.3.1952.
65 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.363, Hoppenot to Paris, no.384/385,1.4.1952.
66 Ibid., New York to Paris, no.399, 1.4.1952; New York to Paris, no.448/453, 3.4.1952. The participants 
were, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Philippine, Syria 
and Yemen.
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place the item on the agenda.67 Maurice Schumann spoke to William Hayter, the British 
Ambassador in Paris, on 1 April, suggesting that the British vote against. He continued 
that the French had maintained complete solidarity with the British when the Persian 
problem was under discussion at the SC.68 Massigli approached Foreign Minister Eden 
two days later, urging him to modify the instructions to Jebb, emphasising that the 
British vote could affect other countries in the SC.69 It was at this moment that, 
probably under Eden’s initiative, the British government changed its position in favour 
of France. On 3 April, the FO instructed Jebb: ‘In view of renewed French 
representation here, you should vote against inclusion of this item on the agenda, 
whatever the American line.’70 
Both the Arabs and the French assumed that many countries would follow the US vote 
concerning the issue of inscription.71 Being under strong pressure from both sides, the 
State Department had not yet decided on its stance. Its indecision also reflected a deep 
division of opinion inside the government. On 2 April 1952, its UN representative 
strongly recommended that ‘we should vote for inscription’ although he added that 
postponing the consideration of the Tunisian item would be preferable. Conversely, 
the Bureau of European Affairs of the State Department had recommended that the US 
vote against, or, if that position was deemed impossible, abstain. In addition, on 3 April, 
Eleanor Roosevelt, the Representative at the Seventh Regular Session of the UNGA, 
strongly pleaded with Acheson that the Americans should not keep the problem off the 
agenda.73 On the same day, the Quai d’Orsay instructed its delegation in Washington to 
‘proc6der k une demi&re et pressante demarche aupres du D6partement Etat afin qu’il 
reconsidere son attitude et donne a la delegation amdricaine au Conseil de Sdcurit6 
instruction de voter contre 1’inscription’.74 Bonnet had talks with a State Department 
official, highlighting the following points. Firstly, the French reform plan had started to
67 PRO, FO371/97094, JF1041/91, Conversation French Ambassador with Strang, 31.3.1952.
68 PRO, F 0371/97094, JF1041/84, Hayter to FO, no.200,2.4.1952.
69 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.363, London to Paris, no. 1566/1569,3.4.1952.
70 PRO, FO371/97094, JF1041/84, Hayter to FO, no.200, 2.4.1952. As for the reason for the change of 
attitude, Eden later declared in the House of Commons that international discussions could only lead to a 
deterioration of the Tunisian situation. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.364, Massigli to Schuman, 
no.686AL, 24.4.1952. However, as will be noted below, the British motivation lay much more in the 
avoidance of a precedent in which the UN dealt with a problem of non-self-goveming territories. PRO, 
FO371/97092, JF1041/46, FO to New York, no.74, 1.3.1952; JF1041/47, FO to New York, no.78,
3.3.1952.
71 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.360, New York to Paris, no.164,14.3.1952.
72 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.709-710, Austin to the State Department, no.663,2.4.1952.
73 She reminded him: ‘our action in the GA on Morocco [in 1951] had done us a great deal of harm’. 
FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.717-718, Memorandum of Telephone Conversation by Evans, Office of the 
Secretary of State, Washington, 3.4.1952.
74 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.363, Paris to Washington, no.5653/5655,3.4.1952.
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make progress, but if it lacked support from outside, the prospect of success would be 
damaged by ‘les agitateurs locaux’. Secondly, the activities of anti-colonialist countries 
served the Soviet Union’s interest, by creating a crack within the Atlantic pact.75 It was 
on the night of 3 April, one day before the US delegation at the UN would speak at the 
SC session, that Acheson decided to abstain on the inscription.76 He instructed the 
delegation on 4 April to make a speech that it would abstain for the reason that ‘at this 
moment it is more useful to concentrate on the problem of facilitating negotiations 
between the French and the Tunisians than to engage in debate at this table.’77 
After all this, the SC rejected the inscription of the Tunisian item on the agenda on 14 
April. The delegations from Pakistan, the USSR, Brazil and Chile voted for the 
inscription, while those of France and the UK voted against. The US, Greece, the 
Netherlands and Turkey abstained.78
Thus the French successfully prevented the Tunisian problem from being discussed in 
the UNSC. They were satisfied with this outcome, but Hoppenot commented on how 
precarious the success was.
Le sentiment latent qui persiste dans tous les milieux du Conseil et des Nations 
Unies... depuis le mois de decembre dernier, va de la disapprobation ouverte a la 
critique modirie et comprehensive de nos difficultis... [L]e fait que ni nos allies ni 
nos amis ne trouvent dans leur appreciation de notre politique tunisienne des 
elements suffisants pour s’en digager, mirite de retenir toute notre attention.79
In fact, following the Moroccan debates in the UNGA in the previous year, American 
public opinion was extremely critical of the US abstention. On 18 April Bonnet noted 
that ‘[o]n parait etre frappe au Departement d’Etat par Pampleur et l’unanimiti de la 
reaction de la presse’,80 stressing that it was not until some progress in Tunisia had been 
made that US opinion would cease to criticise France.81
75 Ibid., Bonnet to Paris, no.2148/2158,3.4.1952.
76 On the morning of 4 April, one British official conveyed the FO’s view to the Americans that their 
representatives should be instructed to follow the British in voting against. She justified a negative vote 
on the ground that the inscription would prejudice the real objective of a solution through negotiations. 
However, the Americans replied that they had already decided to abstain. NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/4- 
452, Memcon, 4.4.1952.
77 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.720-721, Acheson to the US Mission at the UN, no.371, 4.4.1952. Acheson 
was reported to have said at the end of the meeting for the fmal decision that it was one of the most 
difficult decisions he had ever had to make. PRO, FO371/97095, JF1041/105, Washington to FO, 
no. 10268/62/52,4.4.1952.
78 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.364, New York to Paris, no.611/612, 14.4.1952.
79 Ibid., New York to Paris, no.647/654,17.4.1952.
80 Ibid., Bonnet to Paris, no.2521/2523,18.4.1952.
81 Ibid., Bonnet to Schuman, no.1922,18.4.1952.
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3.3 Towards a UNGA Special Session
Despite the failure at the SC, the Asia-African countries continued their efforts to put 
the problem to the UN. As early as 22 April, the thirteen Arab-Asian countries decided 
to approach other governments with the aim of proposing a GA special session. Under 
the GA regulation, they were required to collect a majority of member states (at least 
thirty-one votes) for that purpose, so the Arab-Asians started to canvass the views of 
Latin American countries’ delegations regarding this matter. On 1 May 1952, the 
former group held a meeting with the latter, and Hoppenot reported that it was certain 
that their initiative would receive a favourable reaction from the Latin American 
[hereafter LA] countries.83
The Arab-Asian countries’ new initiative made the State Department consider once 
again alerting Paris. The Americans feared that, as was the case in the SC, they would 
be confronted with a choice between France and the Arab world if there were no 
progress in Franco-Tunisian negotiations. Acheson instructed James Dunn, the newly- 
appointed US Ambassador in Paris, to convey to the Quai d’Orsay the following 
message:
(1) Our decision to abstain... [was] only to give France time to move ahead.
(2) France should have [the] opportunity [to] negotiate a long-term Tunisian 
settlement... with substantive content for bringing Tunisia along [the] road to 
internal autonomy.
(3) If no immediate progress [is] made on [the] program with substantive content 
in negotiations with representatives of Tunisian groups... [w]e would... be 
obliged to reconsider our position.
The message noted that the mixed commission, which had been expected to meet on 24 
April, had not yet been established but had been postponed until early May 1952. 
Coupled with overwhelmingly unfavourable public opinion on the abstention at the SC, 
the State Department judged it paramount to prompt the French to move ahead.84 This 
message was conveyed to Maurice Schumann on 2 May, only to provoke his surprise. 
He mentioned: ‘[the] US position of non-abstaining, if known, would cause dangerous 
reaction... on French public opinion and more particularly on representatives] in [the]
82 Ibid., New York to Paris, no.678/680, 23.4.1952; Paris to Latin American countries, Circulaire no.59,
25.4.1952.
83 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.365, New York to Paris, no.839, 2.5.1952; Secretariat des Conferences, 
Note, undated.
84 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.735-737, Acheson to the Embassy in France, no.6353,29.4.1952.
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Parliament. It would raise latter’s minds how far [the] solidarity of Atlantic nations 
could be maintained in solving particular problems’.85
On 13 May, the Arab-Asian countries reconfirmed their resolution to take up the 
matter at a GA special session. They were reported as believing that it might be difficult 
to collect more than twenty-four or twenty-five votes to support a special session, but 
that ‘si la situation continuait a se ddteriorer en Tunisie, les hesitants du groupe Latino- 
Americain cesseraient d’hesiter’. 86 Six days later, they invited several countries’ 
representatives to their meeting, although the French observed that it did not give any 
encouragement to the Arab-Asians.87
Encouraged by the Arab-Asian countries’ move, the Tunisian nationalists did not stop 
their resistance to the French plan. Indeed, as late as mid-May 1952, the mixed 
commission had not been established because there were no Tunisians disposed to 
participate.88 This being the case, on 13 May, Resident-General Hauteclocque suggested 
that the French government abandon the mixed commission and instead ‘procede k 
1’octroi unilateral des reformes’ and pointed out that the Americans wished that the 
French projects should be realised quickly enough to reassure US opinion.89 Moreover, 
on 22 May, the Bey gave Hauteclocque approval to abandon the mixed commission. 
Following his acceptance of the Chenik Government’s dismissal, he was trying to 
dissociate himself from the nationalist cause. As one French official put it to the 
Americans, the Bey was now opposed to the idea of a constitutional monarch.90 
Hauteclocque reported:
[Le Bey], sous la pression du Neo-Destour avait paru s’orienter dans le sens d’une 
souverainet6 constitutionnelle ainsi qu’en temoignait son discours au Trone du 15 
mai 1951 tandis que maintenant, sous 1’influence de M Baccouche, 
vraisemblablement, il en revient a la notion traditionnelle de la souverainetd 
absolue 91
The French, having being alerted by the State Department, decided to have high-level 
talks with the Americans. They were desperate to avoid the situation in which the 
Americans would back the Arab-Asian countries for a GA special session. On 15 May,
85 Ibid., pp.742-743, Dunn to the State Department, no.6739,2.5.1952.
86 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.365, Hoppenot to Paris, no.1009/1013, 15.5.1952.
87 The invitees were the representatives of Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Island, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Yugoslavia, Thailand, Ethiopia and Liberia. Ibid., Circulaire no.68, 5.15.1952; Hoppenot to 
Paris, no.1033/1035,19.5.1952.
88 L ’Annee Politique, 1952, p.212.
89 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.385, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.901/906,11.5.1952.
90 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.746-747, Memcon, by McBride, 5.5.1952.
91 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.385, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.998/1004,22.5.1952.
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Ambassador Bonnet called on Acheson to prepare for a Schuman-Acheson meeting.92 
Bonnet emphasised how bad the effects of Franco-American disagreements would be in 
the UN, only to find Acheson’s position unchanged. Acheson replied that before 
deciding on support, the Americans would need details of the French programmes. 
Likewise, the Tunisians had also approached the State Department to forestall the 
French move. On 13 May, Bahi Ladgham, a Neo-Destour leader in charge of 
international affairs, had mentioned to US officials: ‘in envisaging French participation 
in and control over [the] executive and legislative branches of [the] Tunisian 
government, they violate [the] French promise of last year to grant internal 
autonomy.’93
On 28 May 1952, Schuman-Acheson talks on North African affairs took place in Paris. 
The former emphasised the importance of US support, arguing that the Tunisian 
nationalists believed the US government would vote for inscription in the UN, and 
therefore that some agreement should be found between the two countries so that the 
‘extremists’ would not exploit the US position. Acheson, however, did not agree. After 
explaining the American way of thinking, which was based on traditional sympathy for 
oppressed people, he stressed that only by publicising French plans could the US 
government canalise these habits of thought satisfactorily. Nevertheless, when Schuman 
asked whether his counterpart would make a public statement regarding the necessity of 
the French presence in North Africa if the French government published the plan, the 
reply was that ‘this was not impossible.’94 This agreement was of much significance to 
the French, as for the first time the US promised support in the case of the French 
publication of their reform plan.
The conversations prompted the French to resume negotiations. Agreeing to 
Hauteclocque’s proposal of 13 May, Schuman sent instructions to him at the end of 
May: ‘Abandon [la] Commission Mixte’.95 On 5 June 1952, Hauteclocque made public 
the French plan’s outline,96 and then Schuman announced its details at the French 
National Assembly on 19 June.97 The method of negotiating apart, this plan was in
92 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.751-754, Memcon, by the Acting Deputy of Director, 15.5.1952.
93 Ibid., pp.750-751, The US Representative at the UN to the State Department, no.810, 13.5.1952.
94 Ibid., pp.766-771, US Delegation Minutes of a Meeting, 3.6.1952.
95 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.385, Reunion chezM Robert Schuman, 31.5.1952.
96 L ’Annee Politique, 1952, p.225. One week after, Acheson declared at the Committee of Foreign 
Relations of the Senate that he would recognise ‘les droits acquis’ o f France in North Africa, but this was 
far from what the French had expected as US support at the meeting of 28 May 1952. Le Monde,
13.6.1952.
97 Before his declaration, the Americans had asked the French to show them the latter’s project, so that 
they could make some suggestions, but had been rejected. FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.772-773, Acheson to 
the embassy in France, no.7283,10.6.1952.
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essence the same as that of March 1952, but with two minor changes. Firstly, it 
proposed the establishment of the Administrative Tribunal. To this tribunal, the 
Resident-General was to have the right to submit all the decrees that he considered 
illegal. The Administrative Tribunal was not to have the power to examine the Bey’s 
judicial and religious decrees. However, this tribunal would be presided over by a 
French person chosen by the members of the Conseil d ’Etat and would be composed of 
four French members and four Tunisian members, allowing the French to retain a 
majority. Secondly, this French plan proposed detailed provisions for the two national 
assemblies. In the legislative council, which would be composed only of Tunisians, the 
members were to be initially appointed by the Bey’s decree, as the Bey would 
exclusively conserve the legislative power for the time being. They would be 
progressively substituted by members elected at a local level. This plan explicitly noted 
that the Financial Council, which would deal with financial and budgetary affairs, 
would have an equal number of Tunisian and French members.98
This plan, however, did not get the approval of the National Assembly. The right 
wing attacked the government and even demanded Schuman’s resignation. One 
parliamentarian succinctly expressed his anxiety: ‘que ferez-vous si 1’Assemble 
legislative homogdne que vous envisagez proclame I’inddpendance de la Tunisie?’ 
Conversely, left wing politicians like Mitterrand criticised the plan as derisory. Being 
immensely divided, the National Assembly did not agree to the plan. Neither did this 
plan receive approval from French settlers nor Tunisian nationalists.99
The French declaration on their plan did not successfully hinder the Arab-Asian 
countries’ move. They had decided on 13 June to formally request Trygve Lie to consult 
sixty member states about a special GA session and one week later, they asked him to 
convene a special GA session.100 Under UN regulations, it was by 20 July 1952 that 
those countries would have to collect thirty-one favourable votes.
To French satisfaction, the British position remained unchanged from that in the SC. 
On 24 June, Hoppenot reported that the British UN delegation had received instructions 
to support French efforts to persuade member states’ representatives to respond
98 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.385, Declaration du Gouvemement Fran9ais relative au Plan de 
Reformes en Tunisie, Paris, 19.6.1952. Needless to say, despite the expressions used in the French note, 
the Bey’s legislative power was only nominal since it was subject to French control.
99 L ’Annee Politique, 1952, pp.225-230.
100 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.366, Hoppenot to Paris, no.1283/1285, 13.6.1952; Hoppenot to Paris, 
no.1372/1375, 18.6.1952; Hoppenot to Paris, no.1442/1449, 20.6.1952. The participants were, 
Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Syria, and Yemen.
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negatively to the UN Secretary-General’s question about a special session.101 Regarding 
the reason for the British position, Eden noted convincingly:
The interests which we have at stake are so great - no less than the political 
stability of the Colonial Empire - that I consider it to be essential that we should 
support the French to the fullest possible extent in keeping Tunisia off any UN 
agenda... We can hold the position in the Security Council and probably also in the 
Assembly, whatever the Americans do.102
On 25 June, Massigli met Strang, who confirmed that he had already instructed the 
British Embassy in Washington to persuade the State Department to take a firm position 
against the envisaged special session. Massigli asked Strang ‘d’entreprendre 
directement aupres des gouvemements sur lesquels Londres a de 1’influence, les 
demarches opportunes.’103 
It turned out that the Americans did not pose a difficult problem to the French either, 
although this never meant that they were satisfied with the French programme. Aware 
of nationalist dissension, State Department officials advised Acheson to refrain from 
any public declaration of support, contrary to the French hopes that their plan would 
receive it in accordance with the 28 May agreement.104 Still, the State Department was 
opposed to a special session, as the US had every desire to avoid a choice between 
France and the Arabs, unless it proved impossible. On 24 June, one State Department 
official spoke on television, stating that the US government was hostile to the 
convocation of a special session.105 It was for this reason that, the following day, the 
Quai d’Orsay was able to note: ‘les 31 voix requises pour une telle reunion ne seront 
pas recueillies’.106 Three days later, the US delegation replied to Trygve Lie that its 
government did not concur with the Arab-Asian request.107
On 2 July 1952, Hauteclocque reported to Paris that the Tunisian Prime Minister 
Baccouche had handed to the Bey the reform projects of the previous month.108 Then 
the Tunisian Council of Ministers started examining them and, late in July proposed a 
number of minor modifications. The French Resident-General reported that there was 
close collaboration between the French ministers and Tunisian ministers inside the
101 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.366, Hoppenot to Paris, no.1474,24.6.1952.
102 PRO, FO371/97099, JF1041/176, Eden minute, 28.6.1952.
103 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.366, no.2904/2908,25.6.1952.
104 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.778-779, Memorandum by Popper to Hickerson, 20.6.1952.
105 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.366, Washington to Paris, no.4498/4502,25.6.1952.
106 Ibid., Secretariat des Conferences, Note pour la Direction d’Afrique-Levant, no.824SC, 25.6.1952.
107 Ibid., New York to Paris, no.1513/1514,27.6.1952.
108 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.386, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.l 197/1198,2.7.1952.
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government, so the Quai noted: ‘Beaucoup de ces propositions sont d’importances 
secondaire et ne soulevent pas de difficulty. ’109 
In the UN, seeing Franco-Tunisian negotiations in progress, the prospect of 
convening a special GA session was disappearing. On 21 July, it was reported from 
New York to Paris that only ten countries had responded favourably to the thirteen 
Arab-Asian countries’ request.110 As a result, two days later, the UN Secretary-General 
informed the member states that he would not call a special session.111
3.4 The UNGA and British intervention
On 30 July 1952, the thirteen countries112 handed in a letter to the UN Secretary- 
General requesting the inscription of the Tunisian problem on the GA agenda. Unlike 
the SC or a GA special session, it was supposed, the Tunisian item would be inevitably 
taken up in the GA, given the number of Arab-Asian member states. This was going to 
provoke different reactions from the Western powers. Neither Paris, London nor 
Washington could immediately decide on its attitude, each exploring the other two 
governments’ views. The British wished to avoid influencing the French standpoint, 
even though the British did not welcome French acceptance of UN debates since it 
could have repercussions in their overseas territories.113 In fact, as will be argued later, 
the basic British position was to let France keep the initiative in Tunisian and Moroccan 
affairs, while hoping to guide French policy in the direction they considered desirable. 
In contrast, reflecting the severe criticism of their abstention in the SC vote in April,114 
the Americans strongly believed that it was very difficult for them to oppose the 
inscription. Rather, they wanted the French to accept the inscription but, nonetheless, 
did not want anti-French resolutions passed in the GA.
Several Quai d’Orsay officials had already started to have doubts about the French 
tactics of keeping the Tunisian problem off the UN agenda. On 25 July, Lacoste sent a 
telegram to Paris:
109 Ibid., Hauteclocque to Paris, no.1232/1233,19.7.1952; Note pour le Ministre, 22.7.1952.
110 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.367, Lacoste to Paris, no. 1693/1694,21.7.1952.
111FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.784-785, Editorial Note.
112 The same countries as those who had requested a special GA session.
1,3 The FO noted: ‘we are not seeking to influence [France] in any way as to the attitude she should adopt 
in the forthcoming Assembly.’ PRO, FO371/97102, JF1041/241, Draft brief for the Secretary of State for 
the visit o f Mr. Pearson. 9.9.1952. The French were aware of the British position. The French Embassy in 
London noted that the British were not willing to define their policy before knowing the French position 
in the UN. MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, London to Paris, no.3608,14.8.1952.
114 As the GA session came closer, public and press criticism in this regard was quite often referred to 
inside the State Department. For instance, FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.786-788, Acheson to the Embassy in 
France, no.548,30.7.1952.
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De nombreux Etats... considtient que, dans le cas ou les negotiations franco- 
tunisiennes actuellement en cours n’auraient pas abouti, au moment de l’ouverture 
de la prochaine session ordinaire de P Assemble, c’est-d-dire k la mi-octobre, k un 
accord dont le gouvemement tunisien se declare satisfait, PAssemblde devra se 
saisir de la question tunisienne...
Le seul fait de notre part d’accepter... Pinscription a l’ordre du jour, provoquerait 
sur P Assemble... une impression profonde, et trds favorable.115
Simply put, he insisted that as the problem would be certainly debated in the GA, the 
French acceptance of such debates was desirable because it would soften the Arab- 
Asian countries’ attitudes.
In Tunisia, despite French expectations in early July, there had been no progress in 
Franco-Tunisian dialogues. On 22 July, the Bey sent a message to Auriol, which 
surprised the French. He stated that, contrary to press suggestions that he had implicitly 
accepted the French plan put forward at the beginning of July, he had not even received 
the draft from Baccouche.116 Irrespective of whether he had really received it or not, the 
Bey was seemingly engaged in dilatory tactics, aware of the prospect of the Tunisian 
problem being discussed in the next GA session. Undoubtedly, his change of attitude 
reflected his fear that he might be overthrown if he was divided from the nationalists, as 
was the case with King Farouk of Egypt.117 On 1 August 1952, he summoned the 
Conseil des Quarante, a meeting which forty people attended including Tahar Ben 
Ammar and members of the Neo-Destour, the Vieux-Destour and the UGTT, to discuss 
the June 1952 French programme. Hauteclocque commented: ‘cette reunion convoquee 
par le Bey k l’insu de son Gouvemement et du Resident-General represente un acte 
caract6risd d’independance’.118
On 6 August, a State Department official talked with Bonnet about US attitudes in the 
UN and suggested that the French government accept the inscription of the Tunisian 
problem because otherwise France’s moral position would be worse. Although the State 
Department had not reached a conclusion in favour of the inscription, he added that the 
British UN Delegation held the same view as the US.119 Realising that the Americans 
would probably vote for the inscription, Bonnet wrote to Paris on the following day: 
‘dans l’hypothese ou nous estimerions possible et opportun de nous rallier k ses vues, le
1,5 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.367, New York to Paris, no.1752,25.7.1952.
116 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.386, Message du Bey de Tunis au President de la Ripublique,
22.7.1952.
1,7 PRO, F 0371/97102, JF1041/238, Rumbold to Allen, 10112/255/52, 6.9.1952. King Farouk was 
overthrown by the Free Officers in a coup d’etat on 23 July 1952.
118 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.386, Tunis to Paris, no.1390/1395,1.8.1952.
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Departement d’Etat nous accorderait... une aide soutenue sur le plan diplomatique et se 
montrerait aussi probablement dispose k entreprendre un r£el effort sur son opinion 
publique afin de l’orienter dans un sens favorable k notre cause.’120 
On 6 August, the State Department sounded out the British view with regard to their 
position in the UN. The Americans wanted to know whether they would cooperate in 
persuading the French.121 However, the British reply was rather negative:
1. If [the] only question were that of UN tactics, [the] Foreign Office agrees that 
probably France should not object to [the] inscription of [this] item on the 
agenda...
2. On principle, however, [the] UK believes [the] issue raised is one of deepest 
concern both to France and to [the] UK... [The] importance of this question of 
principle has been agreed by Eden and [the] Secretary of State for Colonies.
4. [The] Foreign Office thinks it would be unfortunate if [the] US and UK 
should appear to be putting pressure on France.122
Eden later told Massigli: ‘I still took the view that the main debate ought not to take 
place until after the [US] presidential election. It seemed completely crazy to have 
international discussions of this kind in the last fortnight of the campaign.’123 Thus, the 
British desired to keep the problem off the agenda at least until the beginning of 
November 1952. Nevertheless, London would not reach a decision on this matter until 
the French attitude was made clear.
From the French viewpoint, the ideal course of action was the Tunisian acceptance of 
their plan, as had hitherto been the case. Its probability would increase, they speculated, 
if it became clear that the Americans supported that plan. Therefore, the Quai d’Orsay 
instructed the embassy in Washington to approach the State Department, with the 
purpose of obtaining approval from Acheson to issue a declaration to support the French 
position in North Africa, which the French considered had been envisaged at the time of 
Schuman-Acheson talks on 28 May. Likewise, the Embassy in Washington was 
instructed to ask the State Department to approach Tunisian Prime Minister 
Baccouche.124 The Americans, the French expected, would convince the Tunisians of 
their view that the settlement of Franco-Tunisian disputes could only be achieved
120 Ibid., Washington to Paris, no.5638/5645,7.8.1952.
121 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, Massigli to Paris, no.3427/3428, 6.8.1952; London to Paris, 
no.3523/3524, 9.8.1952.
122 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.793-794, The Chargd in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the State 
Department, no.668,6.8.1952.
123 PRO, FO371/97102, JF1041/233, Eden to Harvey, no.876,2.9.1952.
124 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, Paris to Tunis, no.1972/1975, 9.8.1952. Interestingly, it was Eden 
who firstly proposed to Massigli the idea of letting the Americans talk to the Tunisians. Ibid., Massigli to 
Paris, no.3427/3428, 6.8.1952.
77
through bilateral negotiations.125 Hauteclocque initially disliked the idea of a US 
approach to the Tunisians, because ‘nous devons eviter de creer nous-memes le 
precedent dangereux que constituerait une prise de contact directe du Consul General 
des Etats-Unis avec les milieux nationalistes’, but he finally agreed with the Quai that 
Acheson’s declaration of support would outweigh any disadvantages.126
On 12 August, Jean Daridan, an official at the French Embassy in Washington, met 
David Bruce, the US Acting Secretary of State, to ask for a declaration to support 
France. However, the latter refused, mentioning that a decision was impossible as 
Acheson was on leave.127 On the same day, a French official in London told Sir James 
Bowker, the Director of the FO African Department, that British assistance would 
encourage Acheson to decide in favour of such a declaration.128 Then Maurice 
Schumann again instructed Daridan to approach the State Department and asked him to 
emphasise: ‘Notre plan de reformes n’a de chance d’etre acceptd par le Bey et ses 
Conseillers que si ceux-ci sont convaincus de la vanite de leurs efforts pour intdresser k 
leur cause les Etats-Unis.’129 On 20 August, Daridan met Bruce again and highlighted 
the importance of Acheson’s declaration, especially because the Bey’s reply to the 
French plan was supposedly imminent, only to find Bruce’s position unchanged.130 At 
this time, desperate to obtain US support, Schuman was becoming favourably disposed 
towards the inscription of the Tunisian problem; on 20 August, he declared in the 
Foreign Affairs commission of the National Assembly: ‘la France pourrait peut-etre 
accepter 1’inscription... mais qu’en aucun cas, il ne faudrait accepter un debat... avec 
ses corollaires (conclusions, Commission d’Enquete).’131
On the following day, Jefferson Jones, the US Consul General in Tunis, had talks 
with Baccouche. The former stated: ‘la Charte des Nations Unies veut que les parties en 
cause recherchent une solution par voie de negotiation... Un ddbat a l’Assemblee 
Generate et meme... une resolution... pourraient meme retarder la possibility de rdaliser
125 In fact, the State Department had conveyed this view to a Neo-Destour member on 6 August. Ibid., 
Washington to Paris, no.5602/5607,7.8.1952.
126 Ibid., Hauteclocque to Paris, no.1444/1447,11.8.1952.
127 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.795-796, The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Tunis,
13.8.1952.
128 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, London to Paris, no.3555/3556, 12.8.1952. On 20 August, the 
British Embassy in Washington approached the State Department to urge support for France in Acheson’s 
declaration. Ibid., Washington to Paris, no.5858.20.8.1952.
129 Ibid., Schumann to Washington, no.13194/13196,14.8.1952.
130 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.798-799, The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France, no.1041,
22.8.1952.
131 L ’Annee Politique, 1952, p.247.
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des rdformes desirables.’132 This was what the French expected the State Department to 
tell the Tunisians. However, the Americans wished to maintain a balance between 
France and Tunisia. On 1 September 1952, to French embarrassment, Ernest Gross 
announced in a radio interview that, firstly, the Tunisian problem would be taken up in 
the GA unless the Franco-Tunisian negotiations reached a conclusion, and secondly, 
that there would be no constructive solution without agreement by ‘real representatives’ 
of the Tunisian people.133 Obviously, he was referring to the Neo-Destour when he 
stated ‘real representatives’.
On 5 September 1952, Franco-American discussions were held at a higher level than 
previously. Bonnet highlighted the significance of Acheson’s proposed declaration, but 
Acheson again refused, and instead remarked: ‘the opportunity might be given if France 
made known that it would not oppose the question of inscription’. Bonnet replied: ‘this 
would be entering a vicious circle for the French government could not think of 
deciding its position before having obtained a formal promise of support from the 
United States’. 134 Aware of American intentions, Bonnet wrote to Paris on 11 
September, once again proposing that the French government announce its intention not 
to oppose the inscription.135 Meanwhile, on 9 September, die State Department 
discussed with a French diplomat a deal, in which the Americans would issue a 
statement to confirm their support for the French position in North Africa in return for 
French acquiescence regarding inscription. A State Department memorandum dated 16 
September outlined the envisaged statement, in which the US would declare that it 
considered the GA should have as its goal the resumption of Franco-Tunisian 
negotiations but that the US vote for inscription was not a vote of censure of French 
policy in Tunisia.136 This would have been similar to the sort of statement that the 
French had longed for from the US.
On the other hand, the British government was determined to follow the course that 
the French would adopt. After noting the Canadian approval of the inscription, the FO 
argued:
132 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, Tunis to Paris, no.493/495,21.8.1952.
133 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.801-803, Memcon, by Acheson, 5.9.1952, footnote 1; MAE, Tunisie 1944- 
1955, vol.368, New York to Paris, no.2016/2020,4.9.1952.
134 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.801-803, Memcon, by Acheson, 5.9.1952.
135 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.368, Washington to Paris, no.6322/6334,11.9.1952.
136 Both sides insisted that the other should first make an announcement to that effect, though, in order to 
dispel public suspicions of the other country’s intentions. NARA, RG59, Lot58, D48, Entry 1293, Box 5 
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If a precedent is set in the case of Tunis[ia] for the discussion by the UN of such 
affairs, Cyprus and other British territories may well come next. The strategic 
consequences... would be most grave. Nevertheless we recognise the importance of 
the Tunisian question for France and we are not seeking to influence her in any
137way...
The British were fully aware o f the danger resulting from the inscription o f the 
Tunisian question but felt it was essential to support France to the detriment o f 
damages to their own overseas territories.
It was on 9 September that the Bey put forward a reply to the French plan. This was a 
severe blow to French hopes. He wrote:
[les Riformes] ne repondent... pas aux objectifs minimaux que Nous avons 
Nous-meme definis notamment le 15 mai 1951 et le 31 octobre de la meme annee. 
Au surplus, elles ne constituent nullement un acheminement vers l’autonome 
interne solennellement promise par le Gouvemement Fran?ais.138
As the Quai d’Orsay noted, obviously the Bey was largely influenced by the Conseil des 
QuaranteP9 Auriol sent back a message to the Bey six days later, warning ‘qu’il n’a 
pas dependu de la France de poursuivre avec le Bey de Tunis des conversations sur la 
base d’un plan de reformes, dont M Acheson a reconnu le caractere raisonnable.’ 140 
Thus, the French attempted to ascribe the deadlock in negotiations to the Tunisians.
The French government had not yet decided on its attitude in the event that the 
problem’s inscription on the GA agenda was put to a vote.141 The Bey’s rejection of the 
French plan only added difficulties to the French position. According to Dunn, in mid- 
September, Robert Schuman was intent on avoiding actively opposing the inscription.142 
Moreover, some diplomats of France’s allies, such as Lester Pearson of Canada and 
Gladwyn Jebb, were trying to convince the French of the desirability of not opposing 
the inscription.143 It was in these circumstances that Schuman made a statement at the 
Anglo-American Press Club on 24 September: ‘in coming to a decision the French 
government would have to weigh very carefully the views of the other governments, in
137 PRO, FO371/97102, JF1041/241, Draft brief for the Secretary of State for the visit of Mr. Pearson.
9.9.1952.
138 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.386, Le Bey to Auriol, 9.9.1952.
139 Ibid., Paris to Tunis, Circulaire no.l 19,14.9.1952.
140 Ibid., Note, 15.9.1952.
141 In early August 1952, a French official had explained to the British the division of opinion inside the 
government. According to him, Pierre Pflimlin, the Minister of Overseas France, opposed debates on this 
problem, while Schuman was more subtle. Prime Minister Pinay was closer to Pflimlin. PRO, 
FO371/97101, JF1041/224, Hope Minute, 8.8.1952.
142 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.811-812, Dunn to the State Department, no.1711,18.9.1952.
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particular the UK, the US and the governments of South America.’144 It should be noted 
that this was a rare case in which the French government expressed its intention to 
consult other governments in deciding its colonial policy.
Schuman’s announcement made the State Department formally decide to vote for the 
inscription. Under Acheson’s instructions of 26 September, Dunn informed Schuman of 
this decision at the end of September. The reasons were, firstly, that the Tunisian 
situation was at a standstill, unlike the situation in the spring of 1952 when the French 
were about to present their plan. Secondly, as the problem would certainly be inscribed 
no matter what position either France or the US took, they could be more influential in 
the actual consideration of the problem.145 Besides, it is important to emphasise that 
State Department officials favoured the idea of granting a hearing to representatives of 
the Bey and the Sultan, as the Arab-Asians desired. This was what the French had to 
prevent at all costs, since, from their viewpoint, France had exclusive jurisdiction over 
Tunisia. Hoppenot and Bonnet told the Americans on 30 September that Paris was 
unlikely to consent to this idea, but that the government might accept the idea only if it 
realised that the alternative would be the GA’s invitation of Salah Ben Youssef.146 The 
State Department simultaneously started promoting mediation between the French and 
the Arab-Asians; American officials suggested JoSo Carlos Muniz, the Brazilian UN 
representative and also the chairman of the GA First Committee, as a person who 
should assume leadership in persuading the GA to adopt a moderate resolution.147 The 
Americans were pursuing a ‘middle-of-the-road policy’148 and therefore did not wish to 
see the GA close with the Arab-Asians’ total victory or their complete defeat.
However, the British decision was quite opposite to that of the US. Realising French 
intentions to listen to other governments, the British government finally determined its 
own attitude, expecting that it would influence the French. On 2 October 1952, Massigli 
sent a telegram to Paris about the British decision.
Sir Oliver Harvey resoit pour instruction de faire savoir k Votre Excellence que 
le Gouvemement Britannique souhaiterait que nous nous opposions a 1’inscription...
[L]e Gouvemement Britannique estime... qu’il importe... d’eviter de creer un 
precedent qui ne manquera pas d’etre invoque plus tard pour tenter de porter 
devant les Nations Unies d’autres questions concemant des territoires dependants... 
On semble determine ici k se prononcer contre 1’inscription, meme au cas ou [sic]
144 PRO, FO371/97102, JF1041/246, Paris to London, no.397,25.9.1952.
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nous deciderions d’accepter 1’inscription, quitte a contester ensuite la competence 
des Nations Unies.149
The following day, Paris received an aide-memoire from the British to the same 
effect.150 Thus the British explicitly challenged the US position of accepting the 
inscription.
This British decision introduced a fundamentally new element. Actually, it was due to 
this British intervention that the French ultimately changed their course, which had been 
more or less inclined to the acceptance of the inscription. It was argued:
II est bien evident... que ni le Parlement, ni le pays ne comprendraient que la 
d616gation fran9 aise acceptat l’inscription de la question tunisienne k l’ordre du jour 
de l’Assemblee, alors que la delegation britannique s’y opposerait...
[La demarche anglaise] nous promet un appui plus 6nergique... de la d616gation 
britannique au sein du Comit6 et devant l’Assemblee. Elle nous foumirait en meme 
temps, pour expliquer aux Am6ricains ce refiis.
Sur le terrain de principes, la position anglaise est certainement tres forte: 
accepter l’inscription... affaiblit sans aucun doute notre position morale et juridique 
et risque de cr6er... un facheux prec6dent.151
The Quai d’Orsay sought reconfirmation of the British intentions. On 7 October, 
Massigli asked Eden ‘si... [les] Britanniques et Fran9ais se trouvaient d’adopter la meme 
attitude, il devrait... en r£sulter dans la suite des d6bats une solidarity complete des deux 
delegations et la volont6 de concerter ytroitement leur action.’ The latter replied firmly, 
‘c’etait bien ainsi qu’on l’entendait ici.’152 
Consequently, the French Council of Ministers decided to oppose the inscription of 
the problem on 7 October. With reference to Acheson’s instructions of 26 September, a 
Quai d’Orsay official informed the Americans of this decision on the same day, 
reasoning: ‘US [was] not openly and actively supporting France on [the] competence 
question but that support was of more indefinite nature which could not be guaranteed 
to assure favorable outcome [of] these issues before [the] UN.’153 Namely, the French 
chose the UK rather than the US as a partner with whom to handle the North African 
problems in the UN. This was a critical moment when the French decided to defend its 
colonial policy as a whole at the expense of possible short-term benefits in North Africa
149 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.369, Massigli to Washington, no.4173,2.10.1952.
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brought about by US support. This sudden French decision seriously perplexed the 
Americans. Acheson instructed the Embassies in Paris and in London on 10 October to 
explore detailed French tactics and the nature of the British support.154
On the following day, Maurice Schumann instructed the UN delegation to vote 
against the inscription both in the GA First Committee and its plenary session. The 
delegation was also instructed to make every effort to get the examination of the North 
African items placed low down the agenda, once the inscription was decided on.155 This 
meant that the French delegation would have to stay at the GA session during debates 
on North Africa. However, the Quai modified its position on 14 October, instructing 
the delegation to abstain from both the First Committee and the plenary session, if the 
inscription was decided on.156 It was pointed out that these new tactics would deprive 
the French delegation of a chance whereby it could try to prevent the GA from passing a 
resolution hostile to France. Nevertheless, it was perhaps judged that the new tactics 
were more consistent with the principle that the UN was not competent to deal with 
internal affairs, the principle to which the French government attached much importance, 
and that the advantage derived from this consistency would outweigh the disadvantage 
deriving from non-attendance.157
On 22 October, the GA First Committee discussed the Arab-Asian motion which 
proposed placing the Tunisian and Moroccan questions second and third on the GA 
agenda respectively, following the Korean War question. The Committee voted for this 
motion, with fifty-one votes in favour, five against, and four abstentions. To French and 
British surprise, Gross voted for this motion. His vote astonished Hoppenot, who had 
observed that ‘[Gross] nous preterait tout son appui pour maintenir ces deux questions 
en fin de liste.’158 From Tunis, Resident-General Hauteclocque reported: ‘l’inscription 
de la question tunisienne... a etd salute ici, dans les milieux nationalistes, comme une 
ddfaite de la France.’ In fact, the number of violent activities of Tunisian nationalists 
had increased particularly a few days before the opening of the GA session.159 The 
French press harshly attacked the US vote.160
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Hoppenot protested against the US vote when he met Secretary Acheson immediately 
after the First Committee session. Acheson insisted that the US negative vote would not 
have brought any change to the result and that Gross voted on his own judgement, but 
added that his vote must not be interpreted as a sign of the attenuation of US 
determination to assist the French to the fullest extent.161 Nevertheless, Gross actually 
decided to do so, because ‘developing Asia-African sentiment for early consideration of 
Tunisia’ after the GA session’s opening had put the US delegation in a position to 
choose Korea or Tunisia as the first item to be discussed.162 The rise of this sentiment 
was unquestionably caused by the Sultan’s revelation o f Franco-Moroccan dialogues on 
8 October 1952.163
The French reactions were alarming to the Americans. The State Department started 
examining a letter from Acheson to Schuman in order to allay French worries, although 
it had rejected the idea of making a public statement in support of France. On 27 
October, Dunn was instructed to emphasise orally that ‘no other countries could give 
effective assistance to the French if they did not make a strong presentation at the 
United Nations regarding their achievements and programs for North Africa.’164 Then 
the Americans revived an idea of a Brazilian draft resolution when Jessup met 
Hoppenot on the following day. Jessup warned the latter that the Arabs could win a 
majority for an anti-French proposal ‘if we sat back and did nothing’ and mentioned 
that there was a good probability of obtaining sufficient support from the LA 
delegations to get a moderate resolution passed ‘if the French could decide on an 
affirmative and constructive position now’. However, regarding the issue of inviting 
representatives of the Bey, Jessup was not opposed to this and even expected ‘the 
likelihood of a French defeat’. Hoppenot took note of the first point, but underlined that 
the French could under no circumstances acknowledge that France was responsible to 
the UN in this matter.165
The Bey’s declaration of his support of UN recourse on 28 October166 pressed the 
French government into accepting Schuman’s attendance, however. Now that it was 
clear the Bey’s representative would present a strongly nationalist case if invited to the
161 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.369, New York to Paris, no.2508/2512,23.10.1952.
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GA, US support was considered essential.167 As soon as Schuman received a letter from 
Acheson on 31 October suggesting his own presentation at the GA, he drafted a letter 
dated the same day.168 His letter, transmitted to Washington on 3 November 1952, 
stated that he was arriving in New York on 7 November in order to make a speech in 
the GA three days later.169
Schuman’s acceptance contributed to moderating American attitudes concerning the 
invitation of North African representatives. When Massigli had met Bruce in 
Washington on 31 October, the latter was willing to support granting an oral hearing to 
North African representatives. Alarmed by this remark, Massigli, under the Quai 
d’Orsay’s instructions, asked Eden on 4 November 1952 to persuade the State 
Department to oppose this oral hearing.170 However, when Oliver Franks, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, met Acheson on 6 November, it turned out that the latter 
intended to vote against on the issue of North African representatives if it was put to a 
vote.171 The FO noted that this was an improvement on the original US position.172 
Schuman’s acceptance of GA attendance alone did not, nonetheless, explain all the 
reasons for the US concessions, since the Americans had favoured an oral hearing even 
when France was inclined to accept UN debate. Presumably, in view of strong French 
reactions after Gross’s vote on 22 October and, more generally, the Anglo-Franco 
common front, Acheson had already decided to withdraw the US insistence over this 
issue on condition Schuman attended.
In addition to an oral hearing, the Americans had already started trying to dissuade 
the Arab-Asian countries from passing an anti-French resolution. When Acheson had 
talks with Schuman, who had just arrived in New York on 7 November 1952, he 
revealed that he had already contacted Zafrullah Khan, the Pakistani UN representative, 
who Acheson said expressed ‘his desire to be helpful’ to the Americans. Schuman 
replied that there could be no resolution ‘officially’ acceptable to France, but promised 
that the French delegation would provide maximum assistance to the US delegation in
167 See this Chapter, p.81.
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order to get a moderate resolution passed.173 Then Schuman made a speech in the UN in 
which he redefined French policy towards the North African protectorates but 
mentioned that the French delegation would not attend the GA First Committee. This 
triggered difficulties with the Brazilians, who did not wish to present their resolution 
unless the French attended the First Committee, as Muniz complained to Schuman on 
15 November.174 The French delegation would refuse to participate as it was thought 
that a Brazilian resolution possibly implied GA competence, explained Schuman.175 The 
Americans were adamant. On 21 November, Jessup met Muniz and strongly suggested
17Athat he introduce a moderate resolution.
Debates on the Tunisian problem were opened in the First Committee on 4 December 
1952. Two days before, the thirteen Arab-Asian countries had introduced their draft 
resolution which recommended, firstly, that negotiations be resumed between the 
French government and the Tunisian people’s true representatives for the purpose of 
implementing the right of self-determination, and secondly, that a commission of good 
offices be formed to arrange and assist in the proposed negotiations. Subsequently, on 8 
December, the LA countries presented their draft resolution, which expressed the hope 
that the parties would continue negotiations with a view to bringing about self- 
government for Tunisians while safeguarding the legitimate interests of the French.177 
Two days later, the Arab-Asians proposed inviting the Bey’s and the Sultan’s 
representatives, but this proposition was turned down. Undoubtedly, this result reflected 
the US change of stance. Finally, on 12 December, the First Committee rejected the 
Arab-Asian draft resolution by twenty-seven votes to twenty-four with seven 
abstentions, and instead approved the Latin American draft resolution by forty-five 
votes to three with ten abstentions.178 The GA plenary session, held on 17 December, 
decided to follow the First Committee’s recommendation and passed the LA draft 
resolution by forty-four votes to three with eight abstentions.179 In fact, one day before 
the vote in the First Committee, Jamali of Iraq had suggested to Muniz that the Arabs
173 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.839-845, Draft Memcon, by Acheson, New York, 8.11.1952.
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176 NARA, RG59, Lot53 D65, Entry 1496 Box 4, US Delegation to the Seventh Session of the GA, 
[Tunisia - Memos of Conversation], Memcon between Muniz and Jessup, 21.11.1952.
177 UNGA Official Records, vol.7 1952-53, First Committee, p.193, p.206, p.231. The LA countries that 
presented the resolution include Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
178 Ibid., pp.270-271. Britain voted against the Arab-Asian draft resolution and abstained on the LA 
resolutions.
179 UNGA Official Records, vol.7 1952-53, Plenary Meetings, p.382.
86
would vote for the LA resolution if theirs was defeated, because ‘no resolution would be 
by far the worst solution.’180 The GA debates closed with the passage of the moderate 
resolution with an overwhelming majority.
From the French viewpoint, this was not a disastrous result but, nevertheless, a 
sinister precedent whereby the UN took up a colonial matter. More important was the 
fact that the US voted for the GA resolution, since this was a great encouragement to the 
North African nationalists. In fact, on 23 December, Bourguiba noted: TAmerique a 
fait un petit pas de plus... [EJlle a vot6... la competence de l’O.N.U.’ He correctly 
regarded the American vote as ‘un sursis’.181 However, on the other hand, the French 
decision in October 1952 had indicated their determination to fight against any UN 
intervention with Britain’s collaboration, and anyway they ignored the GA resolution. 
Besides, most Tunisian nationalists had already been expelled in January and March 
1952. With this background, the French were to renew attempts to force the Bey and the 
nationalists to surrender, for the Bey’s acceptance of their plan was considered as a 
prerequisite for obtaining US support promised at the Schuman-Acheson talks in May 
1952.
The Resident-General met the Bey on 15 December, three days after the GA First 
Committee’s rejection of the Arab-Asian draft resolution. Hauteclocque insisted on ia  
necessite qu’il y avait de rompre avec les atermoiements qui, depuis mon arrivee en 
Tunisie, paralysaient les affaires publiques au detriment des bonnes relations du 
Souverain avec la France et pour le plus grand dommage du Pays.’ In reply, the Bey 
undertook to seal ‘ce soir meme’ the two decrees on the municipal reform and the 
Conseil des Coidat.182 These two decrees constituted the third element which the French 
had intended to introduce to Tunisian political institutions since the summer of 1950. 
However, in spite of his promise, the Bey was not yet ready to commit himself to 
signing the decrees and, once Hauteclocque had left the Palace, he suddenly stated that 
he refused to sign. The Resident-General commented: ‘le souverain est retombd sous 
l’influence de ses deux fils, Chedly et Mohamed et de son gendre’.183
The French were determined to force him to withdraw his refusal. Robert de 
Boisseson, an official at the Residency in Tunis, had talks with the Bey on 20 December 
1952, and delivered Foreign Minister Schuman’s letter which emphasised that his
180 NARA, RG59, CDF, 320.11/12-1152, Memcon, 11.12.1952.
181 Bourguiba, M a r  Vie, 1952-1956, pp.176-178. He concluded this note by optimism: ‘La victoire du bon 
sens et la justice sera peut-Stre longue k venir, mais elle viendra... et nous l’aurons m6rit6e!’
182 MAE Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.387, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.2118/2122,15.12.1952.
183 Ibid., Hauteclocque to Paris, no.2142/2126,15.12.1952.
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refusal was damaging the function of governmental institutions. The Bey once again 
changed his mind. Boisseson reported to Paris that the Bey assured him that he would 
‘tr&s volontiers’ seal the decrees.184 Thus, the French finally succeeded in forcing the 
Bey to accept the reform plan. At the end of 1952, it appeared to the French that a better 
prospect of realising their purpose was opened: the introduction of a political regime 
based on the principe de co-souverainete and, ultimately, Tunisia’s adherence to the 
French Union.
184 Ibid., Tunis to Paris, no.2155/2158,20.12.1952.
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Chapter 4: The Deposition of the Sultan; Morocco, January 1952 to August
1953
4.1 UN Debates in 1952 and the Casablanca Massacre
Despite the Tunisian recourse to the UN, Moroccan political leaders did not react in 
any significant way at the beginning of 1952. As the French observed, the Sultan was 
watching the Tunisian situation closely to ascertain whether the French would decide to 
revise Tunisia’s protectorate status. It was on 2 February 1952 that Prince Moulay 
Hassan stated in an interview to the press that the Sultan’s idea was based on the 
following points:
1) Le Maroc accedera fatalement a la pleine souverainete et k l’inddpendance.
2) L’independance acquise, les Fran9ais pourraient etre trails... comme des 
privil6gi£s.
3) En aucun cas, le Sultan actuel... ne consentirait k 1’entree du Maroc dans 
l’Union fran^aise.
4) Les accords passes par la France avec les Etats-Unis d’Amerique au sujet 
des bases adriennes dtablies au Maroc... sont contraires au Traitd de Fds.1
The Quai d’Orsay commented that the sovereign was under strong pressure from the 
Istiqlal: ‘Le Sultan... s’efforce... de louvoyer entre le Protectorat qui garantit son regne 
et les nationalistes’. This view more or less reflected the French over-confidence that his 
domestic position still relied on France’s recognition of him as a sovereign, but the 
French were perhaps aware that he had to maintain a careful balance between the 
nationalists and the traditionalists. It was noted: ‘le Sultan n’est pas assez sur de la 
cohesion de PEmpire cherifien, ni des capacity de ses futurs ministres, pour vouloir se 
priver d’emblee du soutien militaire et de l’aide technique d’une puissance £trangere 
modeme, c’est-^-dire de la France’, suggesting that the French had to prove to him that 
the French presence in Morocco was indispensable.
Finally, Mohammed V made up his mind about publicising his requests to France, as 
a result of the Pakistani submission of the Tunisian problem to the UN on 12 March 
1952. He addressed to the French government a memorandum composed of three 
demands on 14 March: (1) the removal of martial law and the right to form trade unions,
(2) the constitution by the Sultan of a government, and (3) negotiations on the revision
1 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.84, Note, Direction G6n£rale des affaires politiques, 9.2.1952.
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of Franco-Moroccan relations.2 The Sultan then sent his entourage to the Americans on 
27 March in order to explain his intentions. An American official in Tangier was 
notified that, firstly, the Sultan did not want to introduce a change in the form of 
Sharifian government but wanted to modify the composition of the present Sharifian 
government and make it capable of negotiating with France. Secondly, the Sultan 
adamantly refused to join the French Union, which would make direct access to the UN 
impossible to Morocco, but would accept Morocco’s becoming part of a French 
Commonwealth in the same manner that India and Australia were part of the British 
Commonwealth.3 On 30 March, he circulated in Rabat by car to show his stance to the 
Moroccan people and to demonstrate his nationalist attitude. Thus, by the end of May 
1952, ‘[l]e Sultan a largement regagne le terrain qu’il avait perdu en fevrier 1951.’4 
Paris was unwilling to respond to the Sultan’s memorandum at this stage, presumably 
because it was so preoccupied with the Tunisian question in the UN.5 In April and May 
1952, the French were keen to secure American support in view of their abstention on 
the inclusion of the Tunisian item on the SC agenda and the Arab countries attempting 
to hold a special GA session.6 Bonnet suggested to Paris that the government approach 
the Americans and emphasise the importance of their role in affecting other 
governments’ voting in the UN.7 On 13 May 1952, Bonnet underlined to McBride that 
‘to give the Moroccans the impression that [the Americans] felt the Treaty of Fez was a 
threat to the public order of Morocco would be... an incitement to disturbances’, and 
added that Schuman wished to discuss the entire North African situation with Acheson.8 
Two days later, Bonnet passed on to Acheson Schuman’s suggestion that the Americans 
‘could decide on [the] nature and scope of discussions establishing common policy... 
for North Africa... in UN’.9 Acheson replied, however, that the next Franco-American
2 Julien, L 'Afrique du Nord, p.334. Le Monde also reported this but its details were not published. Le 
Monde, 22.3.1952.
3 NARA, RG59, CDF 651.71/3-2752, The Diplomatic Agent at Tangier (Vincent) to the State Department, 
Despatch no.512, 27.3.1952. ‘The present Sharifian government’ meant the Maghzen. See Introduction, 
footnote 44.
4 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, de Blesson to Schuman, no.1115, 29.5.1952. Jacques de Blesson was 
assigned to the Residency in Morocco.
5 As for a reason for this delay, Harvey later noted that Schuman was notorious for his distaste for 
tackling the Moroccan problem during his long term of office. PRO, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey 
to FO,no.289, 21.8.1953.
6 Chapter 3, Section 3.
7 MAE, AM 1952-1963, Etats-Unis, vol.359, Bonnet to Schuman, no.2031,25.4.1952.
8 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.600-602, Memcon by McBride, 13.5.1952. McBride was then an official in 
the Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, the State Department. Bonnet 
insisted that any kind of disagreement with the Americans would be made use of by Moroccan 
nationalists, mentioning that the nationalists were already considering that the US presentation at the 
International Court of Justice proved their basic sympathy with the Moroccan cause.
9 NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.022/5-1752, Acheson to Paris, no.6820,17.5.1952.
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conversations ‘ne pourraient etre pleinement efficaces que si nous [les Fran9ais] dtions 
en mesure d’exposer... l’ensemble de notre [les Fran9ais] politique africaine’.10 The 
Schuman-Acheson conversations took place on 28 May 1952, when the latter promised 
that the US would support the French presence if France announced its reform plans in 
the North African protectorates.11
On 7 August 1952, the Iraqi government requested UN Secretary-General to include 
the Moroccan problem on the GA agenda.12 The Iraqi demand forced the Quai d’Orsay 
to discuss how to respond to the 14 March 1952 memorandum of the Sultan, who, 
according to Guillaume, ‘n’envisage pas d’autre... que l’ouverture de negotiations 
devant aboutir a tres br6ve dchdance k 1’abrogation du traite de Fez et k 1’institution 
d’un nouveau regime analogue k celui d’avant 1912’.13 A Quai d’Orsay note dated 21 
August explained the principal points of the French plan, but it repeated the thesis that 
France and French settlers had contributed to the pacification and modernisation of 
Morocco. As with the Tunisian case, the French were determined not to alter their 
position: the establishment of municipal assemblies through the principe de co- 
souverainete, and no transfer of significant political powers to indigenous people. As 
for concrete methods of implementing the plan, the Quai authorised the Resident- 
General to discuss them with the Sultan.14
Guillaume handed the French reply to Mohammed V on 17 September 1952,15 but at 
this stage its content was not made public.16 Immediately after, the latter summoned a 
meeting composed of leading Moroccan figures of various shades of opinion in order to 
examine the French note. On 3 October 1952, as Guillaume himself had already 
anticipated,17 the Sultan rejected it on the ground that the French government had only 
indicated its determination to maintain the protectorate treaty without paying attention 
to his demands of 14 March 1952.18 He did not publicise the French reply at this time,
10 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Washington to Paris, no.3214/3229, 15.5.1952. In this talk, Bonnet 
referred to France’s difficulties by using a somewhat exaggerated expression: ‘les mouvements 
extr£mistes panislamiques’ who dreamed o f a ‘troisi£me force arabe’.
11 Chapter 3, p.72. Before the talks, French officials had even suggested that Schuman warn Acheson: ‘il 
depend largement des Etats-Unis que la France n ’ait pas k choisir entre son attachement k l’O.N.U. et ses 
int6rets vitaux en Afrique du Nord’. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.160, Aide-memoire pour le Ministre,
21.5.1952.
12 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Note pour la Direction d’Afrique Levant, no.l003/SC, 18.8.1952. 
Although this was of grave concern for the Americans, they did not ask the French about this matter. 
Most likely they were much more occupied with the Tunisian case. See Chapter 3, Section 4.
13 Ibid., Rabat to Paris, no.564/565,1.8.1952.
14 Ibid., Projet de R6ponse au Memorandum du Sultan du Maroc, 21.8.1952.
15 Ibid., Rabat to Paris, no.666/669, 17.9.1952.
16 L 'Annee Politique, 1952, p.254.
17 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-1052, Dorman to Acheson, no .22,10.9.1952.
18 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef to Guillaume, 3.10.1952.
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but submitted it to the press on 8 October 1952. The French observed that his aim of 
publication lay in impressing world opinion that it was only the UN that could work out 
an acceptable solution to the Franco-Moroccan dispute. The Sultan also intended to 
appease the nationalists’ discontent and to support the Arab-Asia countries’ initiative in 
the GA.19 In reality, at the end of September 1952, Mohammed V had been rather 
reluctant to publicise the original French plan because it would surely have antagonised 
the French.20 In view of the French decision on 7 October 1952 to oppose the inclusion 
of the North African items on the UNGA agenda, however, he decided to proceed with 
the revelation. As argued in Chapter 3, the Sultan’s revelation would stiffen the US 
attitude in the UN, although it did not immediately cause political instability in 
Morocco.21
However, soon after the opening of the UN debates on Tunisia, a riot led by the 
Istiqlal broke out in Casablanca on 7 and 8 December 1952, protesting against the 
assassination of Ferhat Ached22 in Tunisia on 5 December, and this incident was 
seriously to increase tension inside Morocco. At least eight Frenchmen were murdered 
and an unknown number of Moroccan rioters shot by police and troops. Moreover, on 
8 December the UGSCM (l’Union gdndral des syndicats confederes du Maroc), the only 
Moroccan labour union, called for a 24-hour strike, to which the Residency responded 
by arresting 400 members of the Istiqlal, the UGSCM and the Communist Party, and 
outlawed those groups. French records contend that ‘the Casablanca Massacre’ outraged 
French opinion,24 but the British noted that the members of the French left, such as 
Francis Mauriac, condemned the excesses committed by the French police.25
These violent events in turn strained Franco-American relations. Naturally, American 
public opinion regarded the French response to the riot as typical oppressive French 
policy. On 12 December, the American Consulate at Rabat was instructed to tell 
Guillaume: ‘further violence no matter what origin will alienate US public opinion’.26 
The following day Guillaume explained to the Americans the background and causes of 
the recent events: ‘French attempt to change a backward country of [the] Middle Ages
19 Ibid., Guillaume to Schuman, no.2283AL, 25.10.1952.
20 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-2552, Dorman to Acheson, no.29,25.9.1952.
21 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Guillaume to Schuman, no.2283AL, 25.10.1952.
22 He was the leader of the UGTT.
23 Considering the timing, the riot and strike could have also been aimed at attracting international 
attention. FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.142-144, Memorandum by Bonbright and Jemegan, 17.12.1952. The 
British Consul in Casablanca reported: ‘the true total o f Arabs killed was over 1500.’ PRO, 
FO371/102974, JM1015/4, Casablanca to Allen, 39P/52,18.12.1952.
24 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Rabat to Paris, no.988/993,23.12.1952.
25 PRO, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey to FO, no.289,21.8.1953.
26 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, p.604, The Acting Secretary of State to Rabat, no.52,12.12.1952.
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into a Twentieth Century nation in [a] matter [of] forty years was responsible for their 
present difficulties’. Then he insisted, to no avail, that he had absolute proof of 
connections between the Istiqlal and the Communist Party and that the mass of 
Moroccans was not in sympathy with the Istiqlal.27
On the other hand, debates on Moroccan affairs started in the GA First Committee.28 
On 13 December 1952, the day after its adoption of the Latin American draft resolution 
on Tunisia, the Arab-Asian countries submitted a draft resolution requesting the 
government of France and the Sultan of Morocco to enter into negotiations to reach an 
early peaceful settlement in accord with the sovereignty of Morocco. Eleven Latin 
American countries sponsored a moderate draft resolution on 16 December, expressing 
the hope that France and Morocco would continue to work towards the development of 
free political institutions.29 The following day, the Committee rejected the Arab-Asian 
resolution but adopted the LA resolution with a Pakistani amendment, which required 
‘les parties poursuivront sans retard leurs negociations, en vue de permettre aux 
Marocains de se gouvemer eux-memes’. The GA plenary session, on 19 December, 
approved the LA resolution by a vote of forty-five to three with eleven abstentions but 
rejected the Pakistani amendment, which, according to the US delegation, ‘fausse 
l’esprit de la proposition 1 atino-amdricaine’.30 As with the Tunisian case, the French did 
not favour this result, since ‘la resolution vot6e consacre explicitement, par une majority 
massive, la competence des Nations Unies’.31
Yet the result was not considered a total defeat for the French, because their plan 
advocating French participation in Moroccan political institutions was not overtly 
rejected by the UN as a basis for further bilateral negotiations. So the French started to 
pressurise the Sultan to accept it. Guillaume, who met the Sultan on 22 December, 
noted: ‘j ’ai invit6 le souverain & reprendre avec nous une collaboration denude des 
arrieres pens£es auxquelles avait pu donner naissance le vain espoir d’une intervention 
des Nations Unis, de la Ligue Arabe ou d’une autre puissance 6trangdre.’32 However, 
Guillaume’s persuasion did not work with the Sultan, contrary to the case of the Bey of 
Tunisia, who had accepted a similar French plan. The Moroccan sovereign was
27 Ibid., pp.604-606, Vincent to the State Department, 14.12.1952.
28 UNGA debates on Morocco developed in a similar way to those on Tunisia. For the details o f the three 
Western countries’ attitudes, see Chapter 3, Section 4.
29 Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1952, p.284.
30 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.606-608, Editorial Note; L ’Annee Politique, 1952, pp.288-289. Perhaps the 
Americans reasoned that die term ‘se gouvemer’, which clearly referred to ‘self-government’ as opposed 
to ‘internal autonomy’, would antagonise the French.
31 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.649, Note pour le Ministre, no.275SC, undated.
32 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.85, Rabat to Paris, no.988/993,23.12.1952.
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convinced that the nationalists’ setback was only temporary and that they would soon 
restore their former prestige. As will be discussed, the differences of both sovereigns’ 
attitudes would be much clearer in March 1954.34
Nevertheless, the French succeeded in banning the Istiqlal and ousting the nationalist 
leaders, availing themselves of the Casablanca Massacre. The removal of the nationalist 
leaders in the North African protectorates and the Bey’s approval, as it appeared to the 
French, gave them a green light to proceed to the realisation of their goal: the 
introduction of political regimes based on the principe de co-souverainete and, 
ultimately, the incorporation of both Protectorates into the French Union. The Sultan’s 
refusal to sign posed a principal obstacle to this goal, but the French were perhaps 
confident that they could easily press him to accept the plan about French settlers’ votes.
4.2 The deposition of the Sultan35
At the beginning of 1953, the French publicised their intentions regarding Tunisia and 
Morocco. In his declaration before becoming prime minister, Rend Mayer stated on 6 
January 1953 that France’s mission was ‘de guider les populations de Tunisie et du 
Maroc vers l’administration de leurs propres affaires’. He was nominated as prime 
minister by 389 votes to 205 and, two days later, formed a government including 
Georges Bidault as the new Foreign Minister. Thus the French announced that they 
were intent on giving the right to ‘l’administration de leurs propres affaires’ to local 
people in Tunisia and Morocco. This was not, however, a promise of granting internal 
autonomy to both countries. In fact, Guy Mollet, the leader of the SFIO, criticised 
Mayer by stating that the French had to ‘fixer la date de la suppression du protectorat et 
les dtapes successives du passage de la Tunisie au stade d’un Etat souverain et 
independant’. Likewise, Mitterrand advocated achieving internal autonomy in North 
Africa immediately.37 In any case, ‘there would be no change of French policy in either 
territory and the French meant to go on with the reforms as heretofore’, as Maurice 
Schumann put it to the British.38 By failing to refer to internal autonomy, the French 
were not able to secure US support for the French presence in North Africa, as had been
33 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/12-2452, Dorman to Acheson, no.73,24.12.1952.
34 Chapter 5, Section 2.
35 Unfortunately, few governmental sources have been declassified concerning the deposition of 
Mohammed V in August 1953.
36 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.187.
37 Ibid.
38 PRO, FO371/102937, JF1015/4, Mayall to Allen, no.10115/10/53, 19.1.1953.
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envisaged by the Schuman-Acheson talks in May 1952. Washington made no reaction 
to Mayer’s declaration, although this would, to some extent, contribute to making 
American attitudes sympathetic to the French, as will be argued below.
On the other hand, in Morocco, conflict between the Sultan and the traditionalists had 
been intensifying since the Casablanca Massacre of December 1952. As Muslim leaders, 
the latter were furious with the IstiqlaPs violent methods and hated Mohammed V 
whose sympathetic attitude, they considered, encouraged the Istiqlal thereby 
undermining traditional Muslim society and the French position. This was a very 
serious situation, because el-Glaoui preserved a semi-independent status in Southern 
Morocco. In fact, it was the French authorities that restored him as the Pasha of 
Marrakech in 1912 and armed him with modem weapons since then.39 Since the French 
were reluctant to destroy the feudal hierarchy beneath him, they did not oppose his 
movement. On the other hand, since France had an obligation to defend the Sultan 
under the Treaty of Fez, the French failure to protect the Sultan was potentially a grave 
act which was condemned by international opinion, as will be discussed below. On 2 
January 1953, in an interview with a Madrid newspaper, el-Glaoui had violently 
accused Mohammed V of encouraging a seditious movement. Even though Mohammed 
V probably knew that the French remained committed to the principe de co- 
souverainete, he responded to Mayer’s declaration,40 perhaps largely because of the 
necessity of countering el-Glaoui’s pressure. On 12 January, he sent a message to 
Auriol, which, referring to Mayer’s declaration, confirmed his intention to negotiate 
‘une solution tendant notamment k l’&ablissement d’une cooperation’ 41 The Sultan’s 
note omitted reference to his earlier expressed position that the goal of negotiations 
should be the revision of the protectorate treaty but the Quai d’Orsay had no reason to 
believe this position had changed 42
Mayer’s declaration and his taking office made the Americans willing to cooperate 
with the French. Bidault discussed the North African problems with John Foster Dulles, 
the new US Secretary of State, in Paris on 2 February 1953. He considered Dulles’s 
attitude more encouraging than his predecessor when the latter told him that 
‘1’Administration r6publicaine n’avait pas 1’intention de remettre en cause les principes
39 Maxwell, Lords, p.133, p.155. El-Glaoui had been dismissed from the Pasha of Marrakech by the 
Sultan Moulay Hafid in 1911. See also Introduction, p. 12.
40 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p. 197.
41 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Paris to Rabat, no.l5AL, 14.2.1953.
42 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2-453, Dunn to Dulles, no.4352,4.2.1953.
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fondamentaux de la politique americaine qui 6ta.it fondle sur le Pacte Atlantique’ and 
that ‘les Etats-Unis ne sauraient souhaiter la ‘desintegration’ de l’Union Fran5aise’.43
Bidault’s reply of 7 February 1953 to Mohammed V’s message stated that it was by 
direct conversations between the Sultan and French representatives, i.e. the French 
Resident-General, that the problems had to be examined. For the French, it was 
imperative to make the Sultan realise ‘la ndcessitd de regler les problemes concemant 
les rapports franco-marocains en dehors de toute intervention extdrieure’ or without the 
‘agitation’ of the Communists and of the Istiqlal.44 On 18 February, Bidault instructed 
Guillaume to emphasise to the sovereign: ‘la ddmocratisation que nous sommes rdsolus 
a entreprendre doit etre faite sans porter atteinte aux prerogatives du Sultan, dont nous 
sommes garants’.45 This hypocritical argument did not convince the Sultan to agree to 
the French plan, however.
Unlike 1952, the US government was not willing to see the North African problems 
discussed in the UN’s 1953 session. On 19 February 1953, the Arab-Asian countries in 
the UNGA met to examine the desirability of these items being taken up in the GA. On 
the very next day, an American weekly magazine, which supposedly had close relations 
with the government, announced that Dulles would assure the French that the US 
government would exert its influence in order not to create trouble for France.46 The 
State Department considered it too early for the French to show to the world positive 
results in the negotiations with the North Africans and, therefore, concluded that UN 
debates would be inappropriate. In fact, on 10 March 1953, the State Department 
instructed its UN delegation to the GA to oppose consideration of the North African 
problems in the autumn of 1953, ‘on grounds that far too little time has elapsed since 
[the] adoption of GA resolutions to expect conclusive results in negotiations’.47 Besides, 
the US policy may have been motivated by not pressurising the French excessively in 
order to obtain their adherence to the EDC.48
43 MAE, Secretariat General 1945-1966, vol.29, Paris to Rabat, Circulaire no.20, 3.2.1953. Taking 
advantage of the conversations with Dulles, the French told the Sultan: ‘the United States would give 
France carte-blanche in North Africa.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2-1853, Dorman to Washington, 
no.289,18.2.1953.
44 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Paris to Rabat, no.l5AL, 14.2.1953. This French response was 
publicised on 13 February 1953.
MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.2, Bidault to Guillaume, no.303AL, 18.2.1953.
46 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.203.
47 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.609- 610, The Acting Secretary of State to the US Mission at the UN, Gadel 
A -l, 10.3.1953.
48 In September 1955, one American official noted: ‘in the past the U.S. approach to NA problems has 
been conditioned mainly by French considerations involving our desire not to disturb any given French 
parliamentary equilibrium in order to avoid endangering the attainment of important U.S. objectives, such 
as gaining French adherence to EDC.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.00/9-2955, Holmes to Dulles, 29.9.1955.
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In Morocco, not only el-Glaoui but also several French Residency officials had 
started anti-Sultan campaigns. One French official published an article in Paris-Match 
on 7 February 1953, headed ‘Le Sultan doit changer ou il faut changer le Sultan.’49 In 
mid-February 1953, Mohammed V reportedly complained to his entourage: ‘A bitter 
propaganda [campaign] is being waged against the Sultan by the French officials... with 
the Glaoui serving as the willing leader.’50 Some Residency officials were in fact deeply 
involved in this anti-Sultan movement, considering that Mohammed V was the gravest 
obstacle to the French plans. Residency officials’ activities were made without explicit 
instructions from Paris, but as will be made clear below, the French government, 
Foreign Minister Bidault in particular, was soon to take advantage of pressure on the 
Sultan by forcing him to agree to their programme, even though Bidault himself 
instructed Guillaume not to exert such pressure on Mohammed V, and the French 
government opposed the idea of his deposition. This tactic was in fact similar to what 
the French had adopted from December 1950 to February 1951, when they were 
demanding that the Sultan condemn the Istiqlal.51 However, there was one difference; 
after experiencing the 1952 UN debates, the French Resident-General ceased to threaten 
the Sultan with deposition, fearing criticism of international opinion.
The project of a dahir concerning the municipal institutions was once again tabled to 
Mohammed V on 2 March 1953, although it seemed that no press reported this event. 
The dahir aimed at creating seven municipal assemblies composed of French and 
Moroccan members, each having an equal number of seats, but this project was never 
acceptable to the nationalists, even though most Istiqlal leaders had already been exiled. 
Three days later, Allal el-Fassi in Cairo and other nationalist leaders sent a 
memorandum to Auriol in the name of the Moroccan National Front, criticising the 
municipal project for being ‘incompatible avec la souverainetd marocaine’. On 16 
March, the Arab-Asian countries’ delegations wrote to the UN Secretary-General 
denouncing ‘la politique de ‘violence et d’oppression’ de la France au Maroc’.52 
Nevertheless, unlike July 1951, the sovereign’s position concerning this issue looked 
ambivalent, so Guillaume reported to Paris: ‘Soumis h des influences diverses et
49 Centre d’Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales [hereafter CARAN], Archives Georges 
Bidault, 457AP, vol. 117, [Maroc, la crise d’aofit 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
50 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2-1853, Dorman to Washington, no.289, 18.2.1953.
51 Chapter 2, Section 1.
52 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Situation Politique au Maroc (mars 1953).
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souvent contradictoires, soucieux de ne rompre les ponts ni avec la France ni avec 
l’lstiqlal, Sidi Mohammed h6site’.53
On the other hand, el-Glaoui made a decisive step towards the Sultan’s deposition. 
On 20 March 1953, a petition was signed demanding his removal, following a meeting 
of some twenty caids with el-Glaoui in Marrakech. This movement had originally been 
started in Fez by Sharif Abedelhai el-Kittani, Grand Master of Kittanies, a pro-French 
Moslem brotherhood,54 and ‘espoused by [the] Pasha of Marrakech as a useful 
instrument against the Sultan.’55 The petition stated:
1) That the Sultan Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef had broken the commitments 
and covenants by which he was bound in regard to the Muslim religion and 
under which he bore obligations to the Moroccan people;
2) That by attaching himself to illegal extremist parties and applying their 
principles in Morocco, he was leading the country to its doom;
3) That in so doing, he had placed himself in opposition to all men of goodwill 
in the country and had embarked on a path contrary to the tenets of religion.
Therefore the signatories asked the Resident-General and the French government to 
remove the Sultan and this petition at once began to circulate among the Moroccan 
chiefs.56
Soon after this, at the end of March 1953, Mohammed V was showing a flexible 
attitude over the issue of municipal assemblies, presumably because he wanted Paris’s 
intervention more than ever in order to counter el-Glaoui’s offensive. Emphasising that 
this problem was related to Moroccan sovereignty, he informed the Residency of the 
conditions upon which he would sign the dahir and accept French settlers’ participation 
in those assemblies. Those conditions were: firstly, the right of French settlers to vote 
should be limited to the area of the municipalities, which would enable the Palace to 
regard that right as merely a technical means of recruiting committees and as having no 
political character and, secondly, the administrative supervision of the municipalities 
should be restored by the Residency to the Grand Vizier. Bidault noted with satisfaction 
that the Sultan did not object to the democratic nature of the reform.57 Pressured by el-
53 Ibid., Guillaume to Bidault, 16.3.1953. Guillaume also noted that the Moroccan nationalists were 
encouraged by the recent works of Charles-Andr6 Julien, a professor of the University of Sorbonne.
54 There were seven religious brotherhoods or zaouia in Morocco, who diverged from the orthodox path 
of pure Islam, and had always been distrusted by the Sultans as undermining the central spiritual authority 
o f the throne. Maxwell, Lords, p.218.
55 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/7-2253, American consulate, Bordeaux to the State Department, Dispatch 
no.10, 22.7.1953. This information was brought by Saadek el-Glaoui, one o f the sons of the Pasha of 
Marrakech, who was, however, critical of his father’s attitude against the Sultan.
56 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.147-148.
51 Ibid., p. 140.
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Glaoui and French Residency officials, Mohammed V began considering accepting the 
French settlers’ participation, although he still had reservations. For that reason, 
Mohammed V’s attitude was far from being satisfactory to Paris.
Some French officials in Morocco contributed significantly to the enlargement of el- 
Glaoui’s movement. It was only on 31 March that Jacques de Blesson, Delegue a la 
Residence Generate, notified Paris of the petition without, however, transmitting its text. 
According to him, this was merely ‘un des signes par lesquels se manifeste de temps a 
autre l’opposition conservatrice’. 58 On 1 April 1953, Bidault cabled Guillaume 
instructing: ‘certain persons... are advocating recourse to such extreme measures as the 
deposition of the Sultan... It must be made quite clear... that the French government 
would not condone recourse to such a policy.’59 Needless to say, France had an 
obligation under the Treaty of Fez to defend the Sultan.
Mohammed V’s conciliatory attitude seriously concerned the traditionalist dignitaries, 
because now it was clear that the French government did not accept his deposition if he 
accepted the municipal project. From the dignitaries’ viewpoint, he had to be dethroned 
unless he condemned the Istiqlal. From 4 to 6 April 1953, a congress of the North 
African Religious Brotherhood was held at Fez, presided over by el-Kittani, in the 
presence of el-Glaoui and some twenty caids and a thousand Moroccan delegates 
representing religious brotherhoods. After speeches hostile to the Sultan, this assembly 
adopted resolutions in favour of expanding the movement of the brotherhoods.60 
Naturally, this assembly provoked sharp reactions from the Palace and other religious 
leaders. The Sultan told Guillaume that it would be impossible to make progress on the 
Franco-Moroccan dialogue until the atmosphere had improved, indicating that the 
rapidly-developing revolt of the caids would have been impossible without the 
Residency officials’ support.61 In other words, at this point Mohammed V requested that 
the ongoing Franco-Moroccan dialogues be suspended as long as the Residency 
officials supported el-Glaoui’s movement. He also sent a message to the French 
government on 14 April, proposing that Franco-Moroccan conversations on the 
municipal reform be continued in Paris, not in Rabat, because of the local troubles. This 
was in fact the first time that Paris had been told of the Sultan’s complaint about el- 
Glaoui’s campaigns, because French officials had failed to report it to Paris.62 However,
58 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.l 17, [Maroc, la crise d’aofit 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
59 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.139-140.
60 Ibid., p.148.
61 Ibid., p.142.
62 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aout 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
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the French government refused the Sultan’s request on 23 April 1953, presumably 
because it wished to maintain pressure on him. At the same time, pro-Sultan groups 
were also voicing their opposition to el-Glaoui. The Ulama of Fez submitted a letter to 
the Sultan in which they supported him and protested about el-Glaoui’s activities.63 This 
was a significant counter-attack on el-Glaoui, since no Sultan could rightfully be either 
deposed or elected without the Ulama’s consent.64
Meanwhile, outraged by the anti-Sultan movement, the Arab-Asian countries were 
preparing to bring the Moroccan problem to the UNSC in 1953. On 8 April 1953, Henry 
Cabot Lodge Jr., the US representative at the UN, reported to Washington that the Arab- 
Asian countries had decided to bring the Tunisian and Moroccan cases before the SC, 
hoping that the US would vote for inscription 65 However, on 9 April, Dulles instructed 
Lodge to tell the Arab-Asian group the US view: ‘we do not feel that sufficient time has 
elapsed since [the] adoption of GA resolutions [in 1952]’.66 That day, the Quai d’Orsay 
instructed the French UN delegation to oppose the inscription of the two items on the 
SC agenda.67 In May 1953, despite Dulles’s position, the Arab-Asians still believed that 
the US would vote for the inscription in the UNSC’s 1953 session,68 but it was fortunate 
from the French viewpoint that the Anglo-Saxons agreed that they should vote against 
it.69 In fact, the three countries’ delegations in New York shared the view that ‘[the] best 
course is to keep Arab-Asians in dark regarding] our position thus prolonging their 
state [of] uncertainty and indecision regarding] [the] submission of item’,70 so that 
those countries would finally withdraw their request in view of the ambivalent US 
attitude.
While the petition against the Sultan was circulating throughout the country, de 
Blesson failed to inform Paris of the gravity of the situation. It was not until 15 May 
1953 that he reported that ‘cette initiative semble avoir 6t6 beaucoup plus largement 
suivie qu’il n’etait d’abord & prevoir.’ Bidault, on the following day, rejoined the 
Residency to remind local French officials that their attitude towards such movements
63 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.224.
64 Maxwell, Lords, p.219. Note that the Ulama in Fez were prestigious because Fez was a religious city.
65 NARA, RG59, Lot58 D742 and 59 D237, Tunisia General Correspondence 1953 (Mangano File), 
Memorandum, Hickerson to the Secretary, 9.4.1953.
66 NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/4-953, Dulles to New York no.383,9.4.1953.
67 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.651, Note pour le Secretariat des Conferences, 9.4.1953.
68 PRO, FO371/102941, JF1041/29, New York to FO, no.388, 19.5.1953.
69 PRO, F 0371/102942, JF1041/29, FO to New York, no.471, 26.5.1953; MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, 
Washington to Paris, no.2730/2735, 14.4.1953.
70 NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/6-1053, Dulles to New York, no.482, 10.6.1953.
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should conform to France’s obligation under the protectorate treaty.71 Guillaume 
officially presented the petition to the Quai d’Orsay on 27 May, when the French 
government had already been suffering a ministerial crisis since the fall of the Mayer 
Government on 21 May 1953.72 On 30 May, the Quai issued a communique that it 
would not be replying to the petition but that ‘[cjette demarche ne peut que renforcer la 
volonte du gouvemement de donner une expression democratique aux tendances qui se 
font jour dans l’opinion marocaine’.73 This meant that the French did not intend to 
prevent el-Glaoui’s movement from gaining strength but that they did not want 
positively to assist it. Mohammed V told Guillaume on 31 May that ‘the petition... 
could only be considered as treason’ and asked him to remove the caids who had signed 
it. However, the Resident-General merely pointed out that ‘had [the Sultan] agreed to 
sign the dahir implementing the municipal reforms, the petition would never have been 
circulated’, to which the sovereign was reported as replying that he would never sign 
the municipal reform.74 In fact, it was widely rumoured among Moroccan people that 
France might depose the Sultan and that the Arab-Asian bloc would immediately rally 
to his support. Knowing that Guillaume was reluctant to take action to stop el-Glaoui’s 
movement, Mohammed V chose to appeal to Paris publicly on 1 June 1953, mentioning 
that the French government ‘saura mettre sans tarder un terme h. cette dissidence 
organis^e’.75
Guillaume did not halt el-Glaoui’s movement, with the hope of forcing the sovereign 
to accept the French plans by making use of the troubles. On 3 June, he wrote to Paris: 
‘il dtait de son devoir de laisser l’opinion publique s’exprimer librement contre le 
Sultan’.76 The division of Moroccan opinion was becoming even more conspicuous. On 
the same day, the pashas of Fez, Sefrou, Meknes, and Sale made declarations of loyalty 
to Mohammed V.77 Similarly, about 300 messages protesting against the anti-Sultanate 
movement of pashas and caids were sent to Auriol. On 8 June, el-Glaoui, who was then 
in London, announced his plan clearly:
71 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp. 169-170.
72 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aofit 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
73 L ‘Annee Politique, 1953, p.234.
74 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/6-553, Dorman to the State Department, no.430, 5.6.1953. The pashas and 
caids were officials nominated by the Sultan who chose them from a list of three candidates proposed by 
the Resident-General. L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.234.
75 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, pp.545-546.
76 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.l 17, [Maroc, la crise d’aoftt 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
77 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Situation politique au Maroc, 6.1953.
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Le Sultan est d6chu et n’est plus l’Emir des croyants. Pour qu’il soit detrone, il ne 
manque plus que le consentement de la France... Le nouveau Sultan sera choisi 
parmi les membres de la famille Alaouite par les Caids.. .78
Thus both the Sultan and el-Glaoui openly pressed Paris to give support.
In June 1953, the State Department changed its tactics towards the Arab-Asians in the 
UNSC. Presumably, the Americans judged it best to prevent the Arab-Asian move to 
bring the Moroccan problem to the UNSC, seeing them more eager to do so because of 
Guillaume’s failure to halt el-Glaoui’s movement. The State Department concluded on 
10 June that if asked, the US should inform the Arab-Asians that the US would vote 
against the inscription of the North African problems for the purpose of drawing Arab- 
Asian leaders’ attention to Dulles’s address on 1 June 1953, whereby he had declared: 
‘the western Powers can gain rather than lose from an orderly development of self- 
government’ of colonial territories.79 The FO agreed on the change of US tactics while 
the UN delegations of Britain and France remained opposed to revealing their intention 
because the two delegations estimated that the Arab-Asians were not likely to bring the 
problem to the UN.80 On 15 June, one official at the Pakistani Embassy in Washington 
had conversations with the Americans over the issue of inscription. The Americans 
pointed out that US support for the GA consideration of the North African questions in 
the autumn of 1952 did not imply US acceptance of the idea that these questions 
constituted threats to international peace and security. Then the Americans concluded: 
‘the US would not wish to see [the proposed resolutions] introduced’.81 Thus, despite 
the troubles that el-Glaoui was creating, the US was adamant in opposing SC 
consideration of the Moroccan problem.
On 29 June 1953, the Sultan handed a letter dated 23 June 1953 to Guillaume. This 
letter was addressed to President Auriol, requesting the French government to intervene 
in order to restore order in accordance with the Treaty of Fez, and it also made clear the 
Sultan’s intention to negotiate after the restoration of order. The sovereign insisted: 
“‘les agissement du Pacha de Marrakech”, la “rebellion ouverte des fonctionnaires 
d’autorit£ contre le Pouvoir central” et Faction d’“un chef... d’une confrerie religieuse”, 
constituent des “menses subversives entreprises en violation du Traite du 1912 et en
78 Ibid., Situation politique au Maroc, 6.1953.
79 NARA, RG59, CDF, 330/6-1053, Dulles to New York, no.482, 10.6.1953; The Times, 3.6.1953. He 
had just returned from his trip to twelve Near Eastern and South Asian counties.
“ MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.651, Hoppenot to Paris, no.1245/1246, 12.6.1953; PRO, FO371/102942, 
JF1041/36, Jebb to FO, no.443,15.6.1953; FO to Washington, no.2046,15.6.1953.
81 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.611-613, Memcon, by Metcalf, 15.6.1953.
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particulier de son article troisieme’” 82 The internal division was such that the Sultan had 
no other alternative but to indicate his willingness to negotiate on the French plan in 
order to secure French intervention to restore order. Soon after this, however, during el- 
Glaoui’s absence from Morocco, his sons started circulating a new petition demanding 
that the Sultan specifically condemn the Istiqlal. Fearing that Mohammed V’s 
willingness to negotiate with the French would allow Paris to accept his staying on the 
throne, the dignitaries were trying to remind Paris that their main concern was his siding 
with the Istiqlal. As in February 1951, the sovereign once again refused to condemn the 
nationalist party, declaring: ‘je ne puis prononcer une condamnation quelconque contre 
des musulmans’.83 However, Guillaume’s announcement on 22 July 1953 merely 
supported the anti-Sultanate caids ’ attempts to force him to condemn it: ‘Ces methodes 
[de l’lstiqlal] ont provoqu6 de la part des cai’ds un « mouvement d’autoddfense » qui « a 
abouti a la petition ».’84
In the meantime, Paris was given little information about developments in Morocco. 
In fact, as some Quai d’Orsay officials put it to the Americans later, certain Residency 
officials did not keep the government fully informed because they knew that Paris was 
opposed to the Sultan’s deposition. As a result, el-Glaoui’s movement made such 
headway that it was from a practical point of view too late for Paris to take the 
necessary action to stop the movement. Those Residency officials believed that they 
were acting in the best interests of France and Morocco.85 Bidault was shocked by the 
news of el-Glaoui’s tour throughout Morocco from 4 to 7 August 1953, whose purpose 
was ‘pour y entretenir le zdle de ses partisans’.86 On 4 August, he instructed Rabat to 
report the movement’s goal and intentions, emphasising: ‘il importe d’eviter que des 
616ments irresponsables aient l’impression qu’ils pourraient... creer des faits accomplis 
que nous ne pourrions reconnaitre’.87 The following day, de Blesson optimistically
82 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Situation politique au Maroc (juin 1953); Bernard, The Franco- 
Moroccan Conflict, p. 144. This letter was transmitted to Paris on 4 July 1953.
83 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.260. This was published on 21 July 1953. El-Glaoui was in London and 
then in Paris.
84 Le Monde, 23.7.1953.
85 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.622-624, Dillon to the State Department, no.695, 21.8.1953; pp.614-615, 
Dillon to the State Department, no.541, 12.8.1953. ‘Certain Residency officials’ include Philippe 
Boniface, Director of Interior and Controller Civil of Casablanca.
86 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aofit 1953], Note, 22.8.1953.
87 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre Pinay, no.28, Paris to Rabat, no.716/717, 4.8.1953. Bidault’s message was 
addressed to de Blesson because Guillaume was on vacation in France.
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reported to Paris: ‘Rien... ne nous permet de croire qu’il envisage de passer a Paction 
directe et de nous mettre devant le fait accompli.’88 
However, this was not the case. De Blesson’s telegram on 8 August indicated that he 
himself had dismissed the gravity of the situation. Actually, greatly encouraged by the 
dignitaries’ reactions, el-Glaoui had told him the day before that there had never been 
such favourable conditions to achieve deposition. Under Bidault’s instructions, de 
Blesson tried to dissuade el-Glaoui by stating:
les responsabilit6s assumdes par la France... depuis 1912 ne permettaient pas au 
Gouvemement de la Republique de se desinteresser a ce point de la politique 
intdrieure marocaine... [N]ous ne pouvions pas pour autant faire abstraction de nos 
devoirs concemant le maintien d’ordre. Enfin... [s]eul le Gouvemement fran5ais 
6tait en mesure de juger les consequences extdrieures qu’entrainerait tel ou tel geste 
accompli sur le temtoire marocain.
El-Glaoui did not agree with de Blesson, but promised that he would not take any 
decisive action until around 12-13 August 1953.89 Despite this undertaking, however, 
el-Glaoui and el-Kittani overtly pressed Paris to remove the Sultan. Le Petit Matin of 8- 
9 August 1953 reported that the former, when asked if Mohammed V was to be allowed 
to stay on the throne, responded ‘[c]ela depend de la France, et d’elle uniquement!’ and 
that the latter declared ‘[n]ous voulons que l’on nous laisse libres de choisir un autre 
sultan.’90 They were immensely irritated by the French government’s attitude of 
disapproving of the deposition. Furthermore, de Blesson reported to Paris over the 
telephone on 8 August that ‘el-Glaoui... was no longer in control of his forces’,91 
although the French government did not abandon hopes that the Sultan’s acceptance of 
the French demands would lead el-Glaoui to stop his forces. Conversely, the Sultan 
wrote to Auriol on 11 August, stressing that it was impossible to demonstrate such 
opposition openly without the French authorities’ consent since Morocco was still under 
martial law and that the movements were trying to lead the French government ‘a violer 
les engagements intemationaux... en particulier le traits de 1912’, i.e. the protection of 
the Sultan’s status.92
88 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aout 1953], Rabat to Paris, 
no.632/639, 5.8.1953.
89 Ibid., [Maroc, la crise d’aodt 1953], Rabat to Paris, no.653, 8.8.1953.
90 Le Monde, 12.8.1953.
91 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aofit 1953], Rabat to Paris, 
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On 12 August, the French Council of Ministers sent ‘strong instructions’ to de 
Blesson in Rabat to try to prevent el-Glaoui proclaiming a new Sultan.93 Likewise, on 
the same day Dulles instructed Douglas Dillon, the US Ambassador in France, to tell 
the French that ‘[the] US Government shares French concern over grave repercussions 
which would result in Morocco, Arab-Asian World and United Nations’ if el-Glaoui 
was permitted to proclaim a new Sultan.94 Dulles was so alarmed that he sent another 
telegram to Paris on the same day: ‘you should make it unmistakably clear to Bidault 
that we cannot help being gravely concerned over probable consequences of what 
seems... to be exceedingly ill-advised and ill-timed line of action.’ The Americans were 
acutely anxious that Bidault seemed to think ‘all depends on [the] Sultan’, namely, the 
former was pressurising the latter into accepting the French municipal project by 
making use of el-Glaoui’s movement95 
It appeared that the French brinkmanship ultimately bore fruit. Bidault instructed 
Guillaume, who had just returned to Paris from sick leave, on 13 August 1953: ‘II faut 
que... vous puissiez dds matin faire accepter au Sultan le programme’. If  so, the French 
promised to stop el-Glaoui’s activities and protect the Sultan. Guillaume was also 
instructed to table a new compromise plan to the Sultan.96 French sources did not 
disclose the content of this plan, but it was obvious that the French were demanding that 
he condemn the Istiqlal in tune with el-Glaoui. Guillaume went back to Rabat and met 
Mohammed V. By 6.30 pm on that day, the latter conceded. He agreed to all the points 
of the municipal reform plan, the devolution of the legislative power to the Grand Vizier 
and the rejection of all UN intervention.97 Faced with the fact that only the French could 
protect his position from el-Glaoui, Mohammed V accepted the French demands instead 
of running the risk of leaving the country seriously divided, although his acceptance of 
French settlers’ participation in the municipal assemblies was certainly a betrayal of the 
nationalist cause. As de Margerie later told a British official, the French hoped: ‘having 
got the Sultan to sign the decrees, the French authorities would be able to calm the 
Glaoui and his followers’.98 Thus Mohammed V’s concessions were significant, but, 
importantly, he refused to condemn the Istiqlal to the end, although in its place he
93 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.614-615, Dillon to the State Department, no.541,12.8.1953.
94 Ibid., pp.615-616, Dulles to the Embassy in France, no.471,12.8.1953.
95 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/8-1253, Dulles to Paris, no.508,12.8.1953.
96 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.86, Bidault to Guillaume, no.738/743,13.8.1953.
97 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 156; L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.265.
98 PRO, FO371/102975, JM1015/64, Harvey to FO, no.291, 18.8.1953. Roland Jacquin de Margerie was 
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accepted the rejection of UN intervention. Even so, Bidault noted on 14 August that he 
was satisfied with this result."
However, el-Glaoui did not stop. On 13 August 1953, el-Glaoui and el-Kittani 
gathered 9 pashas out of 23 and 309 caids out of 325, in order to issue a proclamation 
naming a new Sultan. Desperate to avoid the naming of a new Sultan, Guillaume had 
talks with el-Glaoui on 15 August and succeeded in persuading the latter not to do so. 
The pashas and caids, therefore, dissolved the gathering and affirmed Teur confiance 
dans la France pour resoudre le probleme de trone.’ However, on 15 August, el-Glaoui 
and el-Kittani elected as an Imam Sidi Moulay Mohammed Ben Arafa, an uncle of 
Mohammed V.100 Having failed to obtain French approval, they confined themselves to 
nominating an Imam, but this was meant to pressurise Paris to accept Arafa as a new 
Sultan. El-Glaoui explained that ‘un Imam, chef supreme religieux marocain... 
detiendra 1’autorite spirituelle j usque-1 a exercde par le Sultan en meme temps que 
l’autoritd temporelle’ but the existence of an Imam was not compatible with that of a 
Sultan, since the latter was both a sovereign and religious chief. The Sultan announced 
his refusal to accept a new Imam on 16 August and once again requested French 
intervention to restore order. This extraordinary situation led to a bloody incident in 
Oujda, a city in the North-Western region, on that day, in which twenty-three people 
were killed.101
On 17 August, John Dorman, the US consul at Rabat, urged the State Department to 
intervene, firstly because US Air Force and Naval bases could be targets of terrorism in 
the case of passive US acceptance of the coup and secondly because ‘[a]s long as US is 
[the] only country maintaining special treaty rights [in] Morocco we are expected... [to] 
concern ourselves plight [of] their country’.102 Furthermore, another official at Tangier 
argued:
United States was also symbol that some hope lay in eventual recognition of 
legitimate aspirations [through] cooperation with anti-Commie [sic] West. There is 
reason [to] fear now that nationalists may be finally driven to arms of Commies.103
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On the next day, John Jemegan, now the Deputy of Henry Byroade, warned a French 
official that Moroccan affairs were so serious that Ton estime ici particulierement 
inquietants dans la mesure ou ils peuvent affecter les relations de l’Occident avec le 
monde arabe’.104 Similarly, on the same day Harvey conveyed to de Margerie British 
concern about the deposition that could certainly cause Arab resentment.105 However, 
the Anglo-Saxons did not publicly prompt the French to avoid the deposition.
El-Glaoui’s naming of the Imam seriously alarmed Paris, since the French 
assumption that Mohammed V’s acceptance of the French plan would calm el-Glaoui 
had turned out to be wrong. At this stage, it can be assumed, the French had three 
options: firstly, the prevention of el-Glaoui’s attack against the Sultan probably by using 
French military force; secondly, the Sultan’s deposition by el-Glaoui; thirdly, the 
deposition by France. A Quai d’Orsay note of 17 August pointed out that France had 
two obligations resulting from the Treaty of Fez: firstly, to guarantee the Sultan’s status, 
and secondly, to take all police action in order to maintain order.106 The first point 
denoted a double responsibility, i.e. the guarantee of the sovereign and that of the 
dynasty. The second point dictated that the French government should not leave the 
situation as it was, since the conflict between the Sultan and el-Glaoui would be highly 
likely to lead to a civil war or a replacement of the Sultan by el-Glaoui. Then this note 
merely argued for the third option, mentioning that deposition was justified but only if 
the sovereign was endangering the dynasty itself. Why was the third option considered 
the best? The Quai had already ruled out the first option, presumably because it was 
thought this would trigger a large-scale armed conflict with Berber forces led by el- 
Glaoui. The French also feared the possibility of Berber revolt, as most of the French 
Union forces in Morocco were recruited from Berber people. The second option was out 
of the question, because this would be a fatal blow to the French authority in Morocco, 
considering the second point of this note. Thus the Quai was inclined to the Sultan’s 
deposition by France as the least evil of the three options. However, the Quai was aware 
that whatever course the government took, it would have very grave consequences for 
Franco-Moroccan relations.107
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105 PRO, FO371/102975, JM1015/64, Paris to FO, no.291,18.8.1953.
106 CARAN, Archives Georges Bidault, 457AP, vol.117, [Maroc, la crise d’aoQt 1953], Note pour le M. 
President Bidault, 17.8.1953.
107 This view was conveyed to the Americans. FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.619-620, Dillon to the State 
Department, no.624, 18.8.1953
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The situation was reaching a critical point, especially because a religious festival 
called Aid el-Kebir, to be held on 21 August, was thought to represent the deadline for 
the French decision because the Sultan had to attend this festival as a religious leader. 
On 17 August 1953, el-Glaoui finally began to mobilise Berber troops in Marrakech. 
Throughout all the Arab world there were demonstrations against France and demands 
for UN intervention.108 Then, el-Glaoui’s ultimatum of 18 August to the French and the 
Sultan was to determine the French course of action regarding the Sultan most 
decisively. He announced that the Moroccan people were awaiting the French decision 
whether to remove Mohammed V or not and that unless the government acted 
immediately and firmly there would no longer be any place for France in Morocco.109 In 
fact, el-Glaoui could no longer stop the movements of his fellow pashas and caids and 
their tribesmen.110 If el-Glaoui had stopped, he would have lost face in the eyes of 
Berber tribesmen. The Sultan’s acceptance of the French plan turned out to be 
insufficient to halt el-Glaoui’s movement and therefore the Berber troops’ attack against 
the Sultan was imminent.
The French Council of Ministers on 19 August 1953 failed to reach a decision 
whether to support the Sultan because of his acceptance of the French demands or to 
satisfy el-Glaoui by deposing the Sultan. In the early morning of 20 August, Guillaume 
asked el-Glaoui to withdraw his troops on condition that the Sultan denounced the 
Istiqlal, but el-Glaoui refused, because his troops were already moving towards Rabat 
and he knew that such a denunciation was not likely. Finally, the French cabinet reached 
a decision, later the same day, that France could not meet forces backing el-Glaoui with 
French troops, who were recruited from the Berber people, and that the only course 
open was to obtain Mohammed V’s abdication or depose him. Immediately after on that 
day, Guillaume asked the Sultan to abdicate but, when the latter refused, Guillaume 
removed him and his two sons by plane to Corsica.111 On 20 August, Ben Arafa was 
named the new Sultan by the Maghzen. The French government thus chose the 
deposition because it represented the least evil, even though it had obtained Mohammed 
V’s acceptance of the municipal project. The French managed to avoid a civil war while
108 Maxwell, Lords, p.225.
109 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.167.
110 Note that de Blesson had already informed Paris of this point on 8 August 1953.
111 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.621-622, Dillon to the State Department, no.672, 20.8.1953. The following 
day Dillon reported the French decision: ‘We do not believe that French government itself was guilty of 
any duplicity in this matter... Except for L’Aurore, non-Communist press had generally been critical... 
[S]everal Ministers, notably Faure and Mitterrand were strongly opposed to taking action [to] depose 
Sultan but... in final analysis all were unwilling to take decision [to] use force to impose a solution’. Ibid., 
pp.622-624, Dillon to the State Department, no.695, 21.8.1953.
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maintaining their own initiative in coping with the situation, but they knew that not only 
the Arab-Asians but also international opinion were bound to judge them harshly.
Undoubtedly, the deposition was what Paris had wanted to avoid at all costs. French 
Residency officials were largely to blame for the denouement in the immediate term in 
the sense that they contributed to el-Glaoui’s movement gaining strength in defiance of 
governmental instructions, so much that Paris could not halt it without using military 
force. However, the French government itself had to take some responsibility for the 
deposition because it was also certain that the government pressurised Mohammed V to 
agree to its plan, by making use of the anti-Sultan movement. Paris had no intention to 
side with Mohammed V unless he dissociated himself with the Istiqlal. Moreover, as the 
Anglo-Americans correctly pointed out, this was a consequence of the long-term 
culmination of French support for el-Glaoui and the Berbers as against the Sultan,112 
although it was highly doubtful that el-Glaoui’s movement had unanimous support from 
the Berber people.113 In fact, French rule in Morocco had been based on a precarious 
balance between the Arabs represented by the Sultan and the Berbers represented by el- 
Glaoui since 1912. In this sense, August 1953 witnessed the collapse of a traditional 
principle of French colonial rule: ‘divide and rule’. In fact, French control in Morocco 
had been based on a precarious balance between Mohammed V and el-Glaoui.114
Despite its opposition to the deposition, the State Department made no public 
statement concerning the French action. This was because ‘[the] Department feels any 
statement which would not offend French would be too weak to accomplish useful 
purpose with Arabs’.115 Nevertheless, Dulles gave a clear warning to the French. On 24 
August 1953, he told the US Embassy in Paris:
to impress upon Laniel our gravest concern that time is running out and that if 
France does not institute quickly a Reform program with real substance with view 
to granting internal autonomy not only to Moroccans but to Tunisians and show real 
determination to move along this path notwithstanding the obstruction of local 
French officials [and] colons alike, we do not see how we can long pursue our 
present course.116
1,2 PRO, FO371/102976, JM1015/73, Harvey to FO, no.289,21.8.1953.
113 One ex-caid, who had resigned in February 1953, informed the Americans in September 1953: ‘the 
Berbers were wholeheartedly in favor of the former Sultan.’ NARA, RG59, Lot72 D232, Entry 5169, Box 
1, [UN General Assembly (sept-dec. 1953) Morocco and Tunisia], Memorandum from Satterthwaite to 
Lodge, undated.
1,4 Introduction, p. 12.
115 F R U S1952-1954, XI, pp.629-630, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, no.80,25.8.1953.
116 NARA, RG59, Lot58 D48, Box 5, Entry 1293, Memorandum to Byroade, 26.8.1954.
109
On the same day, Dulles instructed Lodge to vote against the inscription of the 
Moroccan case on the SC agenda.117 Thus, the Americans gave a reprieve to the French. 
Failing to obtain two-thirds of the member states (seven votes), the SC rejected the 
inscription on 3 September 1953 by a vote of five to five, with one abstention.118 Dillon 
in Paris reported to Washington on 16 September that the US opposition had made a 
good impression on French opinion.119 In spite of the UNGA resolution of December 
1952, the Americans were patient enough to wait for the French government to move 
towards Morocco’s internal autonomy.
Since the establishment of the Istiqlal, the French goal had been to sever its links with 
Mohammed V. The French had failed to do so when he rejected the December 1952 
plan, but nonetheless succeeded in weakening the party’s strength by making use of the 
Casablanca riot. After this incident, the French still wanted the Sultan to dissociate 
himself from the party, but knowing that it was no longer possible to threaten him with 
deposition, given the UN resolution of December 1952, they expected el-Glaoui’s 
movement to pressurise him to accept the municipal plan, or ideally, to denounce the 
Istiqlal. If only the Sultan accepted the plan, the French hoped, not only would it be a 
significant step towards Morocco’s adherence to the French Union, but also the gap 
between the party and him would be widened. However, el-Glaoui’s failure to stop the 
move against Mohammed V obliged the French to depose him without having severed 
links between him and the Istiqlal. Inevitably, this was to enhance his prestige as a 
political martyr and strengthen the Istiqlal immensely, as the French were well aware. 
The deposition made the French realise the strength of nationalism, but even so, they 
tried to ignore it. They optimistically considered that under Arafa’s reign, their plans 
would be able to receive acquiescence if not support from the people.
117 F R U S1952-1954, XI, pp.627-628, Dulles to the Embassy in France, no.627,24.8.1953.
118 Ibid., pp.629-630, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, no.80,25.8.1953.
119 NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/9-1653, Dillon to Dulles, no.1094, 16.9.1953. Dillon continued that the 
Americans should ‘keep the closest possible liaison with the French delegation’ at the UNGA session, as 
he considered the US vote ‘a basis [sic] and very important factor in Bidault’s decision to push the EDC 
actively’.
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Chapter 5: Tunisia’s internal autonomy; Tunisia, January 1953 to June
1955
5.1 Towards the French plan of March 1954
The Bey’s acceptance of French settlers’ participation in the municipal assemblies in 
December 19521 provoked various reactions in Tunisia. Leaders of French settlers like 
Colonna, welcomed it. In contrast, radical opinion among indigenous people protested 
against his betrayal and felt disappointed with the Neo-Destour, who ‘n’a pu realiser 
aucun de ses buts’ despite their efforts in internationalising the problem in the UN. The 
Neo-Destour and the communists published communiques protesting against the ‘coup 
de force’ by the French authorities, but some Neo-Destour members argued that a truce 
was needed in order to let the French abandon their firm attitude.2 Furthermore, violent 
activities protesting against the French plan started. An armed organisation called the 
Fellaghas was created in Southern Tunisia soon after Hauteclocque’s imposition of the 
plan on the Bey.3
It is worth noting the Bey’s motivation behind his approval of the French plan, which 
the ancient Tunisian Prime Minister Chenik explained to a French official in February 
1953:
le Bey n’avait absolument aucun d£sir de se depouiller de ses privileges. Sidi 
Lamine... n’avait participd en rien a la redaction du discours du trone du 15 mai 1951, 
oeuvre de Ben Youssef et de Badra. La formule d’une monarchic constitutionnelle du 
type anglais etait aussi 61oign6e que possible.. .4
As for the reason why the Bey had come near the Neo-Destour especially in May 
1951, Chenik maintained it was because he had not had any other way to win popularity 
despite his fear of the nationalist party. It can be assumed, therefore, that the Bey was 
more opportunistic than nationalist-oriented: what motivated him to accept the French 
plan in December 1952 was his desire to preserve his privileges as a sovereign and he 
was not unwilling to side with France once he understood that the nationalist cause did 
not win international support. In fact, the nationalists’ demand for the establishment of a
1 Chapter 3, pp.87-88.
2 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.388, Hauteclocque to Schuman, no.2033, 24.12.1952; Hauteclocque to 
Paris, no.2193/2199,27.12.1952; Letter to Bidault, 5.2.1953; L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.195.
3 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Paris to Tunis, Evolution de la Situation en Tunisie depuis 
1’Assem ble Gdn6rale des Nations Unies de 1953,24.9.1954.
4 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.388, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.175, 11.2.1953. Hauteclocque later noted: 
‘le Bey, dans le fond de son coeur, ne souhaite aucunement le ddveloppement d’institutions d6mocratiques 
en Tunisie’. vol.388, Hauteclocque to Paris, no.462/464,16.4.1953.
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legislative Tunisian national assembly theoretically meant the loss of the Bey’s 
legislative power, even if it was nominal.
The Bey’s acceptance allowed the French to proceed to the next step. Mayer’s 
declaration on 6 January 1953 reflected their determination to accomplish the June 1952 
plan.5 The Quai d’Orsay argued later in January 1953 that France should, firstly, prepare 
for the Caidat and municipal elections envisaged in the dahir of December 1952 and 
secondly, follow up the plan.6
The local elections were held in the spring of 1953. In the Caidat elections from 13 to 
23 April 1953, the French were content that 59% of registered voters participated in 
them, despite the boycott from the Neo-Destour and the Tunisian socialist party. 
However, the assassination of Taieb Gachem, the father of the Tunisian Minister of 
Public Health, on 22 April gave impetus to a series of violent activities against pro- 
French Tunisians. Dr Ben Rais, the Minister of Commerce, narrowly escaped 
assassination on 1 May 1953. The municipal elections were held on 3 and 10 May. Just 
before them, on the night of 2 May, fearful of nationalist disruptive activities, the 
French authorities had arrested a number of trade union leaders, Neo-Destour members 
and communists.7 However, the results of these elections were much less satisfactory 
than those of the Caidat elections, as only 51% of Tunisian voters took part and in 
Tunis in particular, the percentage was only 8.83%.8 According to Mayer’s report in 
front of the National Assembly on 12 May, of the sixty-nine municipalities as a whole, 
forty elected all their council members, but two municipalities did not have complete 
Tunisian membership, three municipalities had only French members, and ten purely 
Tunisian municipalities did not elect any members. Some Tunisian council members 
were reportedly elected against their will. Furthermore, the caids, who were the 
presidents of the municipal councils, delayed delegating their powers to elected vice- 
presidents, who had to fulfil the role of mayors. In total, ‘les elections municipales n’ont 
nullement detendu 1’atmosphere dans la Regence. Au contraire, elles ont 6t6 l’occasion 
d’une reprise du terrorisme.’9 
However, some leading French figures were aware of the need for a ‘soft policy’ in 
Tunisia. In May 1953, President Auriol stated at the French Council of Ministers: ‘II 
faut, si l’on veut ramener ce pays a nous, faire des r6formes sociales profondes, il faut
5 Chapter 3, pp.72-73.
6 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre Pinay, no.29, Note, 27.1.1953.
7 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.232.
8 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.388, MAE to Messieurs les chefs des postes diplomatiques, no.480AL, 
15.5.1953; F R U S1952-195, XI, Dillon to the State Department, no.5783,4.5.1953.
9 L 'Annee Politique, 1953, p.233. The Mayer government fell on 21 May 1953.
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avoir le peuple avec nous, il faut enfin changer de methodes’.10 In early July 1953, a 
committee studying the overseas problems, presided over by General Georges 
Catroux,11 made recommendations to the government: ‘la Tunisie verrait affirmer 
solennellement par la France le principe de sa souverainetd. Elle prendrait 
graduellement la gestion de ses affaires interieures sous la direction d’un gouvemement 
tunisien homogene, assiste d’un organisme legislatif elu, les Fran9ais etant represents 
dans un Conseil cr66 aupr6s du Resident general.’12
Meanwhile, the Tunisian situation remained unsettled, partly because of the Moroccan 
situation. An armed incident occurred on 14 August 1953 between the police and the 
Fellaghas, killing eight people.13 On the same day, an American official in Tunis noted 
that there was no sign that a financial council, which was expected to review the budget 
in place of the defunct Grand Council, would be established despite the approaching 30 
September deadline, when the second half of the 1953-54 budget had to be promulgated. 
One week later, the same American official pointed to ‘the continued deterioration in 
the security situation in Tunisia during the past week’, referring to the fact that French 
Residency officials were taking the situation more seriously than before.14
However, the French were slow to move, presumably because they were preoccupied 
with Moroccan affairs, where opposition to the Sultan had increasingly mounted since 
the beginning of 1953. It was only after Moroccan affairs had settled down as a result of 
the Sultan’s deposition15 that the French government took its next major step in Tunisia. 
On 2 September 1953, Pierre Voizard was appointed as the new Resident-General, a 
decision that seemed to reflect Auriol’s statement to the Council of Ministers in May 
1953.16 This was welcomed by the Tunisian nationalists to some extent. Hedi Nouira, 
the then Neo-Destour’s Secretary-General, declared that he was prepared to help
10 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.176-177.
11 He was an ex-Govemor-General o f Algeria and was recognised as a liberal leader on colonial issues.
12 P6rillier, La Conquete, p. 178. Pdrillier himself participated in this committee. Catroux was to publish 
the so-called ‘Catroux Plan’ on 4 October 1953. This constituted two steps: (1) France’s reaffirmation of 
the principle of Tunisian sovereignty, (2) the prompt establishment of a regime of internal autonomy 
which would gradually be placed under the direction of an all-native Tunisian Government. This plan was 
welcomed by the Tunisian nationalists including the Neo-Destour, but was not adopted by the French 
government. NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/10-953, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no.53,
9.10.1953.
13 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.271.
14 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/8-1453, LeBreton to the State Department, Despatch no.26, 14.8.1953; 
772.00/8-2153, LeBreton to the State Department, Despatch no.28, 21.8.1953. A financial council had 
been envisaged in the June 1952 plan and, in the spring of 1953 there had been a prospect o f the Bey’s 
accepting this council.
15 Chapter 4, Section 2.
16 Auriol explains this remark in his memoirs: ‘des changements de m&hodes qui implique un 
changement de personne.’ Vincent Auriol, Journal du Septennat 1947-1954, Tome VII, p. 152.
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Voizard creer une detente.’17 On 21 September, the Bey made an appeal to the 
Tunisian people, expressing the desire for a calmer political atmosphere to facilitate the 
solution of problems, an appeal which, according to French sources, had been made 
voluntarily for the first time. The French hoped that this appeal would reduce terrorist 
activities, considering the prestige that the Bey enjoyed among the Tunisians.18
On 26 September 1953, Voizard arrived in Tunis, with the French government’s 
instructions to begin reducing tension without, however, touching on substantive points 
of internal autonomy. Actually, the amelioration of this tense atmosphere was the key 
theme that Paris and the Bey had in mind. Voizard announced, (1) the abolition of press 
censorship, (2) the transfer of police powers, which had been in French hands since the 
introduction of martial law, to civil authorities, and (3) the amnesty of all political 
leaders who had been arrested in January 1952.19 Paris had also instructed him to 
complete the June 1952 plan and that in the process of implementing the reform, he 
would have to negotiate with the Bey about future agreements between the two 
countries, which the French government judged necessary to guarantee permanent 
Franco-Tunisian links thereby securing the interests of France and French settlers.20 To 
put into effect the above policies, Voizard was given extensive freedom of action so that 
he could explore the conditions under which Franco-Tunisian dialogues would be 
resumed.21
On 17 August 1953, the Arab-Asian countries had requested the UN Secretary- 
General to take up the North African problem.22 The GA decided to inscribe these 
problems on the agenda on 17 September 1953.23 The French and British governments’ 
positions remained opposed to inscription, as the former confirmed: ‘on the Moroccan 
and Tunisian items the French delegation will adopt exactly the same tactics as last 
year.’24 However, on account of the events in Morocco in the summer of 1953, the 
Moroccan issue dominated the UNGA debates on North African affairs.25 On 26
17 L 'Annee Politique, 1953, p.285.
18 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.388, Note ‘situation en Tunisie’, undated.
19 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Bidault to the Bey, 10.5.1954.
20 The French government deemed these conventions necessary because it feared that the Tunisian 
assembly designed in the June 1952 reforms might abrogate the protectorate treaty. However, no 
documents are available to show that Voizard had talks with the Tunisians on this subject. MAE, Tunisie 
1944-1955, vol.388, Compte-rendu de la reunion tenue chez le Secretaire d’Etat, 14.9.1953.
21 The French Council of Ministers had made this decision on 24 September 1953. L ’Annee Politique, 
1953, p.286.
22 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.373, MAE to the Resident-General, no.l203/AL, 2.9.1953. Those which 
submitted this memorandum were Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, 
Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Syria, Thailand and Yemen.
23 L 'Annee Politique, 1953, p.287.
24 PRO, FO371/102942, JF1041/48, FO to New York, no.842, 19.9.1953.
25 Chapter 6, p. 142.
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October 1953, the GA First Committee passed the Arab-Asian draft resolution 
recommending: ‘toutes les mesures necessaires soient prises pour que le peuple tunisien 
jouisse de son droit & l’inddpendance complete’.26 However, having considered the 
unsatisfactory result of the Moroccan debates in the GA plenary session, the Arab-Asian 
countries accepted the amendments introduced by the Icelandic delegation, which 
confined itself to recommending that both parties pursue negotiations ‘en vue de 
l’accession des Tunisiens a la capacity de s’administrer eux-memes’.27 On 3 November 
1953, however, the GA plenary session rejected this motion just after its rejection of a 
Moroccan draft resolution and instead approved the Iraqi motion which proposed 
postponing debate on the Tunisian problem. The French noted that the Arab-Asian 
countries did not want to suffer another defeat following the Moroccan case,28 because, 
to those countries, Morocco offered a more promising prospect than Tunisia.
Even after the UN debates, Voizard was quite cautious: before taking the next step, he 
started to sound out the Tunisian nationalists and, in particular, the Bey about the 
possible programme. The French had already abandoned the June 1952 plan as 
unrealistic, given French settlers’ opposition. In October 1953, he reportedly continued 
to widen contacts with the Tunisians.29 Regarding his tactics, Quai d’Orsay officials 
explained to the Americans in December 1953:
[By] these consultations and his conversations with the Bey... he expects to be able 
to arrive at his own conclusions of the nature of reform which might be feasible. The 
Bey has indicated to the Resident-General that he favors such an approach... [In 
contrast] M. Perillier’s approach... was too spectacular and encouraged ever- 
increasing demands on the part of Neo-Destour.30
The French were trying to convince the Americans that P6rillier’s policy had failed 
because he did not spend enough time on persuading the Tunisians, but not because the 
French aim was unacceptable to them. On 1 January 1954, the Resident-General 
announced that the French authorities would release forty-one Neo-Destour leaders, 
including Mongi Slim, the director of the Neo-Destour Political Bureau.31 In parallel
26 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.373, Hoppenot to Paris, no.2791/2797,21.10.1953; vol.373, Hoppenot to 
Paris, no.2898, 26.10.1953. This draft resolution also recommended that martial law in Tunisia be ended 
and that political prisoners be released. UNGA Official Records, vo l.8 ,1953, First Committee, p.102. The 
US delegation voted against this.
27 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, p.300.
28 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.373, Hoppenot to Paris, no.3100/3101,4.11.1953.
29 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/10-1453, American Consulate General (Morris Hughes) to the State 
Department, Despatch no.57,14.10.1953.
30 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/12-253, Paris to the State Department, Despatch no. 1467,2.12.1953.
31 Habib Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p. 136. The release was what had been demanded by Rend Coty, 
who became the new President of the French Republic on 16 January 1954. Pdrillier, La Conquete, p.187.
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with this caution on the part of the French, the party took ‘une position d’attente et 
d’expectative’.32
However, one major exception to amnesty was left: Habib Bourguiba, who was on the 
Galite Island, about twenty miles off Tunisia’s Mediterranean coast, and who 
consequently was unable to contact the Tunisian nationalists or receive proper medical 
care despite his ill health. Therefore, the Tunisian nationalists campaigned strongly for 
his release. On 18 January 1954, Mohammed Masmoudi, the Neo-Destour’s 
representative in France, publicised a communique deploring the fact that Bourguiba 
had not yet been liberated.33 In response, the French Residency issued a communique: 
‘aucune mesure en faveur de Habib Bourguiba n’interviendrait sous la menace’.34 This 
was because, explained French officials to the Americans, his transfer to France or 
Tunisia could allow him to begin an anti-reform campaign thereby disturbing the 
current atmosphere favourable for the resumption of Franco-Tunisian negotiations. 
They continued that the Bey agreed with the French, and added: ‘he would prefer not to 
have Bourguiba, whom he referred to as an “exalte” (hot-headed person), on the scene 
at this particular time.’35 Namely, the Bey had already decided to break with the 
nationalists. This tough French attitude was opposed, however, by Alain Savary of the 
SFIO, who declared on 28 January: ‘il n’y aura pas de solution contre ou sans 
Bourguiba’.36
5.2 The French plan of March 1954
On 27 February 1954, the French restricted cabinet meeting unanimously approved 
the plan that Voizard had presented.37 This was the so-called Voizard plan. A Quai 
d’Orsay note of that day argued that this plan contained four principal points: 
institutional reforms, the formation of a new Tunisian government, Bourguiba’s transfer 
and a customs and cereal market union between France and Tunisia.38
Regarding the reforms, it argued as follows.
32 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.204.
33 P6rillier, La Conquete, p. 187.
™ Ibid., p.188.
35 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/1-1254, Paris to the State Department, 12.1.1953.
36 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p. 196.
37 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/3-154, Paris to Dulles, no.3132,1.3.1954.
38 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le President par la Direction d’Afrique-Levant,
27.2.1954.
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1. L’Exdcutif
a) Le Conseil des Ministres comprend dorenavant 8 ministres tunisiens... et 
4 membres fran?ais...39
b) Le role de Secretaire General. .. [s]ous son nouveau titre de ‘Secretaire 
general k la Presidence du Conseil’... cesse d’etre chef d’administration et 
sa subordination est nettement affirmee k l’egard du President du Conseil...
S’il continue a centraliser les arretes reglementaire... ceux-ci doivent etre 
desormais soumis k la signature du President du Conseil...
c) Suppression de l’assentiment residentiel aux arrets ministeriels.
2. Assembles representatives
L’Assembiee tunisienne comprend 45 membres tunisiens eius au suffrage 
universel a deux degres... Elle est obligatoirement consultee prealablement 
a 1’adoption par le Gouvemement de tout decret legislatif... La Delegation 
des Francais de Tunisie comprend 23 deieguds et 19 deiegues adjoints, 
eius... au suffrage universel direct... Pour l’exercice de ses attributions 
financieres..., 1’Assemble tunisienne siege en session spedale budgetaire 
par l’adjonction k ses membres de deux delegations, l’une de 19 membres 
designes par les Chambres economiques fran9aises et tunisiennes, 1’autre 
des 42 membres de la Delegation des Fran9ais de Tunisie.
3. Les collectivites locales
a) Municipalites -  Alors que les Presidents de municipalites etaient, jusqu'& 
present, nommes par le Bey parmi des membres du corps caTdal, les conseils 
municipaux eiisent desormais leur President parmi leurs membres...
b) Conseils de caidat -  [L]es membres de l’Assembiee tunisienne, de la 
Delegation des Fran9ais de Tunisie et des Chambres economiques sont 
appeie k sieger... aux deliberations des conseils de caidat...
Certainly the French made concessions on the following points: firstly, the numerical 
predominance of Tunisian ministers over French ministers in the cabinet, secondly, the 
suppression of the French Secretary-General’s endorsement, and thirdly, the 
introduction of some democratic elements at local levels. However, the devolution of 
powers from the French to the Tunisians remained superficial, since the Resident- 
General was to retain the power of veto, as will be shown below. Furthermore, the 
national Tunisian assembly was to be only consultative in character, unlike a legislative 
assembly envisaged in the June 1952 plan. Above all, by allowing French settlers to 
discuss budgetary and financial matters, the French denied the Tunisians a right to self- 
determination, as opposed to Bourguiba’s argument.40 Namely, France was still 
committed to the principe de co-souverainete.
39 It was planned that the prime minister and the ministries of Institutions musulmanes, Justice, Sante 
Publique, Commerce et artisanat, Agriculture, Travail, and Urbanisme et habitat would be occupied by 
the Tunisians and Secretaire general a la Presidence du Conseil, Directeur des Finances, Directeur de 
1‘Institution Publique and Directeur des Travaux Publics by the French.
40 Nineteen members appointed by les chambres economiques were composed of eleven French and eight 
Tunisians. As a result, an equal number of French and Tunisian members were planned to participate in 
financial and budgetary discussions. L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p. 194. For Bourguiba’s argument, see 
Chapter 1, pp.22-23.
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The second point of the Voizard plan concerned a new Tunisian government, with 
which the French government was to negotiate about the implementation of the plan. 
Voizard’s choice of prime minister was Mohammed Salah Mzali, a former minister of 
the Chenik Government. He had already obtained the Bey’s approval on this matter on 5 
February 1954.41 Thirdly, the Quai’s note of 27 February suggested Bourguiba’s 
transfer from the Galite Island to another place where he could enjoy better facilities. 
Therefore, his transfer aimed to ease Tunisian discontent, thereby facilitating the new 
Tunisian government’s task 42 Finally, this note argued that France and Tunisia should 
form the customs and cereal market union.
In addition to the four principal points, this note advised that Voizard should start 
negotiations with the Bey about new Franco-Tunisian agreements with a view to 
guaranteeing the interests of France and French settlers. It was argued:
ces rdformes continuent a proceder de la methode du “don gratuit” sans 
aucune contre partie... [N]ous en arrivons au point ou un nouvel amenuisement 
des prerogatives de la France en Tunisie ne permettrait plus d’assumer 
convenablement la protection des int£r£ts franfais par la voie des garanties 
institutionnelles...
Referring to the fact that in September 1953, Paris had instructed Voizard to examine 
agreements, this note continued: ‘De telles conventions seront de plus en plus difficile a 
ndgocier au fur et k mesure que les pouvoirs de 1’Assemble tunisienne s’affirmeront.’ 
Although Voizard personally considered that his power of veto would be sufficient to 
block possible anti-French deliberations by the Tunisian Assembly, the Quai d’Orsay 
insisted that Foreign Minister Bidault would have to emphasise to him the importance 
of such agreements. Fearing that even nominal concessions listed in their plan could be 
harmful to the interests of France and French settlers, the French considered that their 
protection must be reinforced by means of new agreements, and not only through the 
existing agreements with the Bey, i.e. the Treaty of Bardo.
On 4 March 1954, the Bey sealed the reform projects and the formation of the Mzali 
Government was announced.43 From the French viewpoint, this was a remarkable 
victory in the sense that, for the first time, the Bey’s acceptance paved the way for 
French settlers’ participation in a Tunisian national assembly. In fact, as the Americans 
had correctly pointed out in February 1954, the French were, despite Neo-Destour’s
41 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p. 197.
42 This note agreed with Voizard, who proposed that Bourguiba be transferred to Corsica.
43 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Tunis to Paris, no.172/176,4.3.1954.
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evident opposition, ‘counting on the Bey’s support and personal prestige to counteract 
this opposition and to win popular acceptance... of the reform program.’44
However, the Voizard plan turned out to be very unpopular, and protestations 
followed from both the Tunisian and French settlers’ side. According to a report sent to 
Washington, ‘the recent governmental reforms... have succeeded in pleasing no one.’ 
The Neo-Destour and various nationalists bitterly denounced the ‘pseudo-reforms’ that 
would ‘lead to a type of co-sovereignty rather than Tunisian sovereignty.’45 In fact, the 
party had not yet taken its final position at the end of March, as it did not exclude ‘une 
attitude “d’opposition constructive” a l’int^rieur des nouvelles institutions’. Some Neo- 
Destour leaders were inclined to accept the French plan, because they did not want to 
break their relationship with the Bey.46 The French speculated that Bourguiba’s position 
concerning the plan would crucially affect the party’s orientation.47 On the part of 
French settlers, the Rassemblement frangais issued a motion on 10 March, deploring the 
fact that they were presented with a fait accompli ‘d’une organisation d’Etat confue 
dans le sens du renversement du protectorat’.48 Five days later, Tunisian students of the 
Grande Mosquee launched a demonstration under the Vieux-Destour’s influence.49 
What is more, anti-French armed activities rapidly grew in number. The Fellaghas, 
whom the French considered were receiving support from extremist elements from 
Egypt and Libya, attacked a rail car in Southern Tunisia on 22 March.50 Having started 
in December 1952, the Fellagha movement was increasingly to gain force from March 
1954 onwards.
While accepting the Voizard plan, the Bey was desperate to regain popularity among 
the Tunisian people, particularly because some nationalists insisted that ‘le Bey avait 
trahi la cause du nationalisme’. He had proposed Bourguiba’s transfer to Metropolitan 
France and, on 30 March 1954, he sent a letter to that effect to Rene Coty, the President 
of the French Republic. Knowing the Bey’s intentions, the Quai d’Orsay advised: ‘le 
Souverain pourra-t-il prouver que son appel a 6te entendu et en retirer un benefice moral 
que nous n’avons pas a lui marchander si nous voulons pouvoir compter sur sa
44 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/2-1954, Paris to the State Department, no.2150,19.2.1954.
45 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/3-1754, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no.182,17.3.1954.
46 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.209.
47 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Note, La Situation en Tunisie, 23.3.1954.
48 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, pp.195-196.
49 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Note, La Situation en Tunisie, 23.3.1954.
50 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.200; MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Note, Evolution de la Situation en 
Tunisie depuis T Assem ble G6n6rale des Nations Unies, 24.9.1954.
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collaboration.’ 51 Thus, the strengthening of the Bey’s position was considered 
fundamental in order to achieve the French plan.
Despite opposition to the Voizard plan, the Neo-Destour did not exclude its 
participation in the envisaged elections, due to be held in June 1954. On 2 April 1954, 
its National Council adopted two motions. The first motion stated that ‘les rdformes du 
4 mars 1954... portent atteinte a... la souverainete tunisienne, une et indivisible..., et 
consacrent la participation des Fran9ais de Tunisie aux institutions’ but the second one 
declared that the party ‘ne peut envisage de participer aux prochaines Elections 
qu’autant qu’auront et6 assumes les conditions d’un scrutin sincere et libre’ and that 
Bourguiba’s release was necessary in order to realise those conditions.52
Later in April 1954, opposition to the Voizard plan was also expressed by Tahar Ben 
Ammar,53 a former president of the Tunisian section of the Grand Council. On 21 April, 
he put forward a motion to the French. In fact, as a result of a series of meetings with 
other nationalists in April 1954, he had already the support of fifteen signatories, nine of 
whom had participated in the Conseil des Quarante summoned by the Bey on 1 August 
1952.54 Criticising its undemocratic character, Ben Ammar concluded that the Voizard 
plan, which retained the principes de co-souverainete, did not meet Tunisian 
aspirations.55 The Quai d’Orsay noted that he was beginning to align himself with the 
Neo-Destour although he had long been considered a moderate nationalist.56
5.3 The Carthage Declaration
In May 1954 Tunisia experienced further troubles. As an American diplomat reported 
to Washington, ‘the fellagahs [sic] are undermining French authority in Central and 
South Tunisia, intimidating the local population, and endeavouring to convince the 
villagers that the French are powerless to protect them.’57 Later in the month, the Quai 
d’Orsay noted that the Fellaghas’ activities were expanding into Northern Tunisia, 
commenting that the deterioration of the general situation ‘n’est pas plus l’effet de la 
chute de Dien Bien Phu que Pespoir calculi par le Neo-Destour d’un changement de
51 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Voizard to Paris, no.383/390, 31.3.1954. Voizard commented about 
the Bey’s motive: ‘il ne faut voir dans cette lettre qu’un tdmoignage du besoin qu’dpreuve le Souverain de 
revigorer sa popularity.’
52 Le Monde, 4-5.4.1954.
53 He had stood for the caidat elections in the spring of 1953, but had suddenly resigned his candidacy. 
MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note, 9.5.1954.
54 Chapter 3, p.76.
55 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Etude Critique des Ddcrets du 4 Mars 1954.
56 Ibid., Note, 9.5.1954.
57 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/5-1254, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no.29,12.5.1954.
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gouvemement et d’un retour 6ventuel sur les rdforme du 4 mars.’58 Their activities 
were, continued the Quai, so fierce that police operations alone were limited in their 
ability to halt the attacks. However, the Fellagha was not only challenging French rule. 
It is important to emphasise that it was also undermining the Bey’s authority, since he 
was a sovereign, however nominal, in the Tunisian people’s mind.
It was in these circumstances that Paris decided on Bourguiba’s transfer to Groix 
Island, near the Brittany Peninsula, hoping that this measure would contribute to a 
climate favourable to the elections.59 This was because, firstly, the French were less 
optimistic about holding elections. It was noted: ‘La participation du Ndo-Destour aux 
Elections... apparatt de moins en moins sure et reste subordonnee au reglement du cas 
Bourguiba.’60 The French in fact wondered if the Neo-Destour had not given its 
members instructions to oppose the envisaged elections.61 Secondly, they were anxious 
to restore the Bey’s popularity, which they believed would bring about stability. On 21 
May 1954, Voizard announced Bourguiba’s transfer to Groix Island, where he was 
permitted to receive visits and to make public his views on the evolution of the Tunisian 
problem.62 However, the situation was to evolve in quite the opposite way to what the 
French had hoped.
Immediately after his transfer, Bourguiba wasted no time in phoning one of his 
entourage and ordered that his instructions of March 1954 be published without delay. 
In fact, on 10 March 1954, he had given a letter about the Voizard plan to his son, who 
had exceptionally been allowed to visit his father by the Resident-General. Expressing 
his disagreement with the plan, he had ordered the party leaders to take action ‘pour 
faire comprendre au peuple sa decision de rompre d^finitivement avec le Bey.’ For him, 
‘la legitimitd n’est pas l’apanage du Bey, mais plutdt du peuple « source de tout 
pouvoir ».’63 This was clearly the first outright challenge to the Bey’s legitimacy. His 
conclusion was remarkable, considering other Neo-Destour members’ conciliatory 
attitudes, exemplified by the 2 April 1954 declaration.64 However, the Neo-Destour did 
not follow its president’s instructions. The party’s communique published on 22 May 
1954 opposed the Voizard plan in spite of the improvement in Bourguiba’s living
58 The fall of the Dien-Bien-Phu was on 7 May 1954. The Neo-Destour had announced their indecision on 
the participation in elections in April 1954. Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.204.
59 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note, 10.5.1954.
60 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.217. A similar expression is found in Le Monde, 5.5.1954.
61 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Note pour le President, no.97,20.5.1954.
62 P^rillier, La Conquete, p.203.
63 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, pp.226-227.
64 Ibid, pp.226-236. Neo-Destour leaders had been informed of Bourguiba’s ideas, but did not pursue 
them. Ibid., p.228.
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conditions -  although this certainly attacked French policy -  but was not aimed at 
encouraging the people to challenge the Bey’s authority.65
Bourguiba’s instructions were published in the Arabic newspaper Al-Sabah on 27 
May 1954. This had, to use his own expression, Teffet d’une bombe’. A significant fact 
was that this was a direct appeal to the Tunisian people, unlike the Neo-Destour’s 
communique of 22 May 1954, which was merely directed at the French authorities. The 
press reported a further increase in violent activity, conducted not only by the Fellaghas 
but also by the French settlers. On 29 May, Voizard, who had just returned from Paris, 
was confronted by 200 hostile settlers demanding measures to protect their rights. Two 
days later the Bey condemned the violent activities before French and Tunisian 
representatives, breaking with the custom of not giving any audiences during 
Ramadan.66 Here the French faced a dilemma: Bourguiba’s contact with the nationalists 
was exacerbating the situation but prohibiting such contact would increase his prestige 
as a martyr, thereby further undermining the French plan’s prospects. Therefore, the 
Quai d’Orsay did not decide on the prohibition, even though the Bey now demanded 
that Bourguiba’s broadcasting activities be restricted again because the latter’s remarks 
were seriously damaging his prestige 67
Thus the Fellagha insurgency and Bourguiba’s activities went hand in hand. 
However, this did not mean that Bourguiba was encouraging the Fellaghas’ activities. 
Interviewed by Paris-Match on 28 May 1954, he stated: ‘«des hommes politiques 
serieux » ne peuvent pas pousser leurs compatriotes a des actes de violence... c’est le 
ddsespoir qui a armd les mains des terroristes, et les vrais responsables du terrorisme ne 
sont pas les Tunisiens’ 68 Nonetheless, in any event both Bourguiba and the Fellagha 
undermined the Bey’s authority and French rule immensely.
On 9 June 1954, Voizard noted: ‘Le moral de l’equipe Mzali est mauvais... [L]es 
Ministres ont re5u des lettres de menace.’69 In the light of the pro-French Tunisian 
government being jeopardised, a marked change appeared in the Quai d’Orsay’s 
mindset. Maurice Schumann argued two days later: ‘il y aurait intdret, dans les 
circonstances actuelles, si l’on veut eviter l’isolement du Ministere Mzali et ne pas etre 
amend a une impasse dans la mise en oeuvre des reformes, a reprendre des contacts avec
65 Le Monde, 23-24.5.1954.
66 Le Monde, 29.5.1954-2.6.1954; L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.219. Bourguiba’s analysis of the Voizard 
plan was published in I ’Expresse on 29 May 1954. Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, pp.235-236, pp.348- 
354.
67 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le Secretaire d’Etat, 1.6.1954.
68 This statement was published in Paris-Match on 4 June 1954. Le Monde, 5.6.1954.
69 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Tunis to Paris, no.724/726, 9.6.1954.
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les elements les plus representatifs de la population fran?aise et tunisienne, y compris 
certaines personnalites du N6>Destour.’ This was the first time that the French had 
contemplated the need for overt talks with the Neo-Destour since January 1952, though 
they had no intention of discussing the modification to Tunisia’s protectorate status as 
outlined in the treaty of Bardo.70 Troubles were compounded for the French when the 
Laniel Government fell on 12 June. On the following day, the election for the Tunisian 
Economic Chamber was held, but most of the elected Tunisian members had expressed 
opposition to the Voizard plan.71 Day after day, terrorist incidents were reported in 
which many French and Tunisian people were killed or wounded. Local people were 
discouraged from going to shops or cinemas managed by French people and clerks 
received letters threatening them not to work at those shops.72
On 16 June 1954, four Tunisian government ministers offered their resignation to 
Prime Minister Mzali. Voizard noted: ‘C’est la premiere fois qu’un Ministre tunisien 
abandonne le pouvoir sans en avoir re5u expressement l’ordre du Bey.’73 Furthermore, 
Mzali himself offered his resignation on the same day. ‘The Bey seems definitely to 
have lost whatever popularity or respect in which he was held by a great number of 
Tunisians’, as the Americans correctly put it.74 However, the Bey requested Mzali to 
remain in place provisionally, as the appointment of a successor appeared extremely 
difficult, all the more so because of the ministerial crisis in Paris.75
Mzali’s resignation triggered a clear change in the French way of thinking. A note 
dated 17 June argued that the political situation in Tunisia was quickly deteriorating. 
This was partly due to the activities of the Fellaghas, who had established semi­
independent political regimes in several areas. This note continued:
le Ministere dtinissionnaire n’a jamais... joui d’une grande popularity dans 
l’opinion tunisienne. [L]’attitude du [N6o-]Destour semblait surtout dictee par 
son d6pit d’avoir ete tenu h l’ycart des negotiations et l’on pouvait espdrer 
qu’influencee par la ferme position du Souverain, il se rallierait finalement a une 
attitude d’opposition constructive, excluant le recours a 1’agitation...
[N]ous irions probablement au devant de difficulty plus graves encore si nous 
envisagions... de rechercher, avant que la situation ne soit redressee sur le plan 
de l’ordre public..., un accord avec le Neo-Destour en vue de la constitution 
d’un nouveau Ministdre politique...
70 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Paris to Tunis, no.340/342,11.6.1954.
71 L ’Annie Politique, 1954, p.226.
72 Ibid., p.225.
73 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Voizard to Paris, no.767/768,16.6.1954.
74 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/6-1654, Hughes to the State Department, Despatch no.268,16.6.1954.
75 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.226.
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Dans l’immddiat, notre effort devrait done... tendre k ramener rapidement 
l’ordre et la sdcuritd en Tunisie, et a assurer... 1’administration du Pays. 6
Therefore, this note recommended that the government reinforce French forces in 
Tunisia to restore order and security. The Quai d’Orsay was aware that agreement with 
the Neo-Destour was fundamental in forming a new Tunisian government. This was the 
first time that agreement with the nationalist party had been conceived as indispensable 
to Tunisia’s future.
Why did the Quai argue for the resumption of negotiations with the Neo-Destour? 
This was because the French had realised that it was no longer possible to form a new 
Tunisian government without its agreement. So far, the French had set up puppet 
governments counting on the Bey who had retained popularity among the people, and 
had been trying to introduce pseudo-internal autonomy under the disguise of those 
governments. Now that the Bey’s authority had collapsed due to the activities of 
Bourguiba and the Fellagha, the French had to find a new way of legitimising their 
control, otherwise the privileges of France and French settlers would be at peril. In fact, 
as will be argued below in detail, it was indirect control through collaboration with the 
nationalist party that they would adopt. Logically, these French concessions did not 
mean that they decided to abandon their interests in Tunisia but that they would change 
their way of control.
At the same time, Pierre Mendds-France was appointed as the new French prime 
minister on 18 June 1954, which was to bring about a dramatic change in the French 
attitude to the Tunisian problem. In his speech before being elected, he displayed his 
intentions to ‘reprendre avec la Tunisie et le Maroc, les dialogues malheureusement 
interrompus’. Mend6s-France obtained 419 votes in favour and 47 against for his 
nomination in the National Assembly. This meant that the Parliamentarians approved 
his new policy with an overwhelming majority. Nationalist circles in Tunisia received 
this news with enthusiasm,77 because his liberal stance on overseas territories was well 
known.78 The following day, he set up the Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs, 
with Christian Fouchet as the Minister. Now North African affairs, which had been 
under the control of Maurice Schumann since the beginning of 1953, were handed over 
to Fouchet.79
76 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.375, Note pour le Ministre, 17.6.1954.
77 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.209; PRO, FO371/108588, JF1015/46, Tunis to FO, no.901/601/48,19.6.1954.
78 He had previously advocated that the government resume negotiations with North African nationalists. 
Le Monde, 18.6.1954.
79 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.232.
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Immediately after, whilst negotiations for a peace settlement in Indochina were going 
on in Geneva, Mendes-France and his advisors discussed the development of their 
‘Tunisia strategy’, its main points being: (1) a restoration of some of the moral authority 
of the Bey, providing limited assurance of the continuity of Tunisian legitimacy and (2) 
involving the Neo-Destour in negotiations.80 Then, Mendes-France wanted to achieve a 
renewal of Franco-Tunisian relations, which went further than a resumption of 
dialogues with the Neo-Destour. A Quai d’Orsay memorandum dated 26 June 1954 
argued that, as opposed to the Voizard plan, the opening of new negotiations on the 
status of Franco-Tunisian relations would be a pre-requisite for the Neo-Destour’s 
agreement on a new Tunisian government.81
Paris desperately needed Bourguiba’s agreement on this ‘strategy’, but it was 
politically dangerous to contact him officially. Therefore, Mendes-France asked Alain 
Savary to tell Bourguiba on 4 July 1954 that important decisions were about to be made, 
but that they could not possibly bear fruit without the Neo-Destour’s agreement and 
support. Bourguiba gave Savary an encouraging reply.82 In fact, the day before, 
Bourguiba had written an article in VExpress, stating: ‘les forces armees ffan$aises 
continueront sous l’autorit6 du Resident G6n6ral’.83 On 10 July, in an interview of 
Le Monde he confirmed that the French head of police would remain in post during the 
first stage of ‘tunisificatiori’ of political institutions in his programme.84 Having been 
informed of Mendes-France’s intentions, Bourguiba was undoubtedly trying to make 
the French prime minister’s new thinking more acceptable to French opinion.
Meanwhile, the Tunisian situation continued to worsen. On 5 July, the Bey finally 
accepted the Mzali Government’s resignation and appointed Georges Dupoizat, the 
Secretary-General of the Tunisian government, as an interim prime minister.85 A French 
national being appointed to this post, this was criticised by the Neo-Destour and even 
the Bey’s entourage. In mid-July 1954, a group of French settlers in Tunisia wrote to 
Mendes-France: ‘les « arguments du bon sens » soient substitu6s aux « atouts de la 
force »’.86
80 Lacouture noted that Mendes-France had talks with his advisors around 23 and 24 June 1954. Jean 
Lacouture, Pierre Mendes France, (Paris: Seuil, 1981), pp.246-247.
81 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le Ministre, 26.6.1954.
82 Lacouture, Pierre Mendes France, pp.246-247. No official record can be found concerning the Savary- 
Bourguiba talks. Savary was known for his liberal positions on colonial questions. Ibid., p.200.
83 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le Ministre, 28.7.1954.
84 Le Monde, 10.7.1954.
85 Le Monde, 7.7.1954-10.7.1954.
86 Le Monde, 17.7.1954.
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The note of 16 July 1954 drafted by the Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs 
argued for a more comprehensive plan to be introduced in place of the Voizard plan.87 
First of all, this note pointed out that ‘la politique des rdformes’ based on the 
Convention of Marsa had failed, and that ‘dans le domaine institutionnel, la politique 
des reformes a abouti a zero’, as all the political institutions that France had established, 
such as the Grand Council and even the Tunisian government itself, had ultimately 
failed to function. It went on to argue:
Une seule institution subsiste, celle qui existait deja lors de l’etablissement du 
Protectorat; la dynastie beylicale. Mais le Bey, ... ignor£ de son peuple quand ses 
relations avec le Resident s’ameliorent, n’est plus qu’un symbole... et sans aucune 
autorite politique.
This note suggested that the main reason for this failure was the principe de co- 
souverainete.
The final collapse of ‘la politique des r£formes’, which had become apparent since the 
Mzali Government’s resignation, brought about a fundamentally new way of thinking in 
the French government. So far, the French had aimed to establish a political regime in 
which French settlers’ special position would be institutionalised through their 
participation in the national and local assemblies, thereby depriving the Tunisian people 
of a right to self-determination and, ultimately, achieving Tunisian participation in the 
French Union. The French now realised, however, that it was no longer possible to 
maintain their goal by making use of the Bey’s pseudo-traditional authority, although 
the m&intenance of the Bey was still considered highly helpful in preventing the 
radicalisation of indigenous opinion on whether to uphold close relations with France. 
The experiences after the March 1954 plan made them understand that France’s control 
of Tunisia must be based on the consent of the indigenous people, who desired to 
restore sovereignty and constitute a political community composed of Tunisian 
nationals alone. In fact, this was what Bourguiba meant when he noted ‘la 16gitimit6 
n’est pas l’apanage du Bey, mais plutot du peuple « source de tout pouvoir »’ in March 
1954.88 Hence the French decided to grant internal autonomy to the Tunisians so that 
the latter could establish a new regime based on their own sovereignty, in accordance 
with Bourguiba’s Seven Points of April 1950.89
This change of course did not mean that the French accepted the retreat of their 
position in Tunisia, however. They now turned to a new way of securing the indigenous
87 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le Ministre, 16.7.1954.
88 This Chapter, p.121.
89 Chapter 1, pp.22-23.
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people’s consent to the privileges of France and French settlers. The note of 16 July 
1954 concluded that the only possible solution was ‘un r6seau d’engagements, 
etroitement solidaires les uns des autres, et comportant une sdrie de Conventions’.
Cet ensemble conventionnel... permettrait a la France de renoncer a la Convention 
de la Marsa de 1883 et se substituerait au Traits du Bardo de 1881... [L]es 
engagements pris tireront leur valeur et leur autoritd de la satisfaction d’amour- 
propre des Tunisiens, dont la souverainetS sera ainsi reconnue et confirmee.
The Ministry for Tunisian and Moroccan Affairs reasoned that this new way was much 
more effective in achieving their aim. Simply put, its essence was that ‘[l]’abandon de 
1’initiative des reformes constituera la concession essentielle de la France en 
contrepartie des garanties qu’elle obtiendra pour elle et pour les Fran5ais de Tunisie.’90 
The note of 16 July 1954 continued that the French government should start 
negotiations with the purpose of concluding several particular agreements replacing the 
Convention of Marsa, and conclude a general treaty which would offer the framework 
within which those agreements would be concluded. Firstly, with regard to the general 
treaty, since France decided to give Tunisia internal autonomy but not independence, it 
must define new Franco-Tunisian relations without giving equal status to Tunisia.91 
Furthermore, the new policy was not meant to abandon Tunisia’s future adherence to 
the French Union, as this note argued that the envisaged general treaty ‘devrait ouvrir la 
voie a la participation tunisienne aux institutions de l’Union fran5aise.’92 That is, the 
French assumed that Tunisia’s foreign relations and defence would continue to be their 
responsibility. Secondly, the envisaged particular agreements were aimed at defining 
what kind of internal autonomy Tunisia would enjoy.
On the international scene, it was reported to Paris on 17 July 1954 that the Arab- 
Asian countries had decided to bring the Tunisian problem to the UNGA 93 Their move 
prompted French reactions. Fouchet sketched out the French programme about 
Tunisia’s internal autonomy when he discussed the matter with US Ambassador Dillon
90 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.389, Note pour le Ministre, 28.7.1954.
91 This note argued that it ‘serait fond£ sur le double principe de la reconnaissance de la souverainetd 
tunisienne et de l’interd^pendance de la France et de la Rigence.’
92 In fact, by October 1954, the Quai d’Orsay would start exploring a way of reactivating the High 
Council o f the French Union, an organisation which was then a dead letter. Indeed, as a result of the 
recognition of Tunisia’s internal autonomy, the French now had to make the High Council more attractive 
to the Tunisians so that they would accept participation in it. L’Institut Pierre Mendes France (hereafter 
IPMF), Territoires d’Outre-mer/l’Union Franjaise, 1,1/1/1, Note pour M le Pr6sident, 5.10.1954.
93 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.374, Tunis to Marotuni, no.54, 17.7.1954. Le Monde reported that 
French diplomatic approaches could also be made towards Cairo and Tripoli, but there is no 
governmental document referring to these moves. Le Monde, 28.7.1954.
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on 27 July, referring to the ‘tunisianisation’ of public service including police.94 The 
Council of Ministers on 30 July approved Mendds-France’s proposition regarding the 
new policy.95 Then, on 31 July 1954, Mendds-France, accompanied by Fouchet and 
General Juin,96 flew to Tunisia, where he made the so-called Carthage declaration to the 
Bey. He announced:
‘L’autonome interne de l’Etat tunisien est reconnue et proclamd sans arriere- 
pensee par le gouvemement fran9ais... [N]ous sommes prets a transferer a des 
personnes et k des institutions tunisiennes l’exercice interne de la souverainet£.’
He continued that the interests and rights of French people must be respected and that 
France and Tunisia would enter into negotiations to secure both countries’ new 
relations. 97 While the Tunisians welcomed Mendes-France’s proposal, the 
Rassemblement frangais criticised his plan, emphasising: ‘il ne pouvait pas accepter que 
les Fran9ais deviennent, en Tunisie « des etrangers privil6gi6s et protdgds »’.98
Preparations for the opening of negotiations started immediately. On 2 August 1954, 
the Bey entrusted Ben Ammar with the task of forming a new government, whose 
purpose was negotiating on internal autonomy with France.99 Two days later, the Neo- 
Destour Political Bureau approved the party’s participation in the Ben Ammar 
Government, following Bourguiba’s advice which had been given to Slim, whereas 
Salah Ben Youssef refused to side with Bourguiba’s line.100 The constitution of the Ben 
Ammar Government, with the participation of four Neo-Destour members, was 
announced on 7 August.101 The Neo-Destour National Congress, held eight days later, 
unanimously gave a vote of confidence to the new government. On the other hand, 
however, the Vieux-Destour announced its reservation, ‘en rappelant son opposition a 
tous pourparlers avec la France qui n’auraient pas pour objectif l’independance totale de 
la Tunisie.’ This party also announced its opposition to the country’s secularisation that
94 In reply, Dulles commented: ‘[the] Department is heartened by [the] outlines of [the] French plans’. 
NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/7-2754, Paris to Dulles, no.376, 27.7.1954; 772.00/7-3054, Dulles to Paris, 
no.3067,30.7.1954.
95 Mend6s-France’s position was supported by Faure and Mitterrand but opposed by General Koenig, who 
feared that a future Tunisian assembly might demand independence without strong links with France. 
Pdrillier, La Conquete, pp.214-215.
96 Juin accompanied Mendes-France in order to show French settlers that Paris was not intent on 
abandoning them.
97 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.390, la Declaration de Carthage.
98 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.255.
99 Documents Diplomatiques Frangais [hereafter DDF\, 1954, Doc. 184, p. 186, footnote 1.
100 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.227.
101 Four Neo-Destour members joined the new government: Sadok Mokaddem (Justice), Nouira 
(Commerce), and Slim and Mohammed Masmoudi (Ministers o f State in charge o f negotiation). The 
other Minister o f State for negotiation, Aziz Djelloui, was not from the Neo-Destour. L ’Annee Politique, 
1954, p.548
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Bourguiba advocated.102 Subsequently, the French and Tunisian governments jointly 
declared that negotiations would be opened at the beginning of September 1954.103
In the meantime, the French government had decided to reinforce French troops in 
Tunisia, an essential precondition of entering into negotiations with the nationalists. On 
19 July 1954, Mendes-France had met General Pierre Boyer de Latour,104 the CSTT, to 
give instructions for the reestablishment of order in Tunisia by reinforcing French 
troops. Furthermore, he sounded out Latour as to whether he would accept the 
nomination as the Resident-General, and the latter’s reply was in the affirmative.105 The 
French National Assembly approved on 27 August, by a vote of 451 to 122, the 
government’s Tunisian policy as outlined in the Carthage declaration.106 The US State 
Department, nevertheless, had concluded one day before that the Americans ‘should not 
make any commitments at this time’ but that ‘the most the US can do is to note with 
interest that negotiations are being resumed in an atmosphere of cordiality’, since the 
details of the programme had not yet been announced.107
5.4 Franco-Tunisian Negotiations and the Fellagha problem
Franco-Tunisian negotiations started in Tunis on 4 September 1954. In the first 
session, Fouchet showed the following eight Conventions to the Tunisians, emphasising 
that all of them must be accepted and put into force as a whole. They were, the General 
Convention (previously called a general treaty), the Convention Related to the Rights 
and Interests of French people in Tunisia and Tunisian people in France, the Convention 
Related to Administrative and Technical Cooperation, the Military Convention, the 
Diplomatic Convention, the Judicial Convention, the Cultural Convention and the 
Economic Convention.108 Certain Tunisian leaders noted that the French position had 
been set back compared with that of the Carthage Declaration.109 Salah Ben Youssef 
declared on 7 September in Cairo that the Tunisian negotiators must confine themselves 
to Mendes-France’s Carthage declaration, but that if the negotiations failed, the 
Tunisian people should fight for complete independence. The French were aware that
102 DDF, 1954, doc.84, Boisseson to Fouchet, no.269,20.8.1954.
103 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Boisseson to Marotuni, no.254/256, 16.8.1954; vol.375, Note, La 
Situation en Tunisie depuis le l er aout 1954,23.8.1954.
104 Latour was nominated as the CSTT on 13 February 1954. LAnnee Politique, 1954, p. 187.
105 Pdrillier, La Conquete, pp.210-211. Latour arrived in Tunis in mid-August 1954.
106 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Note, ‘Franco-Tunisian negotiations under way following approval 
by the National Assembly of French policy in Tunisia.’, 7.9.1954.
107 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/8-2654, Office Memorandum, 26.8.1954.
108 In the course of negotiations, the Military and Diplomatic Conventions would be absorbed into the 
General Convention.
109 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.261.
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full independence was the desire of the Neo-Destour’s rank-and-file members and that 
the nationalist party would possibly call for it as the next step.110
In mid-September 1954, Latour argued that it was important to avoid ‘les excds 
auxquels le nationalisme tunisien... est inevitablement conduit.’ According to him, the 
task of constructing a Tunisian constitution should not be left to the Neo-Destour as, if 
this occurred, they would abandon the monarchy and establish a dictatorship, thereby 
enabling the abrogation of the expected Conventions for internal autonomy. Moreover, 
‘[l]a naissance d’une republique tunisienne ne manquerait pas d’exalter le sdparatisme 
algerien’. At the same time, he maintained that it was essential to keep the responsibility 
for public order under the French director, because otherwise troubles would endanger 
French settlers and the envisaged Conventions.111
In relation to these circumstances, Bourguiba was not allowed to return to Tunisia nor 
to take part in the negotiations. This was probably because his intervention might cause 
the flare-up of nationalist sentiment, leading to the formulation of a new Tunisian 
constitution. In fact, in an interview on 2 August 1954, Bourguiba replied 
‘necessairement’ when he was asked whether Tunisia would have a constitution. He 
added that he personally preferred a constitutional monarchy as Tunisia’s newly- 
established regime.112 At any rate, French settlers never accepted that he should be able 
to return to Tunisia. Their position could be summed up in Puaux’s following statement 
in a newspaper Tunisie-France on 15 September 1954: ‘Sur le chemin ou s’est engage 
M. Mendds France, je ne vois qu’une suite d’abandons en face de croissantes 
exigences.’113
In the course of Franco-Tunisian discussions, it turned out that the Fellaghas posed the 
gravest problem. The French speculated that the Fellaghas were now acting in 
collaboration with Salah Ben Youssef in Cairo and that the arms were being provided 
by Egypt and Libya. The French suspected they were also receiving orders from exiled 
nationalist elements, which were believed to be acting in full accord with the Arab 
League.114 On 11 September 1954, when Latour met Ben Ammar and other ministers, 
the Tunisians demanded that French troops’ activities against the Fellaghas be 
terminated.115 This remark reflected a Tunisian desire that a Tunisian national army
110 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Latour to Fouchet, no.359/362,10.9.1954.
111 Ibid., Latour to Fouchet, no.237,13.9.1954.
112 P6rillier, La Conquete, p.226. Bourguiba added: ‘N ’oubliez pas «Destour» veut pr6cis£ment dire 
« Constitution »’.
113 Ibid., p.243. Gabriel Puaux was a leader of French settlers.
1,4 DDF, 1954, doc. 179, Latour to Fouchet, no.238,14.9.1954.
115 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Latour to Marotuni, no.381/384,11.9.1954.
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should be created in place of the existing police under French control and should deal 
with the problem. In fact, the Treaty of Bardo did not prohibit the constitution of a 
Tunisian army. The Resident-General refused, stating that it would cause serious 
danger. Latour instead asked whether the Tunisian government was prepared to call for 
the surrender of the Fellaghas, but the Tunisian reply was evasive. Two days later, the 
Tunisian government demanded that the Fellaghas be given a truce of one month. 
Latour once again refused, stating that this would only give the Fellaghas a rest, thereby 
allowing them to strengthen their military power.116 In fact, the French were aware that 
the Tunisians were trying to transform the Fellaghas into the de facto Tunisian army.117 
The French once again refused this demand and instead, on 16 September, Latour 
appealed to the Fellaghas to surrender.118
The three Tunisian Ministers of State in charge of the negotiations met Mendes- 
France on 24 September 1954. The latter asked the Tunisian government to invite the 
Fellaghas to return their arms and go back to their original tribes.119 The Tunisians did 
not accept this, however, so the meeting ended without results.120 Therefore, both sides 
went their own ways. On 2 October 1954, Mendes-France wrote to Fouchet that a total 
amnesty was necessary121 and, in a press conference on the following day, Latour 
announced that the French had reached a decision to give amnesty to the Fellaghas.122 
On the other hand, the Tunisian government merely announced on 4 October that it 
condemned individual terrorist activities.123 Consequently, there was no solution to the 
Fellagha problem. As for the reasons for the Tunisian attitude, Latour noted:
1° Le gouvemement tunisien souhaite certainement la reussite des negotiations. II 
sait qu’une grande partie de 1’opinion publique tunisienne ne lui pardonnerait pas 
un 6chec des pourparlers...
2° Les 61ements neo-destouriens ont considdrd et considerent encore le mouvement 
fellagha comme un moyen de pression...
3°Mais l’attitude tr6s ferme prise par le president Mend&s France... fait craindre au 
Neo-Destour un durcissement de notre part qui risquerait d’affecter les 
negotiations.
116 Ibid., Latour to Fouchet, no.405/407,14.9.1954.
117 DDF, 1954, doc.179, Latour to Fouchet, no.238,14.9.1954.
118 Ibid., doc.173, p.356, footnote 2.
119 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Note, 2.10.1954.
120 DDF, 1954, doc.227, Fouchet to Latour, no.214/219.27.9.1954.
121 Ibid., doc.238, Mendes-France to MAE, no.3993/3994, 2.10.1954. On the same day, Fouchet 
instructed Latour to make plans to that effect. Ibid., doc.238, footnote 3. Interestingly, Fouchet added: ‘il 
y avait une occasion k saisir pour leur [les Tunisiens] faire comprendre que leur avenir aussi bien que 
celui de la Tunisie d tait« k 1’Occident et non vers la Ligue arabe ».’ The French were perhaps afraid that 
the creation of the de facto Tunisian Army out o f the Fellaghas would allow pro-Arab League elements 
inside the Tunisian government.
122 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Latour to Fouchet, no.524/529,3.10.1954.
123 L 'Annee Politique, 1954, p.267.
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4° [Les Neo-destouriens] redoutent sincdrement d’etre debordes par le mouvement qui 
n’a cesse de s’amplifier et qui pourrait conduire h une situation r6volutionnaire.
5° Ces differentes considerations poussent les uns par sinc6rit6, les autres par 
tactique, k souhaiter que les fellaghas suspendent leurs activity.124
The Tunisian government was in a difficult position. It had to reach accord successfully 
with the French on the agreements for internal autonomy. On the other hand, it had to 
take into consideration the opinion of radical Neo-Destour members, but without the 
regime being overthrown. For these reasons, the Tunisian government confined itself to 
announcing its disapproval of individual terrorist activities, but not of the Fellaghas 
themselves.
Reflecting the failure to reach a Franco-Tunisian agreement on the Fellagha problem, 
the ongoing negotiations on the agreements for internal autonomy had not made much 
progress. At the beginning of October 1954, agreement had almost been achieved only 
on the Convention on Administrative and Technical Cooperation. With regard to the 
Convention on the Interests and Rights of French People in Tunisia and Tunisian People 
in France, the Tunisians opposed having French as the second official language, 
although they approved in principle the French people’s participation in municipal 
assemblies. As for the Judicial Convention, the French insisted on the maintenance of 
existing French jurisdiction in Tunisia, but the Tunisians refused it, demanding the 
immediate transfer of all affairs concerning Tunisian nationals to the competence of 
Tunisian courts. Finally, concerning the Military Convention, the Tunisian delegation 
called for the creation of a Tunisian army, demanding that the stationing of French 
troops must be limited to the strategic bases determined in advance. In relation to this, 
the Tunisians discussed the Treaty of Bardo without questioning it. In turn, they 
requested the maintenance of the Treaty, because it did not forbid the creation of a 
Tunisian army.125
Meanwhile, Tunisia witnessed the rise of radical opinion. The slow progress in the 
Franco-Tunisian negotiations diminished the Tunisian government’s prestige in the eyes 
of local opinion. This was all the more so because of the intensification of the 
Fellaghas’ activities, which were now extending to Algeria. Moreover, they were taking 
on the appearance of a liberation army.126 Latour reported to Paris:
124 DDF, 1954, doc.243, Latour to Fouchet, no.539/550,4.10.1954.
125 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Note, 2.10.1954. Discussions had not started on the Cultural 
Convention, the Economic and Financial Convention.
126 L 'Annee Politique, 1954, pp.266-267.
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‘Le climat politique en Tunisie... est mauvais... Toute mesure de detente est 
depassees par une surenchdre orchestrde, avant d’avoir pu produire un effet 
quelconque. [L]e parti [neo-]destourien est doming par la fraction extremiste’.127
The party’s radical section had pressed Bourguiba to convene its National Council, and 
the latter agreed that it be held in Tunis on 14 November 1954. Conversely, the Neo- 
Destour’s moderate members expected that Bourguiba’s intervention would pacify the 
radicals.128 In the light of this situation, Mend&s-France also decided to count on 
Bourguiba. They secretly met at the end of October 1954 and discussed a solution to the 
Fellagha problem. Knowing the difficulties that Mendes-France was facing at the 
National Assembly, Bourguiba promised to take responsibility for putting an end to the 
Fellaghas’ dissidence and in appealing for their return to their homes if the French 
guaranteed their liberties.129
Nonetheless, the outbreak of the Algerian rebellion on 1 November 1954 further 
radicalised opinion in Tunisia. On the other hand, Nouira, the Minister of Commerce 
from the Neo-Destour, repeatedly emphasised to the French that the situation in Algeria
1 inwas not caused by the Neo-Destour or the Arab League. Latour pointed out that the 
purpose of holding the National Council would be to get the French to accept 
Bourguiba’s participation in the negotiations regarding the Fellaghas. More 
embarrassingly, he also indicated that Salah Ben Youssef s attitude was becoming 
aggressive to the extent that ‘il n’h^siterait pas k provoquer... 6prouve de force destinde 
k faire 6chouer les pourparlers.’131 In fact, the divisions between Bourguiba and Salah 
Ben Youssef, who refused to agree with the French on internal autonomy, became 
increasingly apparent at this time. In addition, the Algerian rebellion had a grave effect 
on the French Parliament. The opposition to Mendes-France, such as the Independents, 
the Peasants, the Radical Socialists and the Gaullists, more than ever criticised the 
government’s conciliatory attitude towards the Fellaghas, insisting that his North 
African policy had given birth to the Algerian fiasco.132
Thus the Algerian problem hardened both French and Tunisian attitudes, thereby 
making Franco-Tunisian agreements more difficult to achieve. At the beginning of 
November 1954, the French government informed the Tunisians: Tadoption ddfmitive
127 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.376, Latour to Paris, no.637/640,17.10.1954.
128 DDF, 1954, doc.304, Seydoux (Ministre d61£gu6 k la Residence g6n6rale de France k Tunis) to 
Fouchet, no.739/747,29.10.1954.
129 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.264.
130 DDF, 1954, doc.313, Seydoux to Fouchet, no.766/777,4.11.1954.
131 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Latour to Paris, no.819/827,9.11.1954.
132 PRO, F0371/113789, JF1015/2, Intelligence Brief, no.1714,18.11.1954.
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des conventions franco-tunisiennes serait subordonnde k la fin de l’activite des 
fellaghas.’133 Conversely, the motion adopted by the Neo-Destour National Council on 
14 November authorised the Tunisian government to work out a solution to the Fellagha 
problem with the French, ‘garantissant... leur sauvegarde, leur liberty individuelle’.134 
The first part of the motion stated that the Fellagha question could not be separated from 
the general political problem, i.e. a solution to the latter required dealing with the 
former. The second part stated that the pursuit of the politics of repression did not 
correspond to the politics of negotiation and that Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef 
should be allowed to return immediately. Latour noted: ‘II y a une volonte ddliberde de 
nous tromper et de nous amener... k une abdication des positions que nous tenons 
encore.’135 French newspapers fiercely condemned the Neo-Destour, insisting that it 
justified violence conducted by the Fellaghas, and French parliamentarians urged the 
government to take a harder line with the Tunisians.
It was at this moment that Bourguiba presented a solution to the Fellagha problem and 
the Franco-Tunisian negotiations with three conditions. In an interview with the New 
York Times on 17 November, he stated that the first condition was that the Fellaghas 
would have to be protected from retaliation. The second was that they should never be 
considered as bandits or outlaws, because ‘[c]e sont... des Tunisiens patriotes qui 
luttent pour le meme id6al que... Bourguiba et les autres. Ils sont n€s de la politique 
criminelle de De Hauteclocque.’ The third and particularly important one was ‘de 
donner au Gouvemement tunisien la responsabilitd immediate du maintien de l’ordre 
dans les regions ou operent les bandes de fellaghas.’ According to him, the Neo-Destour 
would lose face with Tunisian opinion if it accepted the French proposition that they 
should maintain responsibility over the police for ten years after the conclusion of the 
Franco-Tunisian Conventions. He added that for the Tunisians internal autonomy was 
only a step in the battle for independence, but that they wanted to stay in France’s orbit 
as an independent country.137
Bourguiba’s declaration enabled both parties to move ahead quickly on the Fellagha 
question. On 17 November 1954, Franco-Tunisian talks were held in which Faure, the 
acting Prime Minister, Fouchet, Ben Ammar and Djelloui participated. On the following
133 L ‘Annee Politique, 1954, p.278.
134 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.266.
135 DDF, 1954, doc.346, Latour to Fouchet, no.867/869,15.11.1954.
136 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.267.
137 Ibid., p.266; MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.392, Bonnet to Paris, no.6447,16.11.1954.
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day, they met again and reached agreement in principle.138 Mendes-France showed 
strong determination to go ahead, as he wrote to Fouchet:
La question n’est pas de savoir si le Gouvemement sera renversd ou non. Cela est 
secondaire... La question est de savoir si nous aboutirons h une solution tunisienne 
qui aura ensuite ses repercussions dans un sens ou dans 1’autre en Algerie ou au 
Maroc. Seul ce point compte, et je vous demande de le rappeler a nos colldgues et & 
nos amis au Parlement.139
A joint communique was issued two days later, in which, in order to promote the 
reintegration of the Fellaghas into society, both governments appealed to them to 
surrender, guaranteeing that those who returned their arms to the French authorities 
would not be punished.140 The Americans noted that the Tunisian government 
conceded, fearing that the negotiations for internal autonomy would be broken off 
because of French reaction to the Neo-Destour’s hard-line motion if it did not agree to 
the Fellagha accord.141 However, this was not the case. The Tunisians conceded because 
the French showed a flexible attitude on defence and police issues. On 26 November, 
Latour was notified that Mendes-France had decided to draft the General Convention, 
which would deal with these issues, in a way more acceptable to the Tunisians.142
The agreement on the Fellagha question was immediately put into practice. Latour 
met Ben Ammar on 26 November 1954, when they agreed that the Tunisian 
government should appoint twenty-one delegates to visit simultaneously each of the 
areas where the Fellaghas were present. Ben Ammar revealed that he had already sent 
secret emissaries to contact them, and requested that France suspend military operations 
against the Fellaghas. Latour agreed that it would do so from the following day 
onwards.143 This agreement had a remarkable effect: after receiving the emissaries, the 
Fellaghas at once accepted the offer of surrender on 30 November.144 Latour proudly 
announced the success of the operation early in December 1954, stating that 1,998 
Fellaghas had surrendered 1,553 weapons and that the Fellagha problem was 90% 
solved.145 Against the background of this success, the Mendes-France Government 
managed to obtain a vote of confidence by 294 votes to 265 in the National Assembly
138 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.376, Faure to Mendes-France, 17.11.1954. Mendes-France was then in 
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141 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.897-898, The Charge in France to the State Department, no.2182,
22.11.1954.
142 DDF, 1954, doc.386, p.795, footnote 1.
143 Ibid., doc.385, Latour to Fouchet, no.962/968,26.11.1954.
144 Ibid., doc.432, Latour to Fouchet, no.1055/1060,10.12.1954.
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debate on 11 December. In addition, this success had a favourable effect on the 
international scene; the UNGA plenary session decided on 17 December to adjourn 
discussions on the Tunisian problem.146
5.5 The Franco-Tunisian Conventions
The solution to the Fellagha problem prompted the resumption of negotiations for 
internal autonomy. In January 1955, negotiations on the General Convention, which 
would look at diplomacy and defence, were opened. Early in November 1954, the 
Tunisian delegation had already shown their reluctance to agree to the maintenance of 
France’s right to control diplomacy and defence. Latour reported to Paris: ‘Slim s’6tait 
retranchd derriere son [le Bey] autorite pour recuser la convention des Affaires 
Exterieurs.’ Astonished by Slim’s attitude, the Bey told Latour that the problem of 
defence and foreign affairs must be dealt with by the Bey and the Resident-General, 
based on the Treaty of Bardo, and the latter agreed.147
When both parties started discussions on these matters in Paris on 4 January 1955, the 
Tunisians attitude hardened than in the previous year. The Tunisian delegations insisted 
that the General Convention should not mention a Tunisian army and diplomacy 
because the Treaty of Bardo did not prohibit Tunisia from exerting these rights, whereas 
the French argued that the General Convention should confirm the maintenance of 
French responsibility for these issues. That is to say, ‘[a]u total, les ndgociateurs 
fran9ais veulent s’en tenir h la stricte autonomie interne tandis que pour les Tunisiens 
cette autonomie doit tendre vers l’inddpendance.’ 148 Conflict also arose around the issue 
of the Southern Territory, which had been administered by the French military 
authorities since the end of the 19th Century. The French delegation demanded that the 
Tunisians accept France’s special power in this area, because of its strategic importance 
in the light of the defence of Africa.149 Faced with this mutual impasse, both parties 
looked to the Bey to arbitrate.150
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Bourguiba’s declaration on 11 January 1955 put the Tunisian delegation in a difficult 
position in the light of Tunisian opinion. Bourguiba stated: ‘Pour nous, l’autonomie 
interne est une dtape vers l’ind6pendance totale’.151 After returning to Tunis, Djelloui, 
one of the three Tunisian delegates, had talks with Latour and highlighted the profound 
effect that Bourguiba’s declaration would have on the Tunisian negotiators: ‘rompre les 
negotiations constituerait certes une catastrophe, mais accepter ce que propose la 
delegation fran9 aise serait une catastrophe plus grande encore’. 152 However, the 
political organisations and the trade unions which Ben Ammar had consulted were 
unanimous in their desire not to break off the negotiations, as he said to Latour on 18 
January. In addition, he maintained, he had obtained clear authorisation from the Neo- 
Destour and the UGTT permitting him to resume conversations personally in Paris. 
Even so, it was clear to the Resident-General that Ben Ammar, following Bourguiba’s 
declaration, considered that internal autonomy was only a step towards independence. 
He wrote to Paris: ‘Si... la France demandait l’insertion de clauses diplomatique et 
militaires dans les conventions, la Tunisie demanderait a les assortir en echange de 
dispositions permettant de reprendre la discussion de son acces a la souverainete exteme 
dans un certain d&ai.’153 
The second round of the negotiations started in Paris on 23 January 1955. In this 
round, over the issue of the police, both sides agreed on the presence of the Residency’s 
authority for two years but they did not agree on the period on how long the transition 
thereafter would last, the French favouring eight years and the Tunisians two. 
Negotiations progressed on the Southern Territory issue and the Tunisians agreed to the 
maintenance of French troops and French authority for security in this territory. 
However, they refused to allow the Resident-General to nominate the caids, a right 
which should, the Tunisian delegations argued, belong to their government.154
On 5 February 1955, the Mendes-France Government suddenly fell as a result of 
debates in the National Assembly over North Africa that had started three days before. 
It was reported to Paris that a feeling of deception and disillusionment had spread
among the Muslim population, but that French settlers generally did not hide their
satisfaction.155 A ministerial crisis followed, which inevitably interrupted the Franco- 
Tunisian negotiations. Faure, who announced his desire to recommence negotiations 
rapidly with Tunisia before being elected, became the new prime minister on 23
151 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.377, Situation Politique en Tunisie (janvier 1955).
152 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.394, Latour to Paris, no.160/171,14.1.1955.
153 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.393, Latour to Paris, no.229/240,18.1.1955.
154 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, pp.176-177.
155 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.377, Latour to Marotuni, no.406/407, 8.2.1955.
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February 1955 and appointed Pierre July as the new Minister for Tunisian and 
Moroccan affairs.156 France and Tunisia agreed early in March that negotiations should 
be resumed on 15 March 1955.157
In the meantime, the Tunisians were voicing their demand for Bourguiba’s return to 
Tunisia more loudly. The Neo-Destour Political Bureau concluded on 11 March 1955:
1/ affirmer solennellement la ferme volontd de faire aboutir les negotiations sur les 
questions deja regimes sous le Gouvemement de M. Mendes-France, mais se montre 
le plus possible intransigeants sur celles restant a r£gler (police, territoires du sud):
2/ Realiser instamment le retour en Tunisie de Bourguiba, seul capable d’empecher les 
extremistes du parti de commettre des excds.158
This meant that the nationalist party itself could hardly contain the growing demands 
from rank-and-file members, largely instigated by Salah Ben Youssef. Only the party’s 
president, it was believed, could satisfy their demands. Two weeks later, Masmoudi, a 
Tunisian delegate for the negotiations, called for Bourguiba’s return on behalf of the
•  •  159Tunisian government.
When negotiations were resumed on schedule, several important issues remained 
unsettled. Firstly, the question of a Franco-Tunisian ‘permanent link* remained 
unsolved, as the French wished to substitute it for the Treaty of Bardo whereas the 
Tunisians did not want the General Convention to refer to it. Secondly, the problem of 
the security of the Southern Territory was being discussed on the basis of Tunisian
control of the civil police and French control of the frontier military police but both
sides had not yet reached final agreement. Thirdly, the issue of French representation on 
the municipal councils was disputed. The Tunisians argued it should be proportional to 
the number of residents in the community while the French requested parity.160 At this 
point, the negotiations were on the point of failure. On 29 March, July declared that the 
French delegation had to take into account the views expressed in the National 
Assembly, as the Tunisian delegation had to do with Tunisian opinion.
However, French concessions on Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia paved the way to 
conclude agreements.161 On 31 March 1955, Slim remarked that it would be possible to 
accomplish an accord before Ramadan, which was to start on 21 April 1955. The
156 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie (fSvrier 1955).
157 DDF, 1955,1, Seydoux to July, no.637/645, 11.3.1955.
158 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.393, Seydoux to Paris, no.699/704,13.3.1955.
159 The French settlers wasted no time in publishing their opposition to his return. Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 
1952-1956, pp.311-312.
160 PRO, F0371/113790, JF1016/24, Williams to Bromley, no.410/601/24, 25.3.1955; L'Annee Politique, 
1955, p.220.
161 Although no materials had been located determining French reactions, it seems that the French had 
responded favourably to the Tunisian request considering later developments.
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French and Tunisians decided to conclude the negotiations before 20 April. Franco- 
Tunisian negotiations were reopened on 5 April 1955, and with the attendance of Faure 
and Ben Ammar after the first week, the remaining problems were beginning to be 
smoothed away. Both sides compromised on the issue of the Southern Territory, 
whereby they agreed: ‘cette region participera au droit administratif commun, sauf 
consultation des autoritds civiles et militaires de s6curite, et comportera une zone 
ffontfere ou la police relevera exclusivement de l’autorit6 militaire.’162 Subsequently, 
Faure announced on 13 April that Bourguiba would be allowed to travel throughout 
France. As for his return to Tunisia, Faure stated that at that moment it was impossible 
to authorise this, but that ‘la chose etait du domaine du possible’.163
On 21 April 1955, Faure invited Bourguiba to the hotel de Matignon. This was the 
first time that the French prime minister had officially met the latter.164 Bourguiba’s 
participation and Faure’s acceptance of it largely contributed to the successful 
conclusion of the negotiations.165 Faure’s recognition of the Tunisian people’s special 
position in France enabled Bourguiba to propose that the Tunisian delegation 
compromise in the negotiations. The French government agreed that French seats in 
municipal councils would not be over three out of seven. Both sides agreed that Arabic 
would be the only official language, but that French would also be used in public life.166 
However, the most important compromise was made when the French permitted 
Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia, whilst the Tunisians accepted Faure’s insistence that ‘la 
notion de liens 6troits et permanents entre les deux pays’ should be introduced in the 
preamble of the General Convention.167 This meant that Tunisia was not allowed to 
have responsibility for external affairs and defence. Both sides wanted to avoid the 
breakdown of the negotiations, from which Salah Ben Youssef, and ultimately Egypt, 
would profit. This would result in the disappearance of the French presence in Tunisia.
The French and Tunisian delegations signed a protocol of agreement on 22 April 
1955. Then on 3 June 1955, Faure and Ben Ammar officially signed the Franco-
162 Ibid., pp.220-221.
163 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.312.
164 It seemed that Faure had reached the conclusion in early April 1955 that Bourguiba should be allowed 
to participate in the negotiations for internal autonomy. Edgar Faure, Memoires II, pp.179-184, pp.191- 
196.
165 The British appreciated Faure’s courage and realism in inviting Bourguiba to the negotiations. PRO, 
F0371/113790, JF1016/32, Jebb to FO, no.158, 22.4.1955. As for the text of the Conventions, see 
L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.643.
166 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.288. He also accepted that French be the second official language; 
L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.223.
167 Ibid., p.222.
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Tunisian Conventions,168 which meant that the Convention of Marsa was terminated. 
However, Tunisian opinion was not entirely satisfied with the results. In the text on the 
Franco-Tunisian Conventions, there was no reference to the possibility of Tunisia’s 
future independence. In fact, Latour noted that the Tunisians received the signature of 
the Conventions with less enthusiasm than had been expected. The Vieux-Destour and 
Salah Ben Youssef were very disappointed at the Conventions. However, French 
settlers, facing the fait accompli, reacted violently. Latour observed ‘[l]es sentiments qui 
dominent chez eux dont ceux d’une grande amertume suscites par l’impression d’avoir 
et6 abandonn6s par la M6tropole.’ 169 Thus, although Tunisia obtained internal 
autonomy, the situation would not be stable, with opposition forces continuing to attack 
the government and Bourguiba. Nevertheless, the latter’s return was approved by 
France. Backed by Bourguiba’s prestige, the Tunisian government was to consolidate 
the new regime without demanding further steps for independence at least for the time 
being. The French, on the other hand, knew that Bourguiba’s return would inevitably 
increase nationalist demands in the long term, but were satisfied that Tunisian demands 
would focus on internal autonomy for the moment.
168 Shortly before this, the French National Assembly had passed a resolution on 24 May 1955 declaring 
that Title VIII of the Constitution was revisable. Mortimer, France and the Africans, p.221.
169 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.393, Latour to Paris, no.1211/1222,29.4.1955.
Chapter 6: The Restoration of Mohammed V; Morocco, August 1953 to
October 1955
6.1 Terrorism and impasse: August 1953 to December 1954
The deposition of Mohammed V in August 1953 allowed the French government to 
promulgate a series of dahirs; two of which were concerned with the structure of the 
Sharifian government and restricted the Sultan’s power. As in Tunisia, the French now 
began forming a Moroccan government and setting up municipal commissions. The 31 
August dahir provided for the establishment of the Conseil restreint, and the 9 
September dahir was intended to grant increased power to the Conseil des Vizirs et 
Directeurs. The executive and legislative powers, which hitherto the Sultan had 
theoretically exercised, were to be entrusted to the Conseil restreint and Conseil des 
Vizirs et Directeurs, respectively. Both councils would comprise of the same numbers 
of Moroccan and French ministers.1 In addition, the 1953 plan was expected to give 
Morocco elected assemblies at the national and municipal levels. At the national level, 
the 16 September dahir aimed to reorganise the Government Council, made up of a 
Moroccan and French section, with an equal number of representatives. In accordance 
with the 18 September dahir, eighteen towns selected as municipalities were to be 
administrated by elected municipal commissions, consisting of an equal number of 
French and Moroccan members.2 These municipal councils would remain consultative 
in character.3 Therefore, the French project remained with the principe de co- 
souverainete and was not intended to devolve any significant powers to the Moroccan 
people. Rather, the French were keen to pave the way for Morocco’s adherence to the 
French Union through French settlers’ participation in the future national assembly and 
the removal of the Sultan’s legislative power.
The deposition caused resentment among the indigenous people. The Istiqlal’s exiled 
leaders and the Arab countries, especially Egypt, generated anti-French and anti-Arafa 
broadcasts, which led to a popular legend portraying Mohammed V as a national 
resistance hero. The expulsion of nationalist leaders in December 1952 had left rank-
1 As for details of the two councils, see MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.89, Rabat to Paris, 12.10.1955, 
nol 10/8; vol.87, ‘Les Relations de la France avec la Tunisie et le Maroc’, no.l59AL, 18.10.1954.
2 L ’Annee Politique, 1953, pp.283-284. Municipal assemblies were to be presided over by the pasha or 
caid.
3 PRO, FO371/102977, M1015/108, Rabat to FO, Despatch no.88, 30.9.1953; FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, 
pp.632-634.
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and-file nationalists no alternative but to resort to violence in order to influence appeals 
to the French authorities. The first terrorist acts were launched immediately after the 
deposition and Arafa himself narrowly escaped assassination in September 1953. After 
October 1953, terrorist activities increased especially in urban areas such as Casablanca. 
Terrorist activities, which mostly targeted the pro-French Moroccan population, made 
Moroccan notables less co-operative towards the French plan. At every level of the 
structure, including the municipal assemblies, the Moroccan people held themselves 
aloof from the executive or administrative organs.4 Consequently, there would be no 
progress towards the realisation of the French plan except the reorganisation of the 
Shariflan government.
Angered by the deposition, the Arab countries continued their efforts to bring the 
Moroccan problem to the UNGA in the autumn, despite their failure in the UNSC of 
August 1953. The US position turned out to be much more favourable to the French, for 
the reasons analysed before.5 When the Egyptians submitted a draft resolution to the 
GA First Committee on 7 October 1953, the French UN delegation requested the US to 
discourage any Latin American moves to introduce another one. US Secretary of State 
Dulles replied that the US should neither discourage nor encourage the LA countries’ 
move to introduce a moderate draft resolution calling for UN intervention to ease 
tension and the respect of the Moroccan people’s right to free political institutions.6 
However, Dulles reconsidered his position as a result o f the conversations with Bidault 
on 16 October and instructed Lodge in New York to vote against this draft resolution.7 
Three days later, the First Committee including the US voted against the Bolivian draft 
resolution, and on 3 November 1953, the GA plenary meeting also rejected it with US 
opposition and decided to postpone further consideration of the problem.8 The French 
were on the whole satisfied with the Americans.9
Mohammed V’s dethronement had created a new enemy for France. This originated 
in the fact that the northern part of Morocco had been under Spanish control since the
4 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p. 190.
5 Chapter 4, p.96.
6FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.634-635, Editorial Note; NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10-753, Dulles to New 
York, GADEL no.19,7.10.1953.
7 NARA, RG59, CDF, 320/10-2053, Dulles to Paris, no.1505,20.10.1953.
8 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.635-636, The Acting Secretary o f State to the Embassy in the United 
Kingdom, 15.10.1953. This draft resolution received thirty-two votes to twenty-two with five abstentions, 
so did not obtain the two-thirds majority. L 'Annee Politique, 1953, p.299.
9 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.655, Hoppenot to MAE, 13.11.1953. The British noted the French 
considered the situation in both Tunisia and Morocco to be more satisfactory than a year previously. PRO, 
FO371/102937, JF1015/33, FO Minute by Price, 8.12.1953.
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Franco-Spanish agreements of 1904 and 1912. In Spanish Morocco, the Sultan’s deputy, 
the Khalifa, was the native ruler. As the Khalifa was appointed by the Sultan, the 
Spanish government insisted that the deposition also affected Spanish Morocco and, 
shortly after, started to condemn France for not having consulted it in advance. The anti- 
French campaign by the Spaniards culminated in a meeting of pashas and caids at 
Tetuan on 21 January 1954. The Spanish High Commissioner accepted their petition 
that repudiated French policy in the French zone and declared that the dignitaries would 
not recognise the new Sultan’s authority. In January 1954, the French government had 
asked the US State Department to contribute to improving Franco-Spanish relations, but 
had failed to achieve their wholehearted cooperation.10 Spanish activities further 
damaged Arafa’s legitimacy in the eyes of the Moroccan people, thereby increasing 
political instability in French Morocco. As a precaution, the French government decided 
to transfer Mohammed V from Corsica to Antsirabd in Madagascar, where he arrived on 
29 January.11 On 9 February 1954, General Franco announced that ‘la zone marocaine 
espagnole sera maintenue sous la souverainet6 de ... Moulay el Mehdi, khalifa du 
Sultan’, but later in February 1954, the Spanish adjusted their position when they 
admitted that the Khalifa would continue to exercise the ‘droits souverains’ delegated 
by the Sultan in accordance with the Franco-Spanish agreement of November 1912.12
In French Morocco, the elections for the members of municipal commissions, which
1 ^
were due in March 1954, could not take place amidst the climate of terrorism. In April 
1954, terrorist activities surged in Casablanca and a boycott of French products, 
cigarettes in particular, started.14 In early 1954, an examination started in Paris of a 
solution to the Moroccan crisis. The necessity of removing Arafa was being realised, 
but the problem was who would rule afterwards. An unofficial study group called the 
Centre d ’etude et de documentation worked out a plan of setting up a Regency Council 
after Arafa’s departure, which would consist of representatives of Mohammed V, Arafa 
and the traditionalists, as a means of breaking the deadlock.15 Mohammed V’s 
restoration was unthinkable and therefore there would be no Sultan who could enjoy 
popularity among the Moroccan people.
10 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol. 161, Note Pour le President du Conseil, 12.11.1954.
11 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p. 180.
12 Ibid., p. 185.
13 Ibid., p. 198.
H Ibid., p.205, p.214.
15 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.229-234.
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The French government also felt the necessity of breaking the deadlock, and the 
appointment of Francis Lacoste as the new Resident-General was announced on 20 May 
1954.16 He was instructed to implement the following policy: reorganisation of the 
police; distinguishing of moderate nationalists from terrorists when applying repressive 
measures; and resumption of contact with nationalist opposition groups of diverse 
tendencies.17 Needless to say, these measures hardly contributed to solving the 
Moroccan problem. Si Ould Embarek Bekkai, the former pasha of Sefrou,18 publicised 
his own proposal:
1. La souverainetd marocaine doit etre solennellement affirmde. . . ;
2. Un Conseil supreme marocain doit etre constitue qui, en attendant que le 
peuple marocain puisse etre consults sur le choix de son souverain, ddtiendra 
provisoirement cette souverainete;
3. Les moyens propres a developper la souverainete du Maroc jusqu’ji son 
inddpendance complete seront recherchds par le Conseil supreme marocain et le 
gouvemement fransais;
Thus Bekkai called for Morocco’s sovereignty and future independence without the ex- 
Sultan’s restoration.19 In this sense he was categorised as a moderate nationalist, 
whereas more radical nationalists like the Istiqlal demanded Mohammed V’s return.
Lacoste arrived in Morocco in June 1954, but terrorist activities continued 
undiminished particularly in Casablanca, Marrakech and Oujda.20 Tension increased 
partly owing to the approach of the first anniversary of the deposition. On 9 July 1954, 
Ahmed Balafrej, the Istiqlal’s exiled Secretary-General, declared in Madrid that Franco- 
Moroccan dialogue could start only with ‘le seul vrai et ldgitime porte-parole du Maroc, 
celui en qui le people marocain a place toute sa confiance, le Sultan Mohammed V.’21 
In the international scene, the fourteen countries22 of the Arab-Asian bloc demanded, 
four days later, that the Moroccan and Tunisian problems be placed on the agenda of the 
next GA session 23 On 1 August 1954, a demonstration took place in Fez, demanding 
Mohammed V’s return with the cry ‘Vive Allal el Fassi’. In the first week of the month,
16 US newspapers reportedly welcomed this decision because he was a civil, not a military officer, unlike 
his predecessors. MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.3, Washington to Paris, no.3230/3232,22.5.1954.
17 Ibid., Note, 8.6.1954.
18 Together with Si Fatmi Ben Slimane, the former pasha of Fez, he pledged loyalty to Mohammed V in 
August 1953, and therefore was obliged to resign after the deposition.
19 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.217
20 Ibid., p.227.
21 Ibid., p.239.
22 They were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand and Yemen. Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1954, pp.84-85.
23 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.87, Situation Politique au Maroc (Juillet 1954).
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several terrorist attacks occurred in Casablanca and in Port-Lyautey, killing forty-six 
people in total.24 However, the French government ruled out Mohammed V’s 
restoration because it did not want to alienate el-Glaoui. As for the divisions in 
Moroccan opinion, Lacoste noted that while in Tunisia a national sentiment existed, in 
Morocco there were two worlds: urban areas and rural areas, the former counting on 
Egyptian and Iraqi support and the latter being ruled by traditional, feudal elites 25 On 4 
August, the PDI (Parti democratique de l’inddpendance) publicly demanded ‘[le] 
[rjetour du roi legitime sur le trone marocain et reprise du dialogue’. Four days later, 
Balafrej warned the French that unless they applied a sincere solution, ‘[l]es leaders 
emprisonnds... ne pourraient pas exercer longtemps un influence mod6ratrice’ vis-a-vis 
the rank-and-file.26
Later in the month, Lacoste argued that finding a solution to the dynastic problem 
was fundamental:
le nationalisme marocain... a trouv6... un point de cristallisation generate; la 
personne de l’ancien Sultan... [B]eaucoup de nationalistes avises reconnaissaient- 
ils que la France ne pouvait pas consentir au retour sur le trone de l’ancien 
Sultan...27
Accordingly, Lacoste maintained that if it was impossible to obtain nationalist 
cooperation under Arafa’s reign, the French had to search for an alternative, either a 
Regency Council or a new sultan. He continued that many nationalists would 
compromise on the acceptance of Mohammed V’s transfer to France without a 
restoration, as this would improve his living conditions and make his acceptance of the 
settlement process appear ‘voluntary’.
Meanwhile, Paris was preoccupied with other issues such as the EDC, Indochinese 
and Tunisian affairs. As analysed in Chapter 5, the French had recognised Tunisia’s 
sovereignty when Mendes-France made the Carthage Declaration on 31 July 1954. In 
Morocco, however, the French had no intention of taking a significant step until the 
Tunisia problem was settled, since Tunisia was always considered easier to deal with 
than Morocco. On 27 August 1954, Mendes-France stated before the National 
Assembly: ‘Nous devons, avec le Sultan Ben Arafa, appeler progressivement, mais 
aussi rapidement que possible, le peuple marocain a gerer ses propres affaires dans le
24 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.250.
25 DDF, 1954, doc.23, Lacoste to Mendes-France, no. 192,30.7.1954.
26IPMF, Cartonniers DPMF, Maroc 2, 2/V/3 “opinion” Entretiens, - Sous-chemise <Balafrej>, Note sur 
nos conversations avec Hadj Ahmed Balafrej - Geneve, 8.8.1954.
27 DDF, 1954, doc.86, Situation Politique au Maroc en Aoflt 1954. Lacoste to Fouchet, no.529,22.8.1955.
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cadre de la souverainete marocaine’, although he admitted that there was no time to be 
spent on dealing with the Moroccan problem.28 He also promised that the government 
was ready to take steps to improve the ex-Sultan’s personal situation but that, at the 
same time, his restoration must be excluded. The National Assembly approved his 
policy by 419 votes to 112,29 
French difficulties derived from the lack of a moderate nationalist party, unlike in 
Tunisia. El-Glaoui and his fellow dignitaries who had been committed to Mohammed 
V’s deposition were opposed to his transfer to France, let alone his restoration. In 
contrast, el-Fassi announced in September 1954:
tant que la France n’aura pas remis sur le trone le Sultan depose... les 
nationalistes ne discuteront meme pas de reformes avec les Fran9ais... L’objectif 
des nationalistes marocains est l’ind6pendance complete et l’unification des zones 
fran?aise et espagnole du Maroc’.30
As a moderate nationalist, Bekkai declared on 6 September 1954 that the Moroccan 
problem would not be successful ‘si la question du premier interlocuteur... n’est pas 
resolue’. He then suggested that Mohammed V be transferred to France and that 
ultimately his restoration must be allowed.31 BekkaTs view was that France should, 
after recognising Mohammed V as the interlocuteur, grant internal autonomy to 
Morocco and that Mohammed V should be restored after a certain period.
Paris was reluctant to start addressing the problem. Christian Fouchet, the Minister 
for Moroccan and Tunisian affairs, sent instructions to Lacoste on 8 September 1954. 
These instructions suggested that the French were changing their ideas but were buying 
time until the conclusion of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations. Briefly, Fouchet pointed 
to the necessity of establishing a Moroccan government composed of Moroccan 
ministers and French ministers. As well, he agreed with Lacoste that the dynastic 
problem must be given priority and that Arafa must be dethroned, although these 
policies must not be put into practice immediately. Instead, as an immediate measure, 
Fouchet proposed the release of political prisoners and the creation of un Conseil 
d ’Etude des Reformes through which the Moroccans would be consulted regarding the
28 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.252.
29 DDF, 1954, doc. 144, p.289, footnote 3. Mohammed V requested his return with his sons to France in a 
letter to Mendes-France dated 25 June 1954; doc.2, Note du Ministere des Affaires marocaines et 
tunisiennes, 22.7.1954.
30 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.88, Situation politique au Maroc et en Tunisie (septembre 1954),
27.10.1954.
31 Ibid; DDF, 1954, doc.287, p.595
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political reforms. Likewise, Fouchet argued that the nationalists should be informed: ‘la 
question dynastique doit pour le moment rester a l’arridre plan... le retour de Sidi 
Mohammed ben Youssef sur le trone ne pouvant etre envisage par le Gouvemement 
fran5ais\ Lastly, these instructions were aimed at preventing LIN discussion of the 
Moroccan problem.32 Lacoste published these proposals on 20 September, one day 
before the opening of the GA session.33
The French programme was not welcomed by the Americans. Some State 
Department officials simply pointed out that this programme ‘contained nothing new.’ 
Irritated by the lack of progress towards internal autonomy, they recommended that 
Dulles approach Mendes-France:
We hope some further and perhaps dramatic steps can be taken in Morocco 
urgently, otherwise the US... could not work to avoid debate in the 9th General 
Assembly nor a resolution again urging progress through bilateral negotiations.34
Herbert Hoover, the acting Secretary of State, agreed and suggested Dulles, in Paris,
- i f f
should talk with Mendes-France, if possible.
In September 1954, Georges Izard visited Mohammed V in Antsirabe and revealed 
the Regency Council plan.36 The latter consented on condition that the Istiqlal 
approved.37 On the other hand, Paris was contemplating the establishment of a new 
sultan. As such, Paris sent the Dubois-Roquebert mission to Antsirabd on 18 October 
1954, with the aim of obtaining Mohammed V’s renunciation of the throne in return for 
his transfer to France on condition that he would agree to the designation of a new 
sultan. However, the ex-Sultan immediately rejected this and instead requested his own 
restoration, mentioning that there was no justification for abdication. He insisted that he 
could not play any political role in Madagascar and that it was essential that he consult 
representatives of Moroccan public opinion before he made up his mind.38
French difficulties burgeoned with the breakout of an insurrection in Algeria on 1 
November 1954. Two Radio stations in Hungary and Egypt harshly attacked oppressive 
French policy towards North Africa, and this further helped encourage Moroccan
32 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.3, Fouchet to Lacoste, 8.9.1954.
33 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.655, MendSs to Fouchet, no,182/SC, 21.9.1954.
34 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, pp.657-658, Memorandum by Byroade and Merchant to Dulles, 15.10.1954.
35 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10-2154, Hoover to Tangier, no.74, 21.10.1954. No record of the Dulles- 
Mend&s-France conversations is found.
36 This was the plan mentioned above, which had been examined in Paris since March 1954. See this 
chapter, p. 143. Izard was a lawyer and a close friend of Mohammed V.
37 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.229-234.
38 DDF, 1954, doc.287, p.596, footnote 1; Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.229-235.
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nationalists’ violent activities.39 Likewise, the Spanish multiplied their efforts to 
promote anti-French feeling. Driven into a comer, the French sought US support. 
Mendes-France visited Washington and had conversations with Dulles on 20 November, 
invoking the question of Spanish and Egyptian broadcasting activities. In response, 
Dulles considered the question sympathetically;40 although regarding Mendes-France’s 
request for a public statement of US support against outside intervention, Dulles replied 
that the Americans could not give France a blank cheque.41 Overall, however, the 
Americans were supportive because they had already been notified in October 1954 that 
the French had decided on Arafa’s dethronement42 Firstly, Henry Byroade, the assistant 
Under Secretary of State, drew the attention of the Egyptian ambassador to US concern 
over the Voice o f  the Arabs. Secondly, on 21 November, Dulles told the Syrian 
ambassador in Washington: ‘les Etats arabes se gardent de tout ce qui pourrait nuire aux 
possibility de reglement qui existent actuellement en Afrique du Nord’. On the 
following day, Dulles instructed the American ambassadors in Cairo and Madrid to 
request that each government restrict anti-French broadcasting.43
The French also asked the Americans for support in the UN. The GA First Committee 
started debating the North African problems in December 1954. Bonnet asked Dulles on 
9 December to exert influence on the Arab delegations to postpone the GA examination 
of the problems until the following session.44 Therefore, a moderate resolution was put 
forward by the Arab-Asians, and Dulles instructed Lodge on 11 December to vote 
against it, because the ‘[situation in Paris [was] so delicate and balance in favour of 
sustaining Mendes-France on London-Paris accords [over German rearmament] so 
precarious’.45 Two days later, in the First Committee, Lodge voted against the Arab- 
Asian resolution, which asked France to open negotiations with the true representatives
39 DDF, 1954, doc.335, Lacoste to Fouchet, no.l 146/1158,11.11.1954.
40 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.161, Mendes-France to Marotuni, no.6582,20.11.1954.
41 The Dwight D. Eisenhower Library [hereafter DDEL], White House Office NSC Staff; Papers, 1948-61, 
OCB Central Files Series, Box. No.61, OCB091.4 Africa, (File #1) (2), [3.1954-11.1956], ‘Detailed 
Development of Major Actions Relating to US policy on French North Africa.’, 14.4.1955.
42 NARA, RG59, Lot58 D45, Entry 1293, Box 2, [French Policy], Memcon, 19.10.1954. In addition, it 
can be assumed that the forthcoming debates on German rearmament in the French National Assembly, 
scheduled at the end of December 1954, made Dulles feel the necessity of removing French difficulties.
43 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.161, Bonnet to Paris, no.6740/47, 29.11.1954. Bonnet reported that not 
only Radio Cairo but the Egyptian press changed their tone. It was also reported from Madrid that the US 
Ambassador supposed Franco had just decided to modify his French policy and that the High 
Commissioner would renounce his anti-French campaign. Ibid., La Toumelle to Paris, no.709/710,
2.12.1954.
44 DDF, 1954, doc.426, Bonnet to Mendes-France, no.7011/7013,9.12.1954.
45 FRUS, 1952-1594, XI, p.662, Dulles to Lodge, no.316,11.12.1954.
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of Morocco.46 Nevertheless, the Americans did not forget to keep a balance between the 
French and the Arabs. Before voting Lodge affirmed: ‘the US still adhered to President 
Eisenhower’s declaration of 29 June in support of the principles of self-government.’47 
The GA plenary meeting at any rate adopted, on 17 December, a resolution providing 
for the postponement of the Moroccan question until the following session.48
6.2 The Lacoste plan
Following the failure of the Dubois-Roquebert mission, the French government 
formulated a new plan on the settlement process after Arafa had been persuaded to 
depart. In December 1954, Izard was once again sent to Antsirabe with a plan to 
establish the Regency Council. The ex-Sultan promised that he would consult 
nationalist leaders and on 26 December, confirmed his own agreement to a settlement, 
after having obtained agreements from the nationalists including the Istiqlal. What 
Mohammed V accepted was the establishment of a Throne Council49 rather than a new 
sultan, and a provisional government as a basis for unofficial negotiations with the 
French government. Then he specified that the provisional government’s role would be: 
to negotiate an agreement affirming the integrity of Moroccan sovereignty; to organise 
Franco-Moroccan relations on a basis of interdependence; and to put into effect the 
reforms that would transform Morocco into a modem country under a constitutional 
monarchy. Lastly, the ex-Sultan demanded that the Moroccan people freely choose their 
own sovereign once calm was restored.50 Thus, by rejecting a formula for a new sultan, 
Mohammed V left the door open to his own restoration in the future. The important 
subject of how to obtain Arafa’s abdication was not discussed at this time.
However, Rabat disagreed. In January 1955, Lacoste made a long report, in which he 
articulated a serious dilemma regarding Arafa’s position: on the one hand, as long as he 
reigned, the French government could count on support from French settlers and the 
traditionalists; on the other hand, it was clear that terrorist activities would never cease
46 DDF, 1954, doc.443, Hoppenot to Menctes-France, no.3532/353,13.12.1954; UNGA Official Records, 
vol.9 ,1954, First Committee, p.518.
47 Ibid., p.534. On 29 June 1954, in relation to Indo-Chinese affairs but without nominating any countries, 
US President Eisenhower and UK Prime Minister Churchill issued a declaration to affirm the principle of 
the unification of diverse nations through free elections. DDF, 1954, no.443, p.906, footnote 1.
48 FRUS, 1952-1954, XI, p.662, Dulles to the US Mission at the UN, 11.12.1954, footnote 3.
49 This was in substance ‘Regency Council’. The Quai preferred the term ‘Throne Council’ because 
‘Regency’ implied the existence of a sultan, and thereby Mohammed V’s return.
50 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.255; Georges Izard, ‘Le “Secret” d’Antsirab^’, in Etudes 
M6diterran6es, no.4, (printemps, 1958).
149
under his reign since, for the nationalists and the mass of people in the towns, Arafa’s 
presence ‘sur le trone... suffit a justifler... Taction terroriste.’ 51 Nevertheless, he 
believed that Arafa should be dethroned and argued for the establishment of a new 
sultan. The Regency Council should be rejected, because firstly, ‘[lj’histoire du Maroc 
n’offre... aucun precedent de Conseil de regence’.52 Secondly, this solution was a clear 
violation of the Treaty of Fez, since it stipulated that France would guarantee the 
Sultan’s status. Consequently, he recommended the second option, namely the 
‘troisieme homme’. Thirdly, making use of the absence of the Sultan, the Ulama might 
declare that Mohammed V was the legitimate sovereign.53 Therefore, he stressed the 
importance of obtaining the ex-Sultan’s promise of non-restoration.54
The National Assembly debates on North African affairs proved fatal to the Mendes- 
France Government. Mendes-France was criticised for his policies towards North Africa 
and Algeria in particular. He was forced to resign on 5 February 1955 and Edgar Faure 
became the new Prime Minister on 23 February.55 Meanwhile, the Moroccan situation 
again worsened. In mid-March 1955, Lacoste reported to Pierre July, the new Minister 
for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, on the increase in terrorist attacks in Casablanca.56 
The terrorists began deliberately attacking European people rather than the Moroccan 
population, on whom the terrorists’ attention had been concentrated since the 
deposition.57 Yet Faure was so preoccupied with the ongoing Franco-Tunisian 
negotiations that Lacoste was not given any instructions during his stay in Paris from 2 
to 10 March 1955.58
The increase in terrorist activities made Lacoste more reluctant to take action. On 15 
May 1955, he submitted a new plan to July, asking the government to reverse its 
position on the dynastic problem.59 He argued that the following elements necessitated a 
fresh examination of the problem: the evolution of the Franco-Tunisian negotiations for 
internal autonomy, the extension of troubles in Morocco, the aggravation of the
51 DDF, 1955, I, doc.26, Lacoste to Fouchet, n o .ll0 (l to 5, 7), 12.1.1955. Particularly in Casablanca, 
December 1954 saw a series of attacks, killing three people. L ’Annee Politique, 1954, p.289.
52 DDF, 1955,1, doc.26, p.75.
53 Ibid. p.77.
54 Ibid. p.79.
55 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.91, Situation politique au Maroc (F6vrier 1955).
56 DDF, 1955,1, doc.131, Lacoste to July, no.545/560, 15.3.1955.
57 PRO, F0371/113831, JM1016/13, Casablanca to Hayman, 24P/55, 14.3.1955.
58 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.213.
59 DDF, 1955,1, doc.280, Lacoste to July, no.1517/1-2,14.5.1955.
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Algerian situation and the psychological effect of the Bandung Conference.60 According 
to him, the dynastic problem was only a pretext for those who were committed to 
violent acts and the real objective of the nationalists, notably of the Istiqlal, was to drive 
France out of not only Morocco but also North Africa as a whole. He pointed to the 
importance of the caids, since the majority of them still had extraordinary power in the 
rural areas, and their support was indispensable for the French position. The Pasha of 
Marrakech ‘incame... la fidelity a la France’.61 Since Arafa’s departure would be 
regarded as a betrayal by France, regardless of whether the Regency Council or a third 
person would come after, Lacoste now concluded that Arafa should stay on the throne, 
contrary to his January 1955 report and that a Moroccan government should be 
established under his reign.
The new report of May 1955 brought about a change in Paris. Now the French 
government decided that Arafa should stay on the throne despite the agreement with 
Mohammed V in December 1954. However, in contrast to Lacoste, the French 
government, especially Faure, attached more importance to the nationalists, as later 
developments showed. At the end of May 1955, Faure agreed with July on Lacoste’s 
dismissal.62 Shortly after the signature of the Franco-Tunisian conventions on 3 June 
1955, Faure set up an interdepartmental Committee for Coordination of North African 
Affairs 63 The Moroccan situation was so pressing that Lacoste noted: ‘La s6curit£ de 
nos compatriotes et celle meme de l’6tablissement fran9ais au Maroc peuvent se trouver 
en jeu.’64 Economic activities in Casablanca and Rabat were being paralysed because of 
shop closures, partly encouraged by foreign broadcasts, particularly Radio Damascus 65 
On 11 June, Lemaigre-Dubreuil,66 who had been searching for a dialogue between 
French people and moderate Moroccan nationalist elements, was assassinated. French 
shops in major cities closed because of strikes at the end of June 1955.67
60 The Algerian situation so deteriorated that the French National Assembly passed an act declaring a 
state o f emergency on 31 March 1955. The Bandung Conference was held from 18 to 24 April 1955, and 
indicated the development of Third-World anti-colonialism.
61 At that time there was a rumour that the French government was considering Arafa’s deposition. On 9 
May 1955, El-Glaoui declared to the press: ‘la question du sultanat Itait religieuse, ce qui en excluait 
toute inggrence ext6rieure\ DDF, 1955,1, no.280, p. 640, footnote 1.
62 Edgar Faure, Memoires II, (Plon; Paris, 1984), p.265.
63 The other principal members of this Committee were Marshal Juin, General Marie-Pierre Koenig 
(Minister of War), Maurice Bourgfcs-Maunoury (Minister o f Interior), Pierre Pflimlin (Minister of 
Finance).
64 DDF, 1955,1, doc.325, Lacoste to Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, no.1802/1807,7.6.1955.
65 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.89, Lacoste to July, no.1909/1917,12.6.1955.
66 He was the directeur d ’importantes affaires industrielles au Maroc et de France-Presse.
67 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.246.
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On 20 June 1955, the French Council of Ministers decided on the replacement of 
Lacoste by Gilbert Grandval.68 Faure announced the governmental programme before 
the National Assembly the following day. Its main points were: (1) the permanence of 
the French presence in Morocco, (2) the abolition of the system of direct administration,
(3) the creation of modem governmental institutions and (4) the organisation of genuine 
interdependence between the two countries.69 This announcement showed that Faure 
was giving consideration to internal autonomy, which was similar to what Tunisia had 
been granted as a result of the Franco-Tunisian Conventions. After their experiences in 
Tunisia in 1954, the French were starting to search for a way of coming to terms with 
the Moroccan nationalists.
At the same time, US and UK officials were increasingly concerned about Moroccan 
affairs, largely because they were accused by French newspapers of failing to apply the 
principle of the North Atlantic alliance in support of French North African policy.70 On 
16 June 1955, Ambassador Dillon urged Dulles to pay attention to Morocco, stressing 
that French leaders ‘have become suspicious and resentful of U.S. policy in that area’ 
because of its ‘unwillingness to allow the transfer of helicopters from Indochina to 
North Africa’.71 On 23 June, the Americans were informed that while the FO felt the 
French should realise ‘the days of old-time colonialism are over’, it would still continue 
its policy of supporting the French position.72 As discussed before, the British knew that 
Anglo-Saxon advice would merely irritate French opinion thereby increasing the 
probability of French failure. Jebb had written to Eden in March 1955:
During the last years we have... succeeded... in placing the French firmly 
together with Western Germany in the general defensive system of the West... We 
shall still, however, have to continue to work very hard to prevent her from 
slipping out of this system as a result either of internal, or of external pressure, or 
of both... [T]he attitude of the “Anglo-Saxons” towards France generally may 
have a certain influence on the issue of the struggle... [W]hat is evident above all
68 DDF, 1955,1, doc.343, p.779, footnote 1. It seems that a few days before 20 June, Izard had revealed to 
Faure the outline of the plan drawn up at Antsirab6. Izard, ‘Le “Secret” d’Antsirata’, Etudes 
Mediterranees, no.4, (printemps, 1958), p.74.
69 L ’Annee Politique, 1954, pp.245-246.
70 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/6, Paris to the Western Department, FO, no. 10723/37/55,24.6.1955.
71 DDEL, Dulles, John Foster Secretary of State: Papers 1951-1959, Subject Series Box no.6 North 
African Survey - 1955 Julius Holmes [re U.S. policy toward North African countries], Dillon to Dulles,
16.6.1955. On 25 May, the French had asked Washington to consent regarding die transfer o f the 
helicopters provided for French use in Indochina to Algeria, but the American reply was not favourable. 
DDF, 1955, I, doc.300, Pinay to Couve deMurville, no.7878/7881, 26.5.1955; doc.351, MAE to 
Washington, no.9205/9210,20.6.1955.
72 NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/6-2355, London to State Department, despatch no.3764,23.6.1955.
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is that if the French really lose their grip on Africa North of the Sahara, the left
wing and neutralist forces in France itself will be immeasurably increased.73
Jebb continued that the defence of Western Europe in the face of a neutralist or quasi- 
hostile France was impossible in the long run. British concern was the avoidance of 
French withdrawal from the Western Alliance, which was highly likely if France was 
driven out of North Africa. Since Anglo-Saxon intervention would increase this 
probability, the British were extremely hesitant to advise the French. The FO was 
certain that French opinion would not put the blame on the Anglo-Saxons as long as 
France failed to solve the North African problems without their intervention.
State Department officials had little faith in French competence in handling colonial 
affairs, as the British noted.74 This was presumably because Faure’s announcement of 
21 June 1955 did not mention the dynastic problem. As a country which advocated 
national emancipation, the Americans could not afford to be so tolerant as the British. 
Later in June 1955, Dillon strongly conveyed American concerns to Faure. The latter, 
however, did not react favourably and instead produced a list of complaints about the 
failure of British and American policy to support the French in North Africa.75 
Nevertheless, immediately after this, on 2 July 1955 Faure told American officials that 
he was paying close attention to Moroccan affairs and that ‘he would welcome at any 
time an expression of Washington’s views’ especially on the dynastic problem.76 The 
Americans welcomed this move as evidence that the French had finally recognised US 
good-offices and were now seriously addressing the Moroccan problem. They had no 
immediate reaction, fearing that it could still be interpreted as interference.77
6.3 The Grandval plan
The new Resident-General Grandval arrived at Rabat on 7 July 1955. Just before his 
departure, he had received lengthy instructions from the Ministry for Moroccan and 
Tunisian affairs. It was stated at the outset:
73 PRO, F0371/113803, JF1051/3, Jebb to Eden, 23.3.1955.
74 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/5, Makins to Kirkpatrick, no.10643/1/55/55,30.6.1955.
75 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/6, Paris to Western Department, no. 10723/37/55,24.6.1955.
76 NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/7-255, Paris to Dulles, no.24, 2.7.1955. It is not clear why Faure 
suddenly decided to sound out American intentions on this matter, but one possible reason is that he 
considered American support could be useful in encouraging liberal tendencies among French opinion, if 
its timing was carefully calculated.
77 NARA, RG59, CDF, 75IS.00/7-555, Tangier to the Dulles, no.2,5.7.1955.
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C’est... en transferant effectivement l’exercice du gouvemement et de 
1’administration aux Marocaines eux-memes que leur consentement passif a la 
presence permanente de la France se transformera en consentement actif...
II ne saurait etre question de supprimer la souverainete ch6rifienne qui doit au 
contraire etre consacree et qui ne saurait etre partagde. II y a done lieu d’ecarter 
rigoureusement toute formule de « co-souverainet6 »...78
These instructions partially exceeded what Faure had mentioned in the previous month, 
as it referred to Morocco’s sovereignty, though the recognition of it remained a future 
goal. The principe de co-souverainete, to which the French had long been committed, 
should be abandoned when the protectorate system was replaced by ‘une nouvelle 
formule d’association’79 between France and Morocco. This meant that the French 
realised, as was the case in Tunisia, that cooperation with the nationalists was necessary 
to sustain French rule in Morocco and therefore the principe de co-souverainete must be 
abandoned. This note maintained that a Moroccan government should be established, 
although this government was to include French ministers. This government was 
expected to implement administrative decentralisation, but no transfer of power to the 
Moroccan people was envisaged in the short term.
Nevertheless, the French had already been aware that the formation of such a 
government was impossible under Arafa’s reign:
Arafa... n’est parvenu depuis lors a imposer ni son autorite ni son prestige... 
Paraltelement, s’est creee la legende de Mohammed V qui pourtant n’dtait pas 
populaire lorsqu’il regnait.
This was a frank admission that the establishment of Arafa had been a complete failure 
and, worse, had enhanced Mohammed V’s prestige. Yet, crucially important is that the 
establishment of a Moroccan government was considered possible with Arafa staying on 
the throne. The French decided to transfer him to another place in Morocco and to set 
up a Moroccan government during his absence from Rabat. They also clung to the idea 
that ‘nous ne pouvons faire abstraction du credit dont Mohammed V dispose encore au 
Maroc’ at the time of the formation of a Moroccan government. Desperate to exclude 
his influence in a newly-created government, they hoped that its formation would be 
completed before his transfer to France.
Grandval was instructed to inform Paris if he agreed to this solution of the dynastic 
problem. Therefore, upon his arrival, he wasted no time in sounding out the
78 DDF, 1955, II, doc.27, July to Faure, 12.7.1955.
79 It is unclear what this phrase meant, but undoubtedly, the French never accepted the idea that Moroccan 
independence could be achieved outside the French Union.
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representatives of all shades of Moroccan opinion, especially the traditionalists. On 13 
July 1955, he had long talks with el-Glaoui, whose position was: ‘Toute id6e de 
restaurer Mohammed ben Youssef ou ses fils est... absolument a proscrire. Mohammed 
ben Arafa est le sultan legitime du Maroc’.80 However, at the end of July 1955, it 
emerged that the caids appeared to be resigned to the Sultan’s departure, provided they 
received assurances that Mohammed V and his descendants would be kept from the 
throne.81 When he had conversations with caids in Meknes, he found fifty-one of the 
fifty-two caids adopted the position: « Nous ne connaissons que Dieu et la France... ».82 
The chieftains’ orientation was perhaps decisive in changing the stance of el-Glaoui, 
who now felt that he had to make concessions. El-Glaoui, nevertheless, imposed an 
important condition: he approved Arafa’s dethronement only if he was immediately 
replaced by another sultan chosen among six candidates that el-Glaoui himself listed.83 
For him, the absence of a sultan was unthinkable, since it would lead directly to 
Mohammed V’s return.
In the meantime, the British and the Americans were exchanging views. As 
mentioned above, the British were worried that the US had a low opinion of French 
ability to handle colonial situations. They were intent on moderating US attitudes vis-a- 
vis France, so perhaps under the instructions of Eden, who had originally been advised 
by Jebb, Makins began ‘urging the Americans to be sympathetic towards the French in 
North Africa.’84 It was probably these British efforts, together with Dillon’s advice to 
the same effect on 16 June, that made Dulles pay more attention to Moroccan affairs. 
On 13 July 1955, he ordered Julius Holmes, the US Consul General at Tangier, to 
undertake a survey in North African areas.85
By now, the prospect of the Moroccan problem being discussed in the UN emerged 
again. On 26 July, considering the spread of disturbances in those territories, the Afro- 
Asian UN delegations86 decided to demand the inscription of the Algerian and 
Moroccan problems on the GA agenda. The French position remained as in previous 
years; ‘les Nations Unies ne sont pas comp6tentes... [I]l est souhaitable que la question
80 DDF, 1955, II, doc.28, Grandval to July, no.2326/2333, 13.7.1955.
81 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.265. His argument is based on Grandval’s memoirs.
82 DDF, 1955, II, doc.63, Grandval to July, no.2542/ 2545,28.7.1955.
83 Ibid., doc.75, Grandval to July, no.2594/2600, 2.8.1955.
84 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/7, Jebb to FO, 18.7.1955.
85 DDEL, Papers 1951-1959, Subject Series Box no.6 North African Survey - 1955 Julius Holmes [re U.S. 
policy toward North African countries], Dulles to Dillon, 13.7.1955.
They were: Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand and Yemen. Yearbook o f  the United Nations, 1955, pp.63-65.
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ne soit examinee que le plus tard possible’,87 as Antoine Pinay, the French Foreign 
Minister, instructed the UN delegation.
Grandval sent an action plan to Paris on 2 August 1955, whereby he clearly suggested 
that Arafa abdicate, unlike the government’s plan.88 In sharp contrast to el-Glaoui, he 
recommended that the Regency Council be created, not ‘the third person’, because he 
believed that there was no ruler who could stay on the throne without following Arafa’s 
fate. This plan was defined by its strict time schedule:
Le large credit dont je dispose dans tous les milieux marocains me serait retire si 
aucune decision sur ce point n’intervenait avant le 20 aout. Le desespoir populaire 
alimenterait alors le fanatisme... [D]ans un conflit ouvert avec la majeure partie du 
pays, disparattrait l’autorit6 de la France et de son Resident...
20 August 1955 was the second anniversary of the deposition. Grandval warned that if 
the French government did not take action before that date, Morocco would descend 
into anarchy. Also, the ex-Sultan’s involvement was central to this plan. Grandval 
argued that Mohammed V should make ‘une declaration publique par laquelle il 
recommanderait a ses sujets de tenir pour legitime 1’autorite provisoire’. Therefore he 
suggested that the government start negotiations with Mohammed V, whose legitimacy 
could no longer be ignored. This was a clear deviation from Paris’s position to keep his 
involvement to a minimum.
The Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs analysed the Grandval plan with 
grave interest. A memorandum of 3 August 1955 began by stating: ‘L’importance de 
mesures proposes par M. Grandval... montre... la gravity de la situation au Maroc, ou 
les risques d’insurrection tendent desormais a se substituer h la pression du terrorisme.89 
Although this note did not recommend whether to accept the Grandval plan or not, it 
made a number of comments on it, namely:
1. A Council composed of the grand Vizier and two representatives of 
Moroccan opinion would be more stable and solid than a ‘khalifa’90
3. Fatmi ben Slimane91 was the best choice as the head of a future provisional 
government...
87 DDF, 1955, II, doc.98, Pinay to diplomatic representatives, circular no.62,9.8.1955.
88 Ibid., doc.76, Grandval to July, no.2601/2645, 2.8.1955. In his plan, a new Sultan would be established 
after two years’ absence.
89 Ibid., doc. 80, Note de la Direction g£n£rale au Ministdre des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes,
3.8.1955.
90 ‘Khalifa’ here meant a deputy of the Sultan.
91 Grandval had suggested him as the prime minister. Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan conflict, p.265.
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4. A provisional government could not be entitled to negotiate about future 
Franco-Moroccan relations.
5. Mohammed V’s public support for the solution must be his appeal not as the 
sovereign but as a technician.
6. It was essential that the Spanish government be informed of the French 
government’s decisions.
7. If  it was useful to announce Mohammed V’s transfer to France, that transfer 
should be done after the Throne Council and the Moroccan government had 
established their authority.
This memorandum thus agreed with the Grandval plan to establish a Throne Council, 
and to secure the ex-Sultan’s involvement in the settlement process, albeit as a 
‘technician’.
In parallel to the Afro-Asian moves in the UN, the Americans were gradually more 
sensitive to their approach. From 1 to 3 August, a meeting was held in Paris on North 
African problems in which John Jemegan and US officers from North African posts 
participated. The meeting concluded:
there has been recent evolution in French thinking and events in North Africa 
shocked Metropolitan France from its complacency... Influence of colons in France 
is probably diminishing... [The] program which Grandval outlined and general 
approach of Faure and Mendes-France to North Africa do appear worthy of our 
support...92
The Americans welcomed the Grandval plan, since this included Arafa’s dethronement. 
Actually, they had already noted in July 1955 that ‘there is unquestionably [a] new spirit 
developing in France’, as was indicated in the ‘Socialists’ call for basic revision [of the] 
constitution [of the] French Union in order [to] permit free association [of] all three 
North African areas with France’.93 Yet this meeting emphasised that their support for 
the French position in the UNGA would depend on whether the French could take 
action before its opening, and that the French should be warned of this. Finally, the 
meeting recommended that Dulles issue a public statement to show American 
satisfaction on the Franco-Tunisian Conventions, thereby giving support to Grandval’s 
efforts.94
Meanwhile, US Ambassador Dillon and Holmes, who presided over the above 
meeting, had conversations with Faure on 2 August.95 Faure repeatedly asked them 
whether they considered Arafa’s dethronement indispensable or not. Holmes
92 FRUS, 1955-1957, XVIII, doc.28, Paris to the State Department, no.526,4.8.1955.
93 NARA, RG59, CDF 771.00/7-2155, Dillon to Dulles, no.282,21.7.1955.
94 FRUS, 1955-1957, XVIII, doc.28, Paris to the State Department, no.526,4.8.1955.
95 Ibid., doc.182, Paris to the State Department, no.489,2.8.1955.
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mentioned: ‘The solution envisaged by the Resident-General... is on the right lines. But 
it must have the approval of Ben Youssef.’96 Dillon then expressed ‘the personal view 
that the United States might find it very difficult to give France the kind of support on 
the Moroccan problem we have given [in] the past two Assemblies, if the situation there 
has not substantially improved’. Thus the US informed the French of their possible 
attitude at the UNGA. The Americans, nevertheless, had the impression that Faure had 
already decided to tackle the dynastic problem. In addition to the approach to Faure, on 
1 August 1955, Dulles had proposed to the British an Anglo-American joint 
intervention in this matter. The Americans ‘doubted the ability of the French to handle 
the situation effectively... [The French] action in removing to North Africa [the] 
American equipment which they had obtained through MDAP for their NATO forces 
created a serious problem for the State Department’,97 as Dulles explained to Makins. 
However, the FO turned down this proposal, reasoning that there was, in French 
opinion, ‘a growing realisation that new relationship between the metropolitan country 
and the overseas territories will have to be worked out’. Two days later, the FO 
instructed Makins to notify Dulles of its views: if either the UK or the US government 
intervened, it might have a reverse effect on the French.98
US officials were irritated with the lack of progress in Morocco, which had made the 
State Department’s position extremely difficult in terms of US opinion. Two and half 
years had already passed since the UNGA resolution in December 1952 and Mayer’s 
declaration ‘de guider les populations de Tunisie et du Maroc vers 1’administration de 
leurs propres affaires’ in January 1953. As well, as Maurice Couve de Murville, French 
Ambassador in Washington, put it, the Americans were particularly sensitive to the rise 
of Third-World nationalism, exemplified by the Bandung Conference in April 1955. He 
pointed out that the detente in the Cold War encouraged the Americans to turn their 
attention to such phenomena. Couve then warned that the US would vote against a 
resolution unless the French started solving the problem.99 Actually, Holmes had written 
to Dulles that it was important ‘to determine our attitude toward France and toward the 
Afro-Asian Group, bearing the Bandung Conference in mind.’100 
In contrast, the British proposed a far more indirect way of dealing with the French.
96 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/11, Paris to FO, no.290,4.8.1955.
97 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/10, Makins to FO, no.1790,1.8.1955. MDAP stands for Mutual Defense 
Assistance Program.
98 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/10(b), FO to Washington, no.3158,3.8.1955.
99 DDF, 1955, II, doc.99, Couve de Murville to Pinay, no.4217/4228,9.8.1955.
100 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71 A/7-2655, Tangier to Dulles, no.36, 26.7.1955.
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Instead of putting pressure on the French government, their aim lay in encouraging 
French opinion to be liberal. One British official argued that French politicians, press 
and people were beginning to have new thoughts on France’s relations with North 
African dependencies:
This “immobilisme” on the part of successive French Governments has reflected 
a basic unconcern on the part of the French men in the street... Now, however, that 
decisions have been taken in [Indo-China and the EDC], the men in the street and 
the political parties have had time to turn their attention to the problems of North 
Africa...
One which seems feasible is to encourage publicity for the new turn of thought in 
France in the... weighty British papers... 01
Echoing this suggestion, an editorial entitled ‘Unjust Suspicions’ appeared in The Times 
on 5 August 1955, which argued that Britain should assist French efforts in North 
Africa. The British views were soon to be agreed upon by Dulles.
Along with the necessity to take action, the Moroccan situation appeared gloomy. On 
5 August, Arafa announced in Le Monde that under no circumstances would he consider 
withdrawing. This ‘coupait bien 6videmment toute possibility d’adoption rapide du plan 
Grandval’, to use Faure’s expression.102 With some ministers blaming Grandval for his 
surrender to terrorism, the Council of Ministers on the following day could not reach a 
decision to approve his plan or not. Moreover, Arafa’s dethronement was vigorously 
opposed by the principal members of the Laniel Government, who had decided on 
Mohammed V’s deposition, including Bidault.103 This group was undoubtedly backed 
by French settler groups like the Presence frangaise. On the other hand, the Americans 
were trying to encourage Paris to accept the Grandval plan. On 10 August Dulles issued 
a statement indicating American satisfaction with the Franco-Tunisian agreement, 
which the French Senate had ratified five days earlier, in order to ‘help Grandval on 
Morocco’.104 This statement meant that Dulles not only followed the recommendation 
of the 1-3 August meeting mentioned above, but also agreed to the British proposal to 
encourage liberal tendencies in French opinion instead of making a joint approach.105 In
101 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/10(b), Ramsden Minute, 2.8.1955. Using newspapers had originally 
been an idea of Jebb.
102 Faure, Memoires II, pp. 391-392.
103 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/7-2855, Paris to Dulles, no.419,28.7.1955.
104 FRUS, 1955-1957, XVIII, doc.28, Paris to the State Department, no.526,4.8.1955.
105 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/14, Makins to London, no.464,18.8.1955. However, Dulles added to the 
British: ‘I do not believe we should close our minds to the possibility that some positive action may 
become necessary.’
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fact, unlike Britain, Dulles had not issued such a statement at the time of the signing the 
Franco-Tunisian agreement in April 1955, despite Dillon’s repeated requests.106
The Sultan’s refusal, nonetheless, greatly changed Faure’s strategy. In the Committee 
for Coordination held from 11 to 12 August and in the Council of Ministers on 12 
August, he presented a plan and obtained agreement in both meetings. The Faure plan 
instructed the Resident-General to:
suggdrer a Moulay Arafa la constitution immediate d’un gouvemement marocain 
largement representatif dont les membres seraient choisis sur une liste agreee par 
un « Comitd des Cinq » ou sidgeront le president du Conseil, MM. Schuman, Pinay, 
July et le g6n6ral Koenig. Si le Sultan peut constituer ce Gouvemement, ses 
membres seront invites a se rendraient d£s le 18 aout en France ou ils seront re?us 
par la ddl6gation gouvemementale. En cas d’echec, il m’appartiendra de designer 
sur cette liste un certain membre de Marocains qui seront re9us k  la meme date par 
la meme delegation. C’est apres cet echange de vues que le Gouvemement 
determinera... les mesures k  prendre pour rdsoudre la crise marocaine. Celle-ci 
devrait en tout cas etre « sortie de la phase critique » le 12 septembre au plus 
tard.107
Apparently, the Faure plan side-stepped the dynastic problem for a while and was not 
aimed at meeting the due date set by Grandval. However, importantly, this plan put 
more emphasis on the nationalists’ role than the Grandval plan. Firstly, it intended to 
impress Moroccan opinion with Arafa’s inability to deal with the crisis and secondly, to 
illustrate that France relied on the nationalists in establishing a new regime. Faure 
announced that the government had agreed upon a plan, but without revealing its 
tenor.108 According to Grandval, who considered that the Faure plan would pave a way 
to the ex-Sultan’s restoration, he angrily told Faure on 13 August: ‘Votre Politique..., 
va ramener Ben Youssef sur le Trone!’ and the latter replied ‘En avez-vous jamais 
dout6 ?’109 Based on this, Faure could have judged that the force of events might bring 
him back to the throne in the future.110
106 DDEL, Dulles, John Foster Secretary of State: Papers 1951-1959, Subject Series Box no.6 North 
African Survey - 1955 Julius Holmes [re U.S. policy toward North African countries], Dillon to Dulles,
16.6.1955.
107 Gilbert Grandval, Ma Mission au Maroc, (Paris: Libraire Plon, 1956), p. 193; CARAN, Edgar Faure, 
505APII, 345, Maroc, [Aotit 1955, Comit6 de Coordination], untitled, undated.
108 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.276-277.
109 Grandval, Ma Mission, p.201.
110 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.292-296. However, it is difficult to interpret that Faure 
expected his restoration would be realised in several months, as it actually was. The abolition of the 
Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs on 20 October 1955 seemed to indicate that, in French 
judgement, the establishment of the Throne Council settled the matter for the time being. See this chapter, 
p.173.
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On 15 August 1955, Grandval tabled Arafa Faure’s letter, demanding that he 
constitute a government composed of representatives of all shades of Moroccan opinion 
before 18 August.111 However, it was clear by 17 August that the Istiqlal and the PDI, 
without whose agreements no solution was possible, were hostile to any talks with 
Moroccan traditionalists. Understandably, they did not trust French sincerity to 
negotiate with them, and rejected the idea of having talks with the traditionalist 
elements responsible for Mohammed V’s deposition.112 Therefore, the Resident-General 
suggested that July send a delegation to Antsirabd with the purpose of obtaining at least 
passive cooperation from the ex-Sultan ‘d’extreme urgence’.113 Grandval received a 
letter dated 17 August from the Sultan that he had given up the attempt to constitute a 
government.114 This impasse forced the French government to change its position 
concerning Mohammed V’s involvement: it finally decided to rely on his authority in 
order to sell the governmental plan to Moroccan opinion. The Committee of the Five 
decided on 19 August to send a mission to Antsirabe, and to open a Franco-Moroccan 
meeting at Aix-les-Bains on 22 August.115 The ex-Sultan’s expected approval 
moderated the nationalists’ attitude.116
Meanwhile, the Moroccan situation became even more strained as the anniversary of 
the deposition approached. Terrorist attacks multiplied from the night of 17 August in 
Casablanca. Troubles spread throughout Morocco by 20 August.117 Particularly serious 
was the massacre in Oued-Zem where forty-nine Europeans were killed. Disorder 
continued in Marrakech, Mazagan and Safi the next day.118
It was in this explosive atmosphere that Franco-Moroccan discussions began at Aix- 
les-Bains on 22 August 1955. On the French side, the representatives were the members 
of the Committee of the Five. Principal Moroccan attendants were el-Mokri, the 
representatives of the Maghzen, el-Glaoui and other chieftains, the delegates of both the 
Istiqlal and the PDI, and moderate nationalists like Bekkai and Ben Slimane.119 In
111 DDF, 1955, II, doc. 107, p.241, footnote 1.
112 Ibid., doc.113, Grandval to July, no.2855/2861, 17.8.1955; doc.117, Grandval to July, no.2884/2887,
18.8.1955.
1,3 Ibid., doc.116, p.259, footnote 1, Grandval to July, no.2873/2878, 17.8.1955.
114 Ibid., doc. 118, Grandval to July, no.2894/2899,18.8.1955.
115 Ibid., doc.129, p.296, footnote 2.
116 There is no document available regarding French soundings of the nationalist parties about the 
forthcoming Aix-les-Bains meeting.
117 Holmes had already pointed to this danger on 9 August 1955. Ibid., doc.112, Couve de Murville to 
Massigli, 16.8.1955.
118 Ibid. doc.131, p.302, footnote 2.
119 Ibid., doc.144, Note, Conversations franco-marocaines d’Aix-les-Bains, 27.8.1955.
161
accordance with the negotiations at Aix-les-Bains, the Committee reached the following 
conclusion on 26 August.
- retraite du sultan Ben Arafa
- constitution d’un Conseil du Trone dont le personnage central serait Si
Bekkai...
- formation d’un gouvemement representatif charge de ndgocier avec la France...
The French Council of Ministers approved this decision three days later.120 Now Arafa’s 
dethronement was considered essential, but this conclusion was a logical consequence 
of the Faure plan to consult the nationalists.
The Aix-les-Bains meeting and the French decision thereafter brought about 
favourable reactions in the international scene. Early in August 1955, the Arab-Asian 
countries’ attitude towards the Moroccan problem had been so firm that they had 
demanded Dag Hammarskjold, the UN Secretary-General, to intervene against the 
French government.121 However, after the talks started, attitudes abroad moderated. On 
23 August, Hammarskjold discussed Moroccan affairs with the delegates of six Arab- 
Asian countries,122 and focussed their attention on the importance of the forthcoming 
conversations at Aix-les-Bains. He estimated: ‘[les] Arabes et Asiatiques commen9ait k 
rdduire fortement leurs prdtentions’. 123 This group announced on 30 August their 
decision to bring the matter to the UNSC, but ‘[a]fin de tenir compte des exigences de 
leur opinion publique, les Arabes ont voulu donner 1’impression que leur d6cision dtait 
in£branlable’, as one of their delegates said to journalists. In fact, they had already been 
informed that the US would vote against the inscription of the question on the SC 
agenda.124 In the final analysis, the Arab-Asian countries did not formally request the 
UNSC to discuss the Moroccan question.125 Moreover, Dulles announced on 30 August 
that the US government agreed on French policy towards Morocco, and hoped a 
Moroccan government could be established before the UNGA session.126 This was the 
first time that the Americans had openly revealed their support for France over Morocco.
120 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.263.
121 DDF, 1955, II, doc. 125, Lucet to Pinay, no.1530/1538, 19.8.1955.
122 They were: Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, India, and Burma.
123 Ibid., doc.135, Lucet to Pinay, no.1580/1586, 24.8.1955.
m Ibid., doc. 149, Alphand to Pinay, no.1672/1677,30.8.1955.
125 Yearbook o f  the United Nations, 1955, p.64
126 Le Monde, 31.8.1955.
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6.4 The Departure of Arafa
On 30 August 1955, General Latour, former Resident-General in Tunis, was 
nominated as the new Resident-General in Morocco.127 In the instructions given to him, 
the French government emphasised that the settlement of the dynastic problem 
‘constituait, malheureusement, une condition prealable, indispensable a la formation du 
gouvemement marocain’.128 Thus Paris definitely decided to dethrone Arafa. To begin 
with, Latour was told to ask Arafa to abdicate voluntarily. After his departure, he should 
ask el-Mokri to constitute the Throne Council, which would include el-Mokri 
himself,129 Bekkai and the last one yet to be decided. The Council’s first task would be 
to appoint Ben Slimane as the prime minister in accordance with the Grandval plan, and
1 inthen make sure to include members of the PDI and the Istiqlal as ministers. This 
government would establish modem and democratic institutions, while guaranteeing the 
French people’s interests. Then, and this was a novel part of the programme, the 
government was to negotiate new relations with France, a point that the French 
memorandum of 3 August 1955 had not mentioned.131 This was considered essential, 
because of the necessity of obtaining Mohammed V’s approval. The French Council of 
Ministers, nevertheless, had not yet decided at this stage ‘si des amenagements devront 
Stre ou non apportes au traits de F6s’. Finally, the instructions highlighted that the 
programme must be implemented by 12 September 1955. In addition, Latour, as a 
military officer, was instructed to assume responsibility both for the maintenance of 
order and for the application of the new policy.132
At the same time, the French government was preparing for a mission to Antsirabd. It 
instructed General Catroux on 1 September, to ‘convaincre l’ex-Sultan qu’apres les 
conversations d’Aix-les-Bains, le gouvemement est ddcidd a mettre un terme h 
1’administration directe en facilitant la constitution d’un gouvemement marocain
127 On 23 August Grandval had already asked the government to accept his resignation. MAE, Maroc 
1950-1955, vol.3, Grandval to July, no.33/42,23.8.1955.
128 DDF, 1955, II, doc.150, Instructions du Gouvemement au G6n6ral Boyer de Latour Resident g£n£ral 
de France au Maroc, 30.8.1955.
129 Securing el-Mokri’s participation was considered fundamental in showing the continuity of the 
Sharifian State.
130 At the Aix-les Bains meeting, though, it had been agreed that the Istiqlal would not participate in the 
government until after Mohammed V’s transfer to France, but nevertheless give support to the 
government. Ibid., doc.144, Note de M. Duhamel, Conversations franco-marocaines d’Aix-les-Bains, 
p.366.
This Chapter, pp.156-157.
132 Ibid., doc.165, circular no.68, Pinay to French diplomatic representatives, 3.9.1955.
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largement reprdsentatif des diverses tendances de 1’opinion’.133 He was also instructed 
to obtain Mohammed V’s recognition of the envisaged settlement process and his 
promise not to engage in political activities, and to tell him that he would be authorised 
to enter France as soon as a new regime was established, on 15 October 1955 for 
instance. In addition, the instructions clarified that the Throne Council would be 
convened by the Grand Vizier, and consisted of a nationalist and a traditionalist besides 
himself.
On his arrival at Rabat, Latour had talks with Arafa on 5 September 1955, and found 
him inclined to abdicate voluntarily, because the growing opposition made it more 
difficult to fulfil his role.134 Four days later, he went so far as to talk to the Resident- 
General on what he wanted as compensation for his abdication.135 Meanwhile, at a 
conference on 6 and 7 September, the Istiqlal had published a communiqud to affirm the 
Aix-les-Bains agreement on condition that:
- le depart d6finitif de Ben Arafa
- l’accord librement exprime par S.M. Sidi Mohammed Ben Youssef aussi bien 
sur le principe de 1’institution d’un Conseil de Regence que sur la composition 
de ses membres.
- la constitution d’un gouvemement marocain reste conditionnde par une 
declaration d’intention du gouvemement ffan9ais reaffirmant 1’unite et la 
souverainete marocaines et l’integrite territoriale du Maroc et proclamant sa 
volonte de conduire le Maroc au statut d’Etat independant et souverain dans le 
cadre d’une interdependance entre le Maroc et la France librement eiaborde et 
ndgociee.136
The French obtained a satisfactory result at Antsirabe. The Mohammed V-Catroux 
conversations were almost concluded by 8 September, when Catroux presented to the 
former a draft of a declaration by Faure. Its main points were:
1. La politique de la France est fondee sur 1’affirmation... de la souverainet6 
marocaine. Elle vise h conduire le Maroc au statut d’etat modeme libre et 
souverain; uni a la France par des liens permanents d’une interdependance 
librement consentie.
2. [L]e gouvemement fran5ais donnera son accord a toute formule 
sauvegardant la permanence et la mission historique du trone alaouite...
133 Ibid., doc.157, Instructions to Catroux and Yrissou, 1.9.1955. As the instructions showed, the French 
were aware that the ex-Sultan’s position had hardened in comparison with that in December 1954, due to 
the events in Morocco which had happened since then. They were concerned that he might not recognise 
the Throne Council and could claim more than his transfer to France.
134 Ibid., doc.171, Latour to July, no.3174/3177,6.9.1955.
135 Ibid., doc. 198, Latour to July, no.3290/3210,10.9.1955.
136 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.269.
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3. Un gouvemement... devra etre largement repr6sentatif des diverses 
tendances de l’opinion... II devra ^laborer... les institutions ddmocratiques 
modemes... II aura egalement vocation a engager le dialogue avec le 
gouvemement fran9ais afin de definir contractuellement d’une part les 
garanties des droits et interets de la France et des Fran9ais au Maroc, d’autre 
part les liens permanents qui uniront dans l’avenir les deux pays.
Ces liens permanents comporteront:
a. L’association des 6tats par des institutions communes, de type federal, 
constituant en un Conseil ex6cutif charge de g6rer les affaires 
presentant un interet commun aux deux 6tats...
b. La communautd des peuples, par 1’institution d’une citoyennetd 
commune se superposant k la nationalite fran9aise et k la nationalite 
marocaine, et a laquelle sera attachde la jouissance rdciproque des 
droits...137
However, to French embarrassment, Mohammed V’s attitude hardened as a result of
the demarche by Bekkai’s delegation. It was noted on 9 September: ‘II revient sur
l’abrogation du traits de Fes, qu’il tient pour la condition premiere d’une negotiation...
entre le gouvemement fran9ais et le gouvemement marocain pour definir de nouveaux
rapports entre les deux pays.’138 Later that day, the ex-Sultan finalised his position: he
accepted the first and second paragraphs of the French draft of 8 September.
Nonetheless, he did not accept the third paragraph on the basis that: ‘il y retrouvait
esprit Union Fran9aise dans laquelle a plusieurs reprises, les Marocains avaient refuse 
1 1 0de s’intdgrer.’ Catroux issued a communique on the same day: ‘Ben Youssef a 
accepte de soutenir la politique qui tend a creer un Etat libre, souverain, lie k la France 
par un acte d’interdependance.’140 
Thus, one crucial point remained unsolved: to the end Mohammed V did not agree on 
the nature of future Franco-Moroccan relations, despite his acceptance of the 
preservation of permanent Franco-Moroccan links. More precisely, he refused to agree 
to Morocco’s adherence to the French Union, contrary to French hopes. Catroux noted:
ne faut-il pas pr6voir que la contagion de l’exemple ne gagne de proche en proche 
autres territoires outre-mer? Je pense... que ce statut federal doit reprdsenter regime 
final de 1’Union fran9aise, mais j ’estime que cette evolution doit etre conduite et je 
me pose question de savoir si le choix du Maroc... ne comporte pas des risques...141
137 DDF, 1955, II, doc.185, Teitgen, to Soucadaux, no.162/166, 8.9.1955.
138 Ibid., doc.188, Soucadaux to Teitgen, 9.9.1955. Bekkai’s delegation had arrived at AntsirabS on 5 
September.
139 Ibid., doc.190, Soucadaux to Teitgen, no.347/352,9.9.1955.
140 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, pp.269-270.
141 DDF, 1955, II., doc.190. In Catroux’s comment, ‘ce statut f6d6ral’ meant the Moroccan status as had 
been defined in the first paragraph o f the draft dated 8 September.
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It is not clear to what extent this apprehension was shared within the French 
government, but some leading politicians had already been aware of the dysfunction of 
the French Union,142 which was supposed to include Morocco as a member. If Morocco 
failed to accept its participation in it, the secession of other overseas territories could 
follow. Mohammed V’s claim spectacularly revealed that realistically the Union was 
unlikely to survive. Therefore, the French now faced an urgent problem as to how to 
restructure the Union. Having such an importance, the Antsirabe agreement was not 
publicised at this moment.143
This sense of crisis was shared by the British. The record of a secret meeting of 
British diplomats in early September 1955 was transmitted to Paris. They argued:
nous considdrons de notre devoir de conseiller que notre diplomatic s’efforce... 
d’amener le gouvemement fran9ais a envisager une association du type federal 
permettant... de remplacer les structures actuelles, de donner un cadre a 
1’interdependance de la France et de ses anciennes possessions... Y aboutir nous 
semble etre la solution utile pour dviter le depart en lambeaux de l’Empire fran9ais, 
avec tout ce que cela comporte de dangers pour l’Angleterre en Afrique.144
Thus the British considered that the transforming the Union into a federal organisation 
in which a wide range local autonomy was permitted was the only solution and hoped 
this would avert the danger to the British colonies in Africa that a break-up of the 
French Empire could entail. This view was soon to be accepted by the French 
government. In fact, Paul-Henri Teitgen, the Minister of Overseas France, had already 
started examining the Loi-Cadre as a device to achieve administrative decentralisation 
in Africa and a federal structure within the French Union by the autumn of 1955.145
However, even if the ex-Sultan’s attitude created a new problem, having obtained his 
general agreement on Arafa’s departure and the procedure thereafter, was of great 
importance to the French. The next steps were an approach to the Spanish and a 
decision on the members of the Throne Council.
As will be argued below, the Spanish government aimed to internationalise the 
problem thereby securing their say on it. On 9 and 10 September 1955, Pinay had 
conversations with Jose de Casa Rojas, the Spanish Ambassador in Paris, to inform
142 L 'Annee Politique, 1954, p.297.
143 This agreement was approved by the French Council of Ministers on 12 September, but was not 
publicised until November 1955. L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.270; Le Monde, 8.11.1955.
MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pinay, vol. 13, Position Anglaise sur la Question Arabe, undated.
145 Kent, The Internationalization, pp.306-307; Joseph Roger de Benoist, L'Afrique Occidentale 
Franqaise de 1944 a 1960 (Dakar, 1982), pp. 162-163.
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Madrid of the accords with Mohammed V .146 Yet the French were suspicious of 
Spanish intentions. It had been planned that after his abdication, Arafa would be 
transferred to Tangier, which was controlled by the Tangier Control Committee.147 
Therefore, Latour insisted that it was indispensable to agree with the Spaniards in 
advance on Arafa’s transfer, although Pinay rejected this idea on the ground that they 
would intervene in any case, taking advantage of the French request.148 Pinay told the 
Spanish Ambassador on 13 September about the possible installation of Arafa in 
Tangier,149 but his prediction about Spanish intentions were realised. The Spanish 
handed over a letter to the president of the Tangier Control Committee, requesting: ‘les 
autorites de la zone ffan9aise ne prennent aucune decision sur la matiere avant que les 
gouvemements des puissances reprdsentdes a Tanger decident’.150 The British and 
Italian ministers at Tangier immediately promised their aid.151 On 20 September, the 
State Department instructed the US representative on the Committee to indicate: ‘US 
would oppose any action... impeding Faure programme for solving [the] Moroccan 
crisis.’ The Committee meeting on 21 September decided that ‘action on Spain’s 
request was beyond [the] possibilities of [the] committee.’152 The Western allies of 
France thus prevented Spanish attempts to block the French plan.
Concerning the Throne Council, July had suggested on 10 September 1955 that a 
traditionalist would be appointed as the third member, as ‘[c]eci doit dquilibrer la 
personnalitd de Si Bekkai’ et par consequent etre recherchde dans le milieu traditionaliste 
ami de la France’.153 The French knew that they could not appoint a nationalist because 
French settlers would never consent and many parliamentarians still doubted the ex- 
Sultan’s promise not to return to the throne.154 The French and Moroccans had a 
meeting as to the third member on 17 September, but did not reach agreement.155
On the other hand, the growing authority of Mohammed V, due to the Antsirabe 
meeting, had made Arafa change his mind. On 16 September, during a talk with the
146 DDF, 1955, II, doc.204, Pinay to de La Toumelle, no.705/708,12.9.1955.
147 As for this Committee, see Introduction, footnote 40.
148 DDF, 1955, II, doc.205, Pinay to Latour, no.1231/1233,12.9.1955.
149 Ibid., doc.213, MAE to Toumelle, no.722/726, 14.9.1955. Moreover, on 15 September, the State 
Department instructed its embassies in Paris and Madrid to inform the Spaniards of the hopes that the 
latter would facilitate Arafa’s proceeding to Tangier. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-1555, Hoover to 
Paris, no.1042,15.9.1955.
150 DDF, 1955, II, doc.225, p.525, footnote 3.
151 Ibid., doc.225, Tanger to July, no.164/167,18.9.1955.
152 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-2055, Hoover to Tangier, no.154, 20.9.1955; 771.00/9-2155, Tangier to 
Dulles, no.141,21.9.1955.
153 DDF, 1955, II, doc. 196, July to Latour, no.1200/1203,10.9.1955.
154 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.271.
155 DDF, 1955, II, doc.223, Reunion du samedi 17 septembre chez M. July, Proems-verbal.
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Resident-General in the presence of el-Mokri and el-Glaoui, he declared that his 
abdication would be harmful to the interests of France and Morocco. This was partly 
due to a nationalist press article which mentioned that Mohammed V would tolerate 
Arafa only for three months.156 Arafa’s orientation was also greatly affected by some 
Ministers of the Faure Government, presumably including General Koenig, who had 
pushed for a more intransigent attitude.157
The polarisation of Moroccan opinion became far more conspicuous, due to protest 
movements organised by the Presence frangaise. A very pessimistic report was made 
from Rabat on 20 September:
C’est contre un eventuel retour de Mohammed V que se cristallise la resistance 
des Fran5ais. Ils ont maintenant acquis la conviction que l’institution d’un Conseil 
du trone impliquait automatiquement ce retour...
Des troubles sanglants sont inevitables dans ces conditions... Seule la delegation 
d’un troisieme homme peut ramener le calme dans les esprits.158
Seriously alarmed by the pressing situation, this report even proposed to proceed to the 
establishment of the Throne Council before the abdication. The Resident-General had a 
new meeting with Arafa on 22 September only to find that he confirmed ‘son intention 
de ne pas quitter le trone’. Latour observed that his intransigent attitude was encouraged 
by ‘[des] pressions [qui] viennent de Paris et souvent de milieux officiels, par exemple 
la mission de M. Montel’.159
The greater the prospect of civil war, the more internationalised the Moroccan 
problem was becoming. The Istiqlal turned to the Spanish to break the deadlock. On 22 
September 1955, Balafrej declared to the press:
les negotiations avec le gouvemement fran9ais dtant bloquees par suite de 
1’opposition de certains milieux fran9ais du Maroc et de la metropole, il convenait 
d’envisager de placer le probleme marocain sur le plan international: l’Espagne lui 
paraissait etre le plus qualifid pour convoquer une conference intemationale sur le 
Maroc.160
156 Ibid., doc.221, Latour to July, no.3171/3173,16.9.1955.
157 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/18, Conversation between the Secretary of State and Holmes on October 
6 1955. Holmes noted: ‘M. Faure’s Aix proposals... were at once torpedoed by members of his own 
Cabinet who had telephoned to their friends in Morocco’.
158 DDF, 1955, II, doc.227, Panafieu to July, no.3290/3291,20.9.1955.
159 Ibid., doc.235, Latour to July, no.3297/3302, 22.9.1955. Pierre Montel was the president de la 
commission de la Defense nationale a I ’Assemblee Nationale.
160 Ibid., doc.240, footnote 3.
168
On the same day, an American official notified the French that the Spanish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs wanted to convene a tripartite Franco-Spanish-Moroccan conference.161 
In addition, the bureau of the UNGA decided to include the Moroccan problem on the 
agenda.162 July noted: ‘Ce debat sera redoutable pour notre prestige aux Nations Unies. 
Mais surtout il risque, par l’exploitation qu’en feront les propagandes hostiles, de 
declencher au Maroc une nouvelle vague d’agitation et de violences’.163 As was the case 
in earlier years, the French had already decided to vote against placing North Africa on 
the UNGA agenda. As July put it to the Americans, Faure wanted to reverse the 
previous French position of refusing discussions by pointing out French achievements 
in Tunisia and, to a far lesser extent, in Morocco, but he felt unable to do so because of 
the Algerian problem.164
The growing outside pressure made Paris determined to break the stalemate: it 
decided on the Sultan’s dethronement at any cost. On 23 September, July instructed 
Latour to tell Arafa that the French considered recognising the Throne Council even if 
he persisted in his refusal and in staying at the palace.165 On 27 September, Latour was 
once again instructed to warn him in the same way as before, all the more because Pinay 
was going to make an announcement in the UNGA on Morocco two days later.166 The 
latter cabled Faure from New York on 29 September stressing the urgency of 
implementing the Moroccan programme from the viewpoint of the UN timetable.167 
Finally the Sultan surrendered, although this was not in time for Pinay’s declaration in 
the GA: Pinay stated on 29 September that ‘France intended to make of Morocco a 
modem, democratic and sovereign state, united with France by the ties of freely 
accepted interdependence.’168 Arafa was persuaded to abdicate during the night of 29-30 
September and departed for Tangier on 30 September.169
161 Ibid., doc.234, Pinay to Toumelle, no.763/765,22.9.1955.
162 The Bureau consisted of the GA President, and vice-presidents and presidents of the seven committees. 
Its recommendations had to be confirmed by GA plenary meetings. Le Monde, 23.9.1955.
163 DDF, 1955, II, doc.233, July to Latour, no.1318/1320,22.9.1955.
164 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-1255, Dillon to Dulles, no.1123,12.9.1955.
165 DDF, 1955, II, doc.237, July to Latour, no.1331/1334,23.9.1955.
166 Ibid., doc.250, July to Latour, no.1361/1364,27.9.1955.
167 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-2955, Dillon to Dulles, no.1445,29.9.1955.
168 UNGA Official Record, vol. 10, Plenary Meetings, p. 154; The Moroccan question was included in the 
UNGA agenda on 30 September, but the GA plenary meeting decided, on 3 December 1955, to postpone 
further consideration o f the item by fifty-one votes to none, with five abstentions. Yearbook o f the United 
Nations, 1955, p.63-65.
169 Before departure, Arafa announced: ‘Nous avons d^ldgud... & notre cousin Moulay Abdallah Ben 
Moulay Abu Hafid le soin de s’occuper des affaires relatives k la Couronne.’ That is, he officially refused 
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Presence frangaise to do so. L ’Annee Politique, 1955, pp.273-275, pp.283-284.
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6.5 The Establishment of the Throne Council
In the Aix-les-Bains agreement, Arafa’s departure was the first significant step. The 
French needed more time than expected to accomplish this, but his dethronement before 
the debates on Morocco in the National Assembly on 6 October 1955 offered a better 
prospect of the Faure Government maintaining a majority.170 On 1 October 1955, the 
French government made a declaration on the next step of its programme:
I. [L]a France... entend conduire le Maroc au statut d’etat souverain et 
democratique et maintenir avec lui les liens permanents d’une 
interdependance librement consentie.
II. [L]a formation d’une elite marocaine modeme permet aujourd’hui de confier 
a celle-ci des responsabilit£s de plus en plus larges dans la gestion des 
affaires publiques. L’autorite marocaine doit done exercer pleinement les 
attributs et pouvoirs... dans le cadre du traitd de Fes.
V. II s’agira, dans le maintien integral des responsabilites confiees & la France 
en matiere de defense et d’Affaires etrangeres dans l’interet commun des 
deux pays, d’edifier une construction modeme, librement discutee, definie et 
acceptee et traduisant dans des institutions communes 1’association des deux 
etats et la communaute des deux peuples...171
This declaration on the whole reflected both the Aix-les-Bains and Antsirab6 
agreements. However, there was a critical difference: it stated that new Franco- 
Moroccan relations should be defined within the protectorate treaty, negating 
Mohammed V’s desire to modify the protectorate system itself. Nonetheless, the French 
had to refer to the revision of Franco-Moroccan relations, considering the Istiqlal’s 
position publicised on 6 and 7 September 1955.172
However, two serious events occurred before and after the French declaration, and 
poured cold water on their programme. Firstly, on 22 September 1955, Egypt and 
Czechoslovakia had signed an arms deal. This was a clear sign that the Soviet Union 
had started supporting Egypt’s military build-up. Egypt was embarking on a neutralist 
course under the initiative of Prime Minister Gamel Abdel Nasser, who was then 
advocating the solidarity of the Arabs. What was a problem for France was that 
Moroccan opinion was so attracted by Nasser that the nationalists raised their demands
170 PRO, F0371/113835, JM1016/151, Jebb to FO, no.382,29.9.1955.
171 DDF, 1955, II, doc.259, July to Latour, no.1418, 1.10.1955. Points III and IV concerned the new 
Moroccan government. Its role was, in agreement with the French government: to pursue Morocco’s 
modernisation and democratisation; to guarantee the interests o f France and French settlers; to maintain 
permanent Franco-Moroccan links.
72 This chapter, p. 164.
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accordingly. The French were thus forced to confront new circumstances created by the 
arms deal.
The second event was more serious, at least in the immediate term. On the night of 1 
October 1955, Moroccan commando groups attacked two frontier posts in the Rif: Tizi 
Ouzli and Boured. The next night the observatory at Bou Zineb, an enclave in the 
Spanish Zone of Morocco, was also attacked. Another group of Moroccan guerrillas 
attacked the outpost of Imouzzer des Marmoucha in the Middle Atlas.173 On 3 October, 
Al Oummah, a Tetuan daily newspaper, published a proclamation by the Arab Maghreb 
Liberation Army 174 announcing a national insurrection against the French, an 
encirclement of the military posts in the Rif and the Middle Atlas, and the continuation 
of the fight until Morocco and Algeria achieved full independence.175 The situation was 
so alarming that on 3 October, Latour had reported: ‘il ne s’agissait plus de mettre en 
place rapidement un Conseil du trone mais de sauver le Maroc dans rimmediat’.176 The 
ex-Sultan in Madagascar warned the French, on the same day, that if the situation was 
not stabilised within the week, there would be a risk of uprisings throughout North 
Africa.177 The absence of an indigenous sovereign was beginning to drag Morocco into 
civil war.
The sudden Russian involvement in Egypt had made the State Department anxious to 
pressurise the French to come to term with the nationalists. On 29 September, Holmes 
suggested a change of US policy towards the North African problems, arguing: ‘in the 
face of the riptide of nationalism in Africa and Asia... US [should] not premise its 
approach to North Africa... on French considerations to the same degree as in the past, 
but instead place more emphasis on preserving the area for the West, regardless of 
temporary inconveniencies which may arise in our relations with the French.’178 On 3 
October, Dulles and several State Department officials had a meeting in which Holmes 
referred to the arms sale to Egypt, to the establishment of the diplomatic relations with 
Libya, and to the possibility that the Russians could decide to take their seat on the 
Tangier Control Committee, as recent evidence of Soviet interest in North Africa.179
173 DDF, 1955, II, doc.275, p.617, footnote 2.
174 This was organised in the Rif by Moroccan nationalists like Dr Khatib and was operating in liaison 
with Algerian nationalists. Roger Le Toumeau, Evolution Politique de VAfrique du Nord Musulmane 
1920-1961, (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1962), p.245. Tetudn was a city in the Spanish zone.
175 Pierre Boyer de Latour, Verites sur VAfrique du Nord, (Paris, Librairie Plon, 1956), p.173
176 DDF, 1955, II, doc.275, p.617, footnote 2.
177 Ibid., doc.271, p.610, footnote 1.
178 FRUS, 1955-1957, XVIII, doc.29, Memorandum, Holmes to Dulles, 29.9.1955.
179 Ibid., doc.184, Memorandum of a Conversation, State Department, 3.10.1955.
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The talks concluded that they should again consult the British on a joint approach to the 
French.
Holmes tried to induce the British to take a similar stand when he met Harold 
Macmillan, the British Foreign Minister, on 6 October 1955.
The French were trying to set their faces against the tide of nationalism in 
Morocco instead of trying to come to reasonable terms... M. Faure’s Aix proposals 
for a Council of Regency and a Moroccan Government had been reasonable... Mr. 
Dulles thought that it was necessary... to try to bring home the seriousness of the 
situation to the French [at the time of the next meeting between Ministers on 
October 24 1955].'80
However, the British did not agree. Macmillan told Winthrop Aldrich, the US 
Ambassador in London: ‘there was no course open to us except to play the situation by 
ear’.181 In fact, the principal British position was that ‘the French policy in North Africa 
is the domestic concern of the French. We should therefore continue to refrain from any 
lecturing since this would defeat its object’.182 Consequently, the Americans once again 
gave up the idea of a joint approach.
The Istiqlal’s position was hardening. It did not accept the governmental declaration 
of 1 October 1955, claiming that it had agreed at Aix-les-Bains to participate in a 
Moroccan government ‘in exchange of French promise of “independence within an 
interdependence liberally negotiated”.’183 What is more, el-Fassi in Cairo announced on 
4 October i a  formation d’une « armee de liberation du Maghreb » et la constitution 
d’un « commandement unifi£ » pour diriger la « lutte de liberation en Algerie et au 
Maroc ».’ He was also voicing opposition to the Aix-les-Bains agreements.184 To a large 
extent encouraged by the rise of Arab nationalism advocated by Egypt, el-Fassi thus 
gave verbal support to the rebels. July announced that the French government would not 
negotiate with the Istiqlal unless the party condemned him.185 Moreover, on 6 October, 
the Istiqlal openly revealed its disenchantment with the application of the Aix-les-Bains 
agreement.186 In fact, the failure to establish the Throne Council, the rebellion in the Rif
18° p r o ,  F0371/113806, JF1072/18, Conversation between the Secretary of State and Holmes, 6.10.1955.
181 PRO, PREM11/951, Conversation between the Secretary of State and the American Ambassador,
14.10.1955.
182 PRO, F0371/113806, JF1072/20, FO Minute by Phillip, 5.10.1955.
183 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/9-2955, Allen to Tangier, no.201, 20.10.1955. Note that the Istiqlal 
increased its demand ‘independence’ from ‘au statut ind6pendant\ This chapter, p.164.
184 Le Monde, 6.10.1955.
Ibid., 7.10.1955.
186 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.287.
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and el-Fassi’s declaration of commencement of armed struggle ‘provoquent en France
1 8 7une vive emotion et creent au Parlement... une atmosphere de cnse.’
Nevertheless, Faure judged co-operation with the Istiqlal as possible and essential. He 
considered exploiting a rift growing rapidly inside the party. In the National Assembly 
debate on Morocco during 6  and 9 October 1955, he made an impassioned speech:
[il est] indispensable d’obtenir... la collaboration de l’lstiqlal... Cet homme (Allal 
el Fassi) n’est pas tout l’lstiqlal. Demain il lui sera peut-etre. Cela d6pend de nous. 
Evitons que d’autres hommes d65us par Paris ne se toument compl&tement vers le 
Caire. 188
In fact, one Istiqlal leader declared to the press on 7 October: ‘Fassi a parl6 en son nom 
et non en celui de l’lstiqlal’, although this was not a clear condemnation of him by the 
nationalist party. 189 Subsequently, approving Faure’s policy, the French National 
Assembly adopted the Aix-les-Bains agreement on 9 October.
On the Throne Council problem, the French proceeded even without the Istiqlal’s 
final consent. The formation of the Council was announced on 15 October 1955. It 
consisted of el-Mokri; Bekkai, representing the Youssefists; Caid Si Tahar ou Assou; 
and Si Hadj Mohammed Sbihi, the pasha of Said and a nationalist sympathiser. 
Although Assou represented the traditionalists, the French tried to highlight their 
concessions to the Istiqlal by co-opting Sbihi as the fourth member.190
Concurrently, Franco-Spanish relations were becoming strained, although the 
Spaniards were no longer trying to hold an international conference. The Quai d’Orsay 
recognised that the Aix-les-Bains agreement could be harmful to Spanish interests in 
Morocco because French policies could deprive the Spaniards of their advantages, 
which had been gained since the deposition in August 1953, and which had contributed 
to appeasing nationalist discontents in the Spanish zone. Also, the possibility of 
Morocco’s democratisation could risk the absorption of their zone into the French zone, 
since Mohammed V held legitimacy among the people in Spanish Morocco. 191 
Moreover, the Rif incident made the French even more suspicious of Spanish intentions. 
It was reported that a significant amount of arms was being smuggled from Spanish 
Morocco to French Morocco:
187 Ibid., p.285.
188 DDF, 1955, II, doc.332, p.739, footnote 1.
189 Le Monde, 9/10.10.1955.
190 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, pp.328-329.
191 DDF, 1955, II, doc.273, Madrid to Pinay, no.l882/SGL, 4.10.1955.
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C’est par des moyens politiques que les Espagnoles s’attachent implacablement 
depuis trois ans a nous perdre.
La logique de leur position politique les a amends a tolerer et meme k favoriser 
prudemment une certaine action subversive contre nous...192
Le Monde also reported the transfer of arms via two routes to French Morocco and one 
route to Algeria.193 On 15 October, the French Embassy in Madrid received a Spanish 
note, which was publicised the next day. The Spanish foreign minister protested about 
articles in French newspapers which argued that the difficulties in the Rif were due to 
the Spaniards’ complicity with the rebels. He warned: ‘Si la campagne contre l’Espagne 
se poursuivait, le gouvemement de Madrid mena5ait de porter ces faits devant 
l’ONU’.194 Two days later, however, this controversy temporarily ended when Pinay 
sent a note of appreciation about the Spanish efforts to reinforce patrols around the 
border to the Spanish Ambassador in Paris.195
The Throne Council now set about its task of appointing a prime minister. On 18 
October 1955, July instructed Latour to give support to Ben Slimane,196 and four days 
later the Council asked him to form a government. However, while the PDI approved 
the Throne Council, the Istiqlal announced on 21 October its refusal to accept the 
Council as constituted and rejected participation in the government under its aegis. On 
the same day, Bekka'i tried to appease the Istiqlal in vain by publishing a document in 
which Mohammed V had approved it. Nevertheless, the French observed that the 
Istiqlal ‘ne ferme pas la porte k la participation’, because the party had added that the 
Moroccan government must receive ‘1’investiture d’une haute autoritd dont la ldgitimitd 
n’est pas constate’. Even so, the French did not intend to ask the ex-Sultan to advise the 
Istiqlal on moderation. This was because ‘la politique du gouvemement tend... a 
estomper son prestige en faisant naitre au Maroc une vie politique nouvelle, 
inddpendante de sa personne et menee par 1’ensemble des tendances, y compris les 
dldments de l’lstiqlal desireux de coopdrer avec la France.’197
However, a sudden and unexpected development, which would fundamentally 
transform the Moroccan situation, occurred: on 25 October 1955, el-Glaoui issued an
'92Ibid., doc.304, Melillato Pinay, no.l79/AL, 15.10.1955. 
m Le Monde, 22.10.1955.
194 DDF, 1955, II, doc.309, p.687, footnote 1.
195 Ibid., doc.309, Pinay to diplomatic representatives, 18.10.1955.
196 Ibid., doc.332, Note of Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs. 25.10.1955.
197 Ibid, doc.332.
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announcement to approve ‘la prompte restauration de Sa Majeste Sidi Mohammed ben 
Youssef et de son retour sur le trone’. He added:
Mon aspiration se confond avec les aspirations de la Nation marocaine tout 
entiere : Elle est Pinddpendance de mon pays dans un cercle d’interdependance entre 
lui et la France.198
Rabat reported: ‘les Fran5ais du Maroc se rendent compte que Punanimite marocaine en 
train de se constituer ne permettra plus au gouvemement frangais de s’opposer... au 
retour de Ben Youssef... En ce qui conceme les Marocains, le [sic] joie est unanime 
dans les villes’.199 El-Glaoui’s volte-face was reportedly a result of covert negotiations 
with the Istiqlal, which had started around the end of July 1955.200 Perhaps he realised 
that his die-hard opposition to the ex-Sultan was no longer supported by the dignitaries 
and was merely contributing to leaving the country seriously divided. Thus el-Glaoui 
succumbed to the nationalist pressure, although not fully. The acceptance of the ex- 
Sultan’s restoration was aimed at preserving a traditional element in Moroccan political 
society, which was contrary to the nationalist view. It seems that for the French, el- 
Glaoui’s change of mind was not totally unexpected, although it was much earlier than 
anticipated 201 In any case, the French government was now to accept Mohammed V’s 
restoration.
198 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, pp.288-289.
199 DDF, 1955, II, doc.334, Rabat to Ministry for Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs, no.3644/3655, 
26.10.1955; //>/</.,doc.334, p.744, footnote 1.
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Chapter 7: Morocco’s independence; Morocco, October 1955 to May 1956
7.1 The Sultan’s Return and the formation of the Moroccan government
The about-face of the Pasha of Marrakech completely changed Morocco’s political 
situation, as his approval of Mohammed V’s immediate restoration denoted the removal 
of all the obstacles to prevent it. As a result, the Istiqlal raised its demands. It announced 
on 27 October 1955, firstly, that the Aix-les-Bains agreement was obsolete and 
therefore the Throne Council had lost its raison d ’etre', secondly, that now the 
Moroccan people unanimously supported Mohammed V, the French government had 
lost its right to intervene in Morocco’s internal and foreign affairs in accordance with 
the Treaty of Fez; and thirdly, the provisional government should not be formed until 
his return to Morocco.1 The Istiqlal put the second point, because the Moroccan 
people’s undivided support for Mohammed V deprived the French of an excuse to 
intervene with the purpose of guaranteeing the Sultan’s status against internal 
opposition. That is, the party was now demanding the termination of Morocco’s 
protectorate status. The party’s aim was Morocco’s unity, which was unachievable 
without the termination of the Treaty since its Article I clearly referred to the territorial 
division of Morocco by the French and Spanish authorities.
The French now had to deal with Mohammed V’s return. They were aware that 
before his return to Morocco, they had to obtain his guarantee of a permanent French 
presence. The Quai d’Orsay drafted a note that examined his possible attitudes: (1) he 
would remain disposed to settle Morocco’s future with France, not against France, (2) it 
would be convenient to open negotiations to replace the Treaty of Fez with a new 
agreement, (3) those negotiations had to be conducted by a government which the 
Sultan would freely choose and (4) the French Residency must abandon direct 
administration.
In contrast, the French position outlined in this note was:
(1) d’eviter k tout prix 1’internationalisation de la question marocaine, qui est 
ouvertement souhaitde par l’Espagne et secretement d6sir6e par les Etats- 
Unis.
(2) il n ’est pas possible desormais de nous en tenir a la thdse de 1’intangibility 
[du traite de Fes]. Mais il est n6cessaire de distinguer parmi ses clauses:
a. Celles concemant Tanger et la zone d’influence espagnole, qui ne 
sauraient etre modifiees sans crder des complications intemationales;
1 Le Monde, 28.10.1955; NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/11-355, Rabat to Dulles, no.191,3.11.1955.
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b. Celles concemant les engagements de la France envers le Sultan...
c. Celles concemant l’initiative des reformes, reserv6e a la France....
d. Enfin, celles concemant la Defense et les Affaires etrangeres...
(3) de faire reconnaitre par [Mohammed V] la necessit6 de constituer un 
gouvemement de large union, comprenant les differentes tendances de 
l’opinion marocaine.
(4) [N]ous entendons agir loyalement, en abandonnant effectivement les 
m6thodes d’administration directe et renon9ant progressivement controle.2
This note was quite remarkable in the sense that the French finally recognised the 
necessity of revising the Treaty of Fez, i.e. Morocco’s protectorate status. The revision 
was considered inevitable, although, as points (2)c and (2)d indicated, they were 
determined to preserve the initiative in creating new political institutions and, equally, 
not to touch their responsibility for defence and foreign affairs. Point (1) was an 
important concern, given the Moroccan aspiration for the unity of Moroccan territory.
Why did the French decide on the Treaty’s revision? This decision was critical, since 
it could not but bring about certain changes in Morocco’s status even though the French 
were trying to minimise the effect of revision as much as possible. In fact, they felt the 
need to make concessions to Mohammed V, now the French interlocuteur valable, who 
had not abandoned the hope of its revision. The French were afraid that the Moroccans 
might abrogate the Treaty. Resident-General Latour noted on 31 October 1955: ‘Si le 
Sultan n’est pas contre cette abrogation, nous allons a une conference intemationale, 
elle amenera inevitablement la perte de notre protectorat’.3 In fact, on 3 November, 
Balafrej called for the Treaty’s abrogation and for an international conference to be 
convened.4 Furthermore, the concessions to Mohammed V were aimed at appeasing 
French settlers’ anxieties. As the US Consul General noted, while many French settlers 
felt extremely insecure as a result of the upsurge in nationalist demands, Mohammed V 
‘might successfully bring about [a] period of calm if he openly espouses program at 
least partially resembling that of [the] Istiqlal and the resistance.’5 In other words, it was 
observed that his restoration with a plan resembling total independence could alone 
calm the country, where there was a possibility of the outbreak of civil war especially 
after the armed rebellion. Thus the recognition of Morocco’s independence under 
Mohammed V’s control was deemed fundamental in containing the Istiqlal’s radical
2 DDF, 1955, II, no.342, Note du MAE, 31.10.1955.
3 He then developed a domino theory: in the case of the abrogation, ‘[IfAlgdrie alors ne pourra plus tenir, 
l’Afrique du Nord sera perdue, le reste de nos possessions d’outre-mer suivra’. Ibid., doc.339, Latour to 
Pinay, no.3707/3710,31.10.1955.
4 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.335.
5 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/11-355, Rabat to Dulles, no.191,3.11.1955.
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demands and appeasing French settlers. The French feared that Mohammed V could not 
establish his authority, without which Morocco’s political unity would be in peril. El- 
Glaoui had accepted Mohammed V’s restoration and Moroccan independence 
simultaneously, as such these two elements were considered to be complimentary. The 
problem was that independence was not precisely defined and had already been a 
somewhat unclear concept for French policy members. They were prepared to accept 
Morocco’s full independence only when the Istiqlal demanded the revision of the Treaty 
of Fez, and they accepted its full independence and the abrogation of the Treaty as the 
last hope of retaining influence.
On 31 October, Arafa announced his abdication, giving a legal legitimisation to the 
returning ruler. On the same day, the French government announced Mohammed V’s 
restoration.6 He arrived in Saint-Germain-en-Laye on the next day, where he started to 
hold numerous consultations with the nationalist leaders and leading French politicians. 
On 4 November 1955, the Quai d’Orsay argued that the French must find out:
si le Maroc 6voluera vers des structures ddmocratiques et s’unira k la France par 
des liens permanentes, les intdrets legitimes des Fran?ais du Maroc 6tant garantis, 
ou bien au contraire s’il se toumera vers l’Orient et, dans une ind£pendance acquise 
de grd ou de force, 6pousera les theses ideologiques et les institutions tr&s 
particulteres des pays de la Ligue arabe.7
In order not to make the Moroccans turn to the Arab League, Egypt in particular, the 
Quai maintained that the French programme must be based on two points: firstly, the 
modernisation and democratisation of Morocco, and secondly, the country’s permanent 
links with France. Thus in the broader context of international relations, the question 
was seen as the Moroccan people’s choice between France and the Arab world. The 
Quai also underlined that the constitution, which the French viewed should be granted 
by the Sultan rather than formulated by the people, would have to establish the basic 
principles of modem states, such as freedom of assembly, association and expression 
and the separation of powers. Likewise, the representation of French settlers in the 
future Moroccan national assembly was now considered unrealistic.
From 5 to 6 November, Prime Minister Faure and Mohammed V held talks at La 
Celle-Saint-Cloud near Paris. A joint communique was issued, confirming that the latter 
would form a government which would negotiate with France with a view to leading 
Morocco ‘au statut d’dtat ind6pendant uni k la France par les liens permanents d’une
6 Le Monde, 1.11.1955.
7 DDF, 1955, II, doc.346, Note du MAE, 4.11.1955.
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interddpendance librement consentie et ddfinie’.8 Importantly, this declaration failed to 
mention whether the protectorate treaty should be terminated or not, as opposed to the 
IstiqlaPs request. Nevertheless, the reference to ‘statut d’dtat inddpendant’ reflected 
French concessions, whereas the 31 October 1955 note had expected to preserve their 
prerogative in defence and foreign relations. In other words, the Sultan succeeded in 
getting the French to agree to the word ‘independant’ in return for his acceptance of the 
French presence in Morocco. Needless to say, however, the details of ‘inddpendance’ 
and ‘interddpendance’9 had yet to be defined, so both sides hoped that there remained 
room for manoeuvre.
Why did Mohammed V prefer to collaborate with the French? A French official, who 
had conversations with him on 7 November, noted that Mohammed V was fully aware 
of the serious divisions in Moroccan opinion that existed among the Liberation Army, 
the nationalists, the traditionalists and French settlers:
Alors que l’lstiqlal, presse par les exigences de ses exiles impatients, durcit ses 
positions... que les pachas, cai’ds... et autre « traditionalistes »... manifestent leurs 
ddsarrois devant l’effondrement d’une feodalite sapee par un puissant mouvement 
de masses, Sa Majestd Sidi Mohammed ben Youssef... est indiscutablement en 
quete, tant dans les milieux fran5ais que marocains, d’hommes susceptibles de 
l’aider a concilier les tendances contradictoires. La France, qui alimentait jusqu’& 
ce jour les foyers de dissension en opposant les Marocains les uns aux autres, peut, 
dans son esprit, devenir l’aillde iddale pour dviter une veritable guerre civile.
This official recommended that the French government respond to his appeals and 
added: ‘II semble bien que la pire faute consisterait k appliquer a l’dchelle nationale le 
vieux principe des Affaires indigenes divide ut imperes\ 10 Mohammed V himself 
needed the French presence in order to avoid a civil war. Perhaps he was intent on 
recapturing the initiative from the Istiqlal, especially its radical group, whose stands 
would certainly alienate French settlers and the traditionalists. However, the declaration 
at La Celle-Saint-Cloud did not satisfy el-Fassi. He proclaimed on 8 November: ‘le 
communique de Saint-Germain est inacceptable par le peuple marocain.’11 He was 
trying to convince the Sultan to accept the abrogation of the protectorate treaty.
On 11 November 1955, Andrd-Louis Dubois, who had replaced Latour as the 
Resident-General, arrived at Rabat.12 Mohammed V subsequently arrived in Morocco
8 Ibid., doc.369, p.817, footnote 4.
9 Hereafter I will use a term ‘close link’ as a translation of ‘interddpendance’.
10 Ibid., doc.353, Note de la Direction gdndrale des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 9.11.1955.
11 Le Monde, 9.11.1955.
12 DDF, 1955, II, doc.366, p.812, footnote 2.
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and returned to the throne, and on 18 November, made an important declaration. After 
reporting that both countries would enter into negotiations, he stated:
Au terme des negotiations le regime de protectorat prendra fin... [Mais] 
l’independance... n’excluent pas entre les Nations... une union toujours plus solide 
et une cooperation de plus en plus etroite. Les rapports avec la France ne sont pas 
incompatibles avec le maintien des liens... avec les autres peuples arabes’.
He also referred to the future Moroccan government’s objectives; the management of
public affairs, the creation of democratic institutions under constitutional monarchy,
following free elections. On the same day, he received letters from President Coty and
1 ^Eisenhower welcoming his return.
Meanwhile, the Sultan’s return had provoked opposition from Madrid. The Spaniards 
were not indifferent to the development in the French zone, because his return was 
bound to increase the prospect of Morocco’s independence and unity, or, from the 
Spanish view, the absorption of their zone into that of the French. Actually, the French 
later pointed out:
il n’y a pas eu, au cours de ces demieres ann6es, une politique espagnole 
constructive a l’egard du Maroc... [E]lle supputait que nous serions suffisamment 
affaiblis et d6courag6s pour etre contraints de rechercher son appui au prix de 
concessions notables.14
The Sultan and nationalists, on their part, tried not to miss the chance for Moroccan 
unity. This was because, they realised, unity would be less achievable once either zone 
gained separate independence. They believed that maintaining contact with the 
Spaniards would offer a better prospect of unity in the course of the forthcoming 
independence process.
As early as 27 October 1955, two days after el-Glaoui’s turnaround, Guy Le Roy de 
La Toumelle, the French Ambassador in Madrid, had reported to Paris that Spain 
opposed Morocco’s independence on the ground that the Moroccan social structure was 
so fragile that the communists would find suitable hotbeds of discontent to develop.15 
Then the US tried to persuade the Spaniards not to obstruct French efforts to resolve the 
problem when Dulles visited Madrid to meet Franco on 1 November.16 The State
13 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.92, Situation politique au Maroc (novembre 1955).
14 DDF, 1956,1, doc.3 Annexe, La Toumelle to Dubois, no.342, 31.12.1955. Spanish attitudes could be 
grounded on another motivation. They admitted to the Americans that General Franco could not order a 
retreat, because ‘the present regime... has frequently criticised the Monarchy for having thrown away the 
Spanish empire’. NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/1-1356, Madrid to the State Department, no.730, 13.1.1956.
DDF, 1955, II, doc.335, La Toumelle to Pinay, no.503/504,27.10.1955.
16 MAE, Afrique Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, doc.21, La Toumelle to Pinay, no.2134/EU, 17.11.1955.
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Department considered that the Spanish could be helpful in the independence process, 
as being on good terms with moderate Moroccan nationalists would avoid ‘throwing 
[nationalist] movement into Pan Arab extremist hands’, which would ultimately favour 
the Soviets.17 However, Dulles’s demarche did not seem to affect Spanish attitudes 
significantly. On 2 November, Jose de Casa Rojas y Moreno told the French that the 
Spanish should participate in the discussion of the question.18 Likewise, he directly 
expressed their desire when he met Mohammed V in Saint-Germain-en-Laye on 11 
November. After reminding the latter that the Spanish government had refused to 
recognise Arafa as a legitimate Sultan, he tried to obtain Mohammed V’s agreement that 
no decision concerning Morocco’s new status would be taken without consulting Spain. 
In reply, Sidi Mohammed expressed his hopes that a formula would be found which 
would take into account Spain’s legitimate interests. Afterwards, he asked a French 
official ‘si le gouvemement fran9ais ne pourrait trouver une formule, destin£e k apaiser 
1’amour-propre espagnol, qui permit d’associer PEspagne a la phase finale des 
negociations’, although he stressed that his pro-French position had not changed at all.19
The French remained opposed to an international conference, but nevertheless they 
considered it useful to exchange views with Madrid. On 24 November 1955, Pinay 
instructed La Toumelle to submit a note to Martin Artajo, the Spanish Foreign Minister, 
stating that Paris was prepared to enter into conversations with the Spanish but that 
during that period both sides should not approach the Moroccans. In reply, Artajo 
promised that his government would examine the French offer.20
In Morocco, contrary to French expectations, the Sultan’s return did not end bloody 
incidents.21 This clearly showed that his restoration, together with the vague French 
promise of Moroccan independence did not satisfy the Moroccan people; rather, there 
were opposition forces that were still challenging his authority. A number of dignitaries 
were lynched in major cities including Rabat on 19 November 1955 and there were tax 
strikes in the Fez region in the name of independence.22 The Sultan appealed for calm 
without, however, condemning terrorist activities or the Rif dissidence.23 On 21 
November, the Istiqlal’s executive committee, which met in Madrid, announced its
17 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/10-2955, Hoover to Geneva, no.34,29.10.1955.
18 DDF, 1955, II, doc.344, Note d’audience du Secretaire d’Etat aux Affaires 6trang6res, 3.11.1955.
19 Ibid., doc.359, Note du Departement, 11.11.1955.
20 Ibid., doc.367, Pinay to La Toumelle, no.951/955, 16.11.1955; doc.388, La Toumelle to Pinay, 
no.622/626,24.11.1955.
21 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.301.
22 Ibid., p.302.
23 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
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approval of the Sultan’s grandes lignes of 18 November, but made it plain that it would 
not participate in the provisional government unless the forthcoming negotiations were 
intended to accomplish independence through the abolition of the Treaty of Fez.24 Thus 
the most influential nationalist party pushed the French and the Sultan to clarify that the 
purpose of negotiations would be the termination of the Treaty and Morocco’s 
protectorate status themselves.
This situation was perhaps very influential in the French decision on Morocco’s total 
independence. From this time on, the French government became less hesitant to grant a 
right to foreign affairs and defence to the Moroccans. In fact, on 17 November 1955, 
Pinay had sent a message to the embassy in Madrid: ‘Cela ne veut pas dire que 
disparaitraient certaines dispositions fondamentales du traite de Fes, notamment en ce 
qui conceme le maintien integral des responsabilites qui ont 6t6 confines k la France en 
matiere de Defense et d’Affaires etrangeres.’25 However, the French, fully aware of the 
necessity of securing the Istiqlal’s membership in the Moroccan government, would 
soon agree to give independence including responsibilities for defence and foreign 
affairs.
On 22 November, the Sultan gave up an idea of forming a government with Ben 
Slimane as the head, who had offered resignation because of the Istiqlal’s opposition.26 
Thus the Sultan started sounding out principal political organisations on nominating a 
new prime minister,27 and designated Bekkai as Prime Minister on 26 November. 
Although he did not immediately accept it, Bekkai’s nomination implied that the new 
government would be formed with the purpose of something more than the Aix-les- 
Bains agreement in accordance with the Istiqlal’s increased demands. In addition, the 
following day Faure made a significant declaration with regard to the French Union:
Nous aurions 6t6 obliges... de renoncer k toute notre oeuvre si nous nous etions 
accroches au syst&me colonial... [L]’Union Fran5aise peut se faire sous une forme 
feddrale ou confederate et de ne plus etre victime des memes lacunes qu’en 
Indochine.28
These developments in turn moderated the Istiqlal’s attitude towards the new 
government, although in Paris, the Faure Government fell on 29 November 1955
24 Le Monde, 23.11.1955.
25 DDF, 1955, II, doc.369, Pinay to La Toumelle, no.958/963,17.11.1955.
26 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.302.
27 Le Monde, 24.11.1955.
28 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
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because of the Algeria problem.29 The party announced its acceptance of participation in 
the Bekkai Government in principle, ‘mais a la condition de voir confier a ses 
mandataires des postes en rapport avec son importance’.30 Thus compromise was 
achieved on Morocco’s independence including responsibility for foreign relations and 
defence, between the French and the Moroccans on the one hand, and between all major 
elements in Morocco on the other.
On 30 November, Dubois reported to Paris that Bekkai had agreed to form a 
government which consisted exclusively of Moroccan ministers, attributing nine 
ministers to the Istiqlal, six to the PDI and five to others. In reply, Pinay instructed 
Dubois to notify the Moroccans that he would consent on condition that ‘les directeurs 
fran9 ais devraient etre associes, sous une forme a determiner, par exemple au sein de 
comites interministeriels, a l’61aboration des decisions du Conseil des ministres dans les 
domaines techniques’. 31 This suggested that the French had already decided on 
Morocco’s independence by this time. Moreover, on 30 November, Dubois obtained 
from Bekkai a written assurance that the Treaty of Fez would remain the legal basis of 
Franco-Moroccan relations until the conclusion of the forthcoming negotiations. This 
meant: ‘les competences r^servees au Resident general aux termes de ce traite... 
restaient entieres; les pouvoirs des ministres marocains seraient en consequence precises 
d’un commun accord entre le gouvemement marocain et la Residence.’32 The French 
expected that his assurance would allow them to maintain the initiative in the 
forthcoming dialogue. Moreover, as will be shown, this assurance gave the French a 
legal basis on which they were able to negotiate with the Americans on the US military 
bases in Morocco.
On the other hand, in the party congress held from 1 to 4 December 1955, the Istiqlal 
unanimously adopted a motion, which demanded that future negotiations be conducted 
on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty of the two countries. In particular, the 
motion insisted that close links between the two countries be defined only after 
Morocco’s independence. Hence a crucial difference existed between the position of 
Bekkai and the Istiqlal: the former admitted the legal validity of the protectorate treaty 
until the conclusion of Franco-Moroccan agreement whereas the latter argued that both
29 Jean-Pierre Rioux, The Fourth Republic, 1944-1958, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
p.252. The French National Assembly was dissolved on 2 December 1955.
0 French governmental sources do not indicate the date of the party’s acceptance, but it was probably on 
28 November 1955. Le Monde, 29.11.1955; MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.92, Situation politique 
(novembre 1955).
31 DDF, 1955, II, doc.404, Pinay to Dubois, no.2094/2100,2.12.1955.
32 Ibid., doc.399, p.886 footnote 1.
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countries should negotiate on an equal legal status. The party also reaffirmed that 
independence must provide a right to conduct diplomacy and to form a national army. 
In addition, the nationalist party requested that local administration be based on the 
principle of the separation of powers and that the pashas and caids henceforward should 
only exercise administrative power. However, despite the Istiqlal’s firm position, 
Dubois observed that its members were divided and that it was only under el-Fassi’s 
leadership that the radical elements were gaining force.33 In fact, Balafrej told Holmes 
that his position was ‘assez dtrange du Chef de PlstiqlaP.34 Finally, the motion 
underlined that an independent Morocco would assure French settlers of their rights and 
interests.
The prospect of Moroccan independence had made the American bases emerge as an 
important issue in Franco-American relations. On 9 November 1955, the Quai had 
pointed to the necessity of reaching agreement on the ceiling on the number and status 
of American troops, which had not been clearly defined in the Franco-American accord 
in 1950. The French argued:
l’article 2 du Traits de Protectorat dormant au Gouvemement franfais des 
pouvoirs suffisants dans le domaine militaire, l’dtablissement des Forces 
amdricaines au Maroc a dte autorisd sans intervention des autoritds chdrifiennes. II 
est indispensable, afin de conserver l’intdgralitd de nos pouvoirs militaire au 
Maroc, d’dviter que le Gouvemement Chdriflen ne soit parti aux accords franco- 
americains sur les Forces americaines stationndes au Maroc.35
The French felt it urgent to reach agreement on these issues, otherwise an independent 
Morocco and the US could achieve an arrangement without France. As long as the 
protectorate treaty was valid, in accordance with Bekkai” s assurance in November 1955, 
French-US base negotiations were legal. The Quai suggested on 6 December that the 
ceiling on American servicemen authorised in Morocco be raised in accordance with 
US assertions on the ground that a certain level of provision was essential to NATO 
nuclear strategy. In return, the French hoped to obtain US support in the negotiations 
with the Moroccans, particularly relating to foreign relations (i.e. in the UN and 
relations with Spain).36
Perhaps the French considered ensuring US access to Moroccan bases as an effective 
way to attract US attention to North African affairs. One week later, the Quai underlined
33 Ibid., doc.408, Dubois to Pinay, no.4167/4177,6.12.1955.
34 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.162, De Blesson to Pinay, 12.12.1955.
35 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pinay, vol.28, Note pour le Secretaire d’Etat, no.1508,9.11.1955.
36 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.162, Conversations avec M Dulles au sujet de l’Afrique du Nord,
6.12.1955.
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that Faure should explain to Dulles that France was treating the Moroccan problem in 
the most liberal spirit. Then they argued that Morocco, like the rest of North Africa, 
should remain in the Western community and emphasised that France must be the only 
Western country to deal with Morocco.37 In Franco-American talks held in Paris on 17 
December 1955, Dulles asked Pinay to accept the increase in the number of American 
servicemen in the bases. The latter replied: ‘si les effectifs americains s’accroissent dans 
des proportions importantes, les Marocains auront 1’impression que les Etat-Unis se 
substituent a la France en ce qui conceme la sdcurite exterieure du Maroc’. Yet he 
promised to examine the American demands.38 Franco-American talks on this subject 
would be resumed after Morocco’s independence, perhaps because there was no time 
for agreement beforehand.39
On 7 December 1955, Bekkai formed a Moroccan government, with the Istiqlal’s 
participation. The following day, the Resident-General submitted to him an official note 
which reminded the Moroccan government of the agreement that the Treaty of Fez 
would remain the legal basis for the forthcoming Franco-Moroccan negotiations. On 17 
December, thirteen governors of provinces, called oumal, were appointed to supervise 
the management of local affairs by pashas and caids.40 Thus at local level, the new 
Moroccan administration was being set up. Two days later, Bekkai* put forward to 
Dubois an official response to affirm the French request of 8 December, that is, the 
Istiqlal had already made concessions by admitting the validity of the protectorate treaty 
during the negotiation process. In this note, Bekkai* also demanded that the legislative 
power and the management of public affairs, including internal security and foreign 
relations, be transferred to the Moroccan government. Dubois commented that the 
Moroccan note ‘n’impliquait pas de divergences essentielles avec la note fran9 aise’.41 
However, this was not necessarily the case. It was certain that France had already 
agreed on Morocco’s right to external affairs and defence in principle but, with regard 
to internal security, they were not intent on transferring responsibility to the Moroccans 
immediately. In fact, earlier in December 1955, the Quai d’Orsay believed that the 
Sultan’s concern about the Rif situation might provide an excuse for the French to 
curtail negotiations on the ground that the Moroccan people were incapable of 
maintaining order, and that the Sultan realised that collaboration with the French on this
37 Ibid., Note pour le President, 13.12.1955.
38 Ibid., Conversations Franco-Amdricaines, 17.12.1955.
39 Olivier Pottier, ‘Les bases amdricaines au Maroc au temps de la guerre froide (1950-1963): un face k 
face Franco-Amdricain’, Revue d ’Histoire Diplomatique, 2003, n° 1.
40 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.308.
41 DDF, 1955, II, doc.436, Dubois to Pinay, no.ll32/CC, 21.12.1955.
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matter might have a favorable result in view of the Fellaghas’ case in Tunisia in the 
previous year.42 It was natural to assume that the French expected the Moroccans to 
allow them to retain most of the responsibility for this matter.
On the other hand, the Istiqlal approached the Spanish, because a firm opposition to 
Moroccan greater autonomy had been announced by General Franco on 30 November 
1955:
ce serait une erreur de croire que les Marocains laiss6s a eux-memes seraient 
capables de maintenir l’ordre chez eux... [L]a France commet ‘de graves erreurs’ 
en essayant d’introduire des m6thodes democratiques au Maroc 43
However, it was expected that the Spanish attitude would soften as a result of a series of 
assurances by both the French and Moroccans 44 Balafrej stayed in Madrid from 11 to 
14 December to talk with Artajo. The former stated that the nationalists ‘expected the 
Spanish Government to grant concessions equal to those which were obtained from the 
French and commensurate with the new status of an independent and unified Moroccan 
state’ 45 The Spanish reactions turned out to be contradictory. On 15 December, General 
Franco reiterated condemnation of the introduction of democracy in French Morocco, 
but General Garcia-Valiflo, the Spanish High-Commissioner at Tetuan, simultaneously 
publicised his support for Spanish Morocco’s autonomy. These contradictory reactions 
perplexed the French,46 but overall, they speculated that this could be a sign of Spanish 
moderation 47
The Moroccans wanted to open Franco-Moroccan talks on the treaty revision 
immediately. The sovereign was desperate to establish his authority by obtaining 
independence, because of his particular concern about rebel activities in the Rif area.48 
On 21 December 1955, he informed Dubois of his intention to write to Coty, expressing 
his hope to start negotiations ‘a une date rapprochee’. The French shared this hope. 
Dubois replied that the negotiations should be opened at the earliest date after the 
general election in France, which had been fixed for 2 January 1956, but that 
preparatory work could start in Rabat in the first half of January 1956. On 22 December,
42 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/12-955, Dillon to Dulles, no.2775, 9.12.1955. See also Chapter 5, 
Section 4.
43 MAE, Maroc 1950-1955, vol.92, Situation politique (novembre 1955).
44 DDF, 1955, II, doc.406, La Toumelle to Pinay, no.639/646,4.12.1955.
45NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/12-1555, Madrid to the State Department, no.597,15.12.1955.
46 Le Monde, 17.12.1955
47 MAE, Afrique Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, vol.21, Madrid to Paris, no.2305/EU, 21.12.1955.
48 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/12-955, Dillon to Dulles, no.2775,9.12.1955.
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the Moroccans were notified that the negotiations could commence in mid-February 
1956.49
7.2 The Franco-Moroccan protocol of 2 March 1956
At the end of December 1955, the Spaniards also took action for political reform. On 
28 December 1955, the Spanish ambassador Rojas notified Massigli that they wanted to 
have Franco-Spanish talks in January 1956.50 Accordingly, Dubois and Valifio held 
talks in Palafito in Spanish Morocco on 10 January, when the former expressed his hope 
of maintaining contacts between officials and of establishing a liaison between the 
military of the two countries concerning the Rif rebellion. Valifio promised to co­
operate with the French. As for the Spanish shift of attitude, the British speculated: ‘the 
Spanish were at first benevolently neutral towards the Riff [sic] rebels but have lately 
come to realise that they represent a potential threat to Spanish authority as well as an 
actual danger to the French.’51 Valifio pointed out that Moroccan nationalists in the 
Spanish zone were suspicious of French intentions and added:
il avait la grande peine & contenir certains Elements de sa zone et k  entraver... le 
soutien que ces £l£ments tentaient d’apporter k  la rebellion dans le Rif. Le centre 
du mouvement est... Allal el-Fassi.
Valifio added that the Spanish authorities were intent on introducing, in their own zone, 
a phased reform similar to that in the French zone.52 On 13 January, the Spanish 
government declared that it ‘prevoyait « l’autogouvemement» de la zone espagnole en 
accord avec le Khalifa ainsi qu’avec la collaboration des autoritds marocaines’.53
Spain’s intention to follow the French reforms without mentioning unity aroused 
apprehensions on the part of Mohammed V and Bekkai. When Dubois reported the 
result of the talks, they were afraid that the existence of two governments could result in 
a de facto territorial division. Moreover, there was a possibility that the government in 
the Spanish zone would fall under el-Fassi’s influence, which would enhance his 
prestige in Morocco as a whole, ultimately obstructing future Franco-Moroccan 
negotiations.54 Knowing of the Moroccan worries, Pinay instructed Dubois to tell the
49 DDF, 1955, II, doc.438, Dubois to Pinay, no.4365/4368, 22.12.1955. Dubois noted that the Sultan was 
willing to open negotiations as early as the first week of January 1956.
50 Ibid., doc.445, MAE to La Toumelle, no.1066/1075,28.12.1955.
51 PRO, F0371/119348, JF1015/10, FO Minute by Watson, 10.1.1956
52 DDF, 1956,1, doc. 14, Dubois to Pinay, no.80/98,11.1.1956.
53 Ibid., doc. 16, p.32, footnote 1.
54 Ibid., doc. 16, Dubois to Pinay, no. 106/118,12.1.1956.
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Spanish about the problem caused by their policies. The French concern was to ‘6viter 
de donner au Sultan 1’impression de la constitution contre les interets marocains d’un 
front franco-espagnol’.55 Thus the French and Moroccans were in agreement in avoiding 
the consolidation of Morocco’s de facto territorial division. On 17 January 1956, the 
French put forward a note to Madrid, confirming their opposition to a separate 
government: ‘le gouvemement fran5ais serait heureux de pouvoir confirmer a Sa 
Majeste chdrifienne... que le gouvemement espagnole... n’a pas l’intention de doter 
celle-ci [la zone espagnole] d’une organisation gouvemementale qui serait incompatible 
avec l’unite du Maroc.’56 
In mid-January 1956, in conjunction with the turmoil growing in Algeria, disorder 
was persisting in Morocco and threatening the security situation. Firstly, the Rif 
rebellion continued. Dubois noted that ‘des agitateurs se rdclamant d’Allal el-Fassi, seul 
champion... de la v6ritable liberation nationale’ adversely affected Moroccan soldiers’ 
morale. El-Fassi’s activities were a heavy blow to Mohammed V’s prestige, allowing 
soldiers to embrace an idea that the former was a true champion of national liberation. 
As a countermove, the sovereign once again urged the French to open negotiations.57 
Secondly, terrorist activities frequently occurred near Oujda and the border with Algeria. 
The Sultan’s communique calling for calm did not have a great effect. For the purpose 
of maintaining order more effectively, on 18 January Pinay approved Dubois’s 
suggestion ‘tendant a restituer aux pachas et cai’ds l’exercice des pouvoirs de police’.58 
This was a concession in the sense that the French agreed to devolve responsibility for 
the maintenance of order to the Moroccans, but was simultaneously a refusal of the 
Istiqlal’s demand to weaken the dignitaries’ power. As Dubois put it to Holmes, the 
result of this measure was satisfactory in large cities but less so in the countryside where 
terrorism lasted. Holmes wrote to Washington that in Dubois’s mind ‘[the] [m]atter 
apparently... seemed to be whether Sultan or El Fassi would prevail.’59 
Dubois noted that except for the principal cities, ‘le reste du pays demeure soumis a 
un climat d’incertitude favorable k la reprise ou a la continuation de l’agitation’. 
According to him, leading Moroccan figures, including the Sultan, thought that 
independence must be a fait accompli by the time negotiations were opened. Obviously 
this thought reflected the Istiqlal’s position adopted at the beginning of December 1955.
55 Ibid., doc. 16, p.32, footnote 1.
56 Ibid., doc.26, Pinay to Dubois, no.128/130,17.1.1956.
57 Ibid., doc.25, Dubois to Pinay, no.135/144, 16.1.1956.
58 Ibid., doc.33, Dubois to Pinay, no.167/175,18.1.1956.
59 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/1-2756, Holmes to Dulles, no.275,27.1.1956.
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He warned Pinay that now the sovereign also wanted to abrogate the Treaty of Fez 
expressly, gagner de vitesse... dans les ambitions de l’lstiqlal.’60 Undoubtedly, that 
the Moroccan government and the Sultan were under strong Istiqlal pressure.61 The 
Sultan went so far as to declare to the press that he did not intend to appeal to the Rif 
rebels to lay down arms ‘until the French have proved their good faith.’62 This remark 
was aimed at negotiating a call for surrender with the transfer of responsibility for 
internal security to the Moroccan government.
On 30 January 1956, French officials in Morocco and in Algeria met to exchange 
views on the general situation. It was pointed out that in the two territories
une meme offensive est... engagee qui vise a faire 6chec au dessein de la France 
de maintenir avec le Maghreb... des liens dtroits d’interddpendance... Tout se passe 
comme si cette action... ne devait... trouver son terme qu’une fois atteinte, sur les 
bordes de l’Atlantique, la limite occidentale de ce « troisfeme bloc » dont revent 
depuis longtemps certains leaders du monde musulman. Encouragee de diverses 
manidres par Moscou, cette ambition semble avoir trouve, tout au moins 
temporairement, certaines complicity du cote espagnol.
The term ‘certains leaders du monde musulman’ was especially meant to be Nasser. The 
French were aware that Egypt was trying to undermine their presence in North Africa 
by encouraging the nationalists in both territories to follow his own neutralist stance, 
with the aim of severing close links with France. Moreover, the French were convinced, 
not without foundation, that some North African activists were being trained in Egypt.64 
Regarding Morocco, the meeting argued:
Quant au Palais et au gouvemement... [l]es succds que nous les aiderons k  
remporter aux yeux de l’opinion publique seront determinants. Ils pourraient les 
aider k  avoir, le moment venu, le courage d’affirmer non pas leur rupture avec le 
monde arabe, mais au moins leur volonte de choisir, en toute inddpendance vis-a- 
vis du Caire, la voie mediane que nous souhaitons leur voir prendre.
French officials regarded it as essential to impress Moroccan opinion that the Sultan and 
the Moroccan government had succeeded, thereby helping them to appease the
60 DDF, 1956,1, doc.49, Dubois Pinay, no.266/274,28.1.1956.
61 Ibid., doc.45, Dubois to Pinay, no.247/256,26.1.1956.
62 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771A.00/1-2356, Rabat to Dulles, no.269, 23.1.1956.
63 DDF, 1956,1, doc.58, Dubois to Pinay, 30.1.1956.
64 PRO, F0371/119367, JF1022/2, Paris to African Department, FO, no. 10723/28/56, 18.2.1956. The 
French had sent a message to the Anglo-Saxons, arguing that the increase of Egypt’s prestige in the 
Middle East was dangerous to French interests in North Africa. DDF, 1956, I, doc.22, Annexe Aide- 
memoire, Paris, 13.1.1956.
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opposition inside Morocco and to take a middle way independent from Egypt.65 There 
was no doubt that it would also contribute to the failure of the Egyptian plan to weaken 
the French presence in North Africa through el-Fassi and other pro-Egyptian 
nationalists.
As a result of the general election on 2 January 1956, Guy Mollet, the SFIO leader, 
formed a new government on 31 January. Christian Pineau was appointed as the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs and Alain Savary as the Minister for Moroccan and 
Tunisian Affairs. Now being in a position to start negotiations with the Moroccans, the 
French government was confident that a parliamentary majority existed for a far- 
reaching settlement, as Savary put it to Dillon.66 Subsequently, on 11 February, Franco- 
Moroccan agreement was concluded over the transfer of power for internal autonomy to 
the Moroccan government so that it became the ‘gouvemement de gestion et de 
negotiation’ envisaged in the declaration at La Celle-Saint-Cloud.67
On 15 February 1956, as the French had planned in December 1955, Franco- 
Moroccan negotiations commenced. The participants were; Pineau, Savary, Dubois, and 
Massigli from France and Si Bekkai, Si M’Hammedi, Si Bouabid and Si Cherkaoui 
from Morocco.68 A memorandum dated 18 February69 categorised the issues into four 
principal points; (1) the legal situation, (2) independence, (3) close links, (4) others. 
Concerning (1), this memorandum reconfirmed that, despite the Istiqlal’s insistence to 
the contrary, the Treaty of Fez remained valid at that moment and that therefore the two 
countries did not have equal status. Regarding (2), the French intention was clear:
il semble bien que l’inddpendance du Maroc doive etre consue comme une 
autonomie interne et exteme complete, sans restriction ni etapes’... [T]ous les 
attributs apparents de celle-ci (armde, diplomatic) doivent etre donnds en vue 
d’dviter... que les nationalistes, partisans de l’Occident, qui sont actuellement au 
pouvoir, ne soient rapidement depassds par les fanatiques de l’iddal panarabe...
Si la solution que nous preconisons ne comporte pas tous les attributs apparents 
de l’independance, elle aura peu de chances d’etre acceptde.
65 The US embassy in Cairo held a similar view: ‘[the] government o f Egypt[’s] objective in North Africa 
is full independence [of Tunisia and Morocco] followed by adherence [of the] states to [the] Arab League 
and close coordination [of] their foreign policy with those of Egypt.’ NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.002-756, 
Cairo to Dulles, no. 1526,7.2.1956.
66 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/2-1056, Dillon to Dulles, no.3594,10.2.1956.
67 Ibid., doc.95, Dubois to Savary, no.418/424,12.2.1956. See also this chapter, pp.178-179.
68 Si M’Hammedi, Si Bouabid and Si Cherkaoui were Moroccan Ministers of State.
69 Ibid., doc. 110, Note de la Direction gdndral des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes. 18.2.1956.
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‘Close links’ comprised economic links, technical assistance, solidarity as regards 
defence and diplomacy, and the community of the two peoples.70 As to defence, it was 
insisted that the maintenance of the French army in Morocco was indispensable, but that 
its presence must be based on new justifications. Interestingly, it was also pointed out 
that US support, which the French considered necessary in negotiating with Morocco,
71would not be forthcoming if the close links appeared as a new form of protectorate.
However, in the course of the negotiations, as had been anticipated, the Moroccan 
negotiators were insistent that Morocco’s independence had to be proclaimed first and, 
on that presumption, they would negotiate on close links as representatives of a 
sovereign state. This was not acceptable to the French, because ‘[l]e Parlement 
n’acceptera pas l’ind£pendance du Maroc sans 1 ’interdependance’, as Pineau 
mentioned.72 Yet once again, the French made concessions. In fact, former Resident- 
General Latour had recommended to Savary on 19 February that ‘to forestall charges of 
bad faith’, at the outset of the negotiations the French should publicly announce their 
determination to abrogate the protectorate treaty and to grant Morocco independence, 
once special ties with France had been defined.73 The actual wording of the declaration 
appeared to reflect further concessions on the French part. The first stage of the Franco- 
Moroccan negotiations ended on 2 March 1956, when a joint declaration was issued that 
the French government confirmed its recognition of Moroccan independence including 
the foreign service and armed forces and that both parties declared the purpose of 
negotiations recently opened was to conclude new agreements which would define the 
two countries’ close links.74 In addition, it was agreed: ‘Le statu actuel de l’arm6e 
fran9aise au Maroc demeure inchange durant la periode transitoire.’75 In other words, 
the French agreed that they could devolve to the Moroccans certain powers relating to 
this issue only after the conclusion of a Franco-Moroccan agreement over internal 
security.
70 As for economic links, there was a division inside the French government regarding a Franco- 
Moroccan customs union. The supporters argued that it was the only compensation for French political 
concessions while the opponents objected that the Moroccans opposed this idea and that it would call into 
question the treaty of Algeciras, which would necessarily internationalise the problem.
MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pineau, vol.28, Note, Reflexions pr£liminaires sur le probl£me marocain.
2.1956. The French took the view that Moroccan independence could contribute to the improvement of 
their relations with Arab countries in general.
72 DDF, 1956, I, doc. 120, Procds-verbal Stance d’ouverture des negotiations franco-marocaines,
22.2.1956.
73 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/2-2156, Dillon to Dulles, no.3776,21.2.1956.
74 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.349.
75 L 'Annee Politique, 1956, p.202.
191
Logically, this declaration did not mark the end of Morocco’s protectorate status, 
although, in general, books and articles on the Moroccan decolonisation process finish 
their analyses at this date. Important issues such as defence, diplomacy, and a national 
army had yet to be settled in the course of the following negotiations, as what was 
obtained by the Moroccans in March 1956 did not have much substance. Massigli 
summarised the French intentions to the Americans: ‘in general what France had done 
was to follow the line which had been used successfully in the past by the British, 
namely, giving the Moroccans everything on paper and hoping to retain substantial 
influence in fact.’76
Even so, the psychological impact of this declaration on Moroccan opinion was 
dramatic. Several days after the declaration, the Quai referred to the reason for the 
concessions:
Depuis le mois de novembre, nous nous trouvons au Maroc dans une situation 
r6volutionnaire dominie par l’effacement des cadres traditionnels et la 
cristallisation brutale des aspirations nationales... Sans qu’elle s’etende, la rebellion 
du Rif ne se retracte pas. Dans le reste du Maroc et surtout dans le bled, les 
fonctionnaires locaux, fran5ais ou cheriflens, eprouvent des difflcultes de plus en 
plus ardues a maintenir leur autorit6. Le moral des troupes marocaines est 
profonddment atteint...
Pour couper court h cette entreprise de subversion, favorisde pour des raisons 
differentes par l’U.R.S.S., l’Egypte et PEspagne, il est apparu au gouvemement 
fran?ais que le seul moyen etait d’appuyer sans reserve le Sultan.77
Indeed, the 2 March declaration enabled the Sultan to receive enthusiastic support from 
the Moroccan people: ‘La signature de la declaration commune franco-marocaine... a 
6t6  accueillie par l’opinion marocaine avec le plus grand enthousiasme’.78
International opinion broadly welcomed the Franco-Moroccan declaration. On 6 
March 1956, the British Ambassador Jebb published a message in which he ‘salue les 
solutions « admirables et dignes d’une grande nation modeme » apportees par la France 
aux problemes tunisien et marocain’.79 The British remained supportive of the French 
position in North Africa in order to counter Nasser’s influence, as Prime Minister Eden 
reaffirmed to Mollet at a summit meeting held on 11 March.80 On 7 March, the 
Americans publicised two messages. One was addressed to Mollet, congratulating 
Morocco on its independence and expressing US support for close Franco-Moroccan
76 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/3-356, Dillon to Dulles, no.4004, 3.3.1956
77 DDF, 1956,1, doc. 159, Note de la Direction g£n6ral des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 10.3.1956.
78 Ibid., doc.139, Lalouette to Savary, no.582/589,4.3.1956.
79 Le Monde, 8.3.1956. Note that the equivalent Franco-Tunisian agreement had not been achieved at this 
point. This suggested the British attitude was very generous to France. Chapter 8, Section 4.
DDF, 1956,1, doc. 161, Compte rendu des conversations franco-britanniques aux Chequers. 11.3.1956.
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collaboration. The other was conveyed to the Sultan celebrating the recognition of 
independence.81 Thus some differences of attitudes remained between the British and 
the Americans, the former giving unconditional support to the French position and the 
latter putting more emphasis on friendly Franco-Moroccan relations. A more 
fundamental difference was the timing of recognition: the US recognised Morocco’s 
independence soon after the 2 March communique while the British did not.
7.3 Morocco’s independence
Upon his return to Rabat, Mohammed V made a triumphant speech on 7 March 1956:
La France a reconnu au Maroc son ind^pendance et le droit de jouir de tous les 
attributs de sa souverainetd. De meme qu’elle s’est engagde k garantir son 
integrity territoriale...
[N]ous exercerons notre devoir 16gislatif, sans restriction aucune, constituerons 
une arm£e nationale et assurerons notre representation diplomatique.82
Then he made an appeal to calm and order although, once again, he did not explicitly 
condemn the Rif dissidence.83
The French promise of Morocco’s independence prompted Madrid to open 
negotiations with the Moroccans. The following day, Rojas submitted a note to the 
French, mentioning: ‘PEspagne est prete a reconnaitre... I’ind6pendance, assortie d’une 
interddpendance, alors qu’on doit noter que la France n’a pas en r6alit6 encore rien 
accord6 au Maroc puisque l’independance est liee a 1’interdependance.’84 In mid-March 
1956, the Spanish government invited the Sultan to pay an official visit to Madrid. The 
latter wished to use the occasion to realise Morocco’s unity, but he knew that his 
acceptance would create a problem in Franco-Moroccan relations. Knowing his 
intentions, Savary notified Dubois, now the High-Commissioner in Rabat, that he was 
not opposed to the Sultan’s official visit, reminding him of the benefit that the French 
would get by faithfully applying the 2 March accords. Savary, however, considered that 
this visit must not appear to be undertaken without any consultation with the French, so
81 Ibid., 9.3.1956. Some US officials in Paris were afraid that this difference of position would put the US 
in an unfavourable position compared with the British in view of French public opinion, which was 
reportedly increasingly anti-American because of US failure to support France over the transfer o f French 
troops from NATO commitment in Germany to Algeria. NARA RG59 CDF, 751S.00/3-756, Paris to 
Dulles, no.4060, 7.3.1956. As for the state of French opinion, see DDEL, Papers as President o f the US, 
1952-1961 (Ann Whitman File), International Series Box 12, France 1956-1960 (6), Murphy to Hoover,
3.3.1956.
82 Le Monde, 9.3.1956.
83 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 194.
84 DDF, 1956,1, doc.156, Pineau to La Toumelle, no.225/227,9.3.1956.
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insisted that it should be made on his way to France or he must be accompanied by 
French advisors.85 On 17 March, the Moroccan Council of Ministers announced the 
Sultan’s acceptance of the Spanish invitation. Three days later, Dubois reported to 
Savary that the sovereign preferred to be accompanied by French advisors.86
The 2 March communique significantly moderated radical nationalist attitudes. On 13 
March 1956, el-Fassi affirmed his conviction that the Sultan’s appeal would be 
understood in the Rif,87 that is, el-Fassi was becoming loyal to the Moroccan regime 
under Mohammed V’s authority. Thus the 2 March declaration was producing results 
which had been expected in Paris and Rabat. He publicised his position on the following 
day: (1) Morocco would be admitted to the UN before the end of 1956; (2) Morocco 
would join the Arab League; (3) Morocco did not recognise the accords on the 
American bases; (4) Tangier would be attached shortly to a united Morocco.88 On 15 
March, Balafrej stated to a journalist of the A.F.P.: ‘J’ai le sentiment que dans une 
semaine environ les combats du Rif pourraient s’arreter...’ Le Monde also reported that 
the Moroccan political milieux in Tangier had established contact in recent days with 
Liberation Army leaders.89 Dubois observed: ‘Si... l’ordre est suivi, ce sera... une 
consequence directe de l’acte de confiance qu’a reprdsente de la part de la France la 
declaration du 2 mars’.90 On 18 March, at a meeting of the Istiqlal in Tangier, el-Fassi 
made a speech, which, according to Dubois, ‘se posant d6sormais en homme d’Etat... 
apporte son aval aux resultats jusqu’ici obtenus’. Moreover, he was discreet concerning 
aid provided by the Arab world for Morocco’s liberation 91 Dubois noted on 20 March 
that favourable indications had reached him on the progress of appeasement in the 
troubled regions.92 However, it was unfortunate from the French viewpoint that el- 
Fassi’s moderation would be offset by the deteriorating Algerian situation, as will be 
shown below.
The second stage of the Franco-Moroccan negotiations started on 24 March 1956. 
Two days later, the Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs argued that its objective 
was to define the modalities of granting independence in the field of (1) military and
85 Ibid., doc.177, Savary to Dubois, no.605/606,16.3.1956.
86 Ibid., doc.191, Dubois to Savary, no.790/800,20.3.1956.
87 Le Monde, 14.3.1956.
88 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/3-1656, Holmes to Dulles, no.423,16.3.1956.
89 Le Monde, 17.3.1956.
90 DDF, 1956,1., doc. 175, Dubois to Savary, no.714/717,15.3.1956.
91 Ibid., doc. 187, Dubois to Savary, no.762/771,19.3.1956. His attitudes, though, would not henceforward
be in perfect conformity with the French line, for he started a campaign calling for the possession of
Western Sahara on 28 March 1956. L 'Annee Politique, 1956, p.194.
92 DDF, 1956,1., doc. 175, p.429, footnote 1.
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defence questions, (2) administrative and technical cooperation, (3) diplomacy, (4) 
cultural questions and (5) judicial questions.93 It was decided that each point should be 
discussed by the corresponding special committees that both parties appointed.94 
Concerning (1), they argued over how to hold strong influence in Moroccan defence in 
general and the constitution of the Moroccan army more specifically:
Le Maroc est incapable d’assurer seul sa defense. L’interdependance est pour lui 
une necessite. Cette interd6pendance doit reposer sur des responsabilit6s 
communes exercees solidairement en ce qui conceme la defense des territoires 
fran9 ais et marocaine... [Lj’armee fran5aise au Maroc n’aurait plus de 
responsabilites en matiere de sdcurite intdrieure.
Regarding diplomacy, they emphasised:
Les deux pays devraient s’engager a n’adherer k aucun groupement de puissances 
dont les objectifs seraient contraires aux interets de l’un ou de l’autre. De meme, ils 
n’adhereraient a aucun acte international incompatible avec les droits qu’ils se 
seraient accordes mutuellement...
They maintained that France should help the Moroccans organise their army, whose 
soldiers would be conscripted Moroccans and whose officers would be recruited from 
French and Moroccan officers. Regarding Morocco’s diplomacy, the French were 
willing to support the candidacy in international organisations like the UN but would 
not allow Morocco to join a pact hostile to France. Evidently, they were afraid of 
Morocco’s adherence to the Arab League and its closer relations with Egypt. Then as 
early as 27 March, the Franco-Moroccan commission in charge of the problem of the 
Moroccan army started examining the issue. The Moroccans wanted to constitute the 
Royal Army as a symbol when the Sultan departed for Spain, to which the French 
agreed.95
In the interim, the Spaniards and the Moroccans were preparing for the Sultan’s 
forthcoming visit to Madrid, both sides wishing to reach agreement before the 
conclusion of Franco-Moroccan dialogue. Madrid wanted a formula whereby it would 
be assured of the equal status France would enjoy, but that the Moroccans refused. On 
30 March 1956, Dubois noted that no agreement had been reached between the two 
countries regarding the scope of the Spanish-Moroccan declaration and that there was 
even a risk of postponing his visit. According to him, the Moroccans had rejected a 
Spanish proposal, which aimed to ensure the Spanish equal rights with the French.
93 Ibid., doc.202, Note de la Direction g6n6rale des Affaires marocaines et tunisiennes, 26.3.1956.
94 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 195.
95 Le Monde, 29.3.1956; DDF, 1956,1, doc.250, p.609, footnote 1.
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Instead, the Moroccans had submitted to the Spanish High-Commissioner a counter­
proposal to establish the independence and unity of Morocco and affirmed the 
Moroccan government’s intention to respect Spanish interests.96 In the final analysis, 
however, Madrid would soon make concessions.
Owing to el-Fassi’s change of attitude, the Rif situation was becoming calm. This 
was not, however, expected to bring about a truce with the French troops. In fact, the 
Rif rebels had ambushed French troops on 25 March, killing several soldiers.97 On 29 
March, the Liberation Army declared a provisional cease-fire and the following day, 
thirty leaders visited Rabat to pledge their loyalty to the Sultan.98 As el-Fassi declared 
on 2 April 1956, the Liberation Army consisted of two groups, Moroccan and Algerian, 
and it was only the first group who responded to the Sultan’s appeal. He added: ‘La 
demobilisation complete ne viendra qu’apres la conclusion des accords franco-marocain 
et hispano-marocain qui permettront effectivement au Maroc d’agir comme un Etat 
independant et souverain’.99 On 3 April, based on this development, the Moroccan 
government asked the French not to undertake military operations against the rebels.100
On 4 April 1956, the Sultan left for Madrid. He had a series of meetings with Franco, 
and a joint Spanish-Moroccan declaration was issued on 7 April, recognising Moroccan 
independence and unity. Yet again, the Moroccan people welcomed this declaration.101 
To French satisfaction, the content of the joint declaration remained principally the 
same as the Moroccan counter-proposal at the end of March 1956 and it was less 
restrictive than the Franco-Moroccan declaration on 2 March in the sense that the notion 
of ‘libre cooperation’ was used instead of that of ‘interdependance’.102 Later in April 
1956, Dubois informed Savary how, in the process of the conversations in Madrid, the 
Moroccans turned down Spanish demands:
Les Espagnols ont tout d’abord soutenu que la France n’avait pas accordd au 
Maroc une veritable inddpendance... Si Bekkai a frappe du poing sur la table, 
donnant« sa parole d’honneur d’officier franfais » que la France avait reellement 
accorde l’independance au Maroc...
La fermete du Sultan n’a pas seulement servi le Maroc, elle a dgalement... 
sauvegarde les intents de notre pays.103
96 DDF, 1956,1, doc.212, Dubois to Savary, no.965/970,30.3.1956.
97 Ibid., doc.207, Dubois to Savary, no.927/931,28.3.1956.
98 Le Monde, 30.3.1956,1/2.4.1956.
99 MAE, Afrique-Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, vol.25, Couve de Murville to Paris, no.2137,3.4.1956.
100 DDF, 1956,1, doc.215, Dubois to Savary, no.1013/1015,3.4.1956.
101 Ibid., doc.236, Dubois to Savary, no.l 101/1109,12.4.1956.
102 Ibid., doc.224, Dubois to Savary, no.1053/1059, 7.4.1956.
103 Ibid., doc.245, Dubois to Savary, despatch, no.643,14.4.1956.
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It appears that the result of the Spanish-Moroccan negotiations convinced the French of 
Mohammed V’s sincerity to collaborate with them. They were delighted to see the 
Moroccans determined to give less advantage to Spain than to France. Thus, the Spanish 
government finally agreed to Morocco’s independence and unification. The Moroccans, 
nevertheless, accepted a Spanish offer for assistance in one field; General Franco 
offered aid for the organisation of the Moroccan army during the period of transition. 
Realising how desperate the Moroccans were to constitute a national army, Dubois 
urged that it would be important to assist them in its establishment.104
On the other hand, the situation on the Algerian-Moroccan border remained troubled 
in the spring of 1956, since the Algerian group of the Liberation Army did not respond 
to the Sultan’s appeal.105 The intensification of the Algerian insurgency in March 
1956106 had made the Moroccan situation deteriorate through the penetration of 
Algerian militants into Moroccan territory. At the same time, increased pressure came 
from the Moroccans over the pace of the transfer of responsibility for public order. 
Moroccan ministers, including Bekkai, had talks with the French on 4 April to study the 
modalities of the transfer of power concerning internal security. Hence Dubois wrote to 
Paris: ‘on ne pouvait retarder davantage l’entrde en fonctions d’un directeur marocain 
de la S6curitd’.107 The Spanish decision on 9 April to devolve police power to the 
Moroccans added to their demands on the French.108 The French speculated that the 
Moroccan leaders’ attitude was hardening because they were now increasingly aware of 
the difficulties that they confronted due to the accelerated pace of the independence 
process. On 12 April, Dubois noted that, after having conversations with the chiefs of 
the rebels, Moroccan leaders came to understand ‘1’importance des liens qui unissaient 
au sein de l’Armee de liberation Algdriens et Marocains’, although in March 1956 they 
had insisted on the closure of Algerian-Moroccan border in order to prevent arms 
smuggling.109
On 12 April 1956, Savary sent a telegram to Dubois clarifying the conditions under 
which the French could accept the transfer of responsibility for public order. Firstly, the 
French authorities must reserve the possibility of using the army and the gendarmerie in
104 Ibid.
105 MAE, Afrique-Levant, Maroc 1953-1959, vol.25, Couve de Murville to Paris, no.2137,3.4.1956.
106 The Algerian situation worsened to such an extent that on 12 March the French National Assembly 
had voted Special Powers to the Mollet Government. Martin Thomas, The French North African Crisis, 
p.105.
7 DDF, 1956,1, doc.239, p.580, footnote 1.
108 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 199.
109 DDF, 1956,1, doc.236, Dubois to Savaiy, no.l 101/1109,12.4.1956.
197
order to protect the persons and the property of French and foreign nationals. Secondly, 
unless irregular armies were disarmed, the French forces had to deal with them and, in 
any case, would take the initiative to assure security along the Algerian border. Thirdly, 
public security should remain under French authority as long as the situation required its 
necessity, and also the domain of the DST (Direction de la surveillance du territoire).110 
This message suggested that the French government intended to retain significant 
responsibilities over this issue even after the conclusion of Franco-Moroccan 
negotiations.
The Sultan made an official statement on the Moroccan army on 16 April after his 
return from Spain:
le desir tres net du Sultan de disposer des la fete l’Aid Seghir, c’est-^-dire vers le 
12 mai, d’une force militaire d’environ 10,000 hommes. Cette force constituerait 
une premiere et importante etape dans la creation de l’armde marocaine.
Undoubtedly, the sovereign estimated that the army would enable him to remain the 
arbitrator of the situation and thereby to strengthen his authority. In fact, as well as the 
Rif rebels and the troubles in the Middle Atlas area, Moroccan insecurity was such that 
the PDI was openly speaking of the menace of an Istiqlal putsch.111 On 25 April, the 
Franco-Moroccan talks decided on the creation of a Moroccan army of nearly 15,000 
personnel.112
In contrast to the Moroccan army, Franco-Moroccan disagreement remained focussed 
on the transfer of security responsibilities. On 16 April 1956, Savary repeated his 
previous position in his instructions to Dubois but, three days later, the Moroccan 
government issued a declaration requesting the transfer of all necessaiy means for the 
maintenance of order to the Minister of Interior. On 20 April, when Roger Lalouette, 
Dubois’s deputy, talked with Bekkai, the latter confirmed, firstly, that the French would 
retain the right to intervene to protect French nationals and their property, and secondly 
that French troops would retain freedom of circulation for security reasons along the 
Algerian-Moroccan border. Nevertheless, he demanded that if the French wished to 
reserve their right on the second point, ‘nous [les fran?ais] examinons la possibility de le
110 Ibid., doc.239, Savary to Dubois, no.928/935, 12.4.1956. The gendarmerie was the military police 
force in the countryside. The DST was in charge o f border patrol, especially along the Algerian-Moroccan 
border.
111 Ibid., doc.250, Lalouette to Savary, no.1202/1205, 17.4.1956. There is no evidence in French sources 
that support the PDI’s insistence. However, the French were seriously concerned about the Istiqlal’s 
campaign for the re-drawing of the Algerian-Moroccan border, which started at the beginning of 1956. 
The French refused, as it could have constituted a dangerous precedent. Ibid., doc.228, Dubois to Savary, 
no.1064/1065,9.4.1956; doc.259, Lacoste to Savary, no.541/S/Sud/2,19.4.1956.
112 Ibid., doc.268, Savary to Dubois, no.1073/1076,25.4.1956.
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fondre dans les services charges d’assurer et de ne plus le faire apparaitre 
officiellement.’113 Thus the Moroccans accepted French responsibility for these two 
issues, but on condition that it did not stimulate Moroccan nationalist sentiment. The 
Moroccans asked the French for the transfer of power for DST on 25 April, but Savary 
notified Dubois on the following day that French responsibility for this area should be 
kept intact in the short term. He was adamant on this point, since ‘il ne vous echappera 
pas que le probleme de la DST n’intdresse pas uniquement le Maroc. Une concession 
faite dans ce domaine aurait des consequences immediates en Tunisie’.114
At the same time as the decision on the army, the Sultan decided to take over foreign 
affairs. It was observed that he intended to ‘combine presentation of the Moroccan 
Army and control of foreign affairs to impress public with fact that essential attributes 
of independence are being steadily acquired.’115 On 23 April, the Moroccan government 
decided to create the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and to appoint Balaffej as its minister. 
Dubois warned the Moroccans: ‘L’echange de missions diplomatiques entre le Maroc et 
les etats Strangers ne saurait intervenir qu’avec l’accord expres de Paris*.116 This 
development puzzled the Anglo-Saxons, who did not want to waste time before 
exchanging diplomatic missions with Morocco.117 For this reason, the British and US 
Ambassadors in Paris informally approached the French, but on 27 April the latter 
asked them not to appoint their diplomatic representatives until negotiations with the 
Tunisians and Moroccans on the modalities of conducting diplomatic relations were 
complete.118
On 28 April 1956, BekkaT reaffirmed that establishing diplomatic relations with other 
countries was compatible with the Moroccan acceptance of the French special position. 
He stated to a French official: ‘L’intention du Sultan dtait d’avoir le plus rapidement 
possible des reprdsentants diplomatiques en France et en Espagne puis - seulement 
aprds - en Egypte et aux Etats-Unis.’ The French noted: ‘« L ’impatience» des 
Marocains dtait encouragee par la surenchere espagnole, la hate de Washington et 
Londres de voir se regler rapidement la question’.119 Two days later, Savary wrote to
113 Ibid., doc.262, Lalouette to Savary, no.1272/1278,20.4.1956, and p.630, footnote 1.
114 Ibid., doc.274, Savary to Dubois, no.1086/1091, 26.4.1956. The issue of the DST was also pending in 
the ongoing Franco-Tunisian negotiations. Ibid., doc.493. Comptes rendus des negotiations franco- 
tunisienne.
115 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/4-2156, Rabat to Dulles, no.384, 21.4.1956.
116 DDF, 1956,1, doc.276, Savary to Dubois, no.1408/1412,27.4.1956.
1,7 NARA, RG59, CDF, 771.00/4-256, Dulles to Tangier, no.506,2.4.1956.
118PRO, F0371/119368, JF1023/22, Tunis to FO, 24.4.1956; F0371/119368, JF1023/22(A), Minute, 
(Diplomatic Relations with Tunisia and Morocco], 27.4.1956.
" 9 DDF, 1956,1, doc.283, p.682, footnote 1.
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Dubois that French government would welcome Balafrej to Paris and discuss the 
problem over Morocco’s foreign relations. He instructed Dubois to tell the Moroccans
i onthat their policy aroused apprehension among French parliamentarians. In fact, the 
next French concern was to make Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreements acceptable 
to the French parliament, which was due to open at the end of May 1956.
At the night of 2-3 May 1956, some twenty people loyal to el-Glaoui were massacred 
by a crowd near Marrakech. In view of strong Moroccan anti-French sentiment, Bekkai 
demanded the suspension of the punishment of criminals by French troops inside 
Morocco, to which the French agreed.121 Then BekkaT and Balafrej visited Paris from 6 
to 8 May. On the last day, the French submitted to the Moroccans a proposal for certain 
diplomatic agreements, and indicated that, if the National Assembly approved the 
government’s policy, the accord would come into force in June 1956, shortly after the 
debate. On the same day, a communique was published announcing that France and 
Morocco had decided to pursue negotiations for agreements ‘qui ddfiniraient 
l’interdependance’.122 Then Savary was sent to Rabat to complete the negotiations.
The prospect of Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement caused an unexpected 
reaction from London. On 10 May, the British government decided to recognise the 
independence of Tunisia and Morocco ‘pour gagner Nasser de vitesse’ and to establish 
diplomatic relations once negotiations between France and the two countries had been 
concluded, a decision which came earlier than the French had expected. As was the case 
in Tunisia, this decision helped accelerate the conclusion of the Franco-Moroccan 
negotiations.123 Unlike the Americans, the British had not recognised independence at 
the time of the 2 March communique, when there had been no agreement to define 
strong diplomatic cooperation between France and Morocco and, therefore, the latter 
had not attained independence according to the French interpretation. The British 
reached this decision in order not to lose the Moroccan people’s good faith to the
120 Ibid., doc.283, Savary to Dubois, no.l 157/1160,30.4.1956.
121 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p.202.
122 DDF, 1956,1, doc.311, Savary to French diplomatic representatives, 12.5.1956. The main points of 
this accord mentioned that both countries would; (1) ‘se tenir mutuellement informes’, (2) ‘se consulter 
en cas de menaces et d’dtablir une procedure de consultations r6guli£res, notamment au niveau des 
ministres des Affaires 6trang£res’, (3) ‘ne pas adherer k une politique incompatible avec leurs intdrets 
r6ciproque’, (4) ‘ne pas conclure de conventions intemationales contraires aux droits qu’ils se sont 
mutuellement reconnus’, (5) ‘maintenir une liaison constante entre leurs delegations dans les 
organisations intemationales’, and (6) ‘dans les pays etrangers oh le Maroc n ’aura pas de mission 
diplomatiques, les representants fran?ais assureront la protection des ressortissants marocains k la 
demande du gouvemement de Rabat.’
123 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p.204. See also Chapter 8, Section 4.
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Egyptians, even at the expense of their unswerving policy to support the French position 
fully.
On 15 May, the Royal Moroccan Army was officially presented to the Sultan. 
Although the Liberation Army did not participate in the march of the Royal Army, its 
leaders had promised that they would not disturb the ceremony. Dubois noted that the 
presentation of the Royal Army ‘apparait comme une signe tangible et important de la 
cooperation franco-marocaine... [et] incitera peut-etre l’Armee de liberation h observer 
plus de prudence a l’6gard du gouvemement’.124 In mid-May 1956, nonetheless, the 
Liberation Army remained influential in internal politics. On 14 May, the Sultan had 
mentioned to Savary, who was in Rabat, that ‘[l]a situation s’est brusquement d6t6rior£e 
au cours de ces demiers jours’, although even then, he neither approved nor disapproved 
of the Liberation Army. Three days later, it circulated a pamphlet declaring: ‘Nous 
n’aurons de repos que lorsque notre pays se sera d£barrass6 des demiers germes du 
colonialisme.’125
To French surprise, on 15 May 1956, the Moroccan government issued a 
communique ‘le Sultan avait donnd son agrdment a 1’elevation au rang d’Ambassadeur 
d’Espagne a Rabat’. That is, the Sultan had given an unofficial agreement to the 
nomination of the Spanish ambassador in Rabat before the French National Assembly 
approved the government’s policy. Savary immediately protested to BekkaT: ‘combien 
une telle decision, survenant au lendemain de la presentation de l’arm6e royale... 
pouvait avoir un effet facheux sur le Parlement et sur l’opinion ffan5aise’.126 In fact, the 
Algerian fiasco obliged the Moroccan government to take an apparently independent 
stand from France. On 18 May, after stressing the increasing influence of the Liberation 
Army on internal politics, Savary reported to Pineau that, regarding the wording of the 
diplomatic agreement, the Moroccans suddenly began to assert: ‘le mot « solidaire », 
qui figure dans le pr^ambule, paraissait particulferement choquant k plusieurs ministres, 
alors que la France dtait engag6e dans des operations en Algerie’. However, the French 
realised that anti-French sentiment among Moroccan opinion had moderated owing to 
the presentation of the Royal Army, and therefore the Sultan would choose to reach a 
diplomatic agreement with France.127
124 DDF, 1956,1, doc.315, Dubois to Savary, no.1627/1633,15.5.1956.20,000 French-trained servicemen 
were placed at the disposal of the Moroccan government. The initial design of the army relied on 10,000 
veterans o f the Spanish army and 5,000 former members of the Liberation Army. Moshe Gershovich, 
French Military Rule in Morocco, (London; Frank Cass, 2000), p.212.
125 L 'Annee Politique, 1956, p.203.
126 DDF, 1956,1, doc.321, Savary to MAE, no.1667/1672,16.5.1956.
127 Ibid., doc.325, Savary to MAE, no.1732/1738,18.5.1956.
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On the same day, a faction of the Liberation Army announced that they would never 
accept the movement of French troops inside Morocco.128 On 23 May, an incident 
occurred in which French soldiers, while patrolling along the Algerian-Moroccan border, 
were taken prisoner by an armed Moroccan band.129 As the French told an American 
official: ‘the Sultan had no day-to-day control of Eastern Morocco which was controlled 
by various bands of the Army of Liberation.’130 Bekkai notified Dubois of the demand 
by the Moroccans that French patrols be suspended and warned that otherwise the 
Moroccan government could not guarantee the security of French people.131 However, 
Savary confirmed in the Senate on 30 May that the status of the French army remained 
unchanged.132
Nevertheless, the French and Moroccan governments signed the diplomatic 
agreement on 28 May 1956, the substance of which remained the same as that of the 
French note of 8 May. The French thus succeeded in reaching a conclusion before the 
opening of the National Assembly debate.133 The French had suggested concluding a 
treaty of friendship and alliance with the aim of ensuring the approval of the National 
Assembly,134 but the Moroccans were successful in omitting the word ‘alliance’ from 
the text of the agreement, unlike in the Tunisian case. In return, Balafrej declared on 19 
May: ‘Nous venons de conclure avec la France un traitd d’alliance, d’amitte 
permanence et de cooperation’. Subsequently, the debate in the National Assembly on 
general North African policy opened on 31 May and ended on 2 June 1956. A motion of 
confidence in the Mollet Government was adopted by 271 votes to 59, with 200 
abstentions, enabling the Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement to come into force.135 
This finally authorised Morocco to exchange diplomatic missions with other countries.
In July 1956, France brought the question of Moroccan membership before the 
UNSC. On the SC’s recommendation, the GA decided on 12 November 1956 to admit 
Morocco. In the meantime, Morocco’s unity was achieved. On 9 August, the Spanish 
zone of Morocco came under the control of the Moroccan government. On 29 October, 
the diplomatic conference at Fedala put an end to the international administration of 
Tangier. As for the domains of cooperation other than diplomacy and defence, the
128 Ibid., doc.327, footnote 1.
129 Ibid., doc.338, footnote 1.
130 NARA, RG59, CDF, 751S.00/5-2356, Paris to Dulles, no.5574,23.5.1956.
131 DDF, 1956, I, doc.338, Dubois to Savary, no.1834/1840, 24.5.1956. The French patrols had been 
resumed one day before.
132 L 'Annee Politique, 1956, p.204.
133 This was in contrast to the Tunisian case. See Chapter 8, Section 4.
134NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.71/5-1156, Dillon to Dulles, no.5296,11.5.1956.
135 Bernard, The Franco-Moroccan Conflict, p.369.
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agreement on administrative and technical cooperation was signed at Rabat on 6 
February 1957, and the cultural agreement was signed at Rabat on 30 May 1957.136 
Thus Morocco entered the international stage, while its unity was accomplished and its 
close links with France were maintained.
136 Ibid., pp.369-370.
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Chapter 8: Tunisia’s independence; Tunisia, June 1955 to June 1956
8.1 Rivalries between Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef
Tunisia obtained internal autonomy as the result of the conclusion of the Franco- 
Tunisian Conventions in June 1955. The French government allowed Bourguiba to 
return to Tunisia on 1 June 1955 after more than three years’ exile, and the Tunisian 
people enthusiastically received him as ‘le p£re de la Nation’.1 Many French settlers 
also welcomed his return by sending letters to him, although some of them still saw him 
as ‘un ennemi irreductible de la presence fran9aise’.2 Overall, Bourguiba’s conciliatory 
attitude contributed to the development of Tunisia’s moderate atmosphere, which the 
majority of French settlers highly appreciated, as Roger Seydoux put it.3
This did not, however, solve the socio-economic problems, which the Tunisian 
government now had to tackle. The unemployment rate was high and there were many 
demonstrations demanding an increase in wages. The Tunisian government was so short 
of funds that it asked the French government on 25 July 1955 to provide three billion 
francs.4 Discontent spread among trade unions and the UGTT decided at the end of July 
1955 to resort to a general strike on 10 August 1955 to obtain a salary increase, 
although it later abandoned this plan.5 Later in August 1955, the government decided on 
a 30% rise in salaries but this decision did not satisfy the trade unions.6
At the same time, conflict between Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef, which had 
already been evident in the process of negotiations on the Conventions, came to the fore, 
especially because Paris authorised the latter to return to Tunisia and he succeeded in 
rallying support from the unemployed. He decided not to come back to the country, 
however, and continued to oppose the Conventions outside Tunisia. He made a public 
announcement against them in Cairo on 12 July 1955, and one week later, his position 
was supported by some party members in the party session of Tunis. The Neo-Destour 
gave him an ultimatum on 15 July, requesting his return within ten days but he ignored 
this request.7 Realising that the conflict inside the party would certainly endanger his
1 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, p.247.
2 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Latour to Paris, no.1703/1705,6.6.1955.
3 Ibid., Seydoux to Paris, no.1915/1920, 29.6.1955. Seydoux was then a French special minister in 
Tunisia.
4 Ibid., Latour to Paris, no.2268/2273,27.7.1955.
5 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie, 8.1955.
6 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.265. The government decided on a further 10% salary increase in September 
1955. Ibid., p.279.
7 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Physionomie de lap^riode du 20 juin au 20 juillet 1955,23.8.1955.
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own position and the prospect of the success of the Conventions, Bourguiba in turn 
endeavoured to consolidate Tunisia’s unity.8
Security conditions in Tunisia did not stabilise in the summer of 1955, especially on 
its border with Algeria. In July 1955, the violent incidents that Algerian armed groups 
caused were frequently reported especially in El Kef, a city in north-western Tunisia.9 
In fact, it had already been revealed in the preceding month that substantial amounts of 
arms were being supplied from Libya to French North Africa.10 The worsening Algerian 
situation caused further instability in Tunisia. In August 1955, Algerian military 
activists often infiltrated Western Tunisia in order to establish contact with the ex- 
Tunisian Fellagha members. The French observed that these were the direct 
repercussion of two major incidents in Algeria, which took place that month.11
Meanwhile, Tunisian political institutions were being transformed to conform to the 
June 1955 Conventions. After their implementation on 31 August 1955, the Ben Ammar 
Government resigned on 13 September 1955 in order to form a government composed 
only of Tunisian ministers. Four days later, the Ministries of Finance, Public Works, 
Public Instruction and Post Office, which had hitherto been run by French ministers, 
were taken over by Tunisian ministers. On that day, Seydoux was appointed as the 
French High-Commissioner, a newly-created post to replace the Resident-General, and 
Salah Ben Youssef returned to Tunisia and was warmly received by the population in 
Tunis.12
However, the Tunisian security situation remained unstable in the autumn of 1955, 
partly because of Egypt’s enhanced prestige.13 Its neutralist orientation was encouraging 
anti-French movements in Tunisia as well as in Morocco. It was noted that French 
settlers were intimidated by the presence of Algerian rebels, who passed through 
Tunisian territory ‘soit pour chercher refuge ou prendre du repos, soit pour essayer de 
faire du recrutement et de trouver des armes et munitions.’14 French settlers’ fears were 
confirmed when two French people were killed near the Algerian border by Algerian 
Fellaghas, during the night of 3-4 October 1955. The French observed that the Algerian
8 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie, 8.1955.
9 Ibid., Latour to Paris, no.2171/2173,20.7.1955.
10 PRO, F0371/113894, JT10317/112, FO Minute, Kirkpatrick, 18.6.1955.
11 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Situation Politique en Tunisie, 8.1955. In the first incident on 2 
August seventy-one settlers were killed, and in the second on 20 August thirty-seven settlers were killed.
n L ’Annee Politique, 1955, pp.279-280. The principal members of the second Ben Ammar Government 
were, Mongi Slim (Minister of Interior), Kaddem Ben Achour (Justice), Mohamed Badra (Agriculture), 
H6di Nouira (Finance), Mohamed Masmoudi (National Economy), Djelloui FarSs (Public Instruction), 
Sadok Mokkadem (Public Health), Albert Bessis (Urbanisme).
13 Chapter 6, Section 5.
14 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Seydoux to Paris, no.3089/3095,30.9.1955.
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Fellaghas were trying to create unrest in the part of Tunisian territory that lay between 
Libya and Constantine in Algeria.15 Therefore, Seydoux demanded that the CSTT 
undertake a systematic clean-up operation and proposed that the French government 
reinforce the troops stationed along the border with Algeria.16 He further explained: 
‘lors de leurs infiltrations, les rebelles algdriens beneficient aupres de la population 
tunisienne d’une large complicity, sinon d’une participation active.’17 He then asked 
Bourguiba on 4 October to publicise a statement of sympathy in order to ease French 
people’s fears. The Neo-Destour’s president agreed, mentioning that he had already 
requested Ben Ammar to issue a statement condemning the Algerian Fellaghas in the 
name of the Tunisian government.18
This violent incident was immediately followed by Salah Ben Youssef s declaration 
on 7 October 1955,19 in which he decisively opposed the Franco-Tunisian Conventions; 
he stated at the Grande Mosquee in Tunis that the Conventions allowed France to 
legalise what ‘colonialism’ had usurped since 1881 and make Tunisia join the French 
Union. He also exhorted Tunisian people to pursue a battle for total independence and 
moreover, assured Algerian ‘patriots’ of his solidarity with them. Le Monde noted that 
this was the first occasion that he had held a gathering since his return to Tunisia, and 
was ‘les premiers indices de la lutte engagde au sein du Nyo-Destour.’ 20 This 
declaration stunned Seydoux, who straightaway protested to Ben Ammar that it was 
intolerable that the secretary-general of the Neo-Destour, whose members participated 
in the government, should make such an aggressive statement.21 Tunisia’s internal 
dispute between Bourguiba’s pro-French faction and Salah Ben Youssef s pro-Egyptian 
faction was increasingly conspicuous, as it was in Morocco. From this time on, the two 
factions were to hold their own gatherings in order to present their cases to the people.
Bourguiba was quick to react. The Neo-Destour Political Bureau decided on 8 
October to exclude Salah Ben Youssef, who was replaced by Ladgham as the Secretary- 
General.22 This measure aroused resentment in Muslim areas of major cities, where
15 Constantine was one of the three departments of Algeria, bordering on Tunisia. From 1947 to 1956, 
Algeria was also composed of the other four departments, Alger and Oran, Oasis and Saoura. 
http://membres.lvcos.fr/aamafii/page35.html. accessed on 2 August 2005.
16 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Seydoux to Paris, no.3128/3132,4.10.1955.
17 Ibid., Seydoux to Paris, no.3301/3306,14.10.1955.
18 Ibid., Seydoux to Paris, no.3146/3149,6.10.1955.
19 El-Fassi had announced the formation of the Maghreb Liberation Army only three days before this. 
Chapter 6, p. 172.
20 Le Monde, 9/10.10.1955. The Vieux-Destour was influential among students at the Grande Mosquee.
21 DDF, 1955 II, Doc.281, Seydoux to Paris, no.3171/3173,7.10.1955.
22 L 'Annee Politique, 1955, p.293.
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some shops closed as a protest.23 This meant that Salah Ben Youssef enjoyed great 
popularity in urban areas. Seydoux pointed out that the possibility could not be 
excluded that the Neo-Destour’s ex-Secretary-General had stirred up these troubles. 
Seydoux believed that he had returned from Cairo under orders from the Arab League to 
cause as much disruption as possible.24 In a session chaired by el-Fassi, the North 
African Liberation Committee in Cairo decided on 15 October to exclude Bourguiba 
and the members of his party’s Political Bureau, and instead to regard Salah Ben 
Youssef as the Neo-Destour’s legitimate leader. One week later, the ex-Secretary- 
General sent a telegram to Nasser in which he tried to show strong solidarity with 
Egypt, expressing his gratitude for the latter’s support of the ‘cause tunisienne sacrde’ 
and admiring Nasser’s neutralist orientation.25
Both terrorist activities and the domestic conflict made the French less optimistic 
about Tunisian political institutions being successfully created or modified in 
accordance with the Franco-Tunisian Conventions. Ben Ammar announced on 14 
October 1955 that the constitution would be promulgated, but did not specify whether it 
would be issued by the Bey or by an elected assembly.26 The Ministry for Moroccan 
and Tunisian Affairs argued that Bourguiba enjoyed support from the majority of the 
party’s members, while Salah Ben Youssef retained its radical members’ support. It was 
also noted that the latter’s statements could appeal to the ex-Fellagha members and that 
he also benefited from a high reputation among Arab-Asian countries and the North 
African Liberation Committee. The Vieux-Destour’s opposition to the Conventions 
remained strong. Finally, it concluded that the forthcoming Neo-Destour National 
Congress, due to be held in mid-November 1955, would certainly clarify the situation.27 
Seydoux was more pessimistic: he estimated that while the result would probably 
favour Bourguiba, external forces like Egypt would certainly try to give advantages to 
his rival. He even wrote to the Quai d’Orsay28: ‘Un congrds du 15 novembre qui ne 
prendrait pas clairement position constituerait... un 6v6nement de portee intemationale 
susceptible de foumir & l’6tat-major du Caire’.29
23 DDF, 1955 II, Doc.295, Seydoux to Paris, no.3270/3279,13.10.1955.
24 PRO, F0371/113792, JF1016/93, Williams to Bromley, no. 1446/601/102,17.10.1955.
25 L ’Annee Politique, 1955, pp.293-294. He wrote: ‘le peuple tunisien partage la fiert6 de tous les peuples 
arabes pour l’ind6pendance rdelle affirmSe par l’Egypte et son gouvemement dans les relations avec les 
pays Strangers et notamment dans la politique vitale d’achat d’armes ngcessaires pour assurer la s6curit6 
du monde arabe.’ Le Monde, 23.10.1955.
26 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.378, Seydoux to Paris, no.3281/3294,14.10.1955.
27 Ibid., La Situation en Tunisie, 18.10.1955.
28 The Ministry of Moroccan and Tunisian Affairs was abolished on 20 October 1955.
29 DDF, 1955 II, Doc.336, Seydoux to Paris, no.3529/3549,27.10.1955.
207
At this point, a completely new element was introduced into Tunisian affairs by the 
events in Morocco. The ex-Sultan’s restoration had been made virtually inevitable by 
recent events since late October 1955 and, consequently, the prospect of Morocco’s 
independence was suddenly emerging.30 Alarmed by this development, Seydoux sent a 
warning to Paris on 3 November 1955:
Elle [l’opinion tunisienne] est habituee k penser que la Tunisie, plus evolu^e et 
plus en contact avec le monde exterieur que le Maroc, doit devancer celui-ci dans 
1’emancipation politique... Toute concession qui serait faite par le Gouvemement 
fran9 ais au Maroc et qui excdderait ce qui a consenti dans les Conventions 
ffanco-tunisiennes, serait immediatement exploitee par les adversaires de ces 
Conventions...
Therefore he stressed the necessity ‘dans la definition de notre future politique 
marocaine, de ne rien promettre et de ne rien faire qui puisse amoindrir dans 1’esprit des 
Tunisiens les rdsultats obtenus par leur pays grace aux Conventions franco- 
tunisiennes.’31 However, from this time onwards, Paris was increasingly inclined to 
give independence to Morocco in order to secure unity, which would put the French in a 
position where they could hardly refuse independence if requested by the Tunisians.
8.2 The Neo-Destour National Congress
The Neo-Destour party held its National Congress in Sfax, a mid-eastern coastal city, 
from 15 to 19 November 1955. To French satisfaction, this Congress turned out to be a 
success for Bourguiba, adopting several motions, four of which were of particular 
importance. The first motion stated that the Franco-Tunisian Conventions constituted a 
step on the way to independence. The party thus demanded that Tunisia’s independence 
be achieved in the foreseeable future, while rejecting Salah Ben Youssef s position. The 
second motion urged the Tunisian government to ‘appliquer rapidement toutes les 
Conventions sans aucune tolerance ni concession’. This motion demanded immediate 
elections for all the municipalities and that a constituent assembly should be in charge 
of procedures establishing a constitution defining the country’s political structure, based 
around a constitutional monarch, with the people as the source of sovereignty. The third 
motion called for the creation of an auxiliary force which was to constitute the nucleus 
of a national army.32 Finally, the fourth motion related to Algeria, advocating
30 Chapter 7, Section 1.
31 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.379, Seydoux to Paris, no.3658/3662,3.11.1955.
32 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie (Novembre 1955).
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Tengagement solennel de poursuivre la lutte jusqu’a la liberation complete et 
Pindependance totale.’ The Congress reasoned that there would never be peace in 
Tunisia as long as the plight of the Algerian people was unresolved.
Importantly, some Asian and Middle Eastern countries34 sent their delegations to this 
Congress. With the growing prospect of Tunisia’s independence, Egypt and Iraq were 
struggling to expand their influence. The rivalry for Middle Eastern hegemony35 
engulfed Tunisian territory as well. In fact, Egypt and Iraq’s activities were not limited 
to the official level. The French authorities had already found that the Iraqi Royal 
Military College was training North African activists. This news seriously embarrassed 
the British, who had a defence treaty with Iraq.36
The French saw the adoption of Bourguiba’s line by the Neo-Destour as only a partial 
success. Salah Ben Youssef still enjoyed support from a significant part of the 
population. The economic reform plan adopted by the Congress had alienated large 
landowners, who rallied around him.37 He also received support from those who felt 
threatened by ‘un travaillisme tunisien’ and people of the Grand Mosque. On 23 
November 1955, Seydoux noted that he was uncertain whether this Congress would 
have a lasting effect on stability. Moreover, referring to Tattentisme’ of the Tunisian 
government, he was also suspicious whether it could put into practice the Neo-Destour’s 
programme. He perceived that several ministers, including the prime minister, were pro- 
Youssef, as they believed that Bourguiba could not last long and they were strongly 
affected by Prince Chedly’s pro-Youssef position.38 Not only Prince Chedly but also the 
Royal family as a whole sympathised with Salah Ben Youssef because he was 
committed to maintaining Tunisia as a religious country, whereas Bourguiba, who was 
rumoured to be aiming to establish a republican regime,39 advocated Tunisia’s 
secularisation.
The Neo-Destour’s requests to the Tunisian government required the French to rectify 
the security problem in accordance with the 1955 Conventions, while they could not 
deal with the constitutional problem because it solely concerned the Tunisians. At a
33 DDF, 1955 II, Doc.383, Seydoux to Paris, no.4054/4076,23.11.1955.
34 They were Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Saudi Arabia, India and Pakistan.
35 Regarding this rivalry, see Elie Podeh, The Quest fo r  Hegemony in the Arab World: the struggle over 
the Bagdad Pact, (New York: Leiden, 1995).
36 PRO, F0371/113801, JF1022/26G, Beith to Bromley, no. 1073/264/55,3.11.1955.
37 Le Monde, 22.11.1955.
38 DDF, 1955 II, Doc.383, Seydoux to Paris, no.4054/4076, 23.11.1955. Seydoux complained to the 
British that Bourguiba was a sick and tired man, and that he would carry out his promise but doubted if  he 
now had enough energy to put through unpopular decisions. PRO, F0371/113792, JF1016/100, Williams 
to Bromley, no. 1634/601/111,22.11.1955.
39 For example, NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.00/2-2956, Dillon to Dulles, no.3940, 29.2.1956.
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meeting with French officials held in Paris on 25 November, Seydoux40 picked up two 
demands from the Tunisians: firstly, they wanted to augment the number of police staff 
at the Tunisian government’s disposal by creating auxiliary forces and, secondly, create 
Tunisian forces designed to fight the Fellaghas. Seydoux recommended the rejection of 
both demands, but insisted that the increase in police numbers in certain areas should be 
allowed. Regarding the second demand, he argued: ‘il faut s’attendre que les Tunisiens 
insisteront... pour reprendre les bataillons de tirailleurs tunisiens servant dans l’Armee 
fran5aise.’ He added that the government should secretly start examining the creation of 
an embryo of the Tunisian army as soon as possible.41 Then, on 26 November, the 
French government’s Coordination Committee for North Africa published a 
communique, which instructed the High Commissioner to pursue the implementation of 
the Franco-Tunisian Conventions.
Cette politique devra notamment mettre le Gouvemement tunisien en mesure de 
faire face... aux necessites de l’ordre public... Le comite a demande au Haut- 
Commissaire de continuer h veiller au respect des droits que les Fran5ais, qu’ils 
appartiennent ou non a la fonction publique, tirent des conventions 42
The Tunisian situation remained tense. Both Bourguiba and Salah Ben Youssef held 
gatherings in various parts of the country, and continued their disputes.43 The first three 
days of December 1955 witnessed several attacks against individuals in which two were 
killed and seven injured. Both sides condemned the other as responsible. Seydoux noted 
the desire o f ‘bourguibistes... d’utiliser la situation qu’ils ont plus ou moins directement 
cr£ee pour precipiter la formation de la force suppletive’.44 To deal with the insecurity, 
Seydoux announced on 8 December that there was a Franco-Tunisian agreement 
regarding an increase of forces at the Tunisian authorities’ discretion.45 Then on 24 
December, the French and Tunisian governments reached an accord on the issue of the 
Southern territory, unresolved in the 1955 Conventions, agreeing that the transfer of the 
special police force46 in that region to the Tunisian authorities would commence the 
following week.
40 He stayed in Paris from 23 November to 2 December 1955.
41 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.379, Reunion chez M Massigli le 25 novembre 1955.
42 Ibid., Comitd de Coordination pour l’Afrique du Nord (26 novembre 1955).
43 PRO, F0371/113792, JF1016/102, Williams to Bromley, no.1697/601/115, 2.12.1955.
44 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.379, Gillet to Paris, no.4159/4168,3.12.1955.
45 PRO, F0371/113792, JF1016/103, Williams to Bromley, no. 1731/601/118, 9.12.1955. He also stated 
that continued irresponsible and destructive criticism of the Conventions would alienate French sympathy 
and that the French government was concerned to safeguard the French community.
46 This was called ‘les forces du makhzen’, referring to ‘une force auxiliaire de la police particultere aux 
anciens territoires militaires du Sud.’ Le Monde, 25.12.1955.
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Apart from these security problems, the Neo-Destour’s motions had raised 
constitutional issues. As opposed to the nationalist party, the Bey was not keen on 
constitutional reforms. The Bey told Seydoux on 23 November 1955: ‘se produisait 
actuellement une Evolution trop rapide... qu’il s’agisse d’ailleurs du Maroc aussi bien 
que de la Tunisie’, and Seydoux noted that Ben Ammar had expressed almost the same 
opinion the day before.47 The Bey’s position was clear: ‘il ne pouvait reconnaitre aucun 
post-scriptum aux Conventions signdes par lui.’48 He, in particular, did not want an 
increase in the Tunisian government’s police force, but rather emphasised that 
responsibility for the maintenance of order belonged exclusively to the French High 
Commissioner according to the Franco-Tunisian Conventions.49 Aware that the advance 
of Bourguiba’s position denoted the decline of his own position, the Bey did not want 
the government to have more authority than had been provided in the Conventions. This 
was contrary to the Moroccan case, where the Sultan himself took the initiative in 
calling for independence.
When Seydoux met Bourguiba on 25 December 1955, the former found him irritated 
by the attitudes of the Bey and the Tunisian government. Bourguiba resented the fact 
that the Bey and the Palace did not conceal their sympathy for Salah Ben Youssef, who 
was more committed to preserving the monarchy, whereas the Bey disliked Bourguiba’s 
republicanism. Bourguiba told Seydoux that he did not oppose the constitutional 
monarchy itself, but added that he wanted the Bey to play the same role as the British 
King. Likewise, he criticised the government, whose prime minister was incompetent 
and which was suffering from ‘immobilisme’, although he did not wish for a 
reorganisation of the government that would accompany Ben Ammar’s removal. Finally, 
he did not specifically refer to diplomacy and the army, but replied in the affirmative 
when asked whether his policy was to lead Tunisia to independence with French 
agreement, contrary to that of Salah Ben Youssef. Bourguiba said that he wanted to 
avoid making the ex-Secretary-General a martyr, and therefore wished to isolate him 
progressively among those groups hostile to the Neo-Destour, instead of oppressing him 
through violent means.50
On 28 December 1955, the Tunisian government announced its decision to organise 
the elections for a constituent assembly, which would be convened on 8 April 1956, a 
decision that had been strongly pressed for by newspapers which supported Bourguiba
47 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.379, Seydoux to Paris, no.4037/4040,23.11.1955.
48 Ibid., Seydoux to Paris, no.4518/4523,27.12.1955.
49 Ibid., Gillet to Paris, no.4159/4168,3.12.1955.
50 DDF, 1955 II, doc.443, Seydoux to Paris, no.4498/4513,27.12.1955.
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and the UGTT.51 Although the Bey had at first refused to sign the decree to authorise 
them, Bourguiba succeeded in persuading him to do so.52 The decree provided that the 
assembly would be elected by universal suffrage, and the date for the elections was set 
on 25 March 1956. This decision had much significance. Firstly, as Seydoux 
commented, this was the first moment that the Bey, who had nominally been the 
absolute sovereign, had accepted that sovereignty lay not with him but with the people. 
In this sense, the decree totally differed from his own speech of 15 May 1951,53 which 
called for the Tunisian constitution but never implied or stated explicitly the transfer of 
sovereignty. Secondly, this decree was a serious menace to both the Vieux-Destour and 
Salah Ben Youssef. For the former, ‘Notre Constitution c’est le Coran’, and for the 
latter, this decree was nothing but the institutionalisation of what Bourguiba had gained 
as the result of the Conventions.54 Finally, setting the date for convening the constituent 
assembly necessarily tightened the schedules of Tunisia’s domestic politics and Franco- 
Tunisian negotiations, as will be shown below.
8.3 The Franco-Tunisian Protocol of March 1956
In January 1956, to a certain extent due to the decree of December 1955, troubles 
were continuing throughout Tunisia. It was reported to Paris that supporters of Salah 
Ben Youssef were campaigning violently against the 1955 Conventions. Making use of 
high unemployment, he succeeded in rallying around him other anti-French forces such 
as the Vieux-Destour, ex-Fellagha members, traditionalists and bourgeois who were 
worried about the socialist tendencies of the Neo-Destour and the UGTT. This coalition 
group was formed in liaison with the Algerian rebels.55 Le Monde reported on 20 
January the development of ‘neo-fellaguisme’, exemplified by infiltrations by Algerian 
‘hors-de-loi’ and ‘des actes de bandisme’.56 Later in January 1956, Le Monde further 
mentioned: ‘Les groupes rebelles s’etendent maintenant h l’intdrieur du territoire 
tunisien’.57
In Paris, preparations were started for dialogues with Tunisia. In fact, the French 
anticipated that the Tunisians would soon demand independence. On 20 January 1956, 
the Quai d’Orsay argued that the French government should immediately make
51 MAE, Tunisie 1944-1955, vol.379, Seydoux to Paris, no.4541/4542,28.12.1955.
52 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, pp.467-469.
53 Chapter 1, p.34.
54 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.75, Seydoux to Paris, no.29/43,4.1.1956.
55 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Note pour le Ministre, 14.2.1956.
56 Le Monde, 20.1.1956.
51 Ibid., 29.1.1956.
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important decisions about Tunisia, as Salah Ben Youssef was increasing his influence 
due to violent incidents in Algeria, the promise of Morocco’s independence, Tunisia’s 
economic and social difficulties, and support from certain Arab countries. The Tunisian 
government should further reinforce police power, as this was not incompatible with 
France’s special position concerning defence. It was noted:
les avantages qui seront consentis au Maroc, en particulier sur le plan de la 
diplomatic et de l’arm6e devront etre etendus a la Tunisie... [N]ous devrions nous 
resoudre k donner de telles assurances, des le moment ou cela apparaitrait 
absolument ndcessaire pour sauvegarder le prestige et la position du Gouvemement 
tunisien devant les attaques de l’opposition youssefiste.58
Thus, Tunisia must be given independence, but the problem was to what extent the 
Conventions and the Treaty of Bardo should be amended. The Quai pointed out that 
Tunisia’s independence could be achieved without terminating the Conventions, 
because they were flexible enough to allow important amendments to the realm of 
Tunisia’s right to defence. Concerning the Treaty, the Quai considered it preferable not 
to abrogate it. This position was considered possible because, importantly, the Treaty 
did not have provisions that deprived Tunisia of a right to foreign policy and defence. 
Nevertheless, it was also indicated: ‘[Le Traits de Bardo] serait difficile k maintenir au 
cas ou le Traits de Fes serait lui-meme profond&nent modifte et la revision du Traits du 
Bardo entramement ndcessairement une revision de la Convention Gen6rale franco- 
tunisienne.’59
The Neo-Destour held a session of the National Council from 21 to 23 January 1956, 
which unanimously decided to ask the Political Bureau to work for the constitution of a 
national army, and the termination of the troubles in Algeria so that the Algerian people 
could settle conflicts with France through negotiation.60 Against the background of this 
decision, when he met Seydoux on 26 January, Bourguiba called for French agreement 
on the organisation of Tunisia’s national army, responsibility for diplomacy and the 
reinforcement of police power. He justified his demands by stating that he was in a 
difficult position because of developments in Morocco and that it was unthinkable that 
Tunisia would have a less favourable regime than Morocco. He therefore insisted that 
he be given guarantees regarding these problems within a few weeks, adding that he 
wanted French support in his electoral campaign for the constituent assembly. He 
further mentioned his plan to visit Paris at the beginning of February 1956 with the aim
58 Note that this ‘youssefiste’ refers to the people who supported Salah Ben Youssef, not Mohammed V.
59 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Note pour le Secretaire General, 20.1.1956.
60 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie (Janvier 1956).
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of having talks with leading political figures. However, as opposed to Paris’s position, 
Seydoux’s reply was negative. He mentioned that French opinion must not be 
disappointed ‘en remettant en cause des tra ils  dont l’encre 6tait k peine sdche.’61 
On 27 January 1956, perhaps initiated by Slim, the Tunisian government launched a 
large-scale police operation against Salah Ben Youssef and his supporters, arresting 
about 100 people and confiscating a number of weapons. This operation forced Salah 
Ben Youssef to flee Tunisia. He arrived in Libya via Tangier on the following day.62 
Consequently, Bourguiba greatly reinforced his position inside Tunisia. Furthermore, 
the Tunisian police simultaneously started encircling the palace of the Bey and the 
domiciles of members of the royal families. In fact, the Tunisian government suspected 
that the Bey had given refuge to Salah Ben Youssef.63
On 31 January 1956, before being elected as a prime minister, Mollet declared that the 
June 1955 Conventions did not constitute an obstacle to Tind6pendance dans le cadre 
d’une interddpendance organisde’, thereby revealing his intention to negotiate with the 
Tunisians.64 However, the meanings of independance and ‘interddpendance’ were yet to 
be defined.
Bourguiba arrived in Paris on 2 February 1956 and met a number of French leaders 
such as Mollet, Massigli, Savary and Seydoux during his stay until 6 February. He 
officially requested that certain provisions of the Conventions be amended so that 
Tunisia could enjoy ‘1’independance dans Pinterdependance’ soon and exercise its 
responsibilities in the domains of defence and foreign policy.65 The French accepted 
Bourguiba’s demand for a right to defence and foreign policy, but rejected the transfer 
of police power at that moment because there remained internal tension and a menace 
posed by the Algerian Fellaghas.66
Faced with these demands, the French government had to take into account the 
following points. Firstly, it was axiomatic that France would have to be highly 
influential in Tunisia’s foreign policy and defence. The French concern was not the 
formation of the Tunisian army itself but the assurance of French troops’ right to the 
surveillance of Tunisia’s borders especially with Algeria. Secondly, Bourguiba’s 
position should be strengthened, so that he could win the forthcoming elections. The
61 DDF, 1956,1, doc.44, Seydoux to MAE, no.406/414,26.1.1956.
62 Ibid., doc.78, p. 163, footnote 2; L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 185.
63 DDF, 1956,1, doc.78, Seydoux to Savary, no.597/610,6.2.1956.
64 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Note pour le Ministre, 14.2.1956. The general election in France 
took place on 2 January 1956.
65 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (F6vrier 1956); DDF, 1956,1, doc.78, 
p. 162, footnote 1.
66 Ibid., doc.68, Seydoux to Basdevant, 2.2.1956.
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French must, therefore, give him a reward by successfully concluding the approaching 
Franco-Tunisian dialogue by the time of the elections due on 25 March 1956. In 
consequence, Seydoux proposed that the negotiations be taken in two stages; the 
government should firstly declare Tunisia’s independence to reinforce Bourguiba’s 
position, and then negotiate with the Tunisians after the constituent assembly was 
convened in April 1956.67 Thirdly, the enhancement of Bourguiba’s position should not 
weaken the Bey’s position, which France had committed itself to guarantee through the 
Treaty of Bardo. Consequently, Bourguiba should be told that France could give him 
full support only if he assented to the constitutional monarchy.68 Fourthly, the French 
were not unwilling to modify certain provisions of the 1955 Conventions if necessary. It 
would be dangerous, they speculated, if extensive reinterpretation of the Conventions 
was allowed, because it would mean unilateral concessions on the French part. They 
insisted, nonetheless, that future negotiations must be conducted within the framework 
of the Conventions, as this would give support to Bourguiba as against Salah Ben 
Youssef. Fifthly, they had not yet decided whether to abrogate the Treaty of Bardo. As 
has been argued above, it was assumed that France would be pressurised to abrogate it 
if it agreed to the abrogation of the Treaty of Fez with the Moroccans, but some French 
officials strongly argued for its maintenance.69 They put more emphasis on legal 
continuity between Tunisia’s current and future status.
In the meantime, the palace was kept under siege. Perhaps this encirclement was 
meant by the Tunisian government to pressurise the Bey to authorise the opening of 
Franco-Tunisian negotiations, which might pave the way to the republicanism that 
Bourguiba covertly wanted. On 6 February 1956, the Bey strongly articulated his anger 
and irritation to Seydoux, who answered that he could intervene only where public 
order was threatened since Tunisia enjoyed internal autonomy. Seydoux confirmed that 
the Bey ‘considere le depart de Salah ben Youssef... comme une menace envers sa 
dynastie.’ Knowing the Tunisian government’s intention, Seydoux advised that since 
the Bey himself had ratified the 1955 Conventions, no discussions about their 
amendment were possible unless it was explicitly demanded by him and the government 
that he would appoint. Thus Seydoux urged the Bey to accept the revision o f the
67 Ibid., doc.68, Seydoux to Basdevant, 2.2.1956. As in the Moroccan case, the French considered that 
they should firstly announce their intention to recognise Tunisia’s independence and then negotiate on the 
form and content o f the independence which Tunisia would obtain. The concept ‘independence’ 
contained several elements, like diplomatic relations with other countries, a right to defence and a right to 
control internal security, but this note argued that France should recognise Tunisia’s independence 
without defining the details.
68 Ibid., doc.78, Seydoux to Savary, no.597/610, 6.2.1956.
69 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Note, 2.2.1956.
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Conventions promptly. In exchange, he proposed that the French government promise 
the Bey that it would guarantee the maintenance of the dynasty and his status.70
As a result of talks with Bourguiba, on 7 February 1956, Savary declared the French 
willingness to modify Franco-Tunisian relations: ‘si Son Altesse le Bey en exprimait le 
desir, ils etaient d’accord pour discuter avec les reprdsentants du Gouvemement tunisien 
qu’Elle ddsignerait, les problemes souleves par M. Bourguiba qui seraient examines 
dans l’esprit de la declaration d’investiture du President du Conseil.’ The Bey issued a 
communique on 10 February, stating that he would appoint a government to start 
negotiations with France on Tunisia’s independence. Paris did not forget to ease French 
settlers’ anxiety. Seydoux announced the following day that the French government 
would never accept that French settlers’ interests and rights, guaranteed by the 1955 
Conventions, would be put into question.71
Despite the diminishing of Salah Ben Youssef s influence, troubles in Tunisia and in 
North Africa as a whole, did not come to an end. The ‘renaissance du terrorisme urbain’ 
near Tunis and many terrorist attacks were reported in February 1956.72 Tahar Lassoued, 
a ‘fellaga youssefiste’ distributed pamphlets in Tunis, proclaiming the formation of the 
Tunisian National Liberation Army. The infiltration of the Algerian Fellaghas continued 
particularly in Tunisia’s mid-western Gafsa area, often killing French people. The re­
formation of the Tunisian Fellaghas was reportedly under way.73 It was considered that 
the North African Liberation Committee was instigating these troubles under the 
patronage of neutralist pan-Arabist Egypt. The French emphasised the importance of 
satisfying pro-Western nationalists to counter a threat in North Africa.
Nous devons accorder a ces nationalismes toutes les satisfactions de prestige, sans 
lesquelles leurs leaders pro-occidentaux ne pourraient se maintenir devant... les 
attaques de la “resistance” nord-africaine... [L]’independance promise au Maroc ne 
pourra etre refusee a la Tunisie sans amener h tr&s brdve 6ch£ance le remplacement 
de Bourguiba par Salah Ben Youssef.
Thus the granting of independence to Tunisia was again accentuated, although the two 
protectorates’ independence should not be perceived as a sign of allowing ‘separatism’
70 DDF, 1956,1, doc.78, Seydoux to Savary, no.597/610,6.2.1956.
71 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Note pour le Ministre, 14.2.1956; Situation Politique en Tunisie 
(F6vrier 1956). ‘French settlers’ interests and rights’ referred to the protection of individual properties, a 
right to be subject to the jurisdiction o f French courts and a right to continue to work as public officials in 
the Tunisian administration, and so on. DDF, 1955 I, vol.232, Pinay to French diplomatic representatives,
28.4.1955. Note that the French government was no longer requesting the Tunisians to accept French 
settlers’ right to vote for municipal or national assemblies while retaining French nationality.
72 Le Monde, 9.2.1956, 15.2.1956.
73 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (F6vrier 1956); L ’Annee Politique, 
1956, p. 190.
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in Algeria. It was pointed out that independence was incompatible with the spirit of the 
French Union, and the French abandoned these countries’ membership of it in the way 
provided in the Constitution of the Fourth Republic:
L’adhesion de ces deux pays a l’Union Fran9aise dans les conditions prevues 
par le Titre VIII de la constitution est exclue...
La France doit etre la plaque toumante entre l’ensemble ffan?ais (la structure de 
la Rdpublique pouvant etre dventuellement am6nag6e) et le Maroc et la Tunisie, 
dtats “associds” a la Rdpublique dans les conditions prevues par des traites 
n^gocies entre ces pays et la France.74
Now that the two countries’ independence was inevitable, the French finally abandoned 
both countries’ participation in the French Union. They understood that they had to 
accept a big deviation from their decolonisation policy which had been based on the 
Union.
On 25 February 1956, the Bey appointed the Tunisian delegation for the Franco- 
Tunisian negotiations. It consisted of Ben Ammar, Ladgham, Slim and Masmoudi. 
From 29 February, they had several sessions in Paris with their French counterparts 
consisting of Mollet, Pineau, Savary and Seydoux. When the negotiations started, both 
parties had already agreed on ‘1’independance dans l’interdependance’ of Tunisia. In the 
first session, Ben Ammar demanded the termination of the Treaty of Bardo and the 
modification of the 1955 Conventions in order to render the provisions compatible with 
Tunisia’s exercise of full sovereignty. However, Pineau responded that the French 
government had not decided on the Treaty’s abrogation.75 In the third session held on 5 
March 1956, the Tunisians rejected the French draft of an expected communique, 
insisting that it would ‘limite les abrogation totale du traitd du Bardo, comme le 
demande la delegation tunisienne.’76 
The gap between both parties’ positions did not decrease. Despite their recognition of 
Morocco’s independence on 2 March, the French refused to agree on the Treaty’s 
abrogation.77 On 17 March, the negotiations almost collapsed, as the French were trying 
to persuade the Tunisians to agree to a newly-disguised form of French control in 
matters of diplomacy. Both sides’ positions can be summarised:
La pierre d’achoppement demeure la question de savoir si, 1’independance 
tunisienne etant acquise, les adaptations de textes ant£rieures admises, le droit a 
disposer d’une diplomatic et d’une armee reconnue, la Tunisie verrait consacrer sa
74 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Pineau, vol.28, J.S. Direction G6n6rale, 2.1956.
75 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p.191.
76 DDF, 1956,1, doc.167, Comptes rendus des negotiations franco-tunisiennes,
77 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/3-1356, Dillon to Dulles, no.4190,13.3.1956.
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propre « responsabilitd en matiere de sdcurite, d’affaires ext6rieures et de defense », 
ou bien si ne serait mentionne qu’un certain « droit & l’exercice » de cette meme 
responsabilite -  ce qui eut, en droit, etabli une responsabilite commune.78
The former was the Tunisian position and the latter the French. That is, the French were 
aiming to establish an arrangement whereby both countries would exercise a right to 
foreign policy, and therefore allow France an equal say on it. As Massigli put it to the 
Americans, the French believed that in comparison with the Moroccan case, Tunisia’s 
‘independence’ must be a watered-down version because it ‘was much more subject to 
Egyptian influence due to its proximity to the Middle East.’79 Naturally, the talks 
reached a deadlock at the following sessions.
According to Bourguiba, it was he who broke the stalemate. He had talks with Pineau 
and reached agreement on 18 March 1956 concerning the text of the protocol. Pineau 
and Savary basically accepted the Tunisian position and persuaded Mollet, who was 
taking the most hard-line attitude, to agree to it.80 Consequently, the French government 
finally decided to announce the termination of Tunisia’s protectorate status. 
Nevertheless, there was another decisive element in enabling the French to make 
concessions, namely, US support for French policy in Tunisia. Pineau told Ambassador 
Dillon on 19 March that the knowledge that the latter ‘was to make a speech tomorrow 
generally supporting the French position in North Africa had been one of major 
considerations which led the French Government to reach agreement with Tunisia.’81 
On the following day, Dillon gave a speech in which he assured France ‘dans sa lutte 
pour trouver des solutions liberates qui assureront la continuity de sa presence en 
Afrique du Nord, de l’appui total des Etats-Unis... [et la] « coexistence» des 
populations fran5aise et musulmane’.82 Following Dulles’s speech in August 1955 
which had referred to Morocco alone,83 this was the first case in which the US 
government had openly committed itself to supporting French policy in Tunisia. In fact, 
Dillon’s discourse was welcomed favourably by almost all the press in Paris.84 This US
78 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 195.
79 NARA, RG59, CDF 651.72/3-356, Dillon to Dulles, no.4006,3.3.1956. However, US officials in Tunis 
commented that Massigli’s point was counter-productive in assuring Western influence in the country. 
651.72/3-656, Hughes to Dulles, no.102,6.3.1956.
80 Bourguiba, Ma Vie, 1952-1956, p.503.
81 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/3-1956, Dillon to Dulles, no.4312,19.3.1956.
82 Le Monde, 21.3.1956. Originally, this speech had been intended to ease growing suspicion of the USA 
amongst French opinion. On 3 March 1956, Robert Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political 
Affairs, had reported to Washington that anti-American sentiment was growing in French opinion, ‘which 
seeks to place the onus for the French predicament in Algeria and Morocco on the US.’ DDEL, Papers as 
President of the US, 1952-1961 (Ann Whitman File), International Series Box 12, France 1956-1960 (6) 
March 3,1956 Memorandum for the President; The White House.
83 Chapter 6, p. 162.
84 Le Monde, 22.3.1956.
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support was very effective in convincing French opinion that Washington did not want 
France out of North Africa, and that a Franco-Tunisian agreement would not terminate 
French influence in Tunisia.
On 20 March 1956, just five days before the elections in Tunisia, the two countries 
issued a protocol agreeing that firstly, France recognised Tunisia’s independence; 
secondly, the Treaty of Bardo could no longer govern Franco-Tunisian relations; thirdly, 
certain dispositions of the 1955 Conventions incompatible with Tunisia’s new status 
would be modified or abrogated; and fourthly, Tunisia would be able to exercise its 
responsibilities regarding foreign affairs, security and defence, and form a national army. 
Both parties also agreed to enter into negotiations on 16 April 1956 with the purpose of 
defining the modalities of cooperation, particularly in the field of defence and foreign 
policy.85 On 22 March, the US conveyed their congratulations to Tunisia on the 
recognition of its independence.86
8.4 Tunisia’s Independence
The March 1956 protocol brought a favourable result for the Neo-Destour in the 
elections for the constituent assembly held on 25 March 1956. The National Front, 
formed on 14 March around the Neo-Destour and the UGTT, occupied all 98 seats. The 
‘Youssefists’ and the communist party failed to win a single seat. The voting turnout 
was over 84% overall but only 50% in Tunis where, as the French suspected, the 
traditional bourgeoisie was hostile to the democratic system. The turnout was also low 
in Djerba, an island in the south-east of Tunisia on the Gulf of Gabes, where there were 
many supporters of Salah Ben Youssef, and also in the Southern territory.87 Bourguiba 
was starting to institutionalise what he had gained as a result of the Franco-Tunisian 
protocol, which had already granted independence from the Tunisian viewpoint. As 
early as 23 March 1956, he had announced: ‘Nous ne pourrons etre vraiment heureux... 
que le jour ou notre sceur l’Alg6rie aura retrouv6 sa souverainete.’88 This was a clear 
indication of his intention to exert a right to foreign policy. On 31 March, Bourguiba 
announced in Sfax his intention to form a new government immediately after the first 
session of the Constituent Assembly, which would include a Minister of Defence and a
85 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (mars 1956); L'Annee Politique, 
1956, p. 196.
86 NARA, RG59, CDF, 772.02/5-1456, Dullest to Tunis, no.123,14.5.1956
87 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Situation Politique en Tunisie (mars 1956). The other groups which 
joined the National Front were, I ’Union Tunisienne des Artisans et Commergants, and VUnion nationale 
des Agriculteurs et tunisiens, and independent candidates including Ben Ammar.
88 L ’Annee Politique, 1956, p. 196.
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Minister of Foreign Affairs. This was contrary to Ben Ammar’s assurance given to the 
French on 20 March 1956 that the Tunisians would not nominate those ministers for the 
time being.89
Franco-Tunisian talks over the transfer of responsibility for public order, which were 
held from 4 to 7 April 1956, ran smoothly. Both sides in principle agreed on Tunisia’s 
greater responsibility for this issue: firstly, normal internal security forces would retain 
a French director but belong to the Tunisian Ministry of Interior; secondly, a Tunisian 
gendarmerie would be created; and thirdly, the High Commissioner would, with a 
separate director, control a territorial and frontier gendarmerie to protect French settlers 
and assist Tunisian security forces on request. In essence, the new arrangements 
eliminated the waiting period before a Tunisian take-over of normal internal security 
and also defined and limited French responsibility especially in border areas.90
In parallel with the increase of Bourguiba’s prestige because of the March protocol 
and the developments thereafter, the prime minister’s prestige was on the decline. Ben 
Ammar was being criticised due to his failure to condemn Salah Ben Youssef,91 whose 
supporters were engaged in terrorist activities as a protest against the protocol. On 8 
April, the Political Committee of the Arab League authorised its member states to 
recognise Tunisia’s independence immediately. The French welcomed this decision, 
reasoning that this would decisively strengthen Bourguiba’s prestige as against Salah 
Ben Youssef s.93 The developments following the protocol finally determined the Arab 
countries’ support for him. The Constituent Assembly was convened on 9 April. Ben 
Ammar offered his resignation, and the following day, the Bey announced his decision 
to appoint Bourguiba as the next prime minister. The Bourguiba Government was 
formed on 14 April, with twelve Neo-Destour members out of seventeen ministers and 
with full support from the UGTT.94 Bourguiba named himself both as Minister of 
Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs, although the French had tried in vain to 
persuade him not to do so 95
89 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Gillet to Paris, no.1512/1516,7.4.1956.
90 Ibid., Situation Politique en Tunisie (Avril 1956); DDF, 1956, I, doc.226, Comptes rendus des 
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91 MAE Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Seydoux to Paris, no.1400/1413,28.3.1956.
92 Le Monde, 29.3.1956.
93 Egypt recognised Tunisia’s independence on 18 April. MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Situation 
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Franco-Tunisian negotiations on the form and content of independence had seen no 
progress. The Tunisians repeatedly asked the French to adjourn the opening of new 
negotiations scheduled on 16 April.96 This stemmed from disagreements over the 
interpretation of the March protocol. According to French insistence, the protocol’s 
second point concerning the Treaty of Bardo suggested that the Treaty had never been 
abrogated and that ‘until [the] French Assembly ratifies [the] independence protocol it is 
not legal.’97 In fact, the French wanted to get the new accord ratified by the National 
Assembly scheduled to start debates on North Africa at the end of May 1956, so as to 
show French opinion that Tunisia’s protectorate status had not been terminated in 
March 1956.
Bourguiba had to tackle the persistent, although weakening, influence of Salah Ben 
Youssef, combined with the deteriorating situation in Algeria, so that he could 
consolidate his internal position. He met with Seydoux on 12 April 1956, and insisted 
that the March protocol had immediately granted Tunisia independence, and that ‘la 
proclamation de 1’Independance avait porte un coup tres dur a Salah Ben Youssef dont 
la popularity serait en baisse sensible’.98 In fact, on 15 April, Salah Ben Youssef made a 
statement in Cairo accusing the Tunisian government of collaboration with ‘les 
impdrialistes fran?ais’. Two days later, Bourguiba declared that Tunisia must organise 
its national defence, send its diplomatic representatives to foreign countries and be 
admitted to the UN, adding: ‘le gouvemement tunisien ne m£nagera aucun effort pour 
aider a trouver des solutions pacifiques en Alg6rie.’99 On 23 April, in an interview with 
Le Figaro, Bourguiba once again made a statement on Algeria, which angered the 
French: ‘son gouvemement aiderait “les freres alg6riens”, qu’il ne s’opposerait pas a ce 
que des volontiers tunisiens combattent en Alg6rie, et qu’il n’apporterait pas son aide 
aux troupes franfaises luttant contre les trafics d’armes.’100 He asserted to Seydoux two 
days later that he had to take into consideration anti-Bourguiba campaigns conducted in 
Tunisia and the Middle East, and emphasised: ‘II ne peut r£agir contre cette campagne 
et affermir 1’autorite de l’Etat Tunisien qu’en dissociant le Youssefisme de la resistance 
Algerienne.’101
On 24 April 1956, he summoned the consul generals in Tunis and declared that he 
wished ‘la transformation du corps consulaire en corps diplomatic’. Paris immediately
96 DDF, 1956,1, doc.280, Pineau to London, no.4134/4139, 28.4.1956.
97 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/4-1956, Hughes to Dulles, no.132,19.4.1956.
98 MAE, Tunisie 1956-1969, vol.108, Seydoux to Paris, no.1590/1594, 12.4.1956.
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protested, emphasising that the 1955 Conventions would remain valid until the 
conclusion of further agreements.102 From the French viewpoint, the Franco-Tunisian 
protocol of March 1956 stipulated that the General Convention of 1955 could be 
modified if necessary but did not specify how it could be modified. Logically, Tunisia 
was not allowed to exchange ambassadors with other countries before agreeing with 
France on its modifications. Nevertheless, the Anglo-Saxons started examining the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in an effort to ‘press for [a] prompt solution’ of 
the problem, but the French asked them not to appoint diplomatic representatives until 
their negotiations with the Tunisians and the Moroccans were complete.103 However, 
Bourguiba could not wait while Franco-Moroccan negotiations progressed, so he 
confirmed on 1 May 1956 that Tunisia would enter into negotiations only after France 
recognised Tunisia’s full independence: ‘Seule une Tunisie reellement souveraine et 
independante pourra reprendre les negotiations avec la France.’104 On 4 May, Morris 
Hughes, the US Consul General in Tunis, noted that Bourguiba looked anxiously to the 
US ‘to offer him some practical encouragement, specifically through a readiness to open 
normal diplomatic contact with this government, so that he can show his people... that 
his pro-Western convictions are recognized... by the West.’105 These developments 
forced Mollet to decide, by 5 May, to have a summit meeting with Bourguiba to resolve 
the crisis without delay.106
On 8 May, the British notified Bourguiba of their intentions to recognise Tunisia’s 
independence, which he rejected because of the qualification ‘as soon as Franco- 
Tunisian agreement on external affairs has been reached.’ On the same day, the 
Americans orally informed the Tunisians that their message to the Bey of 22 March 
1956 had constituted their recognition of Tunisia’s new independent status as defined in 
the March protocol and that they wished to exchange diplomats.107 Moreover, the 
following day, the Americans told the Quai d’Orsay that they wished to establish their 
embassy in Tunis promptly.108 On 10 May, Britain publicly announced its decision to 
recognise the independence of Tunisia and Morocco after agreement between France 
and both countries.109 Bourguiba then urged the Americans to submit a note stating their
102 DDF, 1956,1, doc.280, Pineau to London et al., no.4134/4139,28.4.1956.
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106 Le Monde, 8.5.1956.
107 FRUS, 1955-1957, XVIII, Doc.243, Dulles to Paris, no.4167, 8.5.1956
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intentions to establish a diplomatic mission, adding that any countries which expressed 
intentions to establish diplomatic missions in Tunis before 31 May 1956 would be in an 
equally favourable position regarding precedence.110
Invited by Mollet, Bourguiba stayed in Paris from 9 to 12 May111 and had talks with 
the French, who tabled a draft of a Franco-Tunisian diplomatic accord on 10 May. 
Bourguiba refused to sign it, but both parties agreed that negotiations should take place 
in Tunis with the purpose of reaching a diplomatic agreement.112 This draft was aimed 
at granting Tunisia as favourable a diplomatic status as Morocco; this was a French 
concession because in late March 1956 they had wished Tunisian independence to be 
‘watered-down’. According to what he said to Dillon, however, Bourguiba flatly 
rejected the draft, because ‘the French tried to insist on his signing [a] draft 
convention... which... unified Franco-Tunisian foreign policy.’ Nevertheless, 
Bourguiba also made minor concessions. He told the French that he would ‘postpone 
the establishment of any foreign mission... after French parliamentary debate 
presumably leading to [the] abrogation [of the] Bardo Treaty on May 31 or June l .’113
The French were desperate to prevent the Anglo-Saxons from opening diplomatic 
relations with Tunisia before they did themselves. On 12 May 1956, Latour, the ex- 
Resident-General in Tunis and Rabat, presented the French case to the Americans. The 
Quai wished, he argued, that Parliament would ratify an agreement and abrogate the 
Treaty, but that it would probably refuse to consider the abrogation due to Bourguiba’s 
refusal to discuss the content of Tunisia’s independence. Therefore, he warned the 
Americans that ‘if other countries established missions [in] Tunis after June 1 in [the] 
absence of [a] new convention... such action would clearly be in contravention [of the] 
March 22 [sic] common agreement.’ The US, as mentioned, had already begun 
discussing with the Tunisians the establishment of its embassy, but Bourguiba notified 
the US of his promise about the postponement of the deadline.114 On the other hand, the 
British FO was divided on whether to establish diplomatic relations if the French 
parliamentary debate closed without a Franco-Tunisian accord. Some officials argued 
for opening diplomatic relations, lest Tunisia should ‘turn towards Egypt and neutralism 
or worse’, but the FO finally adopted Jebb’s suggestion: ‘the creation of an impression
110 NARA, RG59, CDF, 651.72/5-1156, Dillon to Dulles, no.5324, 11.5.1956.
111 Note that die Moroccan delegation stayed in Paris from 6 to 8 May.
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with the French... that their allies had let them down would be even worse.’ 115 
Therefore, the British delayed establishing diplomatic relations until after a Franco- 
Tunisian agreement.
Bourguiba did not want negotiations with France to break down. On 16 May, he 
proposed a deal to Seydoux: firstly, Tunisia would not exchange ambassadors with 
other countries before the parliamentary debate. Secondly, both countries should resume 
a dialogue for a diplomatic accord after the debate closed.116 Nevertheless, thirdly, he 
wanted to upgrade the representatives of France and Tunisia to ambassadors before the 
Parliament opened the debate.117 By contrast, the French were keen to conclude a 
diplomatic accord before its opening. On 23 May, Savary instructed Seydoux to urge 
Bourguiba to agree to the opening of negotiations as soon as possible, because the 
signature of a Franco-Moroccan diplomatic accord was imminent: ‘Si les Tunisiens 
persistent dans leur attitude actuelle... [l]’opinion franfaise s’&onnera du retard pris par 
le gouvemement tunisien par rapport au gouvemement marocain...’ Bourguiba should 
be told, added Savary, that if the Tunisians desired to distinguish themselves from the 
Moroccans in the form of the accord, Paris was prepared to accept that.118 This was 
once again a significant concession; Paris decided to grant a more favourable diplomatic 
status to Tunisia than Morocco. This softened Bourguiba’s attitude. The following day, 
Bourguiba informed Seydoux that he had decided not to exchange ambassadors with 
France before the opening of the parliamentary debates. Instead, he insisted that it be 
done on 2 June, with the exchange of ambassadors with other countries in the course of 
the following days.119 He added: ‘once foreign diplomatic missions have been 
established [in] Tunis, he would conclude [a] diplomatic convention with France even 
more restrictive than that already concluded with Morocco.’120
However, on 28 May, the day the Franco-Moroccan agreement was signed, Bourguiba 
made a critical speech, confirming the ‘designation des reprdsentants diplomatiques de 
la Tunisie a l’etranger avant toute reprise des negotiations avec la France.’121 This 
forced the French to accept the necessity of reaching an agreement with the Tunisians. 
In fact, Bourguiba’s speech urged the Americans to establish their diplomatic mission in
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Tunis, if they did not want other countries like the USSR or Egypt to do so before them. 
On 31 May, the State Department warned the French that Bourguiba might receive 
ambassadors from foreign countries immediately after the closure of the parliamentary 
debate scheduled on 5 June 1956. Washington maintained that if unfriendly countries 
opened embassies in Tunis before the Americans, this would be an embarrassing 
situation for Tes pays amis de la France’, and the US would not want to wait.122
In fact, on 5 June, the French National Assembly closed without any decision on 
Tunisia, although it ratified the Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement. That day, 
agreeing with the Americans, Seydoux warned Paris: Tes pays comme les Etats-Unis et 
l’Angleterre admettront sans doute difficilement d’avoir simplement a Tunis des 
consuls alors que d’autres dtats comme la Russie ou l’Egypte y seraient represents par 
des ambassadeurs.’ Even Tunisia’s exchange of ambassadors with countries friendly to 
France without similar exchanges taking place between Tunis and Paris would weaken 
the French position. Therefore, he suggested that France and Tunisia, after exchanging 
letters announcing the appointment of ambassadors, should exchange ambassadors and, 
thereafter, Tunisia should be allowed to open diplomatic relations with other 
countries.123 In fact, Hughes declared on 5 June that the US government had decided to 
raise the Consulate General to Embassy status and appoint a chargd d’affaire or an 
ambassador.124 Importantly, the Americans decided to establish an Embassy without 
asking for agrement for an ambassador.125 This measure was meant to impress Tunisian 
opinion that Tunisia and the US had already established diplomatic relations, whereas 
de jure they still did not start such relations, a position which satisfied the French. In 
other words, the US urged France to exchange diplomatic missions with Tunisia while 
saving France’s face.
On 6 June, the French cabinet reached a decision: the Treaty of Bardo and the 1955 
General Convention were still valid until the conclusion of a new accord and that France 
was prepared to conclude an accord with Tunisia to replace them. This was because ‘il 
est important... que la parole et la signature de nos partenaires musulmans ne puissent 
etre mises en doute par les Fran9ais.’126 On the following day, Seydoux informed 
Bourguiba of this decision, which made him furious. The latter warned that ‘craignez
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que je ne sois un jour emporte par les courants que j ’ai... bien du mal k  controler’ and 
insisted on avoiding any weakening of his own authority, ‘menacee... par les agents du 
Caire’. 127 However, this decision indicated that the French were now keener to reach 
agreement, as the American move obliged them to avoid a situation in which their 
opening relations with Tunisia would come after foreign countries had established 
relations.
On 9 June 1956, Seydoux and Ladgham agreed that negotiations be concluded in two 
stages: firstly, an immediate agreement on Tunisia’s right to an independent external 
policy, accompanied by the exchange of ambassadors between France and Tunisia; and 
then, secondly, negotiations for the treaty of friendship and alliance. However, what was 
essential for Bourguiba was that Tunisia’s right to diplomacy must not be obtained as a 
result of its agreeing to a diplomatic accord with France. He declared that he was 
prepared to negotiate with France a treaty of friendship and alliance but emphasised that 
what he did not want was ‘dans l’accord, prendre d’engagement en matiere d’action 
concertee’.128 On 12 June, the French cabinet’s limited session chaired by Mollet agreed 
in principle on the draft of the agreement prepared by Seydoux.129
On 15 June 1956, France and Tunisia signed ‘l’accord sur les questions de 
representation diplomatique’ which planned the exchange of ambassadors. In spite of 
the similarities with the Franco-Moroccan diplomatic agreement, they differed 
significantly. Firstly, the Franco-Tunisian accord stipulated: ‘dans les pays ou la Tunisie 
n’aura pas decide d’envoyer une mission diplomatique permanente, la Ripublique 
fran5aise est disposee, si le gouvemement tunisien le lui demande, k  assurer la 
representation et la protection des ressortissants et des interets tunisiens. Dans ce cas, 
les agents diplomatiques et consulaires fran9ais agiront conformement aux directives du 
gouvemement tunisien.’ 130 The Franco-Moroccan equivalence did not refer to 
Moroccan requirements. Secondly, the two governments ‘en attendant la conclusion du 
Traite qui reglera les modalites de leur cooperation en matiere d’affaires exterieures, 
agissant dans l’esprit d’amitie et de solidarity qui caracterise leurs relations, 
s’informeront sur toutes les questions d’interets commun qui se poseront k  eux dans ce 
domaine.’ As the French admitted, ‘[c]ontrairement a l’accord de Rabat, l’accord 
franco-tunisien ne fixe pas des maintenant les modalites de Faction concertee entre les
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deux pays sur le plan diplomatic.’ The joint communique stated on 26 June that both 
parties would resume negotiations anticipated in the March protocol with a view to 
concluding a treaty of friendship and alliance,131 about which, however, both parties 
would not in the end commence talks.
Now Tunisia was allowed to exchange diplomatic representatives with other countries, 
although ‘Youssefists’ still continued anti-French activities especially in Southern 
Tunisia. Reflecting the stronger position that Bourguiba was enjoying compared to 
Mohammed V, Tunisia was given a more favourable status by France than Morocco 
was. On 16 June, the British government, who had repeatedly put off facing French 
objections, expressed their desire to open diplomatic relations with Tunisia, who at once 
accepted it. On 23 June, the Loi-Cadre, which authorised local people in overseas 
territories to enjoy greater autonomy, i.e. was designed to decentralise the French Union, 
was promulgated.132 The UNSC, on the motion of the French delegation, approved 
Tunisia's application for UN membership on 26 July 1956.133 As was the case in 
Morocco, the GA decided on 12 November 1956 to admit Tunisia to membership. In 
July 1957, unlike Morocco, the monarchy was abolished and a republic was declared 
with Bourguiba as president.
131 Ibid., p.208; DDF, 1956,1, Doc.407, Pineau to London et al., no.5877/5881,15.6.1956.
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Conclusion
This thesis has examined French motivations behind their decolonisation policy 
towards Tunisia and Morocco. The existing research assumes that France agreed to 
these countries’ independence because it could not resist nationalist pressures and 
international opinion calling for self-government or independence. There was no doubt 
that nationalist and international pressures played a very significant role in French 
decision-making. However, the thesis argues that these two factors alone do not explain 
the motivations and timings of the French decisions on important concessions: Tunisia’s 
internal autonomy in July 1954 and Morocco’s independence in December 1955. Indeed, 
for the French, the most important concern was whether to secure viable collaborators in 
Tunisia and Morocco and it was only when this concern came to the fore because of 
nationalist and/or international pressure that the French government made the 
aforementioned concessions. Finding viable collaborators was a difficult task, because 
they had to satisfy multifarious and sometimes conflicting needs: on the one hand, they 
had to be able to secure French influence and convince the people of its importance, and 
on the other hand, they had to be able to achieve the political unity of their country, 
which meant, as the French government understood it in July 1954, that viable 
collaborators had to enjoy popular support.
The problem of how to secure local collaborators was particularly acute in French 
decolonisation policy because of the hypocrisy embedded in the policy. In the post- 
World War II era, the French had to commit themselves publicly to the idea of internal 
autonomy but in reality, until 1954, they were never intending to grant any kind of 
autonomy or to transfer significant powers to the local people, and aimed to incorporate 
the two countries into the French Union as associate states. The French initially 
believed that they could impose their false reform plans on both countries, and only 
gradually did they come to realise that those in the colonised areas and international 
opinion wanted the colonial powers to grant self-government and independence to the 
colonial territories. The French needed collaborators in order to sell their plans to the 
Tunisians and Moroccans, but naively believed that the sovereigns, i.e. the Bey and the 
Sultan, who retained a right to seal the decrees tabled by the French Resident-Generals, 
would be persuaded to be collaborators. Since Tunisia and Morocco remained 
protectorate states, the French considered it possible to make use of their state 
apparatuses in order to realise the integration of the two countries into the French Union.
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However, here was a paradox, as once the sovereigns accepted the French plans, they 
would be at high risk of being criticised for betraying the nationalist cause. Then when 
they lost popularity, their authority would be irreversibly lost.
The initial hypocrisy of the French policy was clearly shown by their decision in 
January 1950 to lead Tunisia to internal autonomy. This decision was mostly motivated 
by the UNGA resolution of the previous year to promise Libya’s independence in two 
years. In order to dodge nationalist and international criticism, the French government 
accepted the granting of Tunisia’s internal autonomy, but actually the plan which the 
Quai d’Orsay formulated was not aimed at transferring any significant powers to the 
Tunisian people but at incorporating Tunisia into the French Union in the future. The 
problem for the nationalists was not the fact the French were slow to transfer power to 
them, but that they were trying to establish the institutions with which to block the 
people from having a right to self-determination. This intention was clearly indicated in 
the so-called la Note sur la Co-souverainete, which demanded French settler 
participation in the Tunisian governmental organisations. Particularly important for the 
Tunisian nationalists was French settlers’ right to participate in the future municipal and 
national assemblies with an equal number of representatives to the Tunisians, while still 
retaining French nationality. This clearly had the effect of denying to the Tunisian 
people a right to express and formulate their political views and legislate on them 
according to those views. Moreover, the French did not aim to establish a legislative 
national assembly, except for the plan of June 1952, but merely to establish a 
consultative national assembly. It was for this reason that the Tunisian nationalists 
rejected the French plans. It should be emphasised that the nationalists did so not 
because the timetable for change was too gradual but because they realised that the plan 
was blocking the Tunisian people’s right to self-determination.
The French had the same goal in Morocco, so their plans were also rejected by the 
Moroccan nationalists for the same reason. Nevertheless, the Moroccan nationalist 
requests were much more straightforward than the Tunisians: the former demanded full 
and immediate independence whereas the latter demanded that France grant sovereignty 
at first and then independence at a later stage. This difference derived from the fact that 
the Istiqlal party held a far weaker position in domestic terms than the Neo-Destour 
party and therefore had to rely on international support from the Arab League and the 
North Africa Liberation Committee, who called for the full and immediate 
independence of all North African territories. Besides, fearing that the extension of 
autonomy in the French zone alone might make its unity with the Spanish zone more
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difficult, the Moroccan nationalists wished to abrogate the protectorate treaty and 
achieve independence and unity at one stroke. The Moroccan nationalists’ reliance on 
international support explains why the Moroccan problem was brought to the UN earlier 
than the Tunisian problem. This also explains why the French refused to talk with the 
Istiqlal while they continued negotiations with the Neo-Destour until the latter wrote to 
the UN in January 1952.
The nationalist movements were greatly encouraged by international developments 
and international opinion. Previous research tends to emphasise that international 
pressures significantly affected French policy and forced the French to recognise the 
independence of Tunisia and Morocco. This is true, but closer analysis shows that 
international pressures were never monolithic and did not necessarily force France to 
make concessions. The UN provided international players with an arena where the 
North African problems could be discussed. Therefore, the timing of the UN sessions 
often determined that of the French formulating their pseudo-reform plans in both 
countries. Among the international players, the most sympathetic to the North African 
nationalists were the Arab countries, especially Egypt. They repeatedly tried to 
introduce and pass in the UNSC and UNGA sessions anti-French resolutions which 
criticised French policy for not giving self-government to Tunisia or Morocco. In 
addition to activities in the UN, the Arab League countries provided the North African 
nationalists with the means of broadcasting their cause and, also, engaged in 
broadcasting the Arab countries’ support for nationalism in a strongly anti-imperialistic 
tone. Nonetheless, the Arabs were very reluctant to submit anti-French draft resolutions 
to the UN when it was clear that US support was not forthcoming.
The fact that the Arab countries’ attitude depended on the US showed how influential 
the US was upon other countries’ attitudes towards the Tunisian and Moroccan 
problems. Therefore the US played a very important role in affecting French decisions, 
but its position was always midway between that of the Arabs and the French. The 
Americans were adamant on this point, although some research has argued that their 
position was ambivalent. This was because the US considered France a very important 
ally of the Western Alliance whereas it also did not want to alienate Third-World 
nationalism, otherwise such nationalists might turn to the Soviet Union. In fact, the US 
goal was to persuade the French to accept self-government in the North African 
protectorate states, thereby establishing stable relations between France and the 
nationalists. Thus, the US sometimes tried to protect France from international pressure 
from the Arabs, a point which previous works on North African decolonisation process
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has failed to underline. This US attitude was conspicuous in the UN in 1952. With the 
purpose of mediating between France, who rejected UN jurisdiction over North African 
affairs, and the Arab countries, who wanted UN intervention, the US accepted the UN 
discussing the Tunisian and Moroccan problems but rejected its passing anti-French 
resolutions. The UNGA resolutions in the winter of 1952 on the whole reflected the US 
position. It was certain that the US repeatedly pressurised France to introduce internal 
autonomy in Tunisia and Morocco, but this did not mean that the Americans wanted 
France to be driven out of North Africa. US policy towards North Africa was hardly 
affected by concerns about US military bases in Morocco, because the US adopted very 
similar policies in Tunisia where they did not have military bases. In addition, 
persuaded by the British, the US publicly gave support to France for agreeing to Arafa’s 
departure and the formation of a Moroccan government in the summer of 1955, 
although at the time of Tunisia’s internal autonomy, the US had not publicised its 
support when the British had not urged the US to do so. This noticeably demonstrated 
that US policy towards North Africa was affected by Britain in a significant manner.
Hence the importance of the British role in North African affairs should be 
emphasised although almost no existing research has referred to this point. By the end 
of World War II, the British had already committed themselves to the principle of self- 
government in their colonial areas, so their decolonisation policy constituted constant 
pressure on France by encouraging Tunisian and Moroccan nationalist movements to 
demand self-government. This explained why the French were suspicious that the 
British, together with the Americans, secretly wished for their withdrawal from the 
overseas territories. However, in reality, the British did not want France to be driven out 
of North Africa but, like the US, wanted it to remain influential by the granting of self- 
government. However, the British adopted a much more favourable attitude towards 
France than the US did. Indeed, the British publicly supported the French position in 
North Africa, even though they did not agree with oppressive French policies. In the 
UN, Britain concurred with the French insistence that Tunisia and Morocco were under 
French jurisdiction, and therefore voted against UN debates or abstained on these issues. 
Similarly, the British were so discreet that they did not directly pressurise the French to 
adopt a liberal policy unwelcome to them, but eventually persuaded the US to take a 
similar approach towards France. Here a question arises: why did the British support the 
French position? It appears at first glance that Britain, as a fellow colonial power, tried 
to help France to maintain its influence in its colonies, by blocking international 
intervention. However, colonial concerns do not fully explain British policy. In fact, the
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British government did not oppose the French when they were inclined to accept UNGA 
debates in the autumn of 1952, even though the British knew that French acceptance 
would set a very unwelcome precedent in the UN and be damaging to British overseas 
territories. In fact, by supporting the French position in North Africa, the British aimed 
to prevent the growth of opinion which did not want French membership of NATO. As 
mentioned above, there was a strong tendency in the French government and French 
opinion to be suspicious that the Anglo-Saxons secretly wished the French to retreat 
from North Africa, and the Soviet Union was also criticising French policy towards 
Tunisia and Morocco partly because of France belonging to the Western Alliance. The 
British were certain that French opinion would not blame the US and the UK even if 
France failed to solve its problems, as long as the Anglo-Saxons did not intervene in 
North African affairs.
One exception to this policy was the British decision o f October 1952 to vote against 
the UNGA discussing the Tunisian problem, a decision very significant in determining 
French attitudes to UN debates from 1952 onwards. The British decided to try and 
persuade the French to reject UN debates, after the latter had reluctantly announced that 
they welcomed other countries’ advice on whether to accept them or not. The Anglo- 
French common front regarding colonial matters enabled France to reject UN debates in 
1952, 1953 and 1954. Furthermore, this common front was followed by the US decision 
to drop the issue of the invitation of North African representatives to the 1952 UNGA 
session. If there had not been the Anglo-French common front, France would have 
accepted UN debates on Tunisia and its policy towards North Africa may have been 
altered as a result.
The British intervention made the UNGA resolutions of December 1952 ambivalent 
in character. On the one hand, the resolutions did not recommend that the UN send a 
commission to supervise talks or specify the representatives with whom the French 
should negotiate. Rather, the resolutions allowed the French to justify their policy by 
insisting that they were negotiating with the Tunisians and Moroccans in order to 
achieve internal autonomy, since the French were free to select their interlocutors. 
Hence the French wished the Bey and the Sultan to be their collaborators more than 
ever. However, on the other hand, the UNGA resolutions, which requested France and 
Tunisia to continue bilateral negotiations for self-government, or France and Morocco 
to create ‘free political institutions’,1 set a basic framework defining what international 
opinion wanted France to grant to its North African protectorates. Undoubtedly, the
1 Yearbook o f the United Nations, 1952, p.285.
232
UNGA resolutions of 1952 pressurised France to realise greater autonomy or self- 
government in both countries from this time onwards. Thus, the UNGA resolutions 
were a double-edged sword for the French. Interestingly, the reactions of the sovereigns 
of both countries differed as to which aspect of these resolutions they focussed on. The 
Bey of Tunisia, who judged that the nationalist cause did not receive frill support from 
international opinion, accepted the French municipal project in December 1952. In 
contrast, the Sultan of Morocco refused it because the UN regarded Morocco as an 
international actor who was entitled to negotiate with France. Simply put, the Bey chose 
to be a collaborator but the Sultan refused.
In any case, the French, for their part, did not change their goals in the two countries 
although the UN debates of 1952 made the French fully understand that international 
opinion wanted France to give self-government in Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, in 
Morocco. However, the French moderated their tactics in Morocco. They tried to 
persuade Mohammed V to accept their municipal project in the spring and summer of 
1953, but unlike the case in the winter of 1951-1952, they did not threaten him with 
deposition, fearing international intervention. Even so, it was also certain that the 
French made use of traditionalist pressure to push him to accept the project. Mohammed 
V’s refusal to condemn the Istiqlal had angered the traditionalist dignitaries led by el- 
Glaoui. This conflict was extremely serious because el-Glaoui was a very important 
supporter for the French presence, but the problem for the French was that the Pasha of 
Marrakech could not be a legitimate collaborator, since he did not represent the whole 
country. The French decided on the Sultan’s deposition in August 1953 in order to 
avoid a civil war or a deposition by el-Glaoui, and succeeded in doing so. The French 
were afraid that their authority in Morocco would have been seriously damaged if either 
event had occurred. However, the deposition also illustrated the French optimism that 
they could implement their meaningless reform under the new Sultan Arafa, whom they 
hoped would be able to obtain acquiescence, if not support, from the people. This 
incident not only outraged Arab countries but was also to affect later developments in 
Morocco significantly. Mohammed V became so popular as a political martyr for the 
nationalist cause among the Moroccan people that from August 1953 onwards, no 
Moroccan nationalist movements would be able to develop independent of him. Arafa 
was certainly a French collaborator but was never regarded as a legitimate Sultan by the 
Moroccan people and therefore could not be a viable collaborator.
Indeed, the problem of how to secure collaborators who accepted French control or 
influence was becoming an even bigger concern for French policy towards North Africa,
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and it was this concern which finally obliged the French government to approve of the 
nationalist requests in Tunisia. Existing research tends to assume that nationalist 
pressures or terrorist activities forced the French government to accept internal 
autonomy or argues that Mendds-France’s coming to office changed French policy in 
the summer of 1954. Some research also points out that the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu made 
French leaders and opinion understand the strength of Third-World nationalism. This 
thesis agrees that nationalist pressure worked significantly, but argues that an important 
point was that Bourguiba’s attack was primarily against the Bey’s authority, not against 
French authority per se. It was Bourguiba’s campaign against the Bey, which was the 
first case of the former openly attacking the latter, that played a crucial role in changing 
French policy. The Bey had so far legitimised French policy by appointing those whom 
France had favoured as Tunisian prime ministers. However, his acceptance of the 
French plan in March 1954 to set up a Tunisian national assembly angered the 
nationalists, Bourguiba in particular, because this act was considered a betrayal of the 
nationalist cause. It soon turned out that Bourguiba’s campaign was having a 
remarkable effect. Once the Bey had lost his popularity and authority, Tunisia witnessed 
an extraordinary situation in which no Tunisians were willing to succeed Mzali as prime 
minister, following his resignation in mid-June 1954. Since the French publicly 
committed themselves to the idea of internal autonomy, it was politically impossible for 
a French national to be appointed as a Tunisian prime minister. Simply put, at this 
moment France lost its collaborator and found itself obliged to discover new 
collaborators. Needless to say, it was the Neo-Destour party and the Tunisian people in 
general terms, who were chosen as new collaborators. Bourguiba’s anti-Bey campaign 
that ‘la 16gitimit6 n’est pas l’apanage du Bey, mais plutot du peuple « source de tout 
pouvoir »’ was especially effective in destroying the Bey’s authority, and the French 
government accepted the outline of this idea when Mendds-France made the Carthage 
declaration in July 1954. France had kept ignoring the nationalist requests until the 
summer of 1954 and it was not until it lost its collaborators that France made 
substantive concessions to them. The Fellagha’s activities also greatly contributed to the 
collapse of the Bey’s authority, but this militant group could not be a collaborator to 
whom France transferred power or an actor to win the people’s political support. The 
psychological shock caused by the fall of Dien-Bien-Phu could have played a role in the 
French decision, but merely added momentum to the above process.
There is no doubt that Mendes-France played a key role in this dramatic change of 
course, as previous research has argued. However, it is important to note that French
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archives suggest that the Quai d’Orsay had already began examining the desirability of 
negotiating with the Neo-Destour on 17 June 1954. This was one day after Mzali’s 
resignation and one day before Mend&s-France was elected as a prime minister by the 
French National Assembly. There had been no room for negotiation with the nationalist 
party as long as the French refused to abandon the principe de co-souverainete, so the 
French inclination to talk with the nationalist party represented a drastic change of 
policy. Mendes-France’s decision to grant internal autonomy to Tunisia and to 
terminate the Convention of Marsa was certainly a bold decision but a logical extension 
of this change of policy.
As argued in Chapter 5, the French decision on Tunisia’s internal autonomy did not 
mean that French influence would be terminated in Tunisia but was intended to allow its 
continuation in another way. What the French now recognised was the people’s 
responsibility for domestic affairs. Yet this decision was remarkable in the context of 
North Africa and the French Union as a whole. The French now became determined to 
grant internal autonomy to Morocco as well, once Franco-Tunisian negotiations on the 
content of the internal autonomy that Tunisia would enjoy had been concluded. Even 
the Bey, who had enjoyed popular support to a certain extent, lost popularity due to the 
nationalist attack. It was obvious that the French could no longer implement their false 
reform under the authority of Arafa, whose legitimacy was in question. Yet, internal 
autonomy was incompatible with the sprit of the French Union, although Tunisia was 
still regarded as a possible future member of the Union. The French considered that they 
would be able to gloss over this gap between the French Union and the real meaning of 
internal autonomy if Tunisia was not given a right to foreign relations and defence in a 
reorganised Union. This was why the French government refused to give these rights 
and conceded the Tunisian demand for Bourguiba’s return to Tunisia when they 
concluded the Franco-Tunisian Conventions in June 1955. Importantly, international 
opinion did not require France to give full independence to its overseas territories, so 
the French position did not arouse serious opposition in the UN.
As noted in Chapter 6, the French government decided in June 1955 to grant Morocco 
internal autonomy equivalent to that which Tunisia had obtained through the 
Conventions. However, unlike Tunisia, the French were faced with a problem: there 
was no single dominant group or individual to whom France could transfer power, and 
this was the reason why they decided to form the Throne Council. The nationalist 
parties including the Istiqlal held a much weaker position than the Neo-Destour, so it 
was impossible to form a Moroccan government which exclusively consisted of the
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nationalists, even though the French government fully understood the importance of 
collaborating with them. Furthermore, a far more serious problem for the French was 
that the nationalists refused to concede any reform plan as long as Arafa stayed on the 
throne, so Paris was confronted with a choice as to whether to abandon Arafa, and 
ultimately el-Glaoui, as supporters of the French presence. Realising that el-Glaoui’s 
influence was already on the decline because of nationalist activities, Paris finally 
decided to abandon el-Glaoui in early August 1955. It was the US warning that it would 
vote for Moroccan debates in the UNGA session, due to be held in late September 1955, 
that forced the French to take the decision. The Faure plan of August 1955 clearly 
showed that Paris preferred collaboration with the nationalists, especially the Istiqlal. 
Paris therefore tried to impress on the Moroccan people that France relied on the 
nationalists in establishing a new regime by holding the Aix-les-Bains meeting. The 
French considered it essential to secure Mohammed V’s involvement in establishing a 
government, but did not want to rely on his personal authority and popularity because 
collaboration with the nationalists was considered more dependable and long-lasting 
than that with Mohammed V. Then the French decided to set up the Throne Council 
composed of three people, representing three major shades of Moroccan opinion: the 
radical nationalists like the Istiqlal, the moderate nationalists like Bekkai and the 
traditionalists like el-Glaoui. At the Aix-les-Bains meeting in late August 1955, these 
groups agreed with the French to establish a regime which would enjoy internal 
autonomy, and the French assumed that these groups would constitute suitable 
collaborators.
However, the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia at the end of September 
1955 immensely radicalised some Istiqlal members like el-Fassi, who now started 
opposing the Aix-les-Bains agreements and advocating their abrogation. Moreover, he 
publicly supported the Rif rebellion, which broke out at the beginning of October 1955. 
This not only put the prospect of setting up a new regime in question but also 
undermined the traditionalists’ authority. Moroccan opinion was becoming seriously 
polarised.
This situation led el-Glaoui to accept Mohammed V’s restoration and the country’s 
independence in late October 1955. Realising the traditionalist dignitaries’ strength was 
declining because of the rise of nationalism and feeling abandoned by France, el-Glaoui 
decided to accept the return of the ex-Sultan, who himself was at the top of the 
traditional Muslim hierarchy, aiming to limit any further reduction of traditionalist force. 
However, as a result of el-Glaoui’s acceptance, the Istiqlal party as a whole, not only its
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pro-Egyptian faction under el-Fassi’s initiative, raised its demands later in October 1955, 
requesting the abrogation of the Aix-les-Bains agreements and the Treaty of Fez.
At the end of October 1955, Paris decided to accept not only the ex-Sultan’s 
restoration but also Morocco’s independent status, but without accepting the abrogation 
of the Treaty of Fez. Without his restoration, the French considered, Morocco’s unity 
could have been in danger and the country would have been on the verge of civil war. 
They saw Mohammed V as capable of securing unity both because he himself was at 
the top of traditional Muslim hierarchy and because he was a symbol of moderate 
Moroccan nationalism. It was el-Glaoui’s change of heart which led the French to see 
advantages in greater collaboration with the moderate nationalists now unified through 
traditional authority. However, the ex-Sultan’s restoration alone was not considered 
sufficient to stop the country’s collapse. The French judged it essential to promise 
publicly that France would give Morocco an independent status, because otherwise he 
would not be equipped with authority enough to obtain support from the nationalists. 
Nevertheless, this did not mean that France agreed to abrogate the Treaty and grant the 
Moroccans the rights to foreign affairs and defence. The French believed that they could 
tide over the emergency without terminating the Treaty. Importantly, it was Mohammed 
V that the French chose as a collaborator in November 1955, and the Istiqlal was not 
regarded as a collaborator. This was because el-Fassi remained a political dissident and 
the Istiqlal did not expel him. Unlike the Neo-Destour which was a moderate but 
dominant force in Tunisia, the Istiqlal leaders considered the party in Morocco too weak 
to split by expelling its more radical members. Consequently, the Istiqlal as a whole 
remained a dissident and diverse group. This is the reason why, through a vague 
promise of independence,2 the French endeavoured to strengthen Mohammed V’s 
authority and co-opt the party into the Moroccan regime established under his authority.
However, at the end of November 1955 the French government finally accepted the 
abrogation of the Treaty of Fez, i.e. the termination of Morocco’s protectorate status. 
This was because the Istiqlal kept refusing to join a new government unless France 
agreed to the abrogation of the Treaty. Since the formation of a government was 
impossible without the party’s participation, the Sultan agreed to endorse its position, 
and the French had no alternative but to accept this, because otherwise Mohammed V’s 
authority would be seriously damaged. In the light of the persistent Rif rebellion, the 
French judged it of paramount importance to reinforce the Sultan’s authority. Thus
2 Despite the French announcement at La Celle-Saint-Cloud, probably they anticipated at this time that 
Morocco’s right to external relations would be very limited. Chapter 7, pp.178-179.
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granting Morocco independence with the right to foreign policy and defence was aimed 
at securing its political unity under the Sultan’s authority with some retention of French 
influence.
This analysis differs from the arguments in existing research, which have a tendency 
to assume that the rise of Moroccan nationalism, already with a cohesive power calling 
for independence, forced France to retreat. Actually, on the eve of the French decision 
on the country’s independence, there had been various shades of opinion and, therefore, 
no dominant nationalist force in Morocco. What the French were concerned with was 
the polarisation of Moroccan opinion which was dragging the country into a revolution 
or a civil war. The French government decided on Moroccan independence in order to 
rally support around Mohammed V, who was now regarded as the best French 
collaborator, who would cultivate a sense of community within the Moroccan people. In 
other words, by promising independence, the French aimed to retain influence through 
moderate nationalism acting as a unifying force under Mohammed V. France recognised 
Morocco’s independence, not simply because it was requested to do so by a united 
Moroccan nationalist movement which existing research claims had existed prior to the 
French decisions between August and November 1955. Rather, the French recognition 
of independence was aimed at creating such a moderate force of nationalism by 
collaborating with Mohammed V. This was the reason for France’s rather hasty 
recognition of Moroccan independence, and this process was assisted by the fact that 
France and Spain competed to win the nationalists’ favour. In fact, the French hit the 
nail right on the head, for when the Franco-Moroccan communique was announced in 
March 1956, el-Fassi stopped his support for the Rif rebellion and pledged his loyalty to 
the Sultan. This fact proved that Mohammed V had become France’s best and most 
viable collaborator.
French recognition of Morocco’s independence was soon followed by that of Tunisia. 
However, the French were unenthusiastic about recognising it because they did not 
believe they needed to strengthen Bourguiba’s authority as Tunisian opinion was much 
less divided. They finally did so because of the US decision to establish an Embassy in 
Tunis, as Chapter 8 made clear. Otherwise, the French were afraid, they would lose 
political influence in Tunisia to the Americans. The independence of both countries led 
to different consequences for each sovereign: the Bey completely lost popularity among 
the people because he was totally discredited by his acceptance of the March 1954 plan 
whereas the Sultan, who had played a leading role in calling for independence since 
October 1950, became a champion of national emancipation. This explains why Tunisia
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became a republic soon after its independence whilst Morocco remained a monarchy as 
it is today. However, to compensate for a pro-French Tunisia and Morocco, the French 
had to pay a price in the context of the French Union: now the future membership of the 
two countries became unrealistic. The two countries’ independence was a major 
deviation from the goal of post-war French policy towards its overseas territories. In 
addition, having understood the importance of creating a sense of community in each of 
their overseas territories, the French now also decided to transfer a certain degree of 
power to their territories in Africa by introducing the loi-cadre. Thus, France started to 
restructure the French Union into a less centralised type of organisation, but its attempt 
was to collapse as a result of the fall of the French Fourth Republic in 1958. Meanwhile, 
France remained unable to find a solution to the Algerian problem. Nevertheless, 
France’s recognition of the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in early 1956 was 
significant in the sense it spearheaded Britain’s granting of independence to its colonial 
areas in Africa. By changing colonial policy drastically, France was aiming to recover 
from a setback which had been caused by its reluctance to introduce self-government in 
colonial areas and, ultimately, was paving the way for an Africa of independent 
countries.
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Appendix 2: The Key Texts
Le TraitS de Bardo
Le gouvemement de la Republique ffan9aise et celui de Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis, 
voulant empecher a jamais le renouvellement des desordres qui se sont produits 
r6cemment sur les ffontieres des deux Etats et sur le littoral de la Tunisie, et desireux de 
resserrer leurs anciennes relations d’amitie et de bon voisinage, ont resolut de conclure 
une Convention k cette fin, dans l’intdret des deux Hautes Parties contractantes.
En consequence, le President de la Republique fran5aise a nomme pour son 
Pienipotentiaire M. le general Breart, qui est tombe d’accord avec Son Altesse le Bey 
sur les stipulations suivantes :
A rt. l er. Les traites de paix, d’amitie et de commerce, et toutes autres conventions 
existant actuellement entre la Republique fran5aise et son Altesse le Bey de Tunis, sont 
expressement confirmes et renouveies.
A rt. 2. En vue de faci liter au Gouvemement de la Republique franfaise 
l’accomplissement des mesures qu’il doit prendre pour atteindre le but que se proposent 
les Hautes Parties contractantes, Son Altesse le Bey de Tunis consent a ce que l’autorite 
militaire fran9 aise fasse occuper les points qu’elle jugera necessaire pour assurer le 
retablissement de l’ordre et la securite de la ffonttere et du littoral. Cette occupation 
cessera lorsque les autoritds militaires ffan9aise et tunisiennes auront reconnue, d’un 
commun accord, que 1’administration locale est en 6tat de garantir le maintien de l’ordre.
A rt. 3. Le Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise prend l’engagement de preter un 
constant appui a son Altesse le Bey de Tunis contre tout danger qui menacerait la 
personne ou la dynastie de Son Altesse ou qui compromettrait la tranquillity de ses Etats.
A rt. 4. Le Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise se porte garant de 1’execution 
des traites actuellement existants entre le Gouvemement de la Regence et les diverses 
Puissances europeennes.
A rt. 5. Le Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise sera represent^ aupres de Son 
Altesse le Bey de Tunis par un ministre resident qui veillera k 1’execution du present 
Acte et qui sera l’interrnddiaire des rapports du Gouvemement fran9ais avec les 
autorites tunisiennes pour toutes les affaires communes aux deux Pays.
Art. 6. Les Agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France en payers etrangers 
seront charges de la protection des interets tunisiens et des nationaux de la Regence.
244
En retour, Son Altesse le Bey s’engage a ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caract&re 
international sans en avoir donn6 connaissance au Gouvemement de le Republique 
fransaise et sans s’etre entendu pr6alablement avec lui.
A rt. 7. Le Gouvemement de le Republique fran5 aise et le Gouvemement de Son 
Altesse le Bey de Tunis se r^servent de fixer, d’un commun accord, les bases d’une 
organisation financiere de la Regence, qui soit de nature a assurer le service de la dette 
publique et k garantir les droits des creanciers de la Tunisie.
Art. 8. Une contribution de guerre sera imposee aux tribus insoumises de la frontiere 
et du littoral.
Une convention ulterieure en determinera le chiffre et le mode de recouvrement, dont 
le Gouvemement de Son altesse le Bey se porte responsable.
A rt. 9. Afin de proteger contre la contrebande des armes et des munitions de guerre 
les possessions algdriennes de la Republique franfaise, le Gouvemement de Son Altesse 
le Bey de Tunis s’engage k prohiber toute introduction d’armes ou de munitions de 
guerre par Pile de Derjba, le port de Gabes ou les autres ports du Sud de la Tunisie.
A rt. 10. Le present traits sera soumis a la ratification du Gouvemement de la 
Republique fran?aise et l’instrument de ratification sera soumis a Son Altesse le Bey de 
Tunis dans le plus bref deiai possible.
Casr Said, le 12 mai 1881.
Mohammedes Sadoq Bey. Gal BREART.
(Cachet du Bey)
Source: Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, vol. 158, 1881, (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1977)
La Convention de Marsa
S.A. le Bey de Tunis, prenant en consideration la ndcessite d’ameliorer la situation 
interieure de la Tunisie, dans les conditions pr£vues par le traitd du 12 mai 1881 et le 
Gouvemement de al Republique ayant a cceur de repondre a ce desir et de consolider 
ainsi les relations d’amitie heureusement existantes entre les deux pays, sont convenus 
de conclure une convention spedale a cet effet: en consequence, le President de la 
Republique framjaise a nomme pour son Pienipotentiaire, M. Pierre Paul Cambon, son 
Ministre Resident k Tunis, officier de la Legion d’Honneur,, decore de 1’HaTd et grand- 
croix du Nichan Iftikar, etc. etc., lequel, apres avoir communique ses pleins-pouvoir,
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trouves en bonne et due forme, a arrete, avec S. A. le Bey de Tunis, les dispositions 
suivante:
A rt. l er. Afin de faciliter au Gouvemement ffan5ais l’accomplissement de son 
Protectorat, S. A. le Bey de Tunis s’engage k proceder aux reformes administratives, 
judiciaires et financieres que le Gouvemement ffan9ais jugera utiles.
A rt. 2. Le Gouvemement fran9ais garantira, a l’epoque et sous les conditions que lui 
paraitront les meilleures, un empmnt k 6mettre par S. A. le Bey, pour la convention ou 
le remboursement de la dette consolidee s’elevant k la somme de 125 millions de francs 
et de la dette flottante jusqu’a concurrence d’un maximum de 17.550.000.
S. A. le Bey s’interdit de contracte, a Tavenir, aucun empmnt pour le compte de la 
Regence sans l’autorisation du Gouvemement fran9ais.
A r t  3. Sur les revenus de la Regence, S. A. le Bey pr61Svera: 1° les sommes 
necessaires pour assurer le service de l’emprunt garanti par la France ; 2° la somme de 
deux millions de piastres (1.200. mille fr.), montant de sa liste civile, le surplus des 
revenus devant etre affecte aux ddpenses d’administration de la Regence et au 
remboursement des charges du Protectorat.
Art. 4. Le present arrangement confirme et complete, en tant que de besoin, le traite 
du 12 mai 1881. il ne modifiera pas les dispositions precedemment intervenues pour le 
r^glement des contributions de guerre.
A rt. 5. La present convention sera soumise a la ratification du Gouvemement de la 
Republique fran9ais et l’instmment de ladite ratification sera remis a S. A. le Bey de 
Tunis dans le plus bref deiai possible.
En foi de quoi, les Soussignes ont dresse le present acte et Font revetu de leurs cachet.
Fait k la Marsa, le 8 juin 1883.
Mohammedes Sadog Bey. (L. S.) Cambon.
(Cachat du Bey)
Source: Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, vol. 162, 1883, (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1978)
Le Traite de Fes
Le Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise et le Gouvemement de Sa Majeste 
cherifienne, soucieux d’etablir au Maroc un regime regulier, fonde sur Pordre interieur
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et la securite generate, qui permette 1’introduction des reformes et assure le 
d£veloppement economique du pays, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :
A rt. I. Le Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise et Sa Majesty le Sultan sont 
d’accord pour instituer au Maroc un nouveau regime comportant les reformes 
administratives, judiciaires, scolaires, economiques, financieres, et militaires que le 
Gouvemement fran9ais jugera utile d’introduire sur le territoire marocain.
Ce regime sauvegardera la situation religieuse, le respect et le prestige traditionnel du 
Sultan, l’exercice de la religion musulmane et des institutions religieuses, notamment de 
celles des Habous. II comportera l’organisation d’un Makhzen cherifien reforme.
Le Gouvemement de la Republique se concertera avec le Gouvemement espagnol au 
sujet des interets que ce Gouvemement tient de sa position geographique et de ses 
possessions territoriales sur la cote marocaine.
De meme, la ville de Tanger gardera le caractdre special qui lui a €t€ reconnu et qui 
ddterminera son organisation municipale.
A rt. II. Sa Majeste le Sultan admet des maintenant que le Gouvemement fran9ais 
procede, apres avoir prevenu le Makhzen, aux occupations militaires du territoire 
marocain qu’il jugerait n6cessaires au maintien de l’ordre et de la securite des 
transactions commerciales et k ce qu’il exerce tout action de police sur terre et dans les 
eaux marocaines.
A rt. III. Le Gouvemement de la Republique prend l’engagement de preter un 
constant appui k Sa Majeste cherifienne contre tout danger qui menacerait sa personne 
ou son trone ou qui compromettrait la tranquillite de ses Etats. Le meme appui sera 
prete a l’heritier du tr6ne et a ses successeurs.
A rt. IV. les mesures que necessitera le nouveau regime de protectorat seront 
edictees, sur la proposition du Gouvemement fran9ais, par Sa Majeste cherifienne ou 
par les autorite auxquelles elle en aura deiegue le pouvoir. II en sera de meme des 
rdglements nouveaux et des modifications aux reglements existants.
A rt. V. Le Gouvemement fran9ais sera represente aupres de Sa Majeste cherifienne 
par un Commissaire Resident general, depositaire de tous les pouvoirs de la Republique 
au Maroc, qui veillera a Pexecution du present accord.
Le Commissaire Resident general sera le seul intermediaire du Sultan auprds des 
repmsentants etrangers et dans les rapports que ces representants entretiennent avec le 
Gouvemement marocain. II sera, notamment, charge de toutes les questions interessant 
les etrangers dans l’Empire cherifien.
II aura le pouvoir d’approuver et de promulguer, au nom du Gouvemement fran9ais,
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tous les d6crets rendus par Sa Majesty cherifienne.
A rt. VI. Les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de la France seront charges de la 
representation et de la protection des sujets et des interets marocains k F Stranger.
Sa Majeste le Sultan s’engage a ne conclure aucun acte ayant un caractere 
international sans l’assentiment prealable du Gouvemement de la Republique fran9aise.
A rt. VIII. Sa Majeste cherifienne s’interdit de contracter k Favenir, directement ou 
indirectement, aucun empmnt public ou prive et d’accorder, sous une forme 
quelconque, aucune concession sans l’autorisation du Le Gouvemement fran9ais.
A rt. IX. La presente Convention sera soumise a la ratification du Gouvemement de 
la Republique fran9aise et l’instmment de ladite ratification sera remis k Sa Majeste le 
Sultan dans le plus bref deiai possible.
En foi de quoi les soussignes ont dresse le present acte et Font revetu de leurs cachets. 
Fait a Fez, le 30 mars, 1912.
(L.S.) REGNAULT.
(L.S.) MOULAYABD-EL-HAFID.
Source: Clive Parry, ed., The Consolidated Treaty Series, vol.216, 1912, (New York: 
Oceana Publications, 1980)
Constitution de la IVeme Republique, Texte complet adopte le du 27 octobre 1946
Preambule
Au lendemain de la victoire remportee par les peuples fibres sur les regimes qui ont 
tente d'asservir et de degrader la personne humaine, le peuple fran9ais proclame k 
nouveau que tout etre humain, sans distinction de race, de religion ni de croyance, 
possede des droits inalienables et sacres.
II reaffirme solennellement les droits et les libertes de l'homme et du citoyen 
consacres par la Declaration des droits de 1789 et les principes fondamentaux reconnus 
par les lois de la Republique.
II proclame, en outre, comme particulierement necessaires k notre temps, les 
principes politiques, economiques et sociaux ci-apres :
La loi garantit k la femme, dans tous les domaines des droits egaux k ceux de 
l'homme.
Tout homme persecute en raison de son action en faveur de la liberte a droit d'asile sur 
les territoires de la Republique.
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Chacun a le devoir de travailler et le droit d'obtenir un emploi. Nul ne peut etre lese, 
dans son travail ou son emploi, en raison de ses origines, de ses opinions ou de ses 
croyances.
Tout homme peut d6fendre ses droits et ses interets par Taction syndicale et adherer 
au syndicat de son choix.
Le droit de grdve s'exerce dans le cadre des lois qui le rdglementent. 
Tout travailleur participe, par l'intermediaire de ses d616gu6s, k la determination 
collective des conditions de travail ainsi qu'a la gestion des entreprises. 
Tout bien, toute entreprise, dont l’exploitation a ou acquiert les caracteres d'un service 
public national ou d'un monopole de fait doit devenir la propriety de la collectivity. 
La nation assure a l'individu et a la famille les conditions n£cessaires a leur 
ddveloppement.
Elle garantit a tous, notamment k l'enfant, a la m£re et aux vieux travailleurs, la 
protection de la santd, la sdcurite materielle, le repos et les loisirs. Tout etre humain qui, 
en raison de son &ge, de son etat physique ou mental, de la situation dconomique, se 
trouve dans l'incapacitd de travailler a le droit d'obtenir de la collectivity des moyens 
convenables d'existence.
La nation proclame la solidarity et l'ygalite de tous les Franfais devant les charges qui 
rysultent des calamitys nationales.
La nation garantit l'ygal accys de l'enfant et de l'adulte k l'instruction, k la formation 
professionnelle et k la culture. L'organisation de l'enseignement public gratuit et laique a 
tous les degrys est un devoir de l'Etat.
La Rypublique fran5aise, fidyle a ses traditions, se conforme aux regies du droit 
public international. Elle n'entreprendra aucune guerre dans des vues de conquete et 
n'emploiera jamais ses forces contre la liberte d'aucun peuple.
Sous ryserve de rydprocite, la France consent aux limitations de souverainete 
nycessaires a l'organisation et a la dyfense de la paix.
La France forme avec les peuples d'outre-mer une Union fondye sur l'ygality des 
droits et des devoirs, sans distinction de race ni de religion.
L'Union fran^aise est composee de nations et de peuples qui mettent en commun ou 
coordonnent leurs ressources et leurs efforts pour dyvelopper leurs civilisations 
respectives, accroitre leur bien-etre et assurer leur sycurity.
Fidele a sa mission traditionnelle, la France entend conduire les peuples dont elle a 
pris la charge a la liberte de s'administrer eux-memes et de gyrer dymocratiquement 
leurs propres affaires ; ecartant tout systeme de colonisation fondy sur l'arbitraire, elle
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garantit k tous l'egal acces aux fonctions publiques et l'exercice individuel ou collectif 
des droits et libertes proclames ou confirmes ci-dessus.
Source : http://www.insecula.com/article/FOO 10328.html. accessed on 11 October 2005
Titre V III: de l’Union Francaise 
Section I : Principes 
Article 60
L'Union fran9aise est formee, d'une part, de la Republique fran9aise qui comprend la 
France metropolitaine, les departements et territoires d'outre-mer, d'autre part, des 
territoires et Etats associes.
Article 61
La situation des Etats associes dans l'Union fran9aise rdsulte pour chacun d'eux de l'acte 
qui deflnit ses rapports avec la France.
Article 62
Les membres de l’Union fran9aise mettent en commun la totality de leurs moyens pour 
garantir la defense de l'ensemble de l'Union. Le gouvemement de la Republique assume 
la coordination de ces moyens et la direction de la politique propre k preparer et k 
assurer cette defense.
Section I I : Organisation 
Article 63
Les organes centraux de l'Union fran9aise sont la pr6sidence, le haut Conseil et 
l'Assembl£e.
Article 64
Le president de la Republique fran9aise est president de l'Union fran9aise, dont il 
repr6sente les interets permanents.
Article 65
Le haut Conseil de l'Union fran9aise est compost, sous la pr6sidence du president de 
l'Union, d'une delegation du gouvemement fran9ais et de la representation que chacun 
des Etats associes a la faculte de designer aupres du president de l'Union. 
II a pour fonction d'assister le gouvemement dans la conduite gdnerale de l'Union. 
Article 66
L'Assemblee de l'Union fran9aise est composee, par moitid, de membres representant la 
France metropolitaine et, par moitie, de membres representant les departements et
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territoires d'outre-mer et les Etats associes. Une loi organique determinera dans quelles 
conditions pourront etre representees les diverses parties de la population. 
Article 67
Les membres de l'Assemblie de l'Union sont ilus par les Assemblies territoriales en ce 
qui conceme les dipartements et les territoires d'outre-mer, ils sont ilus, en ce qui 
conceme la France metropolitaine, k raison des deux tiers par les membres de 
l'Assemblie nationale reprisentant la mitropole et d'un tiers par les membres du Conseil 
de la Republique representant la mitropole.
Article 68
Les Etats associes peuvent disigner les d iliguis a l'Assemblie de l'Union dans les 
limites et les conditions fixies par une loi et un acte intirieur de chaque Etat. 
Article 69
Le prisident de l'Union fran5aise convoque l'Assemblie de l'Union fran?aise et en clot 
les sessions. II doit la convoquer a la demande de la moitii de ses membres. 
L'Assemblie de l'Union fran9aise ne peut siiger pendant les interruptions de session du 
Parlement.
Article 70
Les rigles des articles 8, 10, 21, 22 et 23 sont applicables h l'Assemblie de l'Union 
fran9aise dans les memes conditions qu'au Conseil de la Ripublique.
Article 71
L'Assemblie de l'Union fran9aise connait des projets ou propositions qui lui sont 
soumis pour avis par l'Assemblie nationale ou le gouvemement de la Ripublique 
fran9aise ou les gouvemements des Etats associis. L'Assemblie a qualiti pour se 
prononcer sur les propositions de risolution qui lui sont prisenties par l'un de ses 
membres et, si elle les prend en considiration, pour charger son bureau de les 
transmettre a l'Assemblie nationale. Elle peut faire des propositions au gouvemement 
fran9ais et au haut Conseil de l'Union fran9 aise. Pour etre recevables, les propositions 
de risolution visies k l'alinia pricident doivent avoir trait a la ligislation relative aux 
territoires d'outre-mer.
Article 72
Dans les territoires d'outre-mer, le pouvoir ligislatif appartient au Parlement en ce qui 
conceme la ligislation criminelle, le rigime des libertis publiques et l'organisation 
politique et administrative.
En toutes autres matiires, la loi fran9aise n'est applicable dans les territoires d'outre-mer 
que par disposition expresse ou si elle a i t i  itendue par dicret aux territoires d'outre-
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mer apris avis de l'Assemblie de l'Union. En outre, par dirogation a l'article 13, des 
dispositions particuliires a chaque territoire pourront etre idicties par le prisident de la 
Ripublique en Conseil des ministres sur avis prialable de l'Assemblie de l'Union.
Section I I I : Des departements et des territoires d'outre-mer 
Article 73
Le rigime ligislatif des dipartements d'outre-mer est le meme que celui des 
dipartements mitropolitains, sauf exceptions diterminies par la loi.
Article 74
Les territoires d'outre-mer sont dotis d'un statut particulier tenant compte de leurs 
intirets propres dans l'ensemble des intirets de la Ripublique. Ce statut et l'organisation 
intirieure de chaque territoire d'outre-mer ou de chaque groupe de territoires sont fixis 
par la loi, apris avis de l'Assemblie de l'Union fran9aise et consultation des Assemblies 
territoriales.
Article 75
Les statuts respectifs des membres de la Ripublique et de l'Union fran5aise sont 
susceptibles devolution. Les modifications de statut et les passages d'une catigorie a 
l'autre, dans le cadre fixi par l'article 60, ne peuvent risulter que d'une loi votie par le 
Parlement, apris consultation des Assemblies territoriales et de l'Assemblie de l'Union. 
Article 76
Le reprisentant du gouvemement dans chaque territoire ou groupe de territoires est le 
dipositaire des pouvoirs de la Ripublique. II est chef de l'administration du territoire. II 
est responsable de ses actes devant le gouvemement.
Article 77
Dans chaque territoire est instituie une Assemblie ilue. Le rigime ilectoral, la 
composition et la compitence de cette Assemblie sont diterminis par la loi.
Article 78
Dans les groupes de territoires, la gestion des intirets communs est confiie k une 
Assemblie composie de membres ilus par les Assemblies territoriales. Sa composition 
et ses pouvoirs sont fixis par la loi.
Article 79
Les territoires d'outre-mer ilisent des reprisentants k l'Assemblie nationale et au 
Conseil de la Ripublique dans les conditions privues par la loi.
Article 80
Tous les ressortissants des territoires d'outre-mer ont la qualiti de citoyen, au meme titre
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que les nationaux fran9ais de la mitropole ou des territoires d'outre-mer. Des lois 
particulidres 6tabliront les conditions dans lesquelles ils exercent leurs droits de citoyen. 
Article 81
Tous les nationaux fran9ais et les ressortissants de l'Union fran9aise ont la quality de 
citoyen de l'Union fran9aise qui leur assure la jouissance des droits et libertes garantis 
par le prdambule de la presente Constitution.
Article 82
Les citoyens qui n'ont pas le statut civil fran9ais conservent leur statut personnel tant 
qu'ils n'y ont pas renoncd. Ce statut ne peut en aucun cas constituer un motif pour 
refuser ou limiter les droits et libertes attaches a la quality de citoyen fran9ais.
Source: http://www.insecula.com/article/F0010328 nage9.html. accessed on 11 October 
2005
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